Elements of Theology

 as one subsisting, but according to participation not one, the one will be multiplied, just as the multiplicity is unified through the one. Therefore

 activity is better than that which is not self-sufficient but has the cause of its perfection dependent on another substance. For if all beings by nat

 it desires that also, how most of all the good? or if it does not desire, how does it not desire the cause of all things, having proceeded from it? Bu

 is itself, and the mover and the moved are one and the same. For either it moves in one part and is moved in another part, or as a whole it moves and

 beginning from a monad, it proceeds into a multitude coordinate with the monad, and the multitude of every order is led back to one monad. For the mon

 the one being divided. But if it is in one of all things, it will no longer be of all things, but of one. If, therefore, it is both common to those ab

 the thing produced is other than it. Therefore, that which begets is established as unchangeable and undiminished, multiplying itself through a genera

 from something and reverting has a cyclical activity. For if it reverts to that from which it proceeds, it joins the end to the beginning, and the mot

 procession. For since each occurs through likeness, that which has proceeded immediately from something has also reverted immediately to it (for the l

 has reverted to itself according to nature and is perfect in its reversion to itself, and would have its being from itself for that to which the reve

 the self-subsistent is set apart from things measured by time in respect to its substance. For if the self-subsistent is ungenerated, it would not be

 having received the power to produce from the cause which is superior to it, it has from that cause its being the cause of those things of which it is

 Thus the producer in relation to the produced, taken in relation to each other, but that which is able to do more has a greater and more universal pow

 a cause has pre-contained in itself the effect, being primarily what that is secondarily or in the thing produced the producer (for this too, partici

 suffers from the former) and when the second in turn acts, that also co-acts, because whatever the second does, the more causal also co-begets with i

 being, or needing it somehow in order to be, would be in this respect more imperfect than the effect. But that which is in the result is a co-cause ra

 passible, being in every way divisible, and in every way to infinity. But the incorporeal, being simple, is impassible for the indivisible can neithe

 undiminished it contains in itself. But surely infinity in respect to magnitude and in respect to multitude is a complete privation and a falling away

 set apart and if all things enter into it, yet it has something hidden and incomprehensible to secondary things and if it unfolds the powers within

 but nowhere for thus it would be divided and separate from itself, if indeed one part of it is everywhere and in all things, but the other part nowhe

 all things. For since each thing exists either according to cause or according to existence or according to participation, in the first the rest exist

 a turning back as if through similars, dissimilar <being>. For the one is similar as a particular to a particular, the other is kindred as being of th

 a hypostasis but no longer a henad, it would be assigned to another order on account of the alteration of its property. 115 Every god is supra-essenti

 supra-essential, being nothing other than the one for each is not one thing, and then good, but only good, just as it is not one thing, and then one,

 is and in beings has the power of apprehending truth (for it both grasps thoughts and has its subsistence in acts of intellection) but the gods are b

 having set the same before itself, is most self-sufficient and such is all that is divine. Therefore it needs neither other things, being goodness-it

 is more unified than beings. All divine genera, therefore, are bound together by their proper intermediaries, and the first do not proceed immediately

 of a henad working, with which it is connate. This, then, is that which in itself defines the being that partakes of it and shows essentially the supr

 to the gods so that, while they are present to all things in the same way, all things are not present to them in the same way, but as each is able, i

 For the one, having a most unitive power, sends itself through the entire union and unifies all from above, while remaining in itself. But the mean, s

 proceeds from the infinity of the divine power, multiplying itself and passing through all things, and pre-eminently demonstrating the unfailing in th

 presides over composites and of their order and of their division according to number, and is of the same series as the paternal in more partial produ

 they have intelligible [qualities]. In the same way, therefore, that those, by illuminating Being, are intelligible, so also these, by illuminating th

 and sees itself. But seeing that it is thinking and seeing, it knows that it is Intellect in actuality and knowing this, it knows that it thinks, and

 Therefore it has the causes of all things intellectually. So that every intellect is all things intellectually, both the things before it and the thin

 more akin, contracted in quantity, in power surpasses the things after it and conversely the things further from the one. Therefore, those that are h

 on the one hand, but being only intellectual, is participated by souls that are neither divine nor come to be in a state of change from intellect to u

 by its very being, if the participant is suitable, it immediately becomes ensouled and living, not by the soul reasoning and choosing, nor giving life

 and to the soul that substantiates the essential principles of all things in it for everything that produces by its being, which it is primarily, thi

 of the motions it will also have restorations for every period of the eternal things is restorative. 200 Every period of a soul is measured by time

 the relation to the secondary ones, which the divine has to the intellectual, and this to the psychical and the quantities of the lower ones are grea

 it admits of every kind of change, being moved together with their own ruling causes. But indeed that it is also indivisible, is clear. For everything

of the motions it will also have restorations; for every period of the eternal things is restorative. 200 Every period of a soul is measured by time; but the period of the other souls is measured by some particular time, while that of the first soul to be measured by time is measured by the whole of time. For if all motions have a 'before' and 'after', then so too do the periods; and for this reason they participate in time, and that which measures all the periods of souls is time. But if the periods of all were the same and concerned with the same things, the time of all would also be the same; but if the restorations of different souls are different, the periodic and restorative time of different souls is also different. That the soul which is primarily measured by time is measured by the whole of time, is therefore clear. For if time is the measure of all motion, that which is primarily moved will be a participant in all of time and measured by all of it; for unless the whole of time measures that which primarily participates in it, it will not measure anything else at all with its whole self. And that all other souls are measured by certain more partial measures of the whole of time, is evident from these things. For if they are more partial than the soul which primarily participates in time, they will not fit their own periods to the whole of time, but their many restorations will be parts of the one period and restoration which the soul that primarily participates in time brings to completion; for of the lesser power the participation is more partial, and of the greater, more universal. Therefore, the other souls are not by nature able to receive the whole temporal measure in one life, having been allotted a station subordinate to that of the soul primarily measured by time. 201 All divine souls have triple activities: some as souls, some as having received a divine Intellect, and some as being dependent on the gods; and they exercise providence over the wholes as gods, they know all things according to the intellectual life, and they move the bodies according to their self-moved existence. For because they participate connaturally in the superior principles and are not simply souls but divine souls, having set forth in the psychic latitude a station analogous to the gods, they act not only psychically but also divinely, having been allotted the summit of their own substance as divinely inspired. And because they have an intellectual hypostasis, by which they happen to be subordinated to the intellectual substances, they act therefore not only divinely but also intellectually, having established one activity according to the one in them, and the other according to the Intellect. And a third activity is present to them according to their own existence, being motive of things naturally moved by another, and life-giving to things which have their life from an external source; for this is the proper activity of every soul, while the others are by participation, such as to think and to exercise providence. 202 All souls which are attendants of the gods and always follow the gods are inferior to the divine souls, but have been raised above the partial souls. For the divine souls participate both in Intellect and in divinity (wherefore they are at once intellectual and divine) and they rule over the other souls, inasmuch as the gods rule over all beings; but the partial souls have been deprived of the suspension from Intellect, being unable to participate immediately in the intellectual substance; for they would not fall away from the intellectual activity if they participated in Intellect according to their substance, as has been shown before. Intermediate, therefore, are the souls that always follow the gods, having received a perfect Intellect and in this respect surpassing the partial souls, but no longer being dependent on the divine henads; for the Intellect participated in by them was not divine. 203 Of the entire psychic multitude, the divine souls, being greater in power than the others, are contracted in number; while those which always follow them hold an intermediate rank among them all both in power and in quantity; and the partial souls are inferior to the others in power, but have proceeded into a greater number. For the first are more akin to the One on account of their existence being divine, the middle ones on account of their participation in Intellect, and the last according to their rank, being dissimilar in substance both to the middle and to the first. And in eternal things, those nearer to the One are more unified in number and contracted in multitude than those further away, while those further away are more multiplied. And so the powers of the higher are greater, and they have this

τῶν κινήσεων ἕξει καὶ ἀποκαταστάσεις· πᾶσα γὰρ περίοδος τῶν ἀϊδίων ἀποκαταστατική ἐστιν. 200 Πᾶσα ψυχῆς περίοδος χρόνῳ μετρεῖται· ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ψυχῶν περίοδος τινὶ χρόνῳ μετρεῖται, ἡ δὲ τῆς πρώτης ὑπὸ χρόνου μετρουμένης τῷ σύμπαντι χρόνῳ. εἰ γὰρ καὶ πᾶσαι αἱ κινήσεις τὸ πρότερον ἔχουσι καὶ ὕστερον, καὶ αἱ περίοδοι ἄρα· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο χρόνου μετέχουσι, καὶ τὸ μετροῦν ἁπάσας τὰς περιόδους τῶν ψυχῶν χρόνος ἐστίν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν αἱ αὐταὶ πασῶν ἦσαν περίοδοι καὶ περὶ τὰ αὐτά, καὶ χρό νος ἂν ἦν πασῶν ὁ αὐτός· εἰ δὲ ἄλλαι ἄλλων ἀποκαταστάσεις, καὶ χρόνος περιοδικὸς ἄλλος ἄλλων καὶ ἀποκαταστατικός. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ πρώτως ὑπὸ χρόνου μετρουμένη ψυχὴ τῷ σύμπαντι χρόνῳ μετρεῖται, δῆλον. εἰ γὰρ μέτρον ὁ χρόνος κινήσεως ἁπάσης, τὸ πρώτως κινούμενον ἔσται παντὸς τοῦ χρόνου μετέχον καὶ ὑπὸ παντὸς μεμετρημένον· μὴ γὰρ τὸ πρώτως μετέχον μετρήσας ὁ σύμπας χρόνος οὐδὲ ἄλλο μετρήσει καθ' ὅλον ἑαυτὸν οὐδέν. ὅτι δὲ καὶ πᾶσαι αἱ ἄλλαι ψυχαὶ μερικωτέροις τοῦ σύμπαντος χρόνου μετροῦνταί τισι μέτροις, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων. εἰ γὰρ μερικώτεραι τῆς ψυχῆς εἰσι τῆς πρώτως χρόνου μετεχούσης, οὐδὲ χρόνῳ τῷ σύμπαντι τὰς ἑαυτῶν ἐφαρμόσουσι περιόδους, ἀλλ' αἱ πολλαὶ αὐτῶν ἀποκαταστάσεις μέρη ἔσονται μιᾶς περιόδου καὶ ἀποκαταστάσεως, ἣν ἡ χρόνου μετέχουσα πρώτως ἀποκαθίσταται· τῆς γὰρ ἐλάττονος δυνάμεως ἡ μερικωτέρα μέθεξις, τῆς δὲ μείζονος ἡ ὁλικωτέρα. ὅλον οὖν τὸ χρο νικὸν μέτρον κατὰ μίαν ζωὴν αἱ ἄλλαι ψυχαὶ δέχεσθαι οὐ πεφύκασι, τῆς πρώτως <ὑπὸ> χρόνου μετρουμένης ὑφειμένην λαχοῦσαι τάξιν. 201 Πᾶσαι αἱ θεῖαι ψυχαὶ τριπλᾶς ἔχουσιν ἐνεργείας, τὰς μὲν ὡς ψυχαί, τὰς δὲ ὡς νοῦν ὑποδεξάμεναι θεῖον, τὰς δὲ ὡς θεῶν ἐξηρτημέναι· καὶ προνοοῦσι μὲν τῶν ὅλων ὡς θεοί, γινώ σκουσι δὲ τὰ πάντα κατὰ τὴν νοερὰν ζωήν, κινοῦσι δὲ τὰ σώματα κατὰ τὴν αὐτοκίνητον ὕπαρξιν. διότι γὰρ συμφυῶς μετέχουσι τῶν ὑπερκειμένων καί εἰσιν οὐ ψυχαὶ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ θεῖαι ψυχαί, τὴν ἀνάλογον τοῖς θεοῖς ἐν τῷ ψυχικῷ πλάτει προστησάμεναι τάξιν, ἐνεργοῦσιν οὐ ψυχι κῶς μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ θείως, τὴν ἀκρότητα τῆς ἑαυτῶν οὐσίας ἔνθεον λαχοῦσαι. καὶ διότι νοερὰν ὑπόστασιν ἔχουσι, δι' ἣν καὶ ὑπεστρωμέναι ταῖς νοεραῖς οὐσίαις τυγχάνουσιν, ἐνεργοῦσιν οὖν οὐ θείως μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ νοερῶς, τὴν μὲν κατὰ τὸ ἓν τὸ ἐν αὐταῖς, τὴν δὲ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν ἱδρύσασαι ἐνέργειαν. τρίτη δὲ αὐταῖς πάρεστιν ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν ὕπαρξιν ἐνέργεια, κινητικὴ μὲν ὑπάρχουσα τῶν φύσει ἑτεροκινήτων, ζωοποιὸς δὲ τῶν ἐπείσακτον ἐχόντων τὴν ζωήν· πάσης γὰρ ψυχῆς τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ ἴδιον ἐνέργημα, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα κατὰ μέθεξιν, ὡς τὸ νοεῖν καὶ προνοεῖν. 202 Πᾶσαι ψυχαὶ θεῶν ὁπαδοὶ καὶ ἀεὶ ἑπόμεναι θεοῖς καταδεέστεραι μέν εἰσι τῶν θείων, ὑπερήπλωνται δὲ τῶν μερικῶν ψυχῶν. αἱ μὲν γὰρ θεῖαι καὶ νοῦ μετέχουσι καὶ θεότητος (διὸ νοεραί τέ εἰσιν ἅμα καὶ θεῖαι) καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ψυχῶν ἡγεμονοῦσι, καθόσον καὶ οἱ θεοὶ τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων· αἱ δὲ μερικαὶ ψυχαὶ καὶ τῆς εἰς νοῦν ἀναρτήσεως παρῄρηνται, μὴ δυνάμεναι προσ εχῶς τῆς νοερᾶς οὐσίας μετέχειν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν τῆς νοερᾶς ἐνεργείας ἀπέπιπτον κατ' οὐσίαν μετέχουσαι τοῦ νοῦ, καθάπερ δέδεικται πρότερον. μέσαι ἄρα εἰσὶν αἱ ἀεὶ θεοῖς ἑπόμεναι ψυχαί, νοῦν μὲν ὑποδεξάμεναι τέλειον καὶ ταύτῃ τῶν μερικῶν ὑπερφέρουσαι, οὐκέτι δὲ καὶ θείων ἑνάδων ἐξημμέναι· οὐ γὰρ θεῖος ἦν ὁ μετεχόμενος ὑπ' αὐτῶν νοῦς. 203 Παντὸς τοῦ ψυχικοῦ πλήθους αἱ μὲν θεῖαι ψυχαί, τῇ δυνάμει μείζους οὖσαι τῶν ἄλλων, συνῄρηνται κατὰ τὸν ἀριθμόν· αἱ δὲ ἀεὶ αὐταῖς ἑπόμεναι καὶ τῇ δυνάμει καὶ τῷ ποσῷ μέσην ἔχουσιν ἐν πάσαις τάξιν· αἱ δὲ μερικαὶ τῇ μὲν δυνάμει κατα δεέστεραι τῶν ἄλλων εἰσίν, εἰς ἀριθμὸν δὲ πλείονα προεληλύ θασιν. αἱ μὲν γάρ εἰσι τῷ ἑνὶ συγγενέστεραι διὰ τὴν ὕπαρξιν θείαν οὖσαν, αἱ δὲ μέσαι διὰ τὴν νοῦ μετουσίαν, αἱ δὲ ἔσχαται κατὰ τὴν τάξιν, ἀνομοιώδεις κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ταῖς τε μέσαις καὶ ταῖς πρώταις. τὰ δὲ ἐγγυτέρω τοῦ ἑνὸς ἐν τοῖς ἀϊδίοις τῶν πορρω τέρων ἀριθμῷ ἑνικώτερά ἐστι καὶ συνῄρηται κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος, τὰ δὲ πορρωτέρω μᾶλλον πληθύνεται. αἵ τε οὖν δυνάμεις τῶν ἀνωτέρω μείζους, καὶ τοῦτον ἔχουσι