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of heaven, of earth, of air, of water, of living creatures, of stars, nor does it create, but is ordered by another into these things. Since, therefore, it is none of the things that exist in itself, they say, of form and quality, but only potentially being these things, that is, being able to be brought into form and quality, but not actually being any of these things, it is reasonably non-being, not being in actuality by itself, for which reason it was called evil by them, as formless and as qualityless, and as non-being, and as lacking all things. Refuting these things, therefore, the divine Dionysius says: How will matter, which is not at all in actuality, produce evil? For to produce is of actuality; but neither is it able to suffer anything, being only by itself; for according to us, it is ordered by another into form and quality; therefore it does not suffer, being by itself. But if you say it is non-being, as being absolutely nothing, it will be neither evil nor good; but if it is some being, it is either from God or from itself, or from another principle, both it and God; but if matter is necessary, as complementary to the cosmos, how is matter evil? For the definition of necessary is eternal, true, as beneficial, such as virtue which is beneficial. Therefore, evil is one thing, and the necessary another.
For evil, insofar as it is evil: Overthrowing the opinions of those who say (14S_194> that matter is evil, he says: How then is the growth of things from the earth, plants and animals, born from and nourished by matter? for these too are from form and matter. How then does absolute evil generate and nourish, and not immediately corrupt and become corrupted? for this is the state of evil. But neither, as we said above some say, does matter draw souls to vice through the irrational part of the soul, being mixed with the irrational part of the soul through the body; for many have mastered such a part, as the saints of God have. And since some of the Greeks say that for this reason the heaven and the stars are not corrupted, because they came to be from the purer part of matter, but they say that the things near to corruptible bodies came to be from the dregs and grosser matter, necessarily, according to the descent of created things, being the last, turning out to be such; for this reason, the lower things are corrupted and are unstable, not being able to be established and to hold firmly on their own, as the heaven and the stars. If then it has come to be so by necessity, how is matter evil, having, according to us, the necessary in itself? Therefore, matter is in no way evil.
29. Privation according to potentiality: Privation is not some substance, but it occurs concerning that which is deprived of its natural and proper form, as also here; for since the privation of form in matter is partial, there will be something of the good in it, inasmuch as it desires form and order, and receives these as good things. But absolute evil does not receive a share of the good, which is why it does not exist; for complete privation corrupts even the subject body itself, so that it can no longer sustain even a disease; whence he also called it powerless; but partial privation, as having something of the good, is said to have power.
But inasmuch as it is not complete: A brief definition of evil, that (14S_196> it is not according to nature, but according to a partial lack of the good.
§ 30. a. And of the whole cause: He calls the cause of all things the whole cause. And he has spoken of the partial, in order to do away with the universal; for a complete lack constitutes non-being.
God knows evil: And God sometimes knows the so-called evils as goods. But now he speaks of evils, such as wars, instructive diseases, deaths and such things; for they are considered evils by us, but they are powers of a good-producing cause; for through the things mentioned, repentance and knowledge of God and of piety became an occasion for the many; and in the prophets evil is called instruction. Read the 22nd chapter.
b. With him are the causes: The cause of the evil in licentiousness is desire moved contrary to reason. But this desire itself is a good-producing power, for rational beings, for being stretched out through it toward the truly good, but for irrational beings, for the appetite of things suitable for their own preservation.
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οὐρανοῦ, γῆς, ἀέρος, ὕδατος, ζώων, ἀστέρων, οὔτε ποιοῖ, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἑτέρου κοσμεῖται εἰς ταῦτα. Ὡς οὖν οὐδέν οὖσα τῶν ὄντων ἐπ' αὐτῇ, εἴδους φασί καί ποιότητος, μόνον δέ δυνάμει οὖσα ταῦτα, τουτέστιν εἰς εἶδος καί ποιότητα ἐνεχθῆναι δυναμένη, οὐ μήν ἐνεργείᾳ τι οὖσα τούτων, εἰκότως μή ὄν ἐστι, καθ' ἑαυτήν ἐνεργείᾳ μή οὖσα, διό καί ὡς ἀνείδεος καί ὡς ἄποιος, καί μή ὄν, καί ὡς πάντων ἐνδεής, ἐκλήθη κακόν παρ' αὐτῶν. Ταῦτα οὖν λύων ὁ θεῖος ∆ιονύσιός φησι· Πῶς ποιήσει κακόν ἡ ὕλη, ἡ παντελῶς μή οὖσα τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ; τό γάρ ποιεῖν ἐνεργείας ἐστίν· ἀλλά μηδέ πάσχειν τι δυναμένη, καθ' ἑαυτήν μόνον οὖσα· ἐξ ἑτέρου γάρ καθ' ἡμᾶς κοσμεῖται εἰς εἶδος καί ποιότητα· οὐ πάσχει οὖν καθ' ἑαυτήν οὖσα. Εἰ δέ μή ὄν αὐτήν λέγετε, ὡς παντελῶς οὐδέν οὖσαν, οὔτε κακόν ἔσται οὔτε ἀγαθόν· εἰ δέ ἐστί τι ὄν, ἤ ἐκ Θεοῦ ἐστιν ἤ ἐξ ἑαυτῆς, ἤ ἐξ ἑτέρας ἀρχῆς, καί αὐτή καί ὁ Θεός· εἰ δέ ἀναγκαῖον ἡ ὕλη, ὡς συμπληρωτικόν κόσμου, πῶς κακόν ἡ ὕλη; Ὅρος γάρ ἀναγκαίου, ἀΐδιον, ἀληθές, ὡς ὠφέλιμον, οἵα ἐστίν ἡ ἀρετή ὠφελοῦσα. Ἄλλο οὖν τό κακόν, καί ἄλλο τό ἀναγκαῖον.
Τό γάρ κακόν, ᾖ κακόν: Ἀνατρέπων τάς δόζας τῶν λεγόντων (14S_194> κακόν εἶναι τήν ὕλην, φησί· Πῶς οὖν ἐξ ὕλης γεννᾶται καί τρέφεται ἡ ἔκφυσις τῶν ἀπό γῆς, φυτά καί ζῶα; καί ταῦτα γάρ ἐξ εἴδους καί ὕλης εἰσί. Τό οὖν αὐτόκακον πῶς γεννᾷ καί τρέφει, καί οὐκ εὐθύς φθείρει καί φθείρεται; αὕτη γάρ ἕξις τοῦ κακοῦ. Ἀλλ' οὔτε, ὡς ἔφημεν ἄνω λέγειν τινάς, ἐφέλκεται εἰς κακίαν τάς ψυχάς ἡ ὕλη διά τοῦ ἀλόγου μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς, διά τοῦ σώματος μεμιγμένη τῷ ἀλόγῳ τῆς ψυχῆς· πολλοί γάρ ἐκράτησαν τοῦ τοιούτου μέρους, ὡς οἱ ἅγιοι τοῦ Θεοῦ. Ἐπειδή δέ ἔνιοι τῶν Ἑλλήνων φασί, διά τοῦτο τόν οὐρανόν καί τά ἄστρα μή φθείρεσθαι, διά τό ἐκ τοῦ καθαρωτέρου τῆς ὕλης γενέσθαι, τά δέ προσεχῆ τοῖς φθαρτοῖς σώμασιν ἐκ τῆς ὑποστάθμης καί παχυτέρας ὕλης λέγουσι γενέσθαι, ἀναγκαίως καθ' ὑπόβασιν τῶν κτισθέντων, ἐσχάτην οὖσαν, ἀποβῆναι τοιαύτην· διό καί φθείρονται τά κατώτερα καί ἀστατοῦσι, μή δυνάμενα ἰδρῦσθαι καί βεβαίως ἔχειν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς, ὡς ὁ οὐρανός καί τά ἄστρα. Εἰ οὖν ἀναγκαίως οὕτω γέγονε, πῶς ἡ ὕλη κακόν, ἔχουσα καθ' ἡμᾶς ἐν ἑαυτῇ τό ἀναγκαῖον; Οὐκ οὖν οὐδαμῶς ἡ ὕλη κακόν.
29. Ἡ στέρησις κατά δύναμιν: Ἡ στέρησις οὔκ ἐστιν ὑπόστασίς τις, ἀλλά περί τό ἐστερημόνον τοῦ πεφυκότος καί ἐπιβάλλοντος εἴδους γίνεται, ὡς καί ἐνταῦθα· μερικῶς γάρ τῆς στερήσεως οὔσης ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ τοῦ εἴδους, ἔσται τοῦ ἀγαθού τι ἐν αὐτῇ, καθό καί εἴδους καί κόσμου ἐρᾷ, καί δέχεται ταῦτα ὡς ἀγαθά. Τό δέ αὐτόκακον οὔτε ἀγαθοῦ μετουσίαν δέχεται, διό οὔτε ἐστίν· ἡ γάρ παντελής στέρησις καί αυτό τό ὑποκείμενον σῶμα φθείρει, ὡς μηδέ νόσον ἔτι ὑπομεῖναι· ὅθεν καί ἀδύναμον αὐτήν εἶπεν· ἡ δέ μερική, ὡς ἔχουσά τι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, δύναμιν λέγεται ἔχειν.
Ἀλλά καθό οὐ παντελής: Ὅρος σύντομος τοῦ κακοῦ, ὅτι (14S_196> οὐ κατά φύσιν, ἀλλά κατά μερικήν ἔλλειψιν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐστι.
§ 30. α. Καί τῆς ὅλης αἰτίας: Ὅλην αἰτίαν τήν τῶν ὅλων φησι. Τό δέ μερικόν εἴρηκεν, ἵνα τό καθόλου ἀνέλῃ· παντελής γάρ ἔλλειψις τό μή εἶναι συνίστησιν.
Οἶδεν ὁ Θεός τό κακόν: Καί τά λεγόμενα κακά οἶδεν ὁ Θεός ἔσθ' ὅτε ὡς ἀγαθά. Κακά δέ νῦν φησιν, οἷον πολέμους, νόσους παιδευτικάς, θανάτους καί τά τοιαῦτα· νομίζονται γάρ ἡμῖν κακά, εἰσί δέ δυνάμεις ἀγαθοποιοῦ αἰτίας· καί γάρ διά τῶν εἰρημένων μετάνοια καί ἐπίγνωσις Θεοῦ καί εὐσεβείας τοῖς πλείοσιν ἐγένετο πρόφασις· καί ἐν τοῖς προφήταις ἡ κακία παιδεία λέγεται. Ἀνάγνωθι τό κβ ' κεφάλαιον.
β. Παρ' αὐτῷ αἱ αἰτίαι: Αἰτία τοῦ ἐν τῷ ἀσελγαίνειν κακοῦ ἡ ἐπιθυμία παρά λόγον κινηθεῖσα. Ἀλλ' αὐτή ἡ ἐπιθυμία δύναμις ἀγαθοποιός λογικοῖς μέν πρός τό δι' αὐτῆς πρός τό ὄντως ἀνατείνεσθαι ἀγαθόν, ἀλόγοις δέ πρός ὄρεξιν τῶν ἐπιτηδείων τῆς οἰκείας διαμονῆς.