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and doing something bad, one man holds drunkenness, another anger, as the cause for the things done by him, which were voluntary; for it was possible for him not to get drunk. He himself, therefore, has become the cause of his own ignorance. These things, therefore, are not said to be done through ignorance, but in ignorance, which are not involuntary but voluntary. Therefore those who do these things are also blamed by the good. For if he had not gotten drunk, he would not have done it; but he got drunk voluntarily, therefore he also did these things voluntarily. But we do these things through ignorance when we ourselves do not provide the cause of the ignorance, but it so happened; for instance, someone shooting an arrow in a familiar place, by chance hit and killed his father who was passing by. From what has been said, therefore, it is proven that neither he who is ignorant of what is advantageous nor he who thinks that bad things are good suffers an involuntary passion; for the ignorance is of his own wickedness, at any rate this man is also blamed, and blame is for voluntary things. Therefore, ignorance of universal and general things or of things of choice is not involuntary, but of particular things; for we are ignorant of the particulars involuntarily, but of the universals voluntarily. These things having been so defined, it must be said next what the particulars are. These are what are called by the rhetoricians circumstantial parts: who, what things, what, with what, where, when, how, why. for example person, deed, instrument, place, time, manner, cause. Person is the one doing, or concerning whom the action is; for example if a son struck his father in ignorance; deed is the thing done itself, if wanting to slap he blinded; instrument if he threw a stone thinking it was a pumice-stone; place if in turning a corner in a narrow street he struck one he met in ignorance; time if at night thinking a friend was an enemy he killed him; manner if striking gently and not violently he killed him. For he was ignorant if being struck gently he would die; cause if one gave a medicine as if it were healing, but the one who took it died because the medicine was found to be a poison. But not even a madman would be ignorant of all these things at once; but he who is ignorant of most of these or the most important, this man has acted through ignorance. But the most important of these are that for the sake of which and what is being done, that is, the cause and the deed. 31 concerning the voluntary The involuntary being twofold, both that through ignorance and that by force, the voluntary is opposed to both. For it is that which happens neither by force nor through ignorance. And it is not by force when the principle is in them, not through ignorance unless some particular were unknown through which and in which the action occurs. Putting both together, therefore, we define the voluntary as that of which the principle is in oneself, knowing the particulars in which the action occurs. But it is questioned whether things that happen by nature are voluntary, such as digestion and growth. But these are shown to be neither voluntary nor involuntary; for the voluntary and involuntary are in the things that are up to us, but digestion and growth are not up to us. Whence, even if we are not ignorant of the particulars, because they are not up to us they are neither voluntary nor involuntary. But things done through anger and desire were shown to be voluntary; for when they are done rightly they are praised, and when they are done wrongly they are blamed or hated, and pleasure and pain follow them, and the principle is in them. For it was in them not to be easily captured by the passions, for through habits such things are done rightly. Besides, if these things were involuntary, no irrational animal would do anything voluntarily, nor even children. But now it is not so, for we see them coming voluntarily for food, and not by force; for they themselves are the ones that are moved through themselves, nor in ignorance; for it is not ignorant of the food, at any rate seeing food it is pleased and rushes upon it as upon a familiar thing, and failing to get it, it is pained. And the marks of the voluntary are pleasure on succeeding, but pain on failing; from which it is clear that it has desire and anger voluntarily (for anger also occurs with pleasure). And otherwise if one says that things done through anger and desire are not voluntary, he does away with the moral virtues; for these are in a mean of the passions, but if the passions are involuntary, the actions according to the virtues are also involuntary, for these too happen according to passion. But no one says that that which is according to reason and choice and according to one's own impulse and desire with knowledge of the particulars is involuntary. And the principle was also shown to be in them;

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καὶ ποιῶν τι φαῦλον, ὁ μὲν τὴν μέθην, ὁ δὲ τὴν ὀργὴν αἰτίαν ἔχει τῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γινομένων, ἅπερ ἦν ἑκούσια· ἐξῆν γὰρ αὐτῷ μὴ μεθυσθῆναι. αὐτὸς οὖν ἑαυτῷ γέγονε τῆς ἀγνοίας αἴτιος. ταῦτα οὖν οὐ δι' ἄγνοιαν λέγεται ποιεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀγνοοῦντα πράττειν, ἅπερ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀκούσια ἀλλ' ἑκούσια. διὸ καὶ ψέγονται παρὰ τῶν χρηστῶν οἱ ταῦτα πράττοντες. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐμεθύσθη οὐκ ἂν ἐποίησεν· ἑκὼν δὲ ἐμεθύσθη, ἑκὼν ἄρα καὶ ταῦτα ἐποίησεν. δι' ἄγνοιαν δὲ ταῦτα πράττομεν ὅταν μὴ αὐτοὶ παρέχωμεν τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς ἀγνοίας, ἀλλ' οὕτω συνέβη· οἷον ἐν τῷ τόπῳ τις τῷ συνήθει τοξεύων τὸν πατέρα παριόντα κατὰ τύχην βαλὼν ἀπέκτεινεν. ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων οὖν ἀποδείκνυται ὅτι οὐχ ὁ ἀγνοῶν τὰ συμφέροντα οὐδ' ὁ νομίζων εἶναι τὰ φαῦλα χρηστὰ πάθος ἀκούσιον ὑπομένει· τῆς γὰρ αὐτοῦ μοχθηρίας ἐστὶν ἡ ἄγνοια, ψέγεται γοῦν καὶ οὗτος, τῶν δὲ ἑκουσίων ὁ ψόγος. οὐκ ἄρα τῶν καθόλου καὶ γενικῶν ἢ τῶν κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἀκούσιός ἐστιν ἡ ἄγνοια, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐν μέρει· τὰ μὲν γὰρ καθ' ἕκαστα ἄκοντες, τὰ δὲ καθόλου ἑκόντες ἀγνοοῦμεν. τούτων οὕτω διωρισμένων ἑξῆς ῥητέον ποῖά ἐστι τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. ταῦτα δέ ἐστιν ἃ καλεῖται παρὰ τοῖς ῥήτορσιν περιστατικὰ μόρια· τίς, τίνα, τί, τίνι, ποῦ, πότε, πῶς, διὰ τί. οἷον πρόσωπον, πρᾶγμα, ὄργανον, τόπος, χρόνος, τρόπος, αἰτία. πρόσωπον μὲν τὸ ποιοῦν, ἢ περὶ τίνα ἡ πρᾶξις· οἷον εἰ πατέρα υἱὸς ἐτύπτησεν ἀγνοῶν· πρᾶγμα δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ πραχθέν, εἰ ῥαπίσαι θέλων ἐτύφλωσεν· ὄργανον δὲ εἰ λίθον ἠκόντισεν νομίσας εἶναι κίσηριν· τόπος δὲ εἰ ἐν τῷ περικλᾶν στενωπὸν ἔκρουσεν ἀγνοῶν τὸν ἀπαντήσαντα· χρόνος δὲ εἰ ἐν νυκτὶ νομίσας πολέμιον τὸν φίλον ἐφόνευσεν· τρόπος δὲ εἰ πλήξας ἠρέμα καὶ μὴ ῥαγδαίως ἐφόνευσεν. ἠγνόησε γὰρ εἰ πληγεὶς ἠρέμα τελευτήσει· αἰτία δὲ εἰ ὁ μὲν ἔδωκε φάρμακον ὡς ὑγιάζον, ἀπέθανεν δὲ ὁ λαβὼν τῷ τὸ φάρμακον εὑρεθῆναι δηλητήριον. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἅμα πάντα οὐδ' ἂν μαινόμενός τις ἀγνοήσειεν· ὁ δὲ τὰ πλεῖστα τούτων ἢ τὰ κυριώτερα ἀγνοήσας, οὗτος δι' ἄγνοιαν πεποίηκεν. κυριώτατα δέ ἐστιν ἐν τούτοις τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τί τὸ πραττόμενον, τουτέστιν, ἡ αἰτία καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα. 31 περὶ ἑκουσίου Τοῦ ἀκουσίου ὄντος διττοῦ, τοῦ τε δι' ἄγνοιαν καὶ τοῦ κατὰ βίαν, τὸ ἑκούσιον ἀμφοτέροις ἀντίκειται. ἔστι γὰρ τὸ μήτε βίᾳ μήτε δι' ἄγνοιαν γινόμενον. καὶ ἔστιν οὐ βίᾳ μὲν οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτοῖς, οὐ δι' ἄγνοιαν δὲ εἰ μὴ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστά τι εἴη ἀγνοούμενον δι' ὧν καὶ ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις. συνθέντες οὖν ἑκάτερον ὁριζόμεθα τὸ ἑκούσιον οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ εἰδότι τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις. ζητεῖται δὲ εἰ τὰ φύσει γινόμενα ἑκούσιά ἐστιν, οἷον ἡ πέψις καὶ ἡ αὔξησις. δείκνυται δὲ ταῦτα μήτε ἑκούσια μήτε ἀκούσια· τὸ γὰρ ἑκούσιον καὶ ἀκούσιον ἐν τοῖς ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ πέψις καὶ ἡ αὔξησις οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν. ὅθεν εἰ καὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα μὴ ἀγνοοῦμεν, τῷ μὴ ἐφ' ἡμῖν αὐτὰ εἶναι οὔτε ἑκούσιά ἐστιν οὔτε ἀκούσια. τὰ δὲ διὰ θυμὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν ἐδείχθη ἑκούσια· καὶ γὰρ κατορθούμενα ἐπαινεῖται, καὶ ἁμαρτανόμενα ψέγεται ἢ μισεῖται, καὶ ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη αὐτοῖς ἐπακολουθεῖ, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐστιν. ἐν αὐτοῖς γὰρ ἦν τὸ μὴ ὑπὸ τῶν παθῶν ῥᾳδίως ἁλίσκεσθαι, διὰ γὰρ τῶν ἐθῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα κατορθοῦται. ἄλλως τε εἰ ταῦτα ἀκούσια οὐδὲν τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων ἑκουσίως τι πράττει, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὰ παιδία. νῦν δὲ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, ὁρῶμεν γὰρ ἑκουσίως αὐτὰ ἐπὶ τὴν τροφὴν ἐρχόμενα, καὶ οὔτε βίᾳ· αὐτὰ γάρ ἐστι τὰ δι' ἑαυτῶν ὁρμῶντα, οὔτε ἀγνοοῦντα· τὴν γὰρ τροφὴν οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ, θεωρήσαντα γοῦν τροφὴν ἥδεται καὶ ὡς ἐπὶ πρᾶγμα γνώριμον ὁρμᾷ καὶ ἀποτυγχάνοντα λυπεῖται. ἑκουσίου δὲ γνώμονες ἐπιτυγχάνοντος μὲν ἡδονή, ἀποτυγχάνοντος δὲ λύπη· ἐξ ὧν δῆλον ὡς ἑκούσιον ἔχει τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ τὸν θυμόν (καὶ γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς μεθ' ἡδονῆς γίνεται). καὶ ἄλλως ἐάν τις τὰ διὰ θυμὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν ἑκούσια μὴ λέγῃ ἀναιρεῖ τὰς ἠθικὰς ἀρετάς· ἐν μεσότητι γὰρ αὗται τῶν παθῶν εἰσιν, εἰ δὲ ἀκούσια τὰ πάθη, ἀκούσιοι καὶ αἱ πράξεις αἱ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετάς, καὶ γὰρ αὗται κατὰ πάθος γίνονται. οὐδεὶς δὲ τὸ κατὰ λογισμὸν καὶ προαίρεσιν καὶ κατ' οἰκείαν ὁρμὴν καὶ ἔφεσιν μετὰ τοῦ γνωρίζειν τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα ἀκούσιον λέγει. ἐδείχθη δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτοῖς·