Elements of Theology

 as one subsisting, but according to participation not one, the one will be multiplied, just as the multiplicity is unified through the one. Therefore

 activity is better than that which is not self-sufficient but has the cause of its perfection dependent on another substance. For if all beings by nat

 it desires that also, how most of all the good? or if it does not desire, how does it not desire the cause of all things, having proceeded from it? Bu

 is itself, and the mover and the moved are one and the same. For either it moves in one part and is moved in another part, or as a whole it moves and

 beginning from a monad, it proceeds into a multitude coordinate with the monad, and the multitude of every order is led back to one monad. For the mon

 the one being divided. But if it is in one of all things, it will no longer be of all things, but of one. If, therefore, it is both common to those ab

 the thing produced is other than it. Therefore, that which begets is established as unchangeable and undiminished, multiplying itself through a genera

 from something and reverting has a cyclical activity. For if it reverts to that from which it proceeds, it joins the end to the beginning, and the mot

 procession. For since each occurs through likeness, that which has proceeded immediately from something has also reverted immediately to it (for the l

 has reverted to itself according to nature and is perfect in its reversion to itself, and would have its being from itself for that to which the reve

 the self-subsistent is set apart from things measured by time in respect to its substance. For if the self-subsistent is ungenerated, it would not be

 having received the power to produce from the cause which is superior to it, it has from that cause its being the cause of those things of which it is

 Thus the producer in relation to the produced, taken in relation to each other, but that which is able to do more has a greater and more universal pow

 a cause has pre-contained in itself the effect, being primarily what that is secondarily or in the thing produced the producer (for this too, partici

 suffers from the former) and when the second in turn acts, that also co-acts, because whatever the second does, the more causal also co-begets with i

 being, or needing it somehow in order to be, would be in this respect more imperfect than the effect. But that which is in the result is a co-cause ra

 passible, being in every way divisible, and in every way to infinity. But the incorporeal, being simple, is impassible for the indivisible can neithe

 undiminished it contains in itself. But surely infinity in respect to magnitude and in respect to multitude is a complete privation and a falling away

 set apart and if all things enter into it, yet it has something hidden and incomprehensible to secondary things and if it unfolds the powers within

 but nowhere for thus it would be divided and separate from itself, if indeed one part of it is everywhere and in all things, but the other part nowhe

 all things. For since each thing exists either according to cause or according to existence or according to participation, in the first the rest exist

 a turning back as if through similars, dissimilar <being>. For the one is similar as a particular to a particular, the other is kindred as being of th

 a hypostasis but no longer a henad, it would be assigned to another order on account of the alteration of its property. 115 Every god is supra-essenti

 supra-essential, being nothing other than the one for each is not one thing, and then good, but only good, just as it is not one thing, and then one,

 is and in beings has the power of apprehending truth (for it both grasps thoughts and has its subsistence in acts of intellection) but the gods are b

 having set the same before itself, is most self-sufficient and such is all that is divine. Therefore it needs neither other things, being goodness-it

 is more unified than beings. All divine genera, therefore, are bound together by their proper intermediaries, and the first do not proceed immediately

 of a henad working, with which it is connate. This, then, is that which in itself defines the being that partakes of it and shows essentially the supr

 to the gods so that, while they are present to all things in the same way, all things are not present to them in the same way, but as each is able, i

 For the one, having a most unitive power, sends itself through the entire union and unifies all from above, while remaining in itself. But the mean, s

 proceeds from the infinity of the divine power, multiplying itself and passing through all things, and pre-eminently demonstrating the unfailing in th

 presides over composites and of their order and of their division according to number, and is of the same series as the paternal in more partial produ

 they have intelligible [qualities]. In the same way, therefore, that those, by illuminating Being, are intelligible, so also these, by illuminating th

 and sees itself. But seeing that it is thinking and seeing, it knows that it is Intellect in actuality and knowing this, it knows that it thinks, and

 Therefore it has the causes of all things intellectually. So that every intellect is all things intellectually, both the things before it and the thin

 more akin, contracted in quantity, in power surpasses the things after it and conversely the things further from the one. Therefore, those that are h

 on the one hand, but being only intellectual, is participated by souls that are neither divine nor come to be in a state of change from intellect to u

 by its very being, if the participant is suitable, it immediately becomes ensouled and living, not by the soul reasoning and choosing, nor giving life

 and to the soul that substantiates the essential principles of all things in it for everything that produces by its being, which it is primarily, thi

 of the motions it will also have restorations for every period of the eternal things is restorative. 200 Every period of a soul is measured by time

 the relation to the secondary ones, which the divine has to the intellectual, and this to the psychical and the quantities of the lower ones are grea

 it admits of every kind of change, being moved together with their own ruling causes. But indeed that it is also indivisible, is clear. For everything

the relation to the secondary ones, which the divine has to the intellectual, and this to the psychical; and the quantities of the lower ones are greater; for what is further from the one is more of a multitude, and what is nearer is less so. 204 Every divine soul leads many souls which always follow the gods, but still more of those which sometimes receive this rank. For being divine, it must have obtained the leading rank of all and the primary rank among souls (for indeed the divine in all beings leads the wholes); and each rules neither only those that always follow, nor only those that sometimes do. For if one were to lead only those that sometimes follow, how will their connection be with the divine soul, since they are different in every way and participate neither in intellect directly nor, much more, in gods? But if of those that always follow, how has the series proceeded as far as those? For in this way the intellectual beings will be last and barren, and not naturally constituted to perfect and lead up others. It is necessary therefore that from every divine soul depend, firstly, the souls that always follow and are active according to intellect and are led up to intellects more partial than the divine intellects, and secondly, the partial souls, which are able through these intermediaries to partake of intellect and of the divine life; for through those that always partake of the better portion, those that sometimes partake are perfected. And again in turn, there must be more souls that sometimes follow around each divine soul than those that always follow; for the power of the monad always proceeds into multitude according to the subsidence, being deficient in power, but exceeding in number. Since each soul of those that always follow the gods also leads more partial souls, imitating the divine soul, and draws up more souls to the primary monad of the whole series. Therefore every divine soul leads many souls of those that always follow the gods, but still more of those that sometimes receive this rank. 205 Every partial soul has this relation to the divine soul under which it is ordered in substance, which its vehicle has to that one's vehicle. For if the distribution of the vehicles to each is according to nature, it is necessary that for the vehicle of every partial soul this is the relation to the vehicle of the whole, which it has to that one. But indeed the distribution is according to nature; for those that participate primarily are conjoined by their own nature with the participated. If therefore as the divine is to the divine body, so is the partial to the partial, by the very fact of each being participated in, then the original statement is also true, that the vehicles too have the same relation to one another as the souls. 206 Every partial soul is able both to descend into generation infinitely and to ascend from generation to being. For if it sometimes follows the gods, and sometimes falls away from the tension towards the divine, and partakes of both intellect and unintelligence, it is surely clear that it is in turn both in generation and among the gods. For neither <being for an infinite time in material bodies will it then be for another such time among the gods, nor> being for an infinite time among the gods will it again be for the whole of subsequent time in bodies; for what has no temporal beginning will never have an end, and what has no end must also have no beginning. It remains, therefore, that each makes periods of ascents from generation and of descents into generation, and that this is unceasing through infinite time. Each partial soul, therefore, is able both to descend infinitely and to ascend, and this experience will not cease to occur for them all. 207 The vehicle of every partial soul has been crafted by an unmoved cause. For if it is eternally and connately dependent on the soul which uses it, being unchangeable in substance, it received its hypostasis from an unmoved cause; for everything that has come to be from moved causes changes in its substance. But indeed every soul has an eternal body, that which primarily partakes of it; so too does the partial soul. And therefore the cause of its vehicle is unmoved, and for this reason, supracelestial. 208 The vehicle of every partial soul is immaterial and indivisible in substance and impassible. For if it proceeded from an unmoved creation and is eternal, it has an immaterial and impassible hypostasis. For things naturally constituted to be affected in their substance also change and are all material, and being at different times in different states, they are dependent on moved causes; for which reason also

τὸν λόγον πρὸς τὰς δευτέρας, ὃν τὸ θεῖον πρὸς τὸ νοερὸν καὶ τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ ψυχικόν· καὶ αἱ ποσότητες τῶν κατωτέρω πλείους· τὸ γὰρ πορρώτερον τοῦ ἑνὸς πλῆθος μᾶλλόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ ἐγγύτερον ἧττον. 204 Πᾶσα θεία ψυχὴ πολλῶν μὲν ἡγεῖται ψυχῶν ἀεὶ θεοῖς ἑπομένων, πλειόνων δὲ ἔτι τῶν ποτὲ ταύτην τὴν τάξιν δεχομένων. θείαν μὲν γὰρ οὖσαν, πάντων ἡγεμονικὴν τάξιν εἰληχέναι δεῖ καὶ πρωτουργὸν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς (καὶ γὰρ τὸ θεῖον ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς οὖσιν ἡγεῖται τῶν ὅλων)· οὔτε δὲ τῶν ἀεὶ ἑπομένων μόνον ἑκάστην ἄρχειν οὔτε τῶν ποτὲ μόνον. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ποτὲ ἑπομένων ἡγοῖτό τις μόνων, πῶς ἡ συναφὴ ταύταις ἔσται πρὸς τὴν θείαν ψυχήν, πάντῃ διαφερούσαις καὶ μήτε νοῦ προσεχῶς μετεχούσαις μήτε πολλῷ πλέον θεῶν; εἰ δὲ τῶν ἀεὶ ἑπομένων, πῶς μέχρις ἐκείνων ἡ σειρὰ προῆλθεν; ἔσται γὰρ οὕτως ἔσχατα τὰ νοερὰ καὶ ἄγονα, καὶ τελειοῦν ἄλλα καὶ ἀνάγειν οὐ πεφυκότα. ἀνάγκη ἄρα πάσης ψυχῆς θείας πρώτως μὲν ἐξηρτῆσθαι τὰς ἀεὶ ἑπομένας ψυχὰς καὶ κατὰ νοῦν ἐνεργούσας καὶ εἰς νόας ἀνηγμένας μερικωτέρους τῶν θείων νόων, δευτέρας δὲ τὰς μερικὰς καὶ διὰ τούτων μέσων νοῦ μετέχειν καὶ τῆς θείας ζωῆς δυναμένας· διὰ γὰρ τῶν ἀεὶ μετεχόντων τῆς κρείττονος μοίρας τὰ ποτὲ μετέχοντα τελειοῦται. καὶ αὖ πάλιν πλείους εἶναι περὶ ἑκάστην ψυχὴν θείαν τὰς ποτὲ ἑπομένας ψυχὰς τῶν ἀεὶ ἑπομένων· ἡ γὰρ τῆς μονάδος δύναμις κατὰ τὴν ὕφεσιν εἰς πλῆθος ἀεὶ πρόεισι, τῇ μὲν δυνάμει λειπόμενον, τῷ δὲ ἀριθμῷ πλεονάζον. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἑκάστη ψυχὴ τῶν ἀεὶ θεοῖς ἑπομένων πλειόνων ἡγεῖται μερικῶν ψυχῶν, μιμουμένη τὴν θείαν ψυχήν, καὶ πλείους ἀνέλκει ψυχὰς εἰς τὴν πρωτουργὸν μονάδα τῆς ὅλης σειρᾶς. πᾶσα ἄρα θεία ψυχὴ πολλῶν μὲν ἡγεῖται ψυχῶν τῶν ἀεὶ θεοῖς ἑπομένων, πλειόνων δὲ ἔτι τῶν ποτὲ τὴν τάξιν ταύτην δεχομένων. 205 Πᾶσα ψυχὴ μερικὴ τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν λόγον πρὸς τὴν θείαν ψυχήν, ὑφ' ἣν τέτακται κατ' οὐσίαν, ὃν τὸ ὄχημα αὐτῆς πρὸς τὸ ἐκείνης ὄχημα. εἰ γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν ἡ διανομὴ τῶν ὀχημάτων ἑκάσταις, ἀνάγκη πάσης μερικῆς ψυχῆς ὀχήματι τοῦτον εἶναι τὸν λόγον πρὸς τὸ ὄχημα τῆς ὅλης, ὅς ἐστιν αὐτῆς πρὸς ἐκείνην. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡ διανομὴ κατὰ φύσιν· τὰ γὰρ πρώτως μετέχοντα αὐτοφυῶς συνῆπται τοῖς μετεχομένοις. εἰ οὖν ὡς ἡ θεία πρὸς τὸ θεῖον σῶμα, οὕτως ἡ μερικὴ πρὸς τὸ μερικόν, αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι μετ εχομένης ἑκατέρας, καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀληθές, ὅτι καὶ τὰ ὀχήματα ταῖς ψυχαῖς τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα λόγον. 206 Πᾶσα ψυχὴ μερικὴ κατιέναι τε εἰς γένεσιν ἐπ' ἄπειρον καὶ ἀνιέναι δύναται ἀπὸ γενέσεως εἰς τὸ ὄν. εἰ γὰρ ποτὲ μὲν ἕπεται θεοῖς, ποτὲ δὲ ἀποπίπτει τῆς πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ἀνατάσεως, νοῦ τε καὶ ἀνοίας μετέχει, δῆλον δὴ ὅτι παρὰ μέρος ἔν τε τῇ γενέσει γίνεται καὶ ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς ἔστιν. οὐδὲ γὰρ <τὸν ἄπειρον οὖσα χρόνον ἐν σώμασιν ἐνύλοις ἔπειτα ἕτερον τοιοῦτον χρόνον ἔσται ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς, οὐδὲ> τὸν ἄπειρον οὖσα χρόνον ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς αὖθις ὅλον τὸν ἐφεξῆς χρόνον ἔσται ἐν τοῖς σώμασι· τὸ γὰρ ἀρχὴν χρονικὴν μὴ ἔχον οὐδὲ τελευτήν ποτε ἕξει, καὶ τὸ μηδεμίαν ἔχον τελευτὴν ἀνάγκη μηδὲ ἀρχὴν ἔχειν. λείπεται ἄρα περιόδους ἑκάστην ποιεῖσθαι ἀνόδων τε ἐκ τῆς γενέσεως καὶ τῶν εἰς γένεσιν καθόδων, καὶ τοῦτο ἄπαυστον εἶναι διὰ τὸν ἄπειρον χρόνον. ἑκάστη ἄρα ψυχὴ μερικὴ κατιέναι τε ἐπ' ἄπειρον δύναται καὶ ἀνιέναι, καὶ τοῦτο οὐ μὴ παύσεται περὶ ἁπάσας τὸ πάθημα γινόμενον. 207 Πάσης μερικῆς ψυχῆς τὸ ὄχημα ἀπὸ αἰτίας ἀκινήτου δεδημιούργηται. εἰ γὰρ ἀϊδίως ἐξήρτηται τῆς χρωμένης αὐτῷ ψυχῆς καὶ συμφυῶς, ἀμετάβλητον ὂν κατ' οὐσίαν, ἀπ' αἰτίας ἀκινήτου τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔλαχε· τὸ γὰρ ἐκ κινουμένων αἰτίων γεγονὸς μετα βάλλει πᾶν κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν. ἀλλὰ μὴν πᾶσα ψυχὴ ἀΐδιον ἔχει σῶμα, τὸ πρώτως αὐτῆς μετέχον· ὥστε καὶ ἡ μερικὴ ψυχή. καὶ τὸ αἴτιον ἄρα τοῦ ὀχήματος αὐτῆς ἀκίνητόν ἐστι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὑπερκόσμιον. 208 Πάσης μερικῆς ψυχῆς τὸ ὄχημα ἄϋλόν ἐστι καὶ ἀδιαίρετον κατ' οὐσίαν καὶ ἀπαθές. εἰ γὰρ ἐξ ἀκινήτου προῆλθε δημιουργίας καὶ ἔστιν ἀΐδιον, ἄϋλον ὑπόστασιν ἔχει καὶ ἀπαθῆ. τὰ γὰρ πάσχειν κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν πεφυκότα καὶ μεταβάλλει καὶ ἔνυλα πάντα ἐστί, καὶ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως ἔχοντα τῶν κινουμένων αἰτίων ἐξήρτηται· διὸ καὶ