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c. But if evil is eternal: These things are a refutation against the Manicheans and an overturning of their opinion. For even if the heresy did not yet exist, the things that overturn their error were inspired as a precaution. And perhaps such things are also directed against some of the opinions of outsiders.

d. Everything according to nature: That is, the principles of natures are not disordered, but what is definite follows what is according to nature; for a definition is both the interpretive principle of the essence of things, and that which declares the "what it was to be," with "what it was to be" being equivalent to "what it is." Therefore, everything according to nature is from a definite cause, because of which cause what has come to be, comes to be. If, therefore, evil is without cause, for it has not (14S_198> come to be for a reason, it is rightly also in a state of indefiniteness; for it does not have a principle interpreting its "what it was to be," necessarily, nor is it according to nature. If, therefore, it is contrary to nature, it will not have a principle in nature, just as lack of art does not have one in art,

e. If by nature: If the soul does not become evil by a partial privation of the good, externally to its own substance, but by the supervention of something foreign, the privation of the good will belong to its substance, and evil will be essential to it. And how will it be a soul? For it will not be living, for it will not have life; but life is good. But if it is a soul, it partakes of the good, that is, of life; therefore it will have the good as essential, and not evil; for which reason it is also called good-like. But through a weakness concerning its own properties, it becomes evil in acting according to nature, being weak and easily moved toward the passions. And the weakness of the soul is not like stoutness or thinness in bodies in relation to its substance, but a yielding to material and temporary things; whence it is then moved faultily. And here he calls the products its offspring. But note that the activity of the soul does not have immutability, as it comes and goes.

But if by its activities: So that the meaning might be briefly thus: the nature of the soul is good, since it was produced from the good, and its activities are good; for we see good men performing their proper actions; but evil slips in from a turning aside and a deficiency of the good. Therefore evil is not in nature, nor is it substantial.

§ 31. f. If evil is contrary to the good: The many are contrary to the one; therefore, if the many causes are contrary to the one and good cause, there are many causes for evil; and if, as I said above, the principles and powers are the productive causes of things according to nature, the productive causes of things contrary to nature are the faulty activities of things according to nature, occurring out of weakness and inability, (14S_200> through which evil also has its parasitic existence. And sometimes also an incommensurate mixture of dissimilars produces evils, whenever either the hot or the cold, or the dry, or the moist prevails more than the others; whence also diseases often arise. But how could evil have substance, when all things that have come to be remain as they were made? For these things were brought forth from motion by the will of God and remain unmoved within their own bounds, standing and being defined in God, but their opposite, absolute evil, is unstable and has no limit nor is it defined, none of which we see in the creation. How then does evil have hypostasis?

g. Principles and powers: That is, it is not necessary to reckon these things according to a principle necessary to nature, or as some essential property. And I think one should understand "mixture of dissimilars" to be the movement of the natural powers toward things that are not fitting, which immoderation produces, when the movements are not constrained by reason to remain within the bounds for which they came to be.

Of all things, even of evils: That the good is the beginning and end of all things, even of evils, since in doing anything, we think we are doing good, and that evil does not have hypostasis, but a parasitic existence, coming to be for the sake of the good, and not for its own sake. And we have said this above, that we do this not looking to evil, but thinking we are doing good, even if the outcome shows the contrary.

That it is for the sake of the good: What he also said in the chapter before this, 'on account of the good,' since we think what we are doing is good.

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γ. Εἰ δέ τό κακόν ἀΐδιον: Ταῦτα κατά Μανιχαίων ἔλεγχος καί τῆς δόξης αυτῶν ἀνατροπή. Εἰ γάρ καί μήπω ἡ αἵρεσις, ἀλλά προφυλακτικῶς ἐνεπνεύσθη τά τήν πλάνην αὐτῶν ἀνατρέποντα. Ἴσως δέ καί πρός τινας τῶν ἕξωθεν δόξας τά τοιαῦτα.

δ. Πᾶν τό κατά φύσιν: Τουτέστιν οὐκ ἄτακτοι τῶν φύσεων οἱ λόγοι, ἕπεται δέ τῷ κατά φύσιν τό ὡρισμένον· ὅρος γάρ ἐστι καί ὁ ἑρμηνευτικός λόγος τῆς οὐσίας τῶν πραγμάτων, καί τό τί ἦν εἶναι δηλῶν, τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι, τῷ τί ἐστιν ἴσα δυναμένου. Πᾶν οὖν τό κατά φύσιν ἐξ αἰτίας ὡρισμένης ἐστί, δι' ἥν αἰτίαν γίνεται τό γενόμενον. Εἰ οὖν τό κακόν ἀναίτιόν ἐστιν, οὐ γάρ (14S_198> διά τι γέγονεν, εἰκότως καἱ ἐν ἀοριστίᾳ· οὐ γάρ ἐστι αὐτοῦ λόγος, τό τί ἦν εἶναι ἑρμηνεύων, ἐξ ἀνάγκης, οὐδέ κατά φύσιν. Εἰ οὖν παρά φύσιν, οὐχ ἕξει ἐν τῇ φύσει λόγος, ὡς οὔτε ἐν τῇ τέχνη ἡ ἀτεχνία,

ε. Εἰ μέν φύσει: Εἰ μή κατά στέρησιν μερικήν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ κακύνεται ψυχή, ἔξωθεν τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' ἀλλοτρίου τινός ἐπισυμβαίνοντος, ἔσται τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς ἡ στέρησις τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, καί ἔσται οὐσιῶδες αὐτῇ τό κακόν. Καί πῶς ἔσται ψυχή; οὔτε γάρ ἔσται ζῶσα οὐ γάρ ἕξει ζωήν· ἀγαθόν δέ ζωή. Εἰ δέ ψυχή ἐστι, μετέχει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, τουτέστι ζωῆς· οὐσιῶδες οὖν ἕξει τό ἀγαθόν, καί οὐ τό κακόν· διό καί ἀγαθοειδής λέγεται. Ἀσθενείᾳ δέ τῇ περί τά οἰκεῖα, κατά φύσιν ἐνεργεῖν κακύνεται, ὡς ἀσθενής καί εὐκίνητος οὖσα πρός τά πάθη. Ἀσθένεια δέ ψυχῆς οὐχ ὡς ἐπί σωμάτων παχύτης ἤ ἰσχνότης εἰς τήν οὐσίαν αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' ἐπί τά ὑλικά καί πρόσκαιρα ἔνδοσις· ὅθεν καί πλημμελῶς λοιπόν κινεῖται. Ἔκγονα δέ ταύτης ἐνταῦθα τά ποιήματα λέγει. Σημείωσαι δέ ὅτι ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἔχει τό ἀμετάβλητον, ὡς συμβαίνουσα καί ἀποσυμβαίνουσα.

Εἰ δέ ταῖς ἐνεργείαις: Ἵνα ᾖ ὁ νοῦς ἐν συντόμῳ οὕτως· ἡ φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς ἀγαθή, ἐπειδή ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ παρήχθη, καί αἱ ἐνέργειαι αὐτῆς ἀγαθαί· ὁρῶμεν γάρ τούς ἀγαθούς ἄνδρας ἐνεργοῦντας τά οἰκεῖα· ἐκ παρατροπῆς δέ καί ἐλλείψεως τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ παρεισδύνει τό κακόν. Οὐκοῦν οὐκ ἐν φύσει, οὐδέ ἐνούσιον τό κακόν.

§ 31. ς. Εἰ τῷ ἀγαθῷ τό κακόν: Τῷ ἑνί ἐναντία τά πολλά· οὐκοῦν εἰ τῷ ἑνί καί ἀγαθῷ αἰτίῳ ἐναντίον τά πολλά αἴτια, πολλά τῷ κακῷ· καί, εἰ τῶν κατά φύσιν, ὡς ἄνω ἔφην, λόγοι καί δυνάμεις εἰσί τά ποιητικά, τῶν παρά φύσιν ποιητικά αἱ πλημμελεῖς τῶν κατά φύσιν ἐξ ἀσθενείας καί ἀδυναμίας συμβαίνουσαι, (14S_200> δι' ὧν καί παρυφίσταται τό κακόν. Ποιεῖ δέ κακά ἔσθ' ὅτε καί μίξις τῶν ἀνομοίων ἀσύμμετρος, ὅταν ἤ τό θερμόν ἤ τό ψυχρόν, ἤ τό ξηρόν, ἤ τό ὑγρόν πλέον τῶν ἄλλων κρατήσῃ· ὅθεν καί νόσοι πολλάκις. Πῶς δέ συσταίη κακόν, τῶν γενομένων ἁπάντων, ὡς ἐποιήθησαν, μενόντων; Ταῦτα μέν γάρ ἐκ κινήσεως βουλήματι Θεοῦ παρήχθη καί ἀκίνητα ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις ὅροις μένει ἑστῶτα καἱ πεπερασμένα ἐν τῷ Θεῷ, τό δέ τούτων ἐναντίον τό αὐτόκακον, ἄστατον, καί πέρας οὐκ ἔχον οὔτε ὡρισμένον, ὧν οὐδέν ἐν τῇ δημιουργίᾳ ὁρῶμεν. Πῶς οὖν ἐνυπόστατον τό κακόν;

ζ. Λόγοι καί δυνάμεις: Τουτέστιν οὐ κατά λόγον ἀναγκαῖον τῇ φύσει, ἤ τινα οὐσιώδη ἰδιότητα ταῦτα λογίζεσθαι χρή. Μίξιν δέ τῶν ἀνομοίων οἶμαι νοῆσαι τήν τῶν φυσικῶν δυνάμεων ἐπί τά μή προσήκοντα κίνησιν, ὅπερ ἡ ἀμετρία ποιεῖ, μή λόγῳ κρατουμένων τῶν κινήσεων εἴσω μένειν τῶν ὅρων, ἐφ' οἷς καί γεγόνασι.

Πάντων καί τῶν κακῶν: Ὅτι πάντων καί τῶν κακῶν ἀρχή καί τέλος ἐστί τό ἀγαθόν, ἐπειδή καί πᾶν ποιοῦντες, ἀγαθόν ποιεῖν νομίζομεν, καί ὅτι ὑπόστασιν οὐκ ἔχει τό κακόν, ἀλλά παρυπόστασιν, τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἕνεκα, καί οὐχ ἑαυτοῦ γινόμενον. Τοῦτο δέ καί ἀνωτέρω εἰρήκαμεν, ὅτι οὐ πρός τό κακόν ὁρῶντες τοῦτο πράττομεν, ἀλλά δοκοῦντες ἀγαθόν ποιεῖν, εἰ καί ἡ ἔκβασις τουναντίον δείκνυσιν.

Ὅτι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἕνεκα: Ὅ εἶπε καί ἐν τῷ πρό τούτου κεφαλαίῳ, 'διά τό ἀγαθόν', ἐπειδή νομίζομεν ὅ ποιοῦμεν ἀγαθόν.