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having wrestled down; and complete, is he who has preserved unchanged the states of practice and contemplation by the intensity of his longing for the divine.

3.97 (ƒζ΄) Of sorrow in the soul, there are two modes: the one, over one's own; the other, consisting in sorrow over the transgressions of others. And the cause of such sorrow is clearly the pleasure according to the senses of the one who is sorrowful, or of those for whom he is sorrowful. For according to the precise account, there is almost no sin at all among men that does not have as the beginning of its own genesis the soul's irrational relation to sensation for the sake of pleasure. And the cause of pleasure in the soul is manifestly the sorrow according to the senses of the one who is pleased and rejoices over his own or others' virtues. For according to the precise account, there is almost no virtue among men that does not have as the beginning of its own genesis the soul's rational aversion to sensation.

3.98 (ƒη΄) Without the soul's passionate relation to sensation, there is no sin at all among men; and whenever any sorrow occurs in the soul, pleasure of the flesh precedes it.

3.99 (ƒθ΄) The true genesis of virtue is the soul's voluntary alienation from the flesh; and he gladdens the soul spiritually who tames the flesh with voluntary labors.

1304 3.100 (ρ΄) When the soul, for the sake of virtue, has acquired an aversion to sensation, of necessity sensation will be in pain, not having the soul's inventive power for pleasures, which is connected to it by a volitional relation; but on the contrary, the soul manfully repelling through self-control the insurrection of its 15∆_192 natural pleasures; and remaining completely relentless through patience against the infliction of unnatural and involuntary pains, and not departing from the God-befitting worth and glory according to virtue for the sake of an unsubstantial pleasure, and not falling from the height of the virtues in response to pains by sparing the flesh on account of painful sensation. The cause of sorrow according to sensation has become the soul's complete lack of occupation with things according to nature. But pleasure according to sensation is manifestly produced by the unnatural activity of the soul, which can have no other beginning of its constitution than the soul's rejection of things according to nature.

FOURTH CENTURY 15∆_194 4.1 (α΄) He knows the intellectual power of the soul as inventive; which

being separated from the relation according to sensation, leaves the flesh bereft of providence for pleasure, according to the volitional relation, not even enduring to console the pain of the flesh, on account of the complete engagement of the will in relation to divine things.

4.2 (β΄) Intellect and sensation have a natural activity opposed to one another, on account of the extreme difference and otherness of their respective objects. For the one has as its objects the intelligible and bodiless substances, which it is its nature to apprehend bodilessly; while the other has the sensible and bodily natures, which it too naturally apprehends.

4.3 (γ΄) The soul's rejection of things according to nature is constituted to become the beginning of pleasure according to sensation. For when the soul is laboring over the goods according to nature, the power that invents the mode of pleasure according to sensation does not exist.

43

καταπαλαίσας· ὁλόκληρος δέ, ὁ τάς κατά πρᾶξιν καί θεωρίαν ἕξεις, ἀτρέπτους τῇ περί τόν θεῖον πόθον συντονίᾳ διατηρήσας.

3.97 (ƒζ΄) Τῆς μέν κατά ψυχήν λύπης ἐστί, διττός ὁ τρόπος· ὁ μέν, ἐπί τοῖς οἰκείοις· ὁ δέ, ἐπί τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις πλημμελήμασι συνιστάμενος. Αἰτία δέ τῆς τοιαύτης λύπης, ἡ κατ᾿ αἴσθησιν τοῦ λυπουμένου σαφῶς, ἤ τῶν δι᾿ οὕς λυπεῖται καθέστηκεν ἡδονή. Κατά γάρ τόν ἀκριβῆ λόγον, οὐκ ἔστι παντελῶς ἁμαρτία σχεδόν ἐν ἀνθρώποις, μή τῆς ψυχῆς πρός αἴσθησιν, ἡδονῆς ἕνεκεν ἀλόγιστον σχέσιν, ἀρχήν τῆς οἰκείας γενέσεως ἔχουσα. Τῆς δέ κατά ψυχήν ἡδονῆς αἰτία, προδήλως ἐστίν, ἡ κατ᾿ αἴσθησιν τοῦ ἐπί ταῖς οἰκείαις ἤ ταῖς ἀλλοτρίαις ἀρεταῖς ἡδομένου τε καί χαίροντος λύπη. Κατά γάρ τόν ἀκριβῆ λόγον, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρετή σχεδόν ἐν ἀνθρώποις, μή τῆς ψυχῆς πρός αἴσθησιν λελογισμένην ἀποδιάθεσιν, ἀρχήν τῆς οἰκείας γενέσεως ἔχουσα.

3.98 (ƒη΄) Χωρίς τῆς κατά ψυχήν ἐμπαθοῦς πρός αἴσθησιν σχέσεως, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ἀνθρώποις παντελῶς ἁμαρτία· πάσης δέ λύπης συνισταμένης κατά ψυχήν, ἡδονή σαρκός προηγεῖται.

3.99 (ƒθ΄) Γένεσις ἀρετῆς ἐστιν ἀληθής, ἡ πρός τήν σάρκα τῆς ψυχῆς ἑκούσιος ἀλλοτρίωσις· εὐφραίνει δέ ψυχήν πνευματικῶς, ὁ τοῖς ἑκουσίοις τήν σάρκα πόνοις δαμάζων.

1304 3.100 (ρ΄) Τῆς ψυχῆς ὑπέρ ἀρετῆς πρός τήν αἴσθησιν ἀποδιάθεσιν κτησαμένης, ἐξανάγκης ἡ αἴσθησις ἐν πόνοις ἔσται, τήν τῶν ἡδέων ἐπινοητικήν συνημμένην αὐτῇ κατα τήν γνωμικήν σχέσιν, τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἔχουσα δύναμιν· τοὐναντίον δέ, τήν μέν τῶν αὐτῆς 15∆_192 φυσικῶν ἡδονῶν ἐπανάστασιν, δι᾿ ἐγκρατείας ἀνδρικῶς ἀποῤῥαπίζουσαν· πρός δέ τήν τῶν παρά φύσιν και ἀκουσίων πόνων ἐπαγωγήν, διά τῆς ὑπομονῆς, ἀμείλικτον παντελῶς διαμένουσαν, καί τῆς κατ᾿ ἀρετήν θεοπρεποῦς ἀξίας τε καί δόξης διά τήν ἀνυπόστατον ἡδονήν οὐκ ἐξισταμένην, καί πρός τήν τῶν πόνων ἀντίληψιν φειδοῖ τῆς σαρκός διά τήν ὀδυνῶσαν αἴσθησιν, τοῦ ὕψους τῶν ἀρετῶν οὐκ ἀποπίπτουσαν. Τῆς δέ κατ᾿ αἴσθησιν λύπης αἰτία καθέστηκεν, ἡ πρός τά κατά φύσιν τῆς ψυχῆς παντελής ἀσχολία. Τήν δέ κατ᾿ αἴσθησιν ἡδονήν, ἡ παρά φύσιν ἐνέργεια τῆς ψυχῆς προδήλως ὑφίστησιν, ἄλλην ἀρχήν ἔχειν οὐ δυναμένην συστάσεως, ἤ τήν ψυχῆς τῶν κατά φύσιν ἀπόθεσιν.

ΕΚΑΤΟΝΤΑΣ ΤΕΤΑΡΤΗ 15∆_194 4.1 (α΄) Ἐπινοητικήν οἶδε τήν νοεράν τῆς ψυχῆς δύναμιν· ἥτις

χωριζομένη τῆς κατ᾿ αἴσθησιν σχέσεως, ἔρημον τῆς πρός ἡδονήν τήν σάρκα καταλιμπάνει προνοίας, κατά τήν ἐν γνώμῃ σχέσιν, οὐδέ τήν ὀδύνην τῆς σαρκός ἀνεχομένη παραμυθεῖσθαι, διά τήν ἐν σχέσει τῆς γνώμης πρός τά θεῖα ὁλικήν σχολήν.

4.2 (β΄) Νοῦς καί αἴσθησις ἀντικειμένην ἔχουσι πρός ἄλλήλα τήν κατά φύσιν ἐνέργειαν, διά τήν τῶν αὐτοῖς ὑποκειμένων ἀκροτάτην διαφοράν καί ἑτερότητα. Ὁ μέν γάρ, ὑποκειμένας ἔχει τάς νοητάς καί ἀσωμάτους οὐσίας, ὧν ἀσωμάτως ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι πέφυκεν· ἡ δέ, τάς αἰσθητάς καί σωματικάς φύσεις, ὧν καί αὐτή φυσικῶς ἀντιλαμβάνεται.

4.3 (γ΄) Ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς τῶν κατά φύσιν ἀπόθεσις, τῆς κατ᾿ αἴσθησιν ἡδονῆς ἀρχή γίνεσθαι πέφυκε. Τῆς γάρ ψυχῆς περί τά κατά φύσιν ἀγαθά πονουμένης, οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ τόν κατ᾿ αἴσθησιν τῆς ἡδονῆς τρόπον ἐφευρίσκουσα δύναμις.