ARTICLE I

This Question Treats the Word. In the First Article We Ask: CAN THERE BE A WORD, PROPERLY SPEAKING, IN GOD?

Difficulties:

It seems that there cannot be, for

1. There are two kinds of words: exterior and interior. An exterior word cannot be predicated properly of God since it is material and passing. Nor can an interior word be predicated of God, for Damascene defines it as follows: "Speech that is internally expressed is a motion of the soul, produced in the process of thinking, and not orally enunciated." Now, motion or a process of thinking cannot be said to exist in God. Hence, it seems that there cannot be a word, properly speaking, in Him.

2. Augustine proves that some word belongs to the mind, because something is also said to be the mouth of the mind, as is evident in the Gospel according to St. Matthew (15:18): "But the things which proceed out of the mouth . . . these defile a man." That this means the mouth of the heart is clear from what follows: "But the things which proceed out of the mouth, come forth from the heart" (15:18). Now, a mouth cannot be predicated of spiritual things except metaphorically. Hence, neither can a word.

3. That the Word is a medium between the creator and creatures is shown from St. John (1:3) where we read: "All things were made by him." From this passage, Augustine proves that the Word is not a creature. Using the same proof, we can show that the Word is not the creator. Consequently, the Word affirms nothing which is in God.

4. A medium is equidistant from extremes. Now, if the Word is the medium between the Father who utters and the creature which is uttered, the Word should be essentially distinct from the Father, since He is essentially distinct from creatures. But there is nothing in the divine Persons which is distinguished by the divine essence. Hence, a word, properly speaking, cannot be in God.

5. Whatever belongs to the Son in so far as He is incarnate is not properly predicated of God, as, for example, to be man, to walk, or anything of this sort. But being the Word belongs to the Son only in so far as He is incarnate, because it is the nature of a word to manifest the one who is speaking. The Son, however, manifests the Father only in so far as the Son is incarnate, just as our words manifest our understanding only in so far as they are expressed vocally. Hence, a word, properly speaking, does not exist in God.

6. If the Word, properly speaking, existed in God, the Word existing eternally in the Father and that which was made Incarnate in time would be the same--just as we say that it is the same Son. But it seems that we cannot say this, because the Incarnate Word is compared to a word vocally expressed; the Word existing in the Father, however, is compared to a mental word. This is clear from what Augustine has written. Now, the word that is vocally expressed is not the same as that existing in the heart. Therefore, it does not seem that the Word which is said to have existed eternally in the Father properly pertains to the divine nature.

7. The later in a series an effect occurs, the more does it have the nature of a sign. For example, wine is the final cause of a wine jar, and, more remotely, of the circular tag which is attached to the jar as a marker; for this reason, the tag is more truly a sign than the jar is. Now, a word that is vocally expressed is the last effect of the procession from the intellect. Consequently, the nature of a sign belongs to the vocal word more than to the mental concept, and, similarly, the nature of a word belongs more to the external expression from the fact that it manifests something. Now, whatever exists in its primary sense in material things and not in spiritual things is not properly predicated of God. Therefore, a word cannot be properly predicated of God.

8. Every noun especially signifies that from which it has been derived. But verbum (word) is derived either from verberatio aeris (a disturbing of the air) or from boatus (shout), so that verbum means simply verum boans (shouting what is true). Hence, this is what is especially signified by the noun verbum. Now, this cannot be said to be in God except metaphorically. Therefore, a word, properly speaking, is not in God.

9. The word that one says seems to be a likeness of the thing spoken, existing in the speaker. But when the Father knows Himself, He knows Himself not by means of a likeness, but by means of His essence. Consequently, it seems that by intuiting Himself the Father does not generate any word of Himself. "Now, with reference to the Highest Spirit, to speak means simply to intuit in thought," as Anselm says. Hence, a word, properly speaking, does not exist in God.

10. Whenever anything resembling a creature is predicated of God, it is not predicated of Him properly, but only metaphorically. Now, as Augustine says, the Word in God resembles the word which is in us. Hence, it seems that a word can be predicated of God metaphorically, but not properly.

11. Basil says that God is called the Word because all things are uttered by Him, and that He is called the wisdom by which all things are known, and the light by which all things are made manifest. However, to utter is not properly predicated of God, because uttering pertains to the voice. Consequently, word is not predicated of God in its proper sense.

12. The vocal word is related to the Incarnate Word as the mental word is related to the eternal Word. This is clear from Augustine. The vocal word, however, is predicated only metaphorically of the Word Incarnate. Hence, the interior word is also predicated only metaphorically of the eternal Word.

To the Contrary:

1'. Augustine says: "The Word which we are trying to make you understand is knowledge with love." Now, knowledge and love are predicated of God in their proper sense. Hence, so is the Word.

2'. Augustine says: "The word which is heard exteriorly is a sign of the word shining within; and to this latter the name word more properly belongs. For the vocalization of the word by a physical mouth is merely the voice of the word; and it also is called a word because of that from which it has been taken in order that the interior word might itself appear externally." It is clear from this that the term word belongs more properly to the spiritual than to the material word. Now, whatever is found more properly in spiritual things than in material things most properly belongs to God. Therefore, word is predicated of God in its most proper sense.

3'. Richard of St. Victor says that a word manifests the meaning of one who is wise. But the Son manifests the meaning of the Father in the truest way possible. Hence, word is predicated of God in the most proper sense.

4'. According to Augustine, the word is "thought, fully formed." Now, God's contemplation is never capable of formation, but is always fully formed, since it is always in act. Consequently, a word, in the most proper sense, is predicated of God.

5'. Among the types of oneness, that which is most simple is called one primarily and most properly. The same is true of a word--that which is most simple is called a word in the most proper sense. Now, the Word that is in God is most simple; hence, it is most properly called a word.

6'. According to grammarians, the part of speech called the verb receives this general name verbum as its own because it is a perfection of the entire sentence, and is, as it were, the most important part of it. Moreover, other parts of the sentence are expressed by the verb, since the noun is understood in it. Now, the divine Word (Verbum) is the most perfect of all things and expresses all things. Therefore, it is called a word in the most proper sense.

REPLY:

We give names to things according to the manner in which we receive our knowledge from things. Hence, since those things which come after others in the order of nature are usually the ones that we know first, it frequently happens that, in applying names to things, we first use a name of one of two things when the reality it signifies primarily exists in the second. We have a clear example of this in the names that are used of both God and creatures. Being, good, and words of this sort are first applied to creatures, and then transferred from creatures to God, even though the act of existence and the good are found primarily in God.

Consequently, since the exterior word is sensible, it is more known to us than the interior word; hence, according to the application of the term, the vocal word is meant before the interior word, even though the interior word is naturally prior, being the efficient and final cause of the exterior.

It is the final cause, indeed, because we use the exterior word to manifest the interior. Hence, the interior word is that which is expressed by the exterior. Moreover, the exterior word signifies that which is understood, not the act of understanding, nor the habit or faculty, as the objects of understanding, unless the habit and the faculty are themselves the things that are understood. Consequently, the interior word is what is understood interiorly. Again, the interior word is the efficient cause of the word spoken exteriorly, for, since the meaning of a word is arbitrary, its principle is the will--just as the will is the principle of other products. Moreover, just as there preexists in the mind of a craftsman a certain image of his external work, so also does there pre-exist in the mind of one who pronounces an exterior word a certain archetype of it.

Consequently, just as we consider three things in the case of a craftsman, namely, the purpose of his work, its model, and the work now produced, so also do we find a threefold word in one who is speaking. There is the word conceived by the intellect, which, in turn, is signified by an exterior vocal word. The former is called the word of the heart, uttered but not vocalized. Then there is that upon which the exterior word is modeled; and this is called the interior word which has an image of the vocal word. Finally, there is the word expressed exteriorly, and this is called the vocal word. Now, just as a craftsman first intends his end, then thinks out the form of his product, and finally brings it into existence, so also, in one who is speaking, the word of the heart comes first, then the word which has an image of the oral word, and, finally, he utters the vocal word.

Now, because the vocal word is expressed by means of a body, such a word cannot be predicated of God except metaphorically, that is, only in the sense in which creatures or their motions, being produced by God, are said to be His word inasmuch as they are signs of the divine intellect as effects are signs of their cause. For the same reason, the word which has an image of the vocal word cannot be properly predicated of God, but only metaphorically. Consequently, His ideas of things to be made are called the Word of God only metaphorically. But the word of the heart--that which is actually considered by the intellect--is predicated properly of God, because it is entirely free of matter, corporeity, and all defects; and such things are properly predicated of God, for example, knowledge and the known, understanding and the understood.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Since the interior word is that which is understood and is within us only in so far as we actually understand, it always demands that the intellect be in its act, which is to understand. Now, the act of understanding is called a motion, not a motion of what is imperfect, such as is described in the Physics, but a motion of what is perfect--an operation, as is described in The Soul. It is in this sense that Damascene spoke of the interior word as a motion of the mind, because motion is taken for that in which the motion terminates; that is, operation is taken for the term of the operation, just as the act of understanding is taken for the understood.

Moreover, the notion of the mental word does not require that the act of the intellect which terminates in a mental word take place by means of some reasoning process which thinking seems to involve. It is enough that something is actually understood--no matter how this takes place. But because we usually speak interiorly by means of a reasoning process, Damascene and Anselm in defining a word use thinking instead of consideration.

2. Augustine's argument is not from a parallel but from the lesser to the greater. For, if one can speak of the heart as having a mouth, he can with greater verisimilitude speak of it as containing a word. Hence, the argument proves nothing.

3. A medium can be understood in two ways. First, it can be understood as being a medium between the two terms of a motion, as pale is a medium between white and black in a process of blackening or whitening. Second, it can be understood as existing between what is active and what is passive, as the instrument of the artist is a medium between the artist and his work. In fact, anything by which the artist acts is a medium in this sense. It is in this second sense, too, that the Son is a medium between the creating Father and the creature created through the Word. The Son, however, is not a medium between God creating and the creature created, for the Word is also God creating. Hence, just as the Son is not a creature, so also He is not the Father.

There is still another reason why the conclusion does not follow. We say that God creates by means of His wisdom predicated essentially; hence, His wisdom can be called a medium between God and creature. Yet, this very wisdom is God.

In the argument cited, moreover, Augustine is proving that the Word is not a creature, not because He is a medium, but because He is the universal cause of creatures. Now, every motion is reduced to some first mover which is itself unmoved at least relatively to the motion in question, just as all things which undergo qualitative change must be reduced to some first thing which causes this change but is itself not changed in this way. Similarly, that to which all created beings are reduced must itself be uncreated.

4. A medium understood as existing between the two terms of a motion is sometimes taken as existing equidistant from each term, but at other times it is not taken in this sense. For a medium that exists between what is active and what is passive--if, indeed, it is a medium, as an instrument--is sometimes closer to the first active thing, sometimes closer to the last passive thing, although it may at other times stand equidistant from each. This becomes clear if we consider the action of an agent which finally terminates in what is passive by means of several instruments: the medium which is the form by which the agent acts is always closer to the agent because it is really in the agent, whereas only its likeness is in the patient. Now, it is in this manner that the Word is said to be a medium between the Father and the creature. Consequently, the Word does not necessarily stand equidistant between the Father and the creature.

5. It is true that we manifest something to another only by means of a word that is vocally expressed. Yet one can manifest something to oneself by means of the word of the heart; and, since this manifestation takes place before the other manifestation, the interior word is said to be the principal word. Similarly, the Father is revealed to all by means of the Word Incarnate, but the eternally generated Word has manifested Him to Himself. Consequently, the name word does not belong to the Son merely in so far as He is incarnate.

6. The Incarnate Word in some respects resembles, and, in other respects, does not resemble the vocal word. They have this in common as a basis for comparison: a vocal word manifests the interior word as flesh manifested the eternal Word. They differ, however, in the following respect: the flesh assumed by the eternal Word is not said to be a word, whereas the vocal word used to manifest an interior word is said to be a word. Consequently, the vocal word is something other than the interior word, but the Incarnate Word is the same as the eternal Word, just as the word signified by the vocal word is the same as the word within the heart.

7. The nature of a sign belongs more properly to an effect than to a cause when the cause brings about the existence of the effect but not its meaning, as is the case in the example given. But when the effect has derived from its cause, not only its existence, but also its meaning, then this cause is prior to the effect both in existence and in meaning. Hence, signification and manifestation belong more properly to the interior than to the exterior word, for whatever meaning the exterior word has been adopted to convey is due to the interior word.

8. A name is derived from two sources: from the one who uses the word or from the thing to which it has been applied. A word is said to be derived from a thing in so far as it signifies that by which the notion of the thing is completed, that is, the thing's specific difference; and this is what a word principally signifies. But, since we do not know essential differences, sometimes, as is said in the Metaphysics, we use accidents or effects in their place, and name a thing accordingly. Hence, in so far as something other than the essential difference of a thing is used as the source of a word, the word is said to be derived from the one who uses it. An example of this is the word lapis (stone) which is derived from its effect, laedere pedem (to bruise the foot). Now, this effect should not be taken as that which the word principally signifies, but merely as that which takes the place of what is signified. Similarly, verbum (word) is derived from verberatio (a disturbing) or from boatus (shout) because of those who use it--not because of the thing it signifies.

9. As far as the nature of a word is concerned, it makes no difference whether a thing is understood by means of a likeness or by means of its essence; for it is evident that the exterior word signifies whatever can be understood--whether it be understood by means of its essence or by means of a likeness. Hence, whatever is understood, whether it has been caused by a likeness or by its essence, can be called an interior word.

10. Some of the things predicated both of God and creatures exist in God before they exist in creatures, even though their names were applied to creatures first. These predicates, such as goodness, wisdom, and the like, are used of God in their proper sense. Other names signifying other things cannot be used of God in their proper sense, but things similar to these things can be found in God. These things, therefore, are predicated metaphorically of Him, as when we say that God is a lion or that God walks. Hence, when the term word is applied to the divine Word from our word, this indicates merely the order in the use of the name, not the order between the two realities. Consequently, Word is not used metaphorically of God.

11. Vocal expression pertains to the nature of a word only with respect to that from which the word was taken by the one who employed this noun, not with respect to the thing itself. Consequently, even though vocal expression is predicated metaphorically of God, it does not follow that a word is in Him only metaphorically. For example, Damascene says that the word {Theos} (God) comes from {aithein}, which means to burn; but, although burning is predicated metaphorically of God, God is not.

12. The Incarnate Word is compared with the vocal word merely because of a certain resemblance, as is clear from what has been said.* Hence, the Incarnate Word can be said to be a vocal word only metaphorically. But the eternal Word is compared with the word of the heart, according to the true nature of the interior word. Hence, each is called a word in the proper sense.