and there by the theologians, as indicative of the hypostasis of the Father, but not as the Son also being a co-cause with respect to the Godhead.

The pre-eminent and first cause, therefore, is not with respect to the unoriginate Spirit, away with the blasphemy, but with respect to those who have a temporal beginning, for whom the Son is also a co-cause with the Father. But indeed for created things, for which the Father is the first and proper cause, it is not pious to say that we say creation is of the Son, but do not say from the Son. If, therefore, also with respect to the uncreated Spirit the Father were the first cause, with the Son also being a co-cause, it would be impious to say that we do not say "from the Son". But since he who says this is not only pious, but also numbered among the saints, then he is impious who says that the Son is a co-cause with the Father with respect to the Spirit, and for this reason calls the Father the first cause in the highest Trinity. For the Father hears this on account of us who have come to be through the Son, wherefore each is also our maker, or rather also Father; and even if the Father with the Son is spoken of as one maker and Father with respect to us, yet it is as possessing one and the same creative power. But there in every way and altogether is one Father, one cause; for the generative power does not belong to both, but there is one fount-like Godhead, the Father. Where then at all does the "first cause" have a place? with the (p. 246) caused one also being a co-cause? The saying is impious; let it be thrown to the crows, lest it make you a companion to the intelligible crows.

How then would this John, wise if any one is in divine matters, and this while accurately setting forth the sure doctrine about God, have set forth without qualification that which requires qualification? And what foolish saying of the heterodox will not find a place, if we should allow for the qualification of things spoken without qualification concerning the tri-hypostatic Godhead? For since God is Spirit, and each of the three in turn is called Spirit. If someone therefore, innovating, were to say that the Son is from the Spirit, since the Son is God and from God, and God is Spirit, and then we were to rejoin that God is indeed called Spirit and the Spirit of God, but God is not said to be from Spirit, would he be able to say that this is not said with respect to the first cause? Certainly not.

And if someone dared to say the Son is not the creator, would we have justified him by saying that he asserts the Son is not the creator with respect to the first cause? Away with it. And if we, in turn, say piously, 'that there was not when the Son was not', and if someone, qualifying this, were to say not eternally but temporally, as if the phrase includes only time, but not eternity, would he not immediately hear from us that this which you say, O man, is a clear rejection of what is confessed and a distortion of what is piously established? Thus the occasion and beginning and root and fount of all impiety is to qualify the things theologized without qualification by our God-bearing fathers; and this almost alone of all things mixes the unmixable and spins together, so to speak, the unspinnable and things most hostile to each other, both piety and impiety, and for deception shows those who hold to each as being in no opposition. And the Latins make such misuse of this, that even hearing the saints theologizing without qualification that (p. 248) the Father alone is the beginning and root and fount of Godhead, they themselves qualify all these things (or rather, through qualification, they deceitfully dogmatize against these things) although they ought to adhere to all the sayings of the God-wise theologians together, both where they say the Spirit is from the Father alone, wherefore the Father is also the sole cause and fount of Godhead, and where, in turn, that the Spirit is from the Son, to bring these into one and understand correctly that it is from the Father alone, but not also from the Son the

κἀκεῖ παρά τῶν θεολόγων, ὡς δεικτικόν τῆς τοῦ Πατρός ὑποστάσεως, ἀλλ᾿ οὐχ ὡς καί τοῦ Υἱοῦ συναιτίου ὄντος ἐπί τῆς θεότητος.

Οὐκ ἐπί τοῦ ἀνάρχου τοίνυν Πνεύματος τό προκαταρκτικόν καί πρῶτον αἴτιον, ἄπαγε τῆς βλασφημίας, ἀλλ᾿ ἐπί τῶν ἐσχηκότων τήν χρονικήν ἀρχήν, ἐφ᾿ ὧν καί ὁ Υἱός τῷ Πατρί συναίτιός ἐστιν. Ἀλλά μήν ἐφ᾿ ὧν πρῶτον κυρίως αἴτιόν ἐστιν ὁ Πατήρ, τῶν κτισμάτων δηλαδή, οὐκ εὐσεβές εἰπεῖν, ὡς τοῦ Υἱοῦ μέν τήν κτίσιν λέγομεν, ἐκ δέ τοῦ Υἱοῦ οὐ λέγομεν. Εἰ τοίνυν καί ἐπί τοῦ ἀκτίστου Πνεύματος πρῶτον αἴτιον ὑπῆρχεν ὁ Πατήρ, ὡς καί τοῦ Υἱοῦ ὄντος συναιτίου, δυσσεβοῦς ἄν ἦν λέγειν, ὡς ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ οὐ λέγομεν. Ἐπεί δέ ὁ τοῦτο λέγων οὐκ εὐσεβής μόνον, ἀλλά καί τοῖς ἁγίοις ἐναρίθμιος, δυσσεβής ἄρ᾿ ὁ λέγων συναίτιον τῷ Πατρί τόν Υἱόν ἐπί τοῦ Πνεύματος καί διά τοῦτο πρῶτον αἴτιον ἐπί τῆς ἀνωτάτω Τριάδος τόν Πατέρα. Τοῦτο γάρ δι᾿ ἡμᾶς τούς διά τοῦ Υἱοῦ γεγονότας ἀκούει ὁ Πατήρ, διό καί ποιητής ἡμῶν ἑκάτερος, μενοῦνγε καί Πατήρ˙ κἄν εἷς καί ἐφ᾿ ἡμῶν λέγηται ποιητής τε καί Πατήρ ὁ Πατήρ σύν τῷ Υἱῷ, ἀλλ᾿ ὡς μίαν καί τήν αὐτήν δημιουργικήν δύναμιν πλουτοῦντες. Ἐκεῖ δέ πάντῃ τε καί πάντως εἷς Πατήρ, εἷς αἴτιος˙ οὐ γάρ ἐστι τό γόνιμον ἀμφοῖν, ἀλλά μία πηγαία θεότης, ὁ Πατήρ. Ποῦ γοῦν ὅλως χώραν ἔχει τό πρῶτον αἴτιον; ὡς καί τοῦ (σελ. 246) αἰτιατοῦ ὄντος συναιτίου; Ἀσεβής ὁ λόγος˙ ἐς κάρακας ριπτέσθω, μή τοῖς νοητοῖς σε κόραξι σύννομον καταστήσῃ.

Πῶς δέ ἄρα ὁ σοφός οὗτος εἴπερ τις τά θεῖα Ἰωάννης, καί ταῦτα τήν ἀσφαλῆ δόξαν περί Θεοῦ ἠκριβωμένως ἐκτιθείς, ἀπροσδιορίστως ἄν προέθετο τό προσδιορισμοῦ δεόμενον; Ποῖον δέ οὐχ ἕξει χώραν τῶν ἀφρόνως παρά τῶν κακοδόξων εἰρημένων, εἰ προσδιορίζειν δοίημεν τά ἀπροσδιορίστως περί τῆς τρισυποστάτου θεότητος ἐκπεφασμένα; Ἐπεί γάρ Πνεῦμα ὁ Θεός, καί τῶν τριῶν ἕκαστον ἐν μέρει Πνεῦμα λέγεται. Εἴ τις οὖν καινοτομῶν ἔλεγεν ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ Πνεύματός ἐστιν ὁ Υἱός, ἐπεί Θεός ὁ Υἱός καί ἐκ Θεοῦ, Πνεῦμα δέ ὑπάρχει ὁ Θεός, εἶθ᾿ ἡμεῖς ἀντεπεφέρωμεν ὅτι Θεός μέν Πνεῦμα καί Θεοῦ Πνεῦμα λέγεται, Θεός δέ ἐκ Πνεύματος οὐ λέγεται, ἆρα ἄν εἶχε λέγειν, ὡς πρός τό πρῶτον αἴτιον οὐ λέγεται; Οὔμενοῦν.

Τολμήσαντος δέ τινος μή δημιουργόν εἶναι φάναι τόν Υἱόν, ἆρ᾿ ἄν ἡμεῖς ἐδικαιώσαμεν αὐτόν εἰπόντες, ὡς πρός τόν πρῶτον αἴτιον οὐκ εἶναι φάσκει τόν Υἱόν δημιουργόν; Ἄπαγε. Ἡμῶν δ᾿ αὖ λεγόντων εὐσεβῶς, 'ὡς οὐκ ἦν ὅτε οὐκ ἦν ὁ Υἱός', εἴ τις προσδιορίζων ἔλεγε μή αἰωνίως ἀλλά χρονικῶς, ὡς τόν χρόνον μόνον, ἀλλ᾿ οὐχί καί τόν αἰῶνα συμπεριβαλλούσης τῆς φωνῆς, οὐκ εὐθύς ἄν παρ᾿ ἡμῶν ἀκούσειεν ὡς τοῦθ᾿ ὅ λέγεις, ἄνθρωπε, σαφής ἀθέτησίς ἐστι τῶν ὁμολογουμένων καί διαστροφή τῶν εὐσεβῶς κειμένων; Οὕτω πάσης δυσσεβείας ἐστίν ἀφορμή καί ἀρχή καί ρίζα καί πηγή τό προσδιορίζειν τά τεθεολογημένα τοῖς θεοφόροις ἡμῶν πατράσιν ἀπροσδιορίστως˙ καί σχεδόν τοῦτο μόνον τῶν ἁπάντων μιγνύει τά ἄμικτα καί συγκλώθει, τό τοῦ λόγου, τά ἀσύγκλωστα καί τά πολεμιώτατα πρός ἄλληλα, εὐσέβειάν τε καί ἀσέβειαν, καί τούς ἀντεχομένους ἑκατέρας ὠς μηδέν ἀντικειμένους πρός ἀπάτην δείκνυσι. Τοσούτῳ δέ οἱ Λατῖνοι τούτῳ καταχρῶνται, ὡς καί τῶν ἁγίων ἀκούοντες θεολογούντων ἀπροσδιορίστως ὅτι (σελ. 248) μόνος ὁ Πατήρ ἀρχή καί ρίζα καί πηγή θεότητος, αὐτοί πάντα ταῦτα προσδιορίζουσι (μᾶλλον δέ διά τοῦ προσδιορισμοῦ δολίως τούτοις ἀντιδογματίζουσι) καίτοι πάσαις ἐχρῆν αὐτούς ὁμοῦ στοιχεῖν ταῖς τῶν θεοσόφων θεολόγων φωναῖς, καί ποῦ μέν λεγούσαις ἐκ μόνου τοῦ Πατρός τό Πνεῦμα, διό καί μόνον αἴτιον τόν Πατέρα καί πηγήν θεότητος, ποῦ δ᾿ αὖ, ὡς ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ τό Πνεῦμα συνάγειν εἰς ἕν καί φρονεῖν εὖ ἐκ μόνου τοῦ Πατρός, ἀλλ᾿ οὐχί καί ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ τό