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(14S_202> § 32. But in reality, it is not correct: For, desiring the good according to nature and a retentive power, we sometimes act while ignorant of the evil, which is considered good by us, but in truth is evil. For what? Because, in avenging the one who has been wronged, we sometimes kill the wrongdoer who is not worthy of death. Understand it this way, and you will not err.

It is therefore a privation: He wonderfully showed evil to be unsubstantial, proving it to be a privation of things in order and in nature. But privation is not a substance in itself, as we said before, but the absence of that which is natural and ought to be present; whence also he calls the very thing of privation "sin" (ἁμαρτίαν), that is, a missing of the mark and a certain falling away from what is proper, and "aimless" (ἄσκοπον), instead of "shooting beside the mark," from the metaphor of archers; for just as they, when they hit the target, that is, the mark at which they shoot, which is indeed also called the scope (σκοπός), proceed well, so those who shoot outside the target sin against what is proper.

And sin: Do not understand ‘sin’ as that which occurs in us, such as adultery, or injustice, or anything else of that sort, but what he says is of this kind. Missing the good and the movement according to nature, that is, order, we are carried into the unnatural, irrational, and complete and unsubstantial non-existence; whence he also says evil is in no way anything that is.

Not all things for all: Divinely he has preserved the gradations of things in creation; for intellect, according to which the divine intellects, which are entirely immaterial, are substantiated, is superior to soul. Therefore, the angel, who was moved contrary to the good-like intellect, became a demon, and the soul, insofar as it is intellectual and rational, not acting according to the subordinate (14S_204> intelligible intellect, does not perform its proper actions, and bodies, which are subordinate to the intellectual reason, being found contrary to nature, are not strong in their own affairs.

§ 33. How can there be evils at all: If providence is in all things, evil is nowhere by nature. But also with respect to things that happen: Because God uses even the things that happen and are considered evil in a goodly manner for our correction or benefit, or that of others. Or of others or one’s own: Against those who say that we ought to have been good even unwillingly.

Those who say that providence ought: Note how he rebukes those who say: For why did God not make us in such a way that, even if we wanted to, we would not sin? For this is nothing other than to say: Why did he not make us mindless and irrational? for being led to virtue by necessity would show us to be neither masters of ourselves, nor an intellectual soul; for it would take away our free will, and we would be neither an image of God, nor a rational and intellectual soul, and in reality nature would be corrupted, not being what it ought to be. But what he says, "self-moving," must be understood as said instead of "of free will" and "masters of oneself"; for it is not about things that move themselves, such as ensouled beings, in contrast to things that are immovable, like houses and mountains, or moved by others, like stones and pieces of wood. For in discussing virtue he included the self-moving, for whom he says providence is suitable, such as that through the law and the prophets, that through benefactions, as the Apostle also makes clear, speaking publicly among the Athenians.

Us unwillingly: He has well refuted the argument of those who say, (14S_206> that we ought to have been good even unwillingly and by necessity; for this was a corruption of our substance; for free will would have been taken away.

§ 34. And alteration: Note that both incorporeal and immaterial things are altered, not remaining completely in the identity of the good; for the good is the same, as ever-standing and firm, but that which is turned is not the same.

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(14S_202> § 32. Τῷ ὄντι δέ οὐκ ὀρθόν: Ἐφιέμενοι γάρ κατά φύσιν καἱ δύναμιν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἑκτικήν, πράττομεν ἔσθ' ὅτε ἀγνοοῦντες τό κακόν, ὅ ἡμῖν μέν νομίζεται καλόν, τῇ δέ ἀληθείᾳ ἐστί κακόν. Τί γάρ; Ὅτι, τιμωροῦντες τῷ ἠδικημένῳ, φονεύομεν ἐσθ' ὅτε τόν ἀδικήσαντα μή ἄξιον ὄντα θανάτου. Οὕτω νόει, καί οὐ σφάλλῃ.

Στέρησις ἄρα ἐστι: Θαυμασίως ἔδειξεν ἀνυπόστατον τό κακόν, στέρησιν ἀποδείξας τῶν ἐν τάξει καί φύσει. Ἡ δέ στέρησις οὐκ αὐτοϋπόστασις, ὡς προέφημεν, ἀλλά τό πεφυκός καί ἐπιβάλλον παρεῖναι μή παρόν· ὅθεν καί ἁμαρτίαν, τουτέστιν ἀτευξίαν καί ἀπόπτωσίν τινα τοῦ προσήκοντος, αὐτό τό τῆς στερήσεως καλεῖ, καί ἄσκοπον, ἀντί τοῦ, παρά τόν σκοπόν βάλλον, ἐκ μεταφορᾶς τῶν τοξευόντων· ὥσπερ γάρ ἐκεῖνοι, ἐπιτυγχάνοντες τοῦ σκοποῦ, τουτέστι τοῦ σημείου ἐφ' ὅ τοξεύουσιν, ὅ δή καί σκοπός λέγεται, καλῶς προΐασιν, οὕτως οἱ ἔξω τοῦ σκοποῦ τοξεύοντες ἁμαρτάνουσι τοῦ προσήκοντος.

Καί ἁμαρτία: Τό 'ἁμαρτία' μή νοήσῃς τήν γενομένην ἐν ἡμῖν, οἷον μοιχείαν, ἤ ἀδικίαν, ἤ ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ' ὅ λέγει, τοιοῦτόν ἐστι. Τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καἱ τῆς κατά φύσιν κινήσεως, ἤτοι τάξεως, ἀποτυγχάνοντες, φερόμεθα εἰς τήν παρά φύσιν ἄλογον καί παντελῆ καί ἀνούσιον ἀνυπαρξίαν· ὅθεν καί μηδαμῇ μηδέν ὄν λέγει τό κακόν.

Οὐ πάντα πᾶσι: Θείως τάς ὑποβάσεις τῶν ἐν τῇ δημιουργίᾳ διέσωσεν· ὁ μέν γάρ νοῦς, καθ' ὅν οὐσίωνται οἱ θεῖοι νόες καί πάντῃ ἄϋλοι, ἀνώτερος ψυχῆς ἐστιν. Ὁ οὖν ἄγγελος, ὁ παρά τόν ἀγαθοειδῆ νοῦν κινηθείς, δαίμων ἀπέβη, ἡ δέ ψυχή, καθό νοερά καί λογική, οὐ κατά λόγον ἐνεργοῦσα τόν ὑποβεβηκότα (14S_204> νοῦν τόν νοητόν, οὐκ ἐνεργεῖ τά οἰκεῖα, τά δέ σώματα τά ὑποβεβηκότα τόν νοερόν λόγον παρά φύσιν εὑρεθέντα, οὐκ ἔρρωνται εἰς τά ἑαυτῶν.

§ 33. Πῶς ὅλως τά κακά: Εἰ πρόνοια ἐν πᾶσι, οὐδαμοῦ φύσει τό κακόν. Ἀλλά καί τοῖς γινομένοις: Ὅτι καί τοῖς γινομένοις καί νομιζομένοις κακοῖς

ἀγαθοπρεπῶς κέχρηται ὁ Θεός πρός διόρθωσιν ἤ ὠφέλειαν ἡμῶν ἤ ἑτέρων. Ἤ ἄλλων ἤ ἰδικήν: Πρός τούς λέγοντες, ὅτι ἐχρῆν ἡμᾶς καί ἄκοντας εἶναι

ἀγαθούς. Οἵ χρῆναί φασι τήν πρόνοιαν: Σημείωσαι, πῶς ἐπιπλήττει τοῖς λέγουσι· ∆ιά τί

γάρ μή ἐποίησεν ἡμᾶς ὁ Θεός οὕτως, ἵνα, κἄν θέλωμεν, μή ἁμαρτάνωμεν; Τοῦτο γάρ οὐδέν ἕτερόν ἐστιν, ἤ λέγειν· ∆ιά τί μή ἀνόητα καί ἄλογα ἡμᾶς ἐποίησε; τό γάρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡμᾶς ἄγεσθαι ἐπ' ἀρετήν οὔτε αὐτοκράτοράς τινας ἡμᾶς ἐδείκνυ τῶν καθ' ἑαυτούς, οὔτε τήν νοεράν ψυχήν· ἄνελε γάρ ἡμῶν τό αὐτεξούσιον, καί οὔτε εἰκών Θεοῦ ἑσόμεθα, οὔτε ψυχή λογική καί νοερά, καί τῷ ὄντι φθαρήσεται ἡ φύσις, οὐκ οὖσα ὅπερ ἔδει αὐτήν εἶναι. Ὅπερ δέ φησιν, αὐτοκινήτων, ἀντί τοῦ αὐτεξουσίων καί αὐτοκρατόρων εἰρῆσθαι νοητέον· οὐ γάρ τῶν ἑαυτούς κινούντων, οἷον ἐμψύχων, πρός ἀντιδιαστολήν τῶν ἀκινήτων, ὡς οἴκων καί ὀρῶν, ἤ ἑτεροκινήτων, ὡς λίθων καί ξύλων. Περί γάρ ἀρετῆς διαλεγόμενος τούς αὐτοκινήτους παρέλαβεν, ὧν φησι πρόσφορον τήν πρόνοιαν, οἷον τήν διά νόμου καί προφητῶν, τήν διά τῶν εὐεργεσιῶν, ὡς καί ὁ Ἀπόστολος δηλοῖ, δημηγορῶν παρ' Ἀθηναίοις.

Ἄκοντας ἡμᾶς: Καλῶς ἀνέτρεψε τόν λόγον τῶν λεγόντων, (14S_206> ὅτι ἐχρῆν ἡμᾶς καί ἄκοντας καί ἀνάγκης εἶναι καλούς· τοῦτο γάρ φθορά ἦν ἡμῶν τῆς οὐσίας· ἀνῄρητο γάρ τό αὐτεξούσιον.

§ 34. Καί ἀλλοίωσις: Σημείωσαι, ὅτι καί τά ἀσώματα καί τά ἄϋλα ἀλλοιοῦται, μή μένοντα ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὁλοτελῶς ταὐτότητι· τό μέν γάρ ἀγαθόν ταὐτόν, ὡς ἀεί ἑστώς καί βέβαιον, τό δέ τρεπόμενον οὐ ταὐτόν.