Nemesius Emesenus, On Human Nature

since fire burns by nature? as Philopator seems somewhere to intimate in his work *On Fate*. Therefore what is done by us through fate is not in our power. For by the same reasoning, there will be something in our power in the case of a lyre and flutes and other instruments, and all irrational and inanimate things, whenever someone acts through them. But this is absurd. 35 Concerning the fate that comes through the stars But against the wise men of the Egyptians, who say that the fate which comes through the stars is true, but that it is turned aside by prayers and averting rites (for there are certain cults of these very stars, which propitiate them, and certain other superior powers which are able to turn fate aside, and for this reason prayers and the cults of the gods and averting rites have been devised); we will say that they make fate consist of contingent and not necessary things; but the contingent is indeterminate, and the indeterminate is unknowable. Therefore, through this all divination is destroyed, and especially that of the so-called casters of nativities, which they themselves esteem above others as something strong and true. But if they say that the effects of the configurations are manifest, and are known to the experts; but when the configuration does not turn out according to its own power, a god has prevented it; we will say that this too is absurd. First, because they place only prayer and the cult of the gods in our power, and nothing else. Then we will dispute with them how, when all other human actions and choices lie in a certain relation of the stars, only prayer is in our power. For it is baffling for what reason this is so, and what the necessity is. Then, if there is some art and method of averting rites that prevents the things from fate, is the method attainable for all men, or for some but not for others? For if it is for all, nothing prevents fate from being completely overthrown by reason, with everyone learning the art that prevents its effects; but if it is attainable for some but not for others, then for which ones, and who is it that determines this? For if fate itself makes some servants of the divine, and others not, everything will again be found to be according to fate. For prayer and worship, which alone is in our power, has now appeared to be less than fate; but also greater. But if not fate but something else is the cause of these things, that thing will appear to be fate all the more. For in being able, or not being able, to succeed through prayer is contained the whole power of fate. For to those who are able, fate is nothing; but to those who are not able, everything is according to fate. And it will be found that for some men everything is according to fate, but for others nothing is according to fate; and it is clear that the one who determines this is himself the most sovereign fate, and thus again everything will be found to be according to fate, besides the fact that the distributor is also unjust, whether it be some demon, or some other fate. For it does not distribute the method of worshipping the gods to men according to worth. For why is this man more worthy than that one, when all are instruments of fate and no one does anything from his own intention, or rather, from his own choice? For in things that happen thus, no one is either just or unjust, therefore neither worthy nor unworthy of grace; but he who distributes unequally to equals is unjust. 36 Concerning those who say that the choice of actions is in our power But those who say that the choice of actions is in our power, but the outcome of the things chosen depends on fate (and these are the wisest of the Greeks), are in one respect correct but in another are mistaken. For in placing the choices of actions in our power, but not entirely the outcomes as well, they speak most correctly; but in attributing these outcomes to fate they are not correct. For they will be refuted, first, for making fate incomplete, if it possesses one part but not the other; then, for making it a consequence of our judgment; for they say that the works of fate follow upon this; and thus it will be found to be moved by us rather than moving us; and man will be more sovereign than fate, shaping it through his choice

ἐπειδὴ φύσει καίει τὸ πῦρ; ὥς που καὶ παρεμφαίνειν ἔοικεν ὁ Φιλοπάτωρ ἐν τῷ Περὶ εἱμαρμένης. οὐκ ἄρα τὸ δι' ἡμῶν ὑπὸ τῆς εἱμαρμένης γινόμενον ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστι. τῷ γὰρ αὐτῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἐπὶ λύρᾳ καὶ αὐλοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὀργάνοις καὶ πᾶσιν ἀλόγοις τε καὶ ἀψύχοις ἔσται τι, ὅταν τινὲς δι' αὐτῶν ἐνεργῶσι. τοῦτο δὲ ἄτοπον. 35 περὶ τῆς διὰ τῶν ἄστρων εἱμαρμένησ Πρὸς δὲ τοὺς σοφοὺς τῶν Αἰγυπτίων, λέγοντας ἀληθεύεσθαι μὲν τὴν διὰ τῶν ἄστρων εἱμαρμένην, τρέπεσθαι δὲ αὐτὴν εὐχαῖς καὶ ἀποτροπιασμοῖς (εἶναι γάρ τινας καὶ τούτων αὐτῶν τῶν ἀστέρων θεραπείας, τὰς ἐκμειλισσομένας αὐτοὺς καὶ ἄλλας τινὰς ὑπερκειμένας δυνάμεις τὰς τρέπειν αὐτὴν δυναμένας, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὰς εὐχὰς καὶ τὰς θεραπείας τῶν θεῶν καὶ τοὺς ἀποτροπιασμοὺς ἐπινενοῆσθαι)· ἐροῦμεν ὅτι τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ οὐχὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ποιοῦσι τὴν εἱμαρμένην· τὸ δὲ ἐνδεχόμενον ἀόριστον· τὸ δὲ ἀόριστον ἄγνωστον. ἀναιρεῖται οὖν διὰ τούτου πᾶσα μὲν μαντεία, μάλιστα δὲ ἡ τῶν καλουμένων γενεθλιαλόγων, ἣν αὐτοὶ πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων πρεσβεύουσιν, ὡς ἰσχυρόν τι καὶ ἀληθὲς πρᾶγμα. ἐὰν δὲ λέγωσιν ὅτι τὰ τῶν σχημάτων ἀποτελέσματα πρόδηλα, καὶ τοῖς ἐπιστήμοσι γνωρίζεται· ὅταν δὲ τὸ σχῆμα μὴ κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν δύναμιν ἀποβαίνῃ, θεὸς ἐκώλυσεν· ἐροῦμεν ὡς καὶ τοῦτο ἄτοπον. πρῶτον ὅτι τὴν εὐχὴν μόνην ἐφ' ἡμῖν τίθενται καὶ τὴν θεραπείαν τῶν θεῶν, ἄλλο δὲ οὐδέν. εἶτα διαμφισβητήσομεν πρὸς αὐτούς, πῶς τῶν ἄλλων πασῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πράξεών τε καὶ προαιρέσεων ἐν τῇ ποιᾷ σχέσει τῶν ἄστρων κειμένων τὸ τῆς εὐχῆς μόνης ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστιν. ἄπορον γὰρ διὰ ποίαν αἰτίαν οὕτως ἔχει τοῦτο, καὶ τίς ἡ ἀνάγκη. ἔπειτα εἰ τέχνη τίς ἐστι καὶ μέθοδος τῶν ἀποτροπιασμῶν ἡ κωλύουσα τὰ παρὰ τῆς εἱμαρμένης, πότερον πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἡ μέθοδός ἐστιν ἐφικτή, ἢ τισὶ μέν, τισὶ δὲ οὔ. εἰ γὰρ πᾶσιν οὐδὲν κωλύει τῷ λόγῳ παντάπασιν ἀνατραπῆναι τὴν εἱμαρμένην, πάντων μαθόντων τὴν τέχνην τὴν κωλύουσαν αὐτῆς τὰ ἀποτελέσματα· εἰ δὲ τισὶ μέν ἐστιν ἐφικτή, τισὶ δὲ οὔ, ποίοις ἄρα καὶ τίς ὁ τοῦτο διορίζων; εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὴ ἡ εἱμαρμένη τοὺς μὲν ποιεῖ θεραπευτὰς τοῦ θείου, τοὺς δὲ οὐ ποιεῖ, εὑρεθήσεται πάντα πάλιν καθ' εἱμαρμένην. τὸ γὰρ τῆς εὐχῆς καὶ τῆς θεραπείας, ὃ μόνον ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ἔλαττον νῦν ἀνεφάνη τῆς εἱμαρμένης· ἀλλὰ καὶ μεῖζον. εἰ δὲ μὴ εἱμαρμένη ἀλλ' ἕτερόν τι τούτων αἴτιόν ἐστιν, ἐκεῖνο μᾶλλον εἱμαρμένη φανήσεται. ἐν γὰρ τῷ δύνασθαι δι' εὐχῆς κατορθοῦν ἢ μὴ δύνασθαι τὸ πᾶν τῆς εἱμαρμένης περιέχεται κράτος. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ δυναμένοις οὐδὲν ἡ εἱμαρμένη· τοῖς δὲ μὴ δυναμένοις πάντα καθ' εἱμαρμένην. καὶ εὑρεθήσεται τισὶ μὲν ἀνθρώποις πάντα καθ' εἱμαρμένην, τισὶ δὲ οὐδὲν καθ' εἱμαρμένην· καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ὁ τοῦτο ὁρίζων αὐτός ἐστιν ἡ κυριωτάτη εἱμαρμένη, καὶ οὕτω πάλιν πάντα καθ' εἱμαρ μένην εὑρεθήσεται, πρὸς τῷ καὶ ἄδικον εἶναι τὸν διανέμοντα, εἴτε δαίμων τις εἴη, εἴτε καὶ ἄλλη τις εἱμαρμένη. οὐ γὰρ πρὸς ἀξίαν νέμει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὴν τῆς θεραπείας τῶν θεῶν μέθοδον. τί γὰρ μᾶλλον οὗτος ἄξιος ἢ ἐκεῖνος, πάντων ὀργάνων ὄντων τῆς εἱμαρμένης καὶ μηδὲν μηδενὸς ἐξ οἰκείας προθέσεως πράττοντος, μᾶλλον δὲ μὴ προαιρουμένου; ἐν γὰρ τοῖς οὕτω γινομένοις οὐδεὶς οὔτε δίκαιος οὔτε ἄδικος, οὐκοῦν οὔτε ἄξιος οὔτε ἀνάξιος χάριτος· ὁ δὲ τοῖς ἴσοις ἄνισα νέμων ἄδικος. 36 περὶ τῶν λεγόντων αἵρεσιν τῶν πρακτῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι Οἱ δὲ λέγοντες τὴν μὲν αἵρεσιν τῶν πρακτῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ τῶν αἱρεθέντων ἀπόβασιν ἐπὶ τῇ εἱμαρμένῃ (εἰσὶ δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων οἱ σοφώτατοι) τὸ μέν τι κατορθοῦσι τὸ δὲ σφάλλονται. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐφ' ἡμῖν τιθέναι τὰς αἱρέσεις τῶν πρακτῶν, μὴ πάντως δὲ καὶ τὰς ἀποβάσεις, ὀρθότατα λέγουσιν· τὸ δὲ τῇ εἱμαρμένῃ περιάπτειν ταύτας οὐκ ὀρθῶς. ἐλεγχθήσονται γὰρ πρῶτον μὲν ἀτελῆ ποιοῦντες τὴν εἱμαρμένην, εἰ τὸ μὲν ἔχει, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔχει· ἔπειτα παρακολούθημα ποιοῦντες αὐτὴν τῆς ἡμετέρας γνώμης· ταύτῃ γὰρ ἀκολουθεῖν φασι τὰ τῆς εἱμαρμένης ἔργα· καὶ οὕτως εὑρεθήσεται κινουμένη μᾶλλον ὑφ' ἡμῶν ἢ κινοῦσα ἡμᾶς· καὶ κυριώτερος ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῆς εἱμαρμένης, ὁ τυπῶν αὐτὴν διὰ τῆς αἱρέσεως