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of him; it being necessary to call providence the cause of the outcome of things; for this is the work of providence rather than of fate. For it is peculiar to providence to allot to each according to what is advantageous for each; and for this reason the outcome of the things chosen will sometimes be advantageous, and sometimes it will not. But fate, being a certain inalterable series of causes (for thus the Stoics define it, that is, an inalterable order and connection), brings about the ends not according to what is advantageous but according to its own motion and necessity. And what would they say concerning the utterly foolish and senseless and for this reason without choice? Whether it is their lot by fate to be such or not. For if not by fate, they will fall outside of fate; but if by fate, it necessarily follows that not even choice is in our power. For if that which is without choice is under fate, necessarily so also is that which is by choice; and thus they will revert to the first thinkers, those who say that all things are by fate. And superfluous also is the battle of reason and desire in the case of the continent and the incontinent man. For if it has been determined by necessity that the one should act and the other not act, what is the need of the conflict and contention within him? But this also has been co-fated, not only to act, but also to act in such a way. And what else does one who says this affirm than that choice also is among the things fated? For it is choice that fights with desire, and is victorious in the case of the continent, but is defeated in the case of the incontinent. Therefore, their original hypothesis is overthrown; for choice is no longer in our power. 37 Concerning how Plato speaks of fate Plato speaks of fate in two ways, the one in respect to substance, the other in respect to activity; in respect to substance, the soul of the universe, but in respect to activity, an inalterable divine law on account of an inescapable cause, and he calls this the ordinance of Adrasteia; and that this law has been given by the first and highest god to the soul of the universe for the ordering of all things, according to which all things that come to be are conducted; and this fate in respect to activity he also calls in accordance with providence. For fate is contained by providence, for everything that is by fate also comes to be by providence; however, not everything that is by providence is also by fate. And the divine law itself, which he says is at once providence and fate, contains all things in itself, some hypothetically, others as a consequence of hypothesis. For it contains the antecedent causes, like certain principles, hypothetically, which are in our power, assents and judgments and impulses; but those things that necessarily follow these as a consequence of hypothesis. And so the choice of actions that is in our power is hypothetical. But when the things in our power are presupposed, from these very things, as from a hypothesis, the things of fate follow. For example, it is in our power to sail; this is hypothetical; therefore, when our sailing is presupposed, the things from this hypothesis follow, whether to be shipwrecked or not. For this reason he calls the things that accompany and follow the hypotheses in our power, that is, the principles and actions, "from hypothesis"; so that the leading things and those in our power are hypothetical; but the consequent things are from hypothesis and not in our power, but by necessity; for that which is by fate is not determined from eternity, but occurs subsequently, after the things in our power have preceded. And in agreement with this is also the saying, "the cause is in him who chooses, God is without cause," and that "virtue is without a master," and the existence of divinations. But his whole argument tends to the point that choices and some of the actions according to choice are in our power, but the things that follow these and the ends are necessarily dependent on fate. But this was shown in the preceding sections not to be correct. Insofar, then, as he calls fate the ordinance and will of God, and insofar as he subordinates fate to providence, he differs little from the divine oracles that say providence alone governs all things; but he differs greatly in asserting that the ends follow necessarily upon the things in our power. For we say that the things of providence are not brought about by necessity but contingently. For if by necessity, in the first place, the greater part of prayer is cut away; for prayer will be concerning only the principles of actions, according to

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αὐτοῦ· δέον πρόνοιαν λέγειν αἰτίαν τῆς ἐκβάσεως τῶν πραγμάτων· προνοίας γὰρ τοῦτο μᾶλλον ἔργον ἢ εἱμαρμένης. τῆς γὰρ προνοίας ἴδιον τὸ ἑκάστῳ νέμειν κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον ἑκάστῳ· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τῶν αἱρεθέντων ἡ ἔκβασις κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον ποτὲ μὲν ἔσται, ποτὲ δὲ οὐκ ἔσται. ἡ δὲ εἱμαρμένη, εἱρμός τις οὖσα αἰτιῶν ἀπαράβατος (οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὴν οἱ Στωϊκοὶ ὁρίζονται, τουτέστι τάξιν καὶ ἐπισύνδεσιν ἀπαράβατον), οὐ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν κίνησιν καὶ ἀνάγκην ἐπάγει τὰ τέλη. τί δ' ἂν εἴποιεν ἐπὶ τῶν παντελῶς ἠλιθίων καὶ μωρῶν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀπροαιρέτων; πότερον καθ' εἱμαρμένην αὐτοῖς τὸ τοιούτοις εἶναι πρόσεστιν ἢ οὔ. εἰ γὰρ μὴ καθ' εἱμαρμένην ἔξω πεσοῦνται τῆς εἱμαρμένης· εἰ δὲ καθ' εἱμαρμένην ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ μηδὲ τὴν προαίρεσιν ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι. εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἀπροαίρετον ὑπὸ τὴν εἱμαρμένην, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ τὸ προαιρετόν· καὶ οὕτως ἀναδραμοῦνται πρὸς τοὺς πρώτους, τοὺς λέγοντας πάντα καθ' εἱμαρμένην εἶναι. περιττὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ μάχη τοῦ λογισμοῦ καὶ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς καὶ ἀκρατοῦς. εἰ γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὥρισται τὸν μὲν πρᾶξαι τὸν δὲ μὴ πρᾶξαι, τίς ἡ χρεία τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ στάσεως καὶ φιλονεικίας; ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο συγκαθείμαρται, μὴ μόνον πρᾶξαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοιῶσδε πρᾶξαι. τί δ' ἄλλό φησιν ὁ τοῦτο λέγων ἢ ὅτι καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις τῶν πεπρωμένων ἐστίν; ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσίς ἐστιν ἡ μαχομένη τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ καὶ νικῶσα μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν ἐγκρατῶν, ἡττωμένη δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀκρατῶν. οὐκοῦν ἀνῄρηται τὰ τῆς ἐξ ἀρχῆς αὐτοῖς ὑποθέσεως· οὐκέτι γὰρ ἡ προαίρεσις ἐφ' ἡμῖν. 37 περὶ τοῦ πῶς λέγει Πλάτων τὴν εἱμαρμένην Πλάτων δὲ διχῶς λέγει τὴν εἱμαρμένην, τὴν μὲν κατ' οὐσίαν, τὴν δὲ κατ' ἐνέργειαν· κατ' οὐσίαν μὲν τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ψυχήν, κατ' ἐνέργειαν δὲ θεῖον νόμον ἀπαράβατον δι' αἰτίαν ἀναπόδραστον, καλεῖ δὲ τοῦτον θεσμὸν Ἀδραστείας· τοῦτον δὲ τὸν νόμον δεδόσθαι παρὰ τοῦ πρώ του καὶ ἀνωτάτου θεοῦ τῇ τοῦ παντὸς ψυχῇ εἰς διακόσμησιν τῶν ὅλων, καθ' ὃν διεξάγεται τὰ γινόμενα· ταύτην δὲ τὴν κατ' ἐνέργειαν εἱμαρμένην καὶ κατὰ πρόνοιαν λέγει. ἀπὸ γὰρ τῆς προνοίας ἐμπεριέχεσθαι τὴν εἱμαρμένην, πᾶν γὰρ τὸ καθ' εἱμαρμένην καὶ κατὰ πρόνοιαν γίνεσθαι· οὐ μὴν πᾶν τὸ κατὰ πρόνοιαν καὶ καθ' εἱμαρμένην εἶναι. αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ θεῖος νόμος, ὅν φησιν εἶναι πρόνοιαν ὁμοῦ καὶ εἱμαρμένην, πάντα ἐν ἑαυτῷ περιέχει, τὰ μὲν καθ' ὑπόθεσιν, τὰ δὲ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως. τὰς μὲν γὰρ προηγουμένας αἰτίας ὥσπερ τινὰς ἀρχὰς καθ' ὑπόθεσιν περίεχει, ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, συγκαταθέσεις καὶ κρίσεις καὶ ὁρμαί· τὰ δὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ταύταις ἑπόμενα ἐξ ὑποθέ σεως. καὶ ἔστιν ἡ μὲν ἐφ' ἡμῖν αἵρεσις τῶν πρακτῶν καθ' ὑπόθεσιν. ὑποκειμένων δὲ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ἐξ αὐτῶν τούτων, ὥσπερ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, ἀκολουθεῖν τὰ τῆς εἱμαρμένης. οἷον ἐφ' ἡμῖν κεῖται τὸ πλεῦσαι· τοῦτο καθ' ὑπόθεσίν ἐστιν· ὑποκειμένου τοίνυν τοῦ πλεῖν ἡμᾶς, ἐπακολουθεῖ τὰ ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ὑποθέσεως, τὸ ναυαγῆσαι ἢ μή. διὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως καλεῖ τὰ παρακολουθοῦντα καὶ ἑπόμενα ταῖς ἐφ' ἡμῖν ὑποθέσεσιν, τουτέστιν ἀρχαῖς καὶ πράξεσιν· ὡς εἶναι τὰ μὲν ἡγούμενα καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῖν καθ' ὑπόθεσιν· τὰ δὲ ἑπόμενα ἐξ ὑποθέσεως καὶ οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης· μὴ γὰρ ἐξ ἀϊδίου ὡρίσθαι τὸ καθ' εἱμαρμένην, ἀλλ' ἐπισυμβαίνειν, προηγησαμένοις τοῖς ἐφ' ἡμῖν. τούτῳ δὲ συμφωνεῖ καὶ τὸ αἰτία ἑλομένου, θεὸς ἀναίτιος, καὶ τὸ ἀδέσποτον εἶναι τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ τὸ εἶναι μαντείας. συντείναι δὲ αὐτῷ πᾶς ὁ λόγος εἰς τὸ τὰς προαιρέσεις καί τινας τῶν κατὰ προαίρεσιν πράξεων ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι, τὰ δὲ ἐπακολουθοῦντα ταύταις καὶ τὰ τέλη ἐπὶ τῇ εἱμαρμένῃ ἐξ ἀνάγκης. τοῦτο δὲ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἐδείχθη μὴ καλῶς ἔχειν. καθ' ὃ μὲν οὖν καλεῖ θεοῦ διάταξιν καὶ βούλησιν τὴν εἱμαρμένην καὶ καθ' ὃ τὴν εἱμαρμένην ὑπάγει τῇ προνοίᾳ, μικρόν τι διαλλάττει πρὸς τὰ θεῖα λόγια τὰ λέγοντα πρόνοιαν μόνην διοικεῖν τὰ πάντα· κατὰ πολὺ δὲ διαφέρεται φάσκων ἐξ ἀνάγκης τοῖς ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἕπεσθαι τὰ τέλη. ἡμεῖς γὰρ οὐ κατ' ἀνάγκην ἐπάγεσθαι τὰ τῆς προνοίας φαμὲν ἀλλ' ἐνδεχομένως. εἰ γὰρ κατ' ἀνάγκην, πρῶτον μὲν τὸ πολὺ τῆς εὐχῆς μέρος περικέκοπται· περὶ μόνων γὰρ τῶν ἀρχῶν τῶν πράξεων τὰ τῆς εὐχῆς ἔσται κατ'