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For generation is an alteration of the underlying matter. One might understand what is being said by looking at all plants and animals, both terrestrial and winged and aquatic. For their change is continuous. But that free will also enters in with the rational principle is very clear from what has been said concerning something being in our power, to those who have not listened carelessly. And perhaps it is not at all out of place to be reminded of these same things now, since the logical sequence requires them. Of the rational, one part is contemplative, the other practical; the contemplative is that which understands beings as they are; the practical is the deliberative, which defines for practical matters the right reason. And they call the contemplative part intellect, and the practical part reason; and the one wisdom, the other prudence. Everyone who deliberates, deliberates as if the choice of practical matters is in his own power, so that he may choose what has been preferred from his deliberation and, having chosen it, may act. It is therefore absolutely necessary that he who has the power to deliberate is also master of his actions. For if he were not master of his actions, the power to deliberate would be superfluous; but if this is the case, free will necessarily accompanies the rational principle; for either it will not be rational, or being rational it will be master of its actions; and being master of its actions, it will by all means be endowed with free will. And it has also been shown that things generated from underlying matter are changeable. From both, therefore, it is concluded that man is necessarily possessed of free will and is changeable; changeable because he is created, and possessed of free will because he is also rational. All those, therefore, who blame God because He did not make man unsusceptible to evil but endowed with free will, are unwittingly blaming God because He made man rational and not irrational; for it is necessary to be one of the two, either to be irrational, or, being rational and concerned with practical matters, to be endowed with free will. Therefore, every rational nature is of necessity endowed with free will and is changeable according to its own nature. But those that have come into being from underlying matter have changeability in two ways, both according to their matter and according to their very coming into being; but as many as have not come into being from underlying matter are changeable in only one way, that of their generation. Again, of these immaterial beings, as many as are in the earthly regions, being occupied with practical matters through their association with men, are more changeable than the others; but as many as through excellence of nature draw near to God in their disposition and reap blessedness in the contemplation of Him, and being turned only toward themselves and God have completely alienated themselves from practical matters and from matter, and have appropriated themselves to contemplation and to God, remain unchangeable; being endowed with free will because they are rational, yet not being changed for the aforementioned reasons. And this is no wonder; for even of men, as many as became contemplative and separated themselves from practical matters remained unchangeable. I think it has been demonstrated along with what has been said that in the beginning all rational natures were created most excellently, and if they had remained as they were created from the beginning they would have been outside of all evil; but evil comes to them by choice; thus, at any rate, those that remained according to their original generation possess blessedness. But only angels of the incorporeal beings were changed, and not even all of them but some of them, as many as, inclining downwards, had a desire for earthly things, having departed from their disposition toward things above and toward God. Therefore, from what has been shown it is clear that we have changeable powers of choice because we are by nature changeable, but one could not blame God for our being evil because we have changeable powers. For evils are not in the powers, but in the dispositions; and the dispositions are according to choice; therefore, we become evil by choice, and are not so by nature. One might learn what is being said more accurately thus. In what has gone before we said that a power is that from which we are able to do each of the things we do. Every power of choice is the same for opposites; for there is one and the same power of lying and telling the truth, and one and the same power of being temperate and being intemperate. But the disposition is no longer the same for opposites, such as for being intemperate and being temperate, or for lying and

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ἀλλοιώσεως γὰρ τῆς ὑποκειμένης ὕλης ἡ γένεσις. κατανοήσειε δ' ἄν τις τὸ λεγόμενον ἀποβλέπων εἴς τε τὰ φυτὰ πάντα καὶ τὰ ζῷα, τά τε χερσαῖα καὶ πτηνὰ καὶ ἔνυδρα. συνεχὴς γὰρ ἡ τούτων με ταβολή. ὅτι δὲ καὶ τῷ λογικῷ συνεισέρχεται τὸ αὐτεξούσιον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων περὶ τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναί τι τοῖς μὴ παρέργως ἀκηκοόσιν εὔδηλόν ἐστιν. οὐδὲν δὲ ἴσως ἄτοπον καὶ νῦν ὑπομνῆσαι τῶν αὐτῶν, τῆς ἀκολουθίας ἐπιζητούσης αὐτά. τοῦ λογικοῦ τὸ μέν ἐστι θεωρητικόν, τὸ δὲ πρακτικόν· θεωρητικὸν μὲν τὸ κατανοοῦν ὡς ἔχει τὰ ὄντα· πρακτικὸν δὲ τὸ βουλευτικόν, τὸ ὁρίζον τοῖς πρακτοῖς τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον. καὶ καλοῦσι τὸ μὲν θεωρητικὸν νοῦν· τὸ δὲ πρακτικὸν λόγον· καὶ τὸν μὲν σοφίαν, τὸν δὲ φρόνησιν. πᾶς δὲ ὁ βουλευόμενος, ὡς ἐπ' αὐτῷ τῆς αἱρέσεως οὔσης τῶν πρακτῶν βουλεύεται, ἵνα τὸ προκριθὲν ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς ἕληται καὶ ἑλόμενος πράξῃ. πᾶσα τοίνυν ἀνάγκη τὸν ἔχοντα τὸ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ κύριον εἶναι πράξεων. εἰ γὰρ μὴ κύριος εἴη πράξεων, περιττῶς ἔχει τὸ βουλεύεσθαι· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἐξ ἀνάγκης παρυφίσταται τῷ λογικῷ τὸ αὐτεξούσιον· ἢ γὰρ οὐκ ἔσται λογικόν, ἢ λογικὸν ὂν κύριον ἔσται πράξεων· κύριον δὲ ὂν πράξεων, πάντως αὐτεξούσιον ἔσται. ἐδείχθη δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐξ ὑποκειμένης ὕλης γενητὰ τρεπτὰ ὄντα. ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ἄρα συνάγεται τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐξ ἀνάγκης αὐτεξούσιον καὶ τρεπτὸν εἶναι· τρεπτὸν μὲν ἐπειδὴ γενητός, αὐτεξούσιον δὲ ἐπειδὴ καὶ λογικός. ὅσοι τοίνυν αἰτιῶνται τὸν θεὸν ὅτι τὸν ἄνθρωπον οὐκ ἐποίησεν κακίας ἀνεπίδεκτον ἀλλ' αὐτεξούσιον λανθάνουσιν ἑαυτοὺς αἰτιώμενοι τὸν θεὸν ὅτι λογικὸν ἐποίησε τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ οὐκ ἄλογον· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τῶν δύο τὸ ἕτερον, ἢ ἄλογον γενέσθαι, ἢ λογικὸν ὄντα καὶ περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ στρεφόμενον αὐτεξούσιον εἶναι. ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὖν πᾶσα φύσις λογικὴ αὐτεξούσιός ἐστι καὶ τρεπτὴ κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῆς φύσιν. ἀλλ' αἱ μὲν ἐξ ὑποκειμένης ὕλης γενόμεναι κατὰ δύο τρόπους τὸ τρεπτὸν ἔχουσιν, κατά τε τὴν ὕλην καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ γενέσθαι· ὅσαι δὲ οὐκ ἐξ ὑποκειμένης ὕλης ἐγένοντο καθ' ἕνα μόνον τρόπον τὸν τῆς γενέσεώς εἰσι τρεπταί. πάλιν δὲ τούτων τῶν ἀΰλων ὅσαι μὲν ἐν τοῖς περιγείοις εἰσί, τῇ κοινωνίᾳ τῇ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ καταγινόμεναι, μᾶλλόν εἰσι τῶν ἄλλων τρεπταί· ὅσαι δὲ δι' ἀκρότητα φύσεως τῷ θεῷ κατὰ σχέσιν πλησιάζουσι καὶ τῇ τούτου κατανοήσει τὸ μακάριον καρποῦνται, καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὰς καὶ τὸν θεὸν μόνον ἐστραμμέναι τῶν μὲν πρακτῶν καὶ τῆς ὕλης παντάπασιν ἑαυτὰς ἀπηλλοτρίωσαν, τῇ δὲ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῷ θεῷ προσῳκείωσαν, μένουσιν ἄτρεπτοι· αὐτεξούσιοι μὲν οὖσαι διὰ τὸ λογικαὶ εἶναι, οὐ μὴν τρεπόμεναι διὰ τὰς προειρημένας αἰτίας. καὶ θαῦμά γε οὐδέν· καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὅσοι θεωρητικοὶ γενόμενοι τῶν πρακτῶν ἑαυτοὺς ἐχώρισαν ἔμειναν ἄτρεπτοι. οἶμαι συναποδεδεῖχθαι τοῖς εἰρημένοις ὅτι τὴν ἀρχὴν αἱ λογικαὶ πᾶσαι φύσεις ἄριστα δεδημιούργηνται, καὶ εἴπερ οὕτω διέμειναν ὡς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐκτίσθησαν πάσης ἂν κακίας ἐκτὸς ἦσαν· γίνεται δὲ αὐταῖς ἡ κακία κατὰ προαίρεσιν· οὕτω γοῦν αἱ μείνασαι κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γένεσιν τὸ μακάριον ἔχουσι. μόνοι δὲ ἄγγελοι τῶν ἀσωμάτων ἐτράπησαν, καὶ οὐδὲ αὐτοὶ πάντες ἀλλά τινες ἐξ αὐτῶν, ὅσοι ῥέψαντες πρὸς τὰ κάτω τῶν ἐπιγείων ἔφεσιν ἔσχον, τῆς πρὸς τὰ ἄνω καὶ τὸν θεὸν σχέσεως ἀποχωρήσαντες. οὐκοῦν ἐκ τῶν δεδειγμένων δῆλόν ἐστιν ὡς ἕνεκα μὲν τοῦ φύσει τρεπτοὺς ἡμᾶς εἶναι τὰς δυνάμεις τὰς προαιρετικὰς τρεπτὰς ἔχομεν, οὐ μὴν διὰ τὸ ἔχειν τρεπτὰς δυνάμεις τοῦ κακοὺς ἡμᾶς εἶναι τὸν θεὸν ἄν τις αἰτιάσαιτο. οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς δυνάμεσίν εἰσιν αἱ κα κίαι, ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς ἕξεσιν· αἱ δὲ ἕξεις κατὰ προαίρεσιν· κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἄρα κακοὶ γινόμεθα, καὶ οὐ κατὰ φύσιν ἐσμέν. μάθοι δ' ἄν τις ἀκριβέστερον τὸ λεγόμενον οὕτως. ἐν τοῖς προλαβοῦσιν δύναμιν ἐλέγομεν εἶναι ἀφ' ἧς ἕκαστον ὧν ποιοῦμεν ποιεῖν δυνάμεθα. πᾶσα δὲ προαιρετικὴ δύναμις ἡ αὐτὴ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἐστίν· μία γὰρ καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ δύναμις τοῦ ψεύδεσθαι καὶ ἀληθεύειν, καὶ μία καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ δύναμις τοῦ σωφρονεῖν καὶ ἀκολασταίνειν. οὐκέτι δὲ ἡ αὐτὴ ἕξις τῶν ἀντικειμένων, οἷον τοῦ ἀκολασταίνειν καὶ σωφρονεῖν ἢ τοῦ ψεύδεσθαι καὶ