To Ablabius, on why, when we speak of one divinity in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, we are forbidden to speak of three gods, having established the complete unity of the divine nature, "if anyone," he says, "should slander the Word as, by not accepting the difference according to nature, contriving some mixture and confusion of the hypostases, we shall offer this defense against such a charge: that while confessing the unchangeable character of the divine nature, we do not deny the distinction between cause and caused, in which alone we apprehend one to be distinguished from the other, by believing the one (p. 282) to be the cause, and the other to be from the cause. And of that which is from the cause, we again conceive another distinction. For the one is immediately from the first, and the other is through the one who is immediately from the first; so that both the 'only-begotten' remains doubtless upon the Son, and that the Spirit is from the Father is not in doubt, the mediation of the Son both preserving for Himself the 'only-begotten' and not excluding the Spirit from the natural relation to the Father."

This, then, should first be said here to the Latins: since you suppose not only that which is from the cause, but also the cause to be in two persons (for you place the cause of the divine Spirit in two persons, and in each of them differently), if this most brilliant luminary of Nyssa had thought according to you, he would have distinguished the cause before the caused. But in doing this he is in no way shown to have even taken into his mind what you attempt to infer from his words, from which, to one who examines well, even the contrary of your dogmas appears. For this is what he says, that the Son does not exclude the immediate relation of the Spirit to the Father, even though He alone is the Son. Next, this too should not be omitted from consideration, that after saying, "we do not deny the distinction between cause and caused," having called the Son, along with the Spirit, 'caused,' he added, "in which alone we apprehend one to be distinguished from the other," clearly forbidding the Latin innovation, that the Son is not only caused, but also cause, and shaking off in brief all their devised distinctions, that first the Father is cause with respect to the Spirit, and second the Son, and whatever is similar to these; for, he says, we apprehend the divine nature only in the cause and the caused, and we do not behold the cause in two persons, but of the caused (p. 284) alone do we conceive this distinction in two persons, which is not that one of these is also a cause, and the other only caused, as the Italians think, or rather, are madly mistaken, but that one is the Son, and the other is not the Son. And this is not excluded by the natural union of the Son with the Father. For having said earlier in the argument what these three are, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, that they are one super-essential substance, then showing how these three are, whether causally as having also some cause, or in every way without cause, he says that one of them is cause, and the other has its being causally, and he says that both the Son and the Holy Spirit have their being causally.

Did he not then show here that there is only one cause taken from the three, evidently the Father alone? Then, wishing to show how each of these two persons exists causally, so that no one might suppose, as the Latins do, that they introduce that same distinction of cause and caused again with respect to the Son and the Spirit, he says clearly that concerning these we conceive another distinction. But the Latins, in opposition to him, say not another, but the same one; and again, when the saint intended to say how the Son has His being causally, they slander him by saying how He is a cause. For that the Son is in any way a cause, this God-bearer is nowhere shown to say or to think, and especially in his words just set forth. But that He too exists causally

Πρός Ἀβλάβιον, διά τι, μίαν θεότητα ἐπί Πατρός καί Υἱοῦ καί Πνεύματος ἁγίου λέγοντες, τρεῖς θεούς λέγειν ἀπαγορεύομεν, τό παντάπασιν ἑνιαῖον παραστήσας τῆς θείας φύσεως, «εἰ δέ τις», φησί, «συκοφαντοίη τόν Λόγον ὡς ἐκ τοῦ μή δέχεσθαι τήν κατά φύσιν διαφοράν μίξίν τινα τῶν ὑποστάσεων καί ἀνακύκλησιν κατασκευάζοντα, τοῦτο περί τῆς τοιαύτης ἀπολογησόμεθα μέμψεως˙ ὅτι τό ἀπαράλλακτον τῆς θείας φύσεως ὁμολογοῦντες τήν κατά τό αἴτιον καί αἰτιατόν διαφοράν οὐκ ἀρνούμεθα, ἐν ᾧ μόνῳ διακρίνεσθαι τό ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου καταλαμβάνομεν, τῷ μέν (σελ. 282) αἴτιον πιστεύειν εἶναι, τό δέ ἐκ τοῦ αἰτίου. Καί τοῦ ἐξ αἰτίας ὄντος πάλιν ἄλλην διαφοράν ἐννοοῦμεν. Τό μέν γάρ προσεχῶς ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου, τό δέ διά τοῦ προσεχῶς ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου˙ ὥστε καί τό μονογενές ἀναμφίβολον ἐπί τοῦ Υἱοῦ μένειν καί τό ἐκ τοῦ Πατρός εἶναι τό Πνεῦμα μή ἀμφιβάλλειν, τῆς τοῦ Υἱοῦ μεσιτείας καί ἑαυτῷ τό μονογενές φυλαττούσης καί τό Πνεῦμα τῆς φυσικῆς πρός τόν Πατέρα σχέσεως μή ἀπειργούσης».

Τοῦτο δή πρῶτον ἐνταῦθα λεκτέον ἄν εἴη πρός Λατίνους˙ ἐπειδήπερ ὑμεῖς οὐ τό ἐξ αἰτίας μόνον, ἀλλά καί τό αἴτιον ἐν δυσίν οἴεσθε προσώποις (ἐν γάρ δυσί προσώποις τίθεσθε τήν αἰτίαν τοῦ θείου Πνεύματος καί ἐν ἑκατέρῳ τούτων διαφόρως), εἴπερ ἐφρόνει καθ᾿ ὑμᾶς ὁ τῆς Νύσσης οὗτος φανότατος φωστήρ, διεῖλεν ἄν πρό τοῦ αἰτιατοῦ τό αἴτιον. Τοῦτο δέ ποιήσας οὐδαμῶς δῆλός ἐστι μηδ᾿ εἰς νοῦν λαβών, ὅπερ ὑμεῖς ἐκ τῶν ἐκείνου συνάγειν πειρᾶσθε λόγων, ἀφ᾿ ὧν τῷ καλῶς σκοπουμένῳ καί τἀναντία τῶν ὑμετέρων ἀναφαίνεται δογμάτων. Τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ὅ φησιν, ὡς ὁ Υἱός οὐκ ἀπείργει τήν ἄμεσον τοῦ Πνεύματος πρός τόν Πατέρα σχέσιν, εἰ καί μόνος αὐτός ἐστιν Υἱός. Ἔπειτα μηδέ τοῦτο παραλειπτέον συνιδεῖν, ὡς μετά τό εἰπεῖν ὅτι «τήν κατά τό αἴτιον καί αἰτιατόν διαφοράν οὐκ ἀρνούμεθα», αἰτιατόν ὁμοῦ μετά τοῦ Πνεύματος καί τόν Υἱόν εἰπών, ἐπήνεγκεν, «ἐν ᾧ μόνῳ διακρίνεσθαι τό ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου καταλαμβάνομεν», φανερῶς ἀπαγορεύων, τήν λατινικήν καινοτομίαν, ὡς οὐ μόνον αἰτιατός, ἀλλά καί αἴτιός ἐστιν ὁ Υἱός, καί πάσας τούτων ἐν βραχεῖ τάς ἐπινενοημένας διαφοράς ἀποσειόμενος, ὅτι πρῶτον μέν ὁ Πατήρ αἴτιόν ἐστιν ἐπί τοῦ Πνεύματος, δεύτερον δέ ὁ Υἱός, καί ὅσα τούτοις παραπλήσια˙ ἐν μόνῳ γάρ, φησί, τῷ αἰτίῳ καί τῷ αἰτιατῷ τήν θείαν φύσιν κατανοοῦμεν, καί τό μέν αἴτιον οὐκ ἐν δυσί προσώποις θεωροῦμεν, τοῦ δέ αἰτιατοῦ (σελ. 284) μόνου ταύτην τήν ἐν δυσί προσώποις διαφοράν ἐννοοῦμεν, ἥτις ἐστίν οὐχ ὅτι τό μέν τούτων καί αἴτιόν ἐστι, τό δέ μόνον αἰτιατόν, ὡς Ἰταλοί φρονοῦσι, μᾶλλον δέ παραφρονοῦσιν, ἀλλ᾿ ὅτι τό μέν Υἱός ἐστι, τό δέ οὐχ Υἱός. Καί οὐκ ἀπείργεται τοῦτο παρά τῆς τοῦ Υἱοῦ πρός τόν Πατέρα κατά φύσιν ἑνώσεως. Εἰπών γάρ ἀνωτέρω τοῦ λόγου, τί ἐστι τά τρία ταῦτα, ὁ Πατήρ, ὁ Υἱός καί τό Πνεῦμα τό ἅγιον, ὅτι μία ὑπερούσιος οὐσία, δεικνύς ἔπειτα πῶς ἐστι τά τρία ταῦτα, ἆρα αἰτιατῶς ὡς ἔχοντά τι καί αἴτιον, ἤ ἀναιτίως πάντῃ, φησίν ὅτι τό μέν αὐτῶν ἐστιν αἴτιον, τό δέ αἰτιατῶς ἔχει τό εἶναι, αἰτιατῶς δέ φησιν ἔχει τό εἶναι ὁ Υἱός τε καί τό Πνεῦμα τό ἅγιον.

Ἆρ᾿ οὐκ ἐντεῦθεν ἔδειξεν ἐνταῦθα, ἕν εἶναι μόνον αἴτιον τό ληφθέν ἐκ τῶν τριῶν, δηλονότι τόν Πατέρα μόνον; Εἶτα θέλων δεῖξαι πῶς τῶν δύο τούτων προσώπων ἑκάτερον αἰτιατῶς ἐστιν, ἵνα μή τις νομίσῃ, καθάπερ οἱ Λατῖνοι, πάλιν ἐκείνην τήν τοῦ αἰτίου καί αἰτιατοῦ διαφοράν καί ἐπί Υἱοῦ καί Πνεύματος εἰσάγειν, φησί σαφῶς, ὅτι ἐπί τούτων ἄλλην διαφοράν ἐννοῦμεν. Λατῖνοι δέ ἀντιθεϊκῶς τούτῳ φασίν οὐκ ἄλλην, ἀλλά τήν αὐτήν˙ καί τοῦ ἁγίου πάλιν, πῶς αἰτιατῶς ἔχει τό εἶναι ὁ Υἱός φάναι προθεμένου, αὐτοί πῶς αἴτιός ἐστι φάναι συκοφαντοῦσιν αὐτόν. Τό μέν γάρ εἶναι τόν Υἱόν ὁπωσοῦν αἴτιον, οὐδαμῇ δείκνυται λέγων ἤ φρονῶν ὁ θεοφόρος οὗτος, καί μάλιστα ἐν τοῖς ἀρτίως προκειμένοις ρήμασιν αὐτοῦ. Ἀλλά τό αἰτιατῶς μέν καί τοῦτον