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54

for the sake of providence, the difference of form has been varied in individuals? For consider, if all preserved the same unvarying character, how great a confusion of things would occur, and how great an ignorance and darkness would possess man, recognizing neither his own nor the stranger, nor distinguishing an enemy or a wicked person from a friend and a good one; and all things would truly have been together, according to Anaxagoras. For this being so, nothing would have prevented men from having intercourse with sisters and mothers, nor from plundering, nor from committing any other injustice openly, if only for the present he escaped; for having been seen, he would not have been recognized afterwards. Nor would a law or a state have been established, nor would fathers and children have known one another, nor would anything else concerning man have been established; for man would have been blind with respect to men, his sight affording him little help; for besides age and size he would have distinguished nothing else. Providence has become the cause of so many goods for us, diversifying the form of men always and everywhere and at no time failing to do this, which is also the greatest proof that individuals are also under the care of providence, if each one is recognized even to the type of the fashioning of his character and voice, even if such a thing is not preserved with precision, as the form is sufficient. For in addition to this, providence has also added for us the difference of colors, so that the weakness of human nature might be helped in many ways. And I think that many of the animals that are of the same form in their species, such as the crow and the raven, have certain differences in their appearance by which they recognize each other in pairs. At any rate, crows and ravens often flock together in great numbers; but they separate into pairs, each female and each male recognizing its mate. And how would they know each other if there were not in each some peculiar character, not easily discerned by us, but naturally easy to perceive by those of the same species? And the omens and rumors and portents and signs from Zeus (for the argument is addressed to the Greeks) which, according to their own account, as they themselves say, preserve the outcomes of what is signified by them, surely signify by the reason of providence, and they confirm the outcomes for the things signified. But that providence exists is clear both from these things and from what will be said next; but let us say what providence is. Providence, then, is the care that comes from God for existing things. And they also define it thus: Providence is the will of God through which all existing things receive their fitting guidance. But if providence is the will of God, it is altogether necessary, according to right reason, that things happen in the most beautiful and most God-fitting manner, and as they alone could be well, so as not to admit a better order. And it is necessary that the same be creator of existing things and their provider; for it is neither consistent nor fitting for one to create, and another to care for what has been created; for such a thing is always seen in weakness. And a great emphasis of what has been said lies in animals; for everything that gives birth also takes care of the nourishment of what has been born, and man provides for all other things in life as far as he is able; but those that do not provide, do not provide because of weakness. It has been shown, therefore, that God is the provider, and providence is His will. 42 Concerning of what things providence is That providence exists, then, and what it is has been said; it remains to say of what things providence is, whether of universals or of individuals, or of both universals and individuals. Plato, then, wishes that providence governs both universals and individuals, dividing the account of providence into three. For he says that the first is that of the first god; and that this one provides primarily for the ideas, and then for the whole universal cosmos, such as heaven and stars and all universals, that is, the genera, of substance and quantity and quality, and the other such things and the species subordinated to them; and that the second gods, those who traverse the heavens, provide for the generation of individual animals and plants and all things in generation and corruption (and Aristotle also these things'

54

προνοίας ἕνεκα τὴν διαφορὰν τῆς μορφῆς παρηλλαγμένην ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα; σκόπει γάρ, εἰ τὸν αὐτὸν πάντες ἔσῳζον ἀπαραλλάκτως χαρακτῆρα, πόση σύγχυσις τῶν πραγμάτων ἐγίνετο, πόση δὲ ἄγνοια καὶ σκότος κατεῖχε τὸν ἄνθρωπον, οὔτε τὸν οἰκεῖον γνωρίζοντα οὔτε τὸν ἀλλότριον ἢ πολέμιον ἢ φαῦλον ἀπὸ τοῦ φίλου καὶ χρηστοῦ διακρίνοντα· πάντα δὲ ἢν ἀληθῶς ὁμοῦ χρήματα κατὰ Ἀναξαγόραν. τούτου γὰρ οὕτως ὄντος οὐδὲν ἐκώλυεν ἀδελφαῖς καὶ μητράσι συγγίνεσθαι οὐδὲ ἁρπάζειν οὐδὲ ἄλλο τι ἀδικεῖν ἐμφανῶς, εἰ πρὸς τὸ παρὸν μόνον διέφυγεν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ὀφθεὶς ἐγνωρίσθη μετὰ ταῦτα. οὐδ' ἂν νόμος ἢ πολιτεία συνετάττετο, οὐδὲ πατέρες καὶ παῖδες ἀλλήλους ἐγίνωσκον, οὐδ' ἄλλο τι συνέστη τῶν κατὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον· τυφλὸς γὰρ ἂν ἦν ἕνεκα τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὁ ἄνθρωπος, μικρὰ τοῦ βλέπειν αὐτῷ παρεχομένου· πλὴν γὰρ ἡλικίας καὶ μεγέθους οὐδὲν ἄλλο διεγίνωσκεν. τοσούτων ἡμῖν ἀγαθῶν αἰτία γέγονεν ἡ πρόνοια, ποικίλλουσα τὴν μορφὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων διὰ παντὸς καὶ πανταχῇ καὶ μηδένα χρόνον τοῦ ποιεῖν τοῦτο παραλείπουσα, ὃ καὶ μέγιστόν ἐστι τεκμήριον τοῦ τυγχάνειν προνοίας καὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, εἰ μέχρι καὶ τοῦ τύπου τῆς διαπλάσεως τοῦ χαρακτῆρος καὶ τῆς φωνῆς ἕκαστος γνωρί ζεται, εἰ καὶ μὴ δι' ἀκριβείας τὸ τοιοῦτον φυλάττεται ὡς τῆς μορφῆς ἀρκούσης. ἐξ ἐπιμέτρου γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο προσέθηκεν ἡμῖν ἡ πρόνοια καὶ τὴν χρωμάτων διαφοράν, ἵνα πολυτρόπως βοηθῆται τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως ἡ ἀσθένεια. οἶμαι δὲ καὶ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν ζῴων τῶν κατ' εἶδος ὁμοσχημόνων οἷόν ἐστι κορώνη καὶ κόραξ, ἔχειν τινὰς κατὰ τὴν πρόσοψιν διαφορὰς αἷς γνωρίζει κατὰ συζυγίαν ἄλληλα. κορῶναι γοῦν καὶ κόρακες συναγελάζονται μὲν πολλοὶ πολλάκις· χωρίζονται δὲ πατὰ συζυγίαν, ἑκάστης καὶ ἑκάστου γνωριζόντων τὸ σύζυγον. πῶς δ' ἂν ἐγίνωσκον ἀλλήλους εἰ μή τις ἦν ἐν ἑκάστῳ χαρακτὴρ ἴδιος, ἡμῖν μὲν οὐκ εὐκρινής, εὐσύνοπτος δὲ φυσικῶς τοῖς ὁμοειδέσι; καὶ τὰ σύμ βολα δὲ καὶ φῆμαι καὶ κληδόνες καὶ διοσημεῖαι (πρὸς Ἕλληνας γὰρ ὁ λόγος) κατὰ τὸν οἰκεῖον λόγον, ὡς αὐτοί φασι, τῶν δηλουμένων ὑπ' αὐτῶν τὰς ἐκβάσεις διασῴζουσαι, πάντως που προνοίας λόγῳ καὶ σημαίνουσι, καὶ τοῖς σημαινομένοις τὰς ἐκβάσεις ἐπαληθεύουσιν. ἀλλ' ὅτι μέν ἐστι πρόνοια διά τε τούτων δῆλον καὶ διὰ τῶν ἑξῆς ῥηθησομένων· εἴπωμεν δὲ τί ἐστι πρόνοια. πρόνοια τοίνυν ἐστὶν ἐκ θεοῦ εἰς τὰ ὄντα γινομένη ἐπιμέλεια. ὁρίζονται δὲ αὐτὴν καὶ οὕτως· πρόνοιά ἐστι βούλησις θεοῦ δι' ἣν πάντα τὰ ὄντα τὴν πρόσφορον διεξαγωγὴν λαμβάνει. εἰ δὲ θεοῦ βούλησίς ἐστιν ἡ πρόνοια, πᾶσα ἀνάγκη κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον καὶ κάλλιστα καὶ θεοπρεπέστατα καὶ ὡς ἂν μόνως καλῶς ἔχοι τὰ γινόμενα γίνεσθαι, ὡς τὴν κρείττω τάξιν μὴ ἐπιδέχεσθαι. ἀνάγκη δὲ καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι ποιητὴν τῶν ὄντων καὶ προνοητήν· οὔτε γὰρ ἀκόλουθον οὔτε πρέπον ἄλλον μὲν ποιεῖν, ἄλλον δὲ τῶν γινομένων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ γὰρ πάντως ὁρᾶται τὸ τοιοῦτον. πολλὴ δὲ καὶ τοῖς ζῴοις ἔμφασις ἐναπόκειται τῶν εἰρημένων· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ γεννῆσαν καὶ τῆς τροφῆς ἐπιμελεῖται τοῦ γεννηθέντος, ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον καθ' ὅσον οἷός τέ ἐστι προνοεῖ· τὰ δὲ μὴ προνοοῦντα δι' ἀσθένειαν οὐ προνοεῖ. δέδεικται οὖν θεὸς μὲν ὢν ὁ προνοητής, πρόνοια δὲ ἡ βούλησις αὐτοῦ. 42 περὶ τοῦ τίνων ἐστὶ πρό νοια Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστι πρόνοια, καὶ τί ἐστιν εἴρηται· λείπεται δὲ εἰπεῖν τίνων ἐστι πρόνοια, πότερον τῶν καθόλου ἢ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα, ἢ καὶ τῶν καθόλου καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα. Πλάτων μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ καθόλου καὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα πρόνοιαν διοικεῖν βούλεται, διαιρῶν τὸν τῆς προνοίας λόγον εἰς τρία. πρώτην μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὴν τοῦ πρώτου θεοῦ· προνοεῖν δὲ τοῦτον προηγουμένως μὲν τῶν ἰδεῶν, ἔπειτα δὲ ξύμπαντος τοῦ καθόλου κόσμου, οἷον οὐρανοῦ καὶ ἀστέρων καὶ πάντων τῶν καθόλου, τουτέστι τῶν γενῶν, οὐσίας τε καὶ ποσότητος καὶ ποιότητος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων καὶ τῶν τούτοις ὑποτεταγμένων εἰδῶν· τῆς δὲ γενέσεως τῶν ἀτόμων ζῴων τε καὶ φυτῶν καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐν γενέσει καὶ φθορᾷ τοὺς δευτέρους θεούς, τοὺς τὸν οὐρανὸν περιπολοῦντας, προνοεῖν (καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ τὴν τούτων