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he assigns generation to the sun and to the zodiacal circle); but Plato declares that the third providence is of the conduct and the end of actions and of the attainment of the things in life, of the goods called both natural and material and instrumental, and of their opposites. And that certain appointed daemons about the earth preside over this, as guardians of human actions. And that the second and third providence derive their being from the first, so that all things are potentially governed by the first god, who appointed both the second and the third providers. Now, to refer all things to God and to say that all providence depends on His will is worthy of praise; but no longer so, to call those who revolve in the heavens a second providence. For what happens is not providence but fate and necessity. For in whatever way they are configured, it is necessary for events to happen and not possible for them to be otherwise; but it has long been shown that nothing under providence falls under necessity. But the Stoic philosophers, by advocating for fate and that which is in our power, leave no room for providence; but in truth they also do away with that which is in our power, as was shown before. But Democritus and Heraclitus and Epicurus hold that there is no providence for universals or for particulars. Epicurus, at any rate, used to say that the blessed and incorruptible being neither has troubles itself nor provides them for another, so that it is held by neither angers nor favors; for all such things are in weakness. Anger is foreign to the gods. for it happens over something unwilled; but to God, nothing is unwilled. These men, therefore, follow their own principles. For thinking that this universe was constituted by chance, they reasonably assert that all things are without providence. For of things for which there is no creator, who could be the provider? For it is clear that things that came to be by chance at the beginning must necessarily be carried along by chance. It is necessary, therefore, to oppose their first opinion; for if this is refuted, what has been said will suffice as proof that providence exists. Reserving, therefore, the refutation of these men for its proper time, let us come to the opinion of Aristotle and of the others who say that particulars are without providence. For Aristotle also holds that particular things are governed by nature alone, as he intimated in the seventh book of the Nicomachean Ethics; for he supposes that this [nature], being divine and existing in all created things, naturally suggests to each one the choice of advantageous things and the avoidance of harmful ones; for each of the animals, as has been said, both selects the food suitable for itself and pursues what is advantageous and naturally understands the cures for its ailments. But Euripides and Menander, in some places, say that the mind in each one provides for each, but none of the gods do. But the mind is concerned only with things in our power; for it is concerned either with actions and arts, or with contemplation; but providence is concerned with things not in our power, such as being rich or not, and being healthy or not, none of which the mind can bring about, nor indeed can nature, as Aristotle thinks; for the works of nature are also clear. But what has it to do with the mind or with nature that a murderer is sometimes punished and sometimes escapes? Unless someone should say that the one is of the providence of mind and nature; but the second, of fate. But if things according to mind and nature are of providence, and the things that follow are of fate, that which is in our power has been destroyed. But it is not so. For the things of the mind, both practical and contemplative, were shown to be in our power. But not all things under providence are of nature, even if the things of nature happen according to providence. For many things under providence are not works of nature, as was shown in the case of the murderer. For nature is a part of providence, not providence itself. These men, therefore, attribute the providence of particulars to nature and the mind; but the others say that God is concerned with the preservation of beings, so that nothing that has come to be should fail, and that he exercises providence for this alone, but that particulars are carried along as they happen; and because of this, many injustices, many blood-defilements, and, to speak concisely, all wickedness is current among men; and of these, as it happens, some escape justice, and some even

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γένεσιν ἀνατίθησιν ἡλίῳ καὶ τῷ ζωδιακῷ κύκλῳ)· τῆς δὲ διεξαγωγῆς καὶ τοῦ τέλους τῶν πρακτῶν καὶ τῆς τεύξεως τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον τῶν τε φυσικῶν καὶ τῶν ὑλικῶν τε καὶ ὀργανικῶν καλουμένων ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν τούτοις ἀντικειμένων, τὴν τρίτην εἶναι πρόνοιαν Πλάτων ἀποφαίνεται. προΐστασθαι δὲ ταύτης τινὰς τεταγμένους δαίμονας περὶ τὴν γῆν, φύλακας τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πράξεων. εἶναι δὲ καὶ τῇ δευτέρᾳ καὶ τῇ τρίτῃ προνοίᾳ τὸ εἶναι παρὰ τῆς πρώτης, ὡς δυνάμει πάντα παρὰ τοῦ πρώτου θεοῦ διοικεῖσθαι, τοῦ τάξαντος καὶ τοὺς δευτέρους καὶ τοὺς τρίτους προνοητάς. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀναφέρειν εἰς θεὸν τὰ πάντα καὶ τῆς ἐκείνου βουλήσεως λέγειν ἠρτῆσθαι τὴν πᾶσαν πρόνοιαν ἄξιον ἐπαινεῖν· οὐκέτι δὲ τὸ δευτέραν λέγειν πρόνοιαν τοὺς τὸν οὐρανὸν περι πολοῦντας. οὐ γὰρ πρόνοια τὸ γινόμενον ἀλλ' εἱμαρμένη καὶ ἀνάγκη. ὅπως γὰρ ἂν ἐκεῖνοι συσχηματίζωνται, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ γινόμενα γίνεσθαι καὶ ἄλλως μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι· τῶν δὲ κατὰ πρόνοιαν οὐδὲν ὑποπίπτειν ἀνάγκῃ πάλαι δέδεικται. οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ φιλόσοφοι τὴν εἱμαρμένην καὶ τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν πρεσβεύοντες οὐδεμίαν χώραν τῇ προνοίᾳ καταλείπουσιν· ἀλλὰ ταῖς ἀληθείαις καὶ τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἀναιροῦσιν, ὡς ἐδείχθη πρότερον. ∆ημόκριτος δὲ καὶ Ἡράκλειτος καὶ Ἐπίκουρος οὔτε τῶν καθόλου οὔτε τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα πρόνοιαν εἶναι βούλονται. Ἐπίκουρος γοῦν ἔλεγεν τὸ μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον οὔτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχει οὔτε ἄλλῳ παρέχει, ὥστε οὔτε ὀργαῖς οὔτε χάρισι συνέχεται· ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ γὰρ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα. ὀργὴ θεῶν ἀλλότριον. ἐπὶ γὰρ ἀβουλήτῳ γίνεται· θεῷ δὲ οὐδὲν ἀβούλητον. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ἀκολουθοῦσι ταῖς ἰδίαις ἀρχαῖς. ἐξ αὐτομάτου γὰρ ἡγούμενοι τὸ πᾶν τοῦτο συστῆναι, εἰκότως ἀπρονόητα φάσκουσιν εἶναι τὰ πάντα. ὧν γὰρ οὐδείς ἐστι δημιουργός, τούτων τίς ἂν εἴη προνοητής; δῆλον γὰρ ὡς αὐτομάτως ἀνάγκη φέρεσθαι τὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτομάτως γενόμενα. δεῖ τοίνυν πρὸς τὴν πρώτην αὐτοῖς ἐνστῆναι δόξαν· ταύτης γὰρ ἀναιρουμένης ἀρκέσει τὰ ῥηθέντα εἰς ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ πρόνοιαν εἶναι. φυλάξαντες οὖν τοῖς οἰκείοις καιροῖς τὸν τούτων ἔλεγχον, ἔλθωμεν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀριστοτέλους δόξαν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἀπρονόητα λεγόντων τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. καὶ γὰρ Ἀριστοτέλης ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως μόνης διοικεῖσθαι βούλεται τὰ κατὰ μέρος, ὡς ἐν τῷ ζῆτα τῶν Νικομαχείων Ἠθικῶν ὑπῃνίξατο· ταύτην γὰρ θείαν οὖσαν καὶ τοῖς γενητοῖς πᾶσιν ἐνυπάρχουσαν ἑκάστῳ φυσικῶς ὑποτίθεσθαι τὴν τῶν συμφερόντων αἵρεσιν καὶ τὴν τῶν βλαπτόντων φυγήν· ἕκαστον γὰρ ὡς εἴρηται τῶν ζῴων καὶ τὴν κατάλληλον ἑαυτῷ τροφὴν ἐκλέγεται καὶ τὸ συμφέρον μεταδιώκει καὶ τὰς ἰατρείας τῶν παθῶν φυσικῶς ἐξεπίσταται. Εὐριπίδης δὲ καὶ Μένανδρος ἐν ἐνίοις τὸν νοῦν τὸν ἐν ἑκάστῳ φασὶ προνοεῖν ἑκάστου, θεῶν δὲ μηδένα. ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν νοῦς τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστι μόνων· ἢ γὰρ τῶν πρακτῶν καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν, ἢ τῆς θεωρίας· ἡ δὲ πρόνοια τῶν οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, καὶ γὰρ τοῦ πλουτεῖν καὶ μή, καὶ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ μή, ὧν οὐδὲν ὁ νοῦς ποιεῖν δύναται, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἡ φύσις, ὡς Ἀριστοτέλει δοκεῖ· δῆλα γὰρ καὶ τὰ τῆς φύσεως ἔργα. τί δὲ πρὸς τὸν νοῦν ἢ τὴν φύσιν τὸ ποτὲ μὲν τιμωρεῖσθαι τὸν φονέα ποτὲ δὲ διαφεύγειν; εἰ μή τις λέγοι τὸ μὲν τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῆς φύσεως προνοίας εἶναι· τὸ δὲ δεύτερον, εἱμαρμένης. εἰ δὲ τὰ κατὰ νοῦν καὶ φύσιν προνοίας ἐστίν, τὰ δ' ἐπακολουθοῦντα τῆς εἱμαρμένης, ἀνῄρηται τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν. ἀλλ' οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει. τὰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ νοῦ, τοῦ τε πρακτικοῦ καὶ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ, ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐδείχθη. οὐ πάντα δὲ τὰ κατὰ πρόνοιαν τῆς φύσεως, εἰ καὶ τὰ τῆς φύσεως κατὰ πρόνοιαν γίνεται. πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν κατὰ πρόνοιαν οὐκ ἔστι φύσεως ἔργα, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ φονέως ἐδείχθη. ἔστι γὰρ μέρος προνοίας ἡ φύσις, οὐκ αὐτὸ πρόνοια. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν τῇ φύσει καὶ τῷ νῷ τὴν πρόνοιαν ἐπιγράφουσι τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα· οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι τῷ θεῷ μέλειν φασὶ τῆς τῶν ὄντων διαμονῆς ὥστε μηδὲν τῶν γενομένων ἐπιλεῖψαι, καὶ τούτου μόνου πρόνοιαν ποιεῖσθαι, τὰ δὲ καθ' ἕκαστα φέρεσθαι ὡς ἔτυχεν· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πολλὰς μὲν ἀδικίας, πολλὰς δὲ μιαιφονίας, καὶ συλλήβδην εἰπεῖν πᾶσαν κακίαν ἐμπολιτεύεσθαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· καὶ τούτων ὡς ἔτυχεν τινὰς μὲν διαφεύγειν τὴν δίκην, τινὰς δὲ καὶ