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that beings have a beginning according to essence and genesis, who does not know that of everything that is in any way whatsoever, except for the divine alone, which properly exists even beyond being itself, the ‘where’ is preconceived, with which the ‘when’ is in every way and altogether necessarily co-conceived. For it is not possible to conceive of the 'where' as defined by the privation of the 'when' (for these things are simultaneous, since they exist not without each other), nor is the 'when', which is naturally co-conceived with the 'where', in any way defined by privation. And all things are shown to be under the 'where', as being in place. For the whole itself is not beyond the whole of the whole (for it is somehow both irrational and impossible to declare the whole itself to be beyond its own whole), but having its circumscription by itself within itself, after the infinite power of the all-causal one that circumscribes all things, its own outermost limit. Which is also the place of the whole, just as some also define place, saying, Place is the circumference outside the whole, or the position outside the whole (14∆_234>, or the limit of the container in which the contained is contained.

And it will be jointly demonstrated that they are under the 'when', as being altogether in time, since all things that have being after God do not have being simply, but in a certain way. And for this reason they are not without beginning. For whatever in any way admits the principle of 'how', even if it is, yet it was not. Whence, in saying that the Divine is, we do not say *how* it is; and for this reason we say "Is" and "Was" of it simply and indefinitely and absolutely. For the Divine is unreceptive of any logos or thought, in that, not even when predicating 'being' of it, do we say that it *is*. For being is from it, but it is not being itself. For it is beyond even being itself, whether spoken of and conceived of as 'how' or simply. But if beings have being in a certain way, but not simply, just as they are under the 'where' because of the position and limit 1181 of the natural principles within them, so too will they admit being under the 'when' because of their beginning.

58. DEMONSTRATION THAT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO BE INFINITE, AND FOR THIS REASON NEITHER

WITHOUT BEGINNING... Demonstration that it is not possible to be infinite, and for this reason neither is anything without beginning, if

anything has its being according to quantity in multitude. And again if the essence of all things, there being many things, cannot be infinite in every way

can (for the quantity in multitude of these many beings constitutes a limit, circumscribing its principle of both being and how it is, for the essence of all things is not unconstrained), neither, clearly, will the hypostasis of each individual be without circumscription, (14∆_236> being circumscribed in relation to one another by number and by essence according to a principle. But if nothing among beings is free from circumscription, then clearly all beings have received both their 'when' to be and their 'where to be' in proportion to themselves. For without these nothing at all will be able to be, not essence, not quantity, not quality, not relation, not action, not passion, not motion, not state, nor anything else of those things by which the experts on these matters enclose the whole. Therefore none of the beings is without beginning, to which something else is preconceived, nor uncircumscribed to which something else can be co-conceived. But if none of the beings is without beginning or uncircumscribed, as the argument has shown by following the nature of beings, there was surely a time when some being was not; and if it was not, it has surely come to be, since it was not. For it is not possible to both be and come to be without turning or alteration. For if it was and has come to be, it turned, having passed over in genesis into that which it was not, or it was altered, having received an addition of beauty of which it was deprived. And everything that turns, or is altered, or is deficient in form, cannot be self-perfect. And that which is not self-perfect will in every way have need of another, who provides it with perfection, and such a thing is indeed perfect, but not self-perfect, because not by nature, but by participation the perfect

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τοῦ ἦρχθαι κατ᾿ οὐσίαν καί γένεσιν τά ὄντα, τίς ἀγνοεῖ ὅτι παντός τοῦ ὁπωσοῦν ὄντος, πλήν τοῦ θείου καί μόνου, τοῦ καί ὑπέρ αὐτό τό εἶναι κυρίως ὑπάρχοντος, προεπινοεῖται τό ποῦ, ᾧ πάντη τε καί πάντως ἐξ ἀνάγκης συνεπινοεῖται τό πότε. Οὐ γάρ τοῦ ποτέ διωρισμένον κατά στέρησιν δυνατόν ἐστιν ἐπινοῆσαι τό ποῦ (τῶν γάρ ἅμα ταῦτά ἐστιν, ἐπειδή καί τῶν οὐκ ἄνευ τυγχάνουσιν) ἤ δέ τοῦ ποῦ τό ποτέ, ᾧ συνεπινοεῖσθαι πέφυκεν, οὐδαμῶς διώρισται κατά στέρησιν. Ὑπό τό ποῦ δέ πάντα, ὡς ἐν τόπῳ ὄντα, δείκνυται. Οὐ γάρ ὑπέρ τό πᾶν αὐτό τό πᾶν τοῦ παντός (τοῦτο γάρ πως καί ἄλογον καί ἀδύνατον αὐτό τό πᾶν ὑπέρ τό ἑαυτοῦ πᾶν θεσπίζειν), ἀλλ᾿ ὑφ᾿ ἑαυτοῦ ἐν ἑαυτῷ τήν περιγραφήν ἔχον, μετά τήν πάντα περιγράφουσαν τοῦ παναιτίου ἄπειρον δύναμιν, αὐτό τό πέρας ἑαυτοῦ τό ἐξώτερον. Ὅπερ καί τόπος ἐστί τοῦ παντός, καθώς καί ὁρίζονταί τινες τόν τόπον λέγοντες, Τόπος ἐστίν ἡ ἔξω τοῦ παντός περιφέρεια, ἤ ἡ ἔξω τοῦ παντός (14∆_234> θέσις, ἤ τό πέρας τοῦ περιέχοντος ἐν ᾧ περιέχεται τό περιεχόμενον.

Καί ὑπό τό ποτέ, ὡς ἐν χρόνῳ πάντως ὄντα, συναποδειχθήσεται, ἐπειδή μή ἁπλῶς, ἀλλά πῶς τό εἶναι ἔχουσι, πάντα ὅσα μετά Θεόν τό εἶναι ἔχει. Καί διά τοῦτο οὐκ ἄναρχα. Πᾶν γάρ ὅπερ καθ᾿ ὁτιοῦν τόν τοῦ πῶς ἐπιδέχεται λόγον, κἄν εἰ ἔστιν, ἀλλ᾿ οὐκ ἦν. Ὅθεν τό Θεῖον εἶναι λέγοντες οὐ τό πῶς εἶναι λέγομεν· καί διά τοῦτο καί τό " Ἔστι" καί τό " Ἦν" ἁπλῶς καί ἀορίστως καί ἀπολελυμένως ἐπ᾿ αὐτοῦ λέγομεν. Ἀνεπίδεκτον γάρ παντός λόγου καί νοήματος τό Θεῖόν ἐστι, καθ᾿ ὅ οὔτε κατηγοροῦντες αὐτοῦ τό εἶναι λέγομεν αὐτό εἶναι. Ἐξ αὐτοῦ γάρ τό εἶναι, ἀλλ᾿ οὐκ αὐτό τό εἶναι. Ὑπέρ γάρ ἐστι καί αὐτοῦ τοῦ εἶναι, τοῦ τε πῶς καί ἁπλῶς λεγομένου τε καί νοουμένου. Εἰ δέ πῶς, ἀλλ᾿ οὐχ ἁπλῶς, ἔχει τά ὄντα τό εἶναι, ὥσπερ ὑπό τοῦ ποῦ εἶναι διά τήν θέσιν καί τό πέρας 1181 τῶν ἐπ᾿ αὐτοῖς κατά φύσιν λόγων, καί ὑπό τό ποτέ πάντως εἶναι διά τήν ἀρχήν ἐπιδέξεται.

ΝΗ (58). ΑΠΟ∆ΕΙΞΙΣ ΤΟΥ ΜΗ ∆ΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ ΑΠΕΙΡΟΝ ΕΙΝΑΙ, ΚΑΙ ∆ΙΑ ΤΟΥΤΟ ΟΥΤΕ

ΑΝΑΡΧΟΝ ΠΑΝ... Ἀπόδειξις τοῦ μή δύνασθαι ἄπειρον εἶναι, καί διά τοῦτο οὔτε ἄναρχον πᾶν, εἴ

τι κατά τήν ἐν πλήθει ποσότητα ἔχει τό εἶναι. Καί πάλιν εἰ ἡ πάντων οὐσία πολλῶν ὄντων τῶν πάντως ἄπειρος εἶναι οὐ

δύναται (πέρας γάρ ἔχει αὐτῶν τῶν πολλῶν ὄντων τήν ἐν πλήθει ποσότητα, περιγράφουσαν αὐτῆς τόν τε τοῦ εἶναι καί τοῦ πῶς εἶναι λόγον, οὐ γάρ ἄφετος ἡ πάντων οὐσία), οὐδέ ἡ τοῦ καθ᾿ ἕκαστον δῆλον ὑπόστασις ἔσται δίχα περιγραφῆς, (14∆_236> ἀλλήλαις τῷ ἀριθμῷ καί τῇ οὐσίᾳ κατά λόγον περιγεγραμμέναι. Εἰ δέ περιγραφῆς οὐδέν τῶν ὄντων ἐλεύθερον, πάντα τά ὄντα δηλονότι ἀναλόγως ἑαυτοῖς καί τό ποτέ εἶναι καί τό "ποῦ εἶναι" εἴληφε. Τούτων γάρ ἄνευ τό παράπαν οὐδέν εἶναι δυνήσεται, οὐκ οὐσία, οὐ ποσότης, οὐ ποιότης, οὐ σχέσις, οὐ ποίησις, οὐ πάθος, οὐ κίνησις, οὐχ ἕξις, οὐχ ἕτερόν τι τῶν οἷς τό πᾶν περικλείουσιν οἱ περί ταῦτα δεινοί. Οὐδέν οὖν τῶν ὄντων ἄναρχον, ᾧ τι ἕτερον προεπινοεῖσθαι, οὐδέ ἀπερίγραφον ᾧ τι ἕτερον συνεπινοεῖσθαι δύναται. Εἰ δέ τῶν ὄντων οὐδέν ἄναρχον ἤ ἀπερίγραφον, ὡς ἔδειξε ἀκολούθως τῇ φύσει τῶν ὄντων ἑπόμενος ὁ λόγος, ἦν πάντως ποτέ ὅτε τι τῶν ὄντων οὐκ ἦν· εἰ δέ οὐκ ἦν, πάντως γέγονεν, εἴπερ οὐκ ἦν. Οὐ γάρ ἄμφω ἐνδέχεται καί εἶναι καί γίνεσθαι χωρίς τροπῆς καί ἀλλοιώσεως. Εἰ γάρ ἦν καί γέγονεν, ἐτράπη, εἰς ὅπερ οὐκ ἦν μεταχωρῆσαν κατά τήν γένεσιν, ἤ ἠλλοιώθη, προσθήκην οὖ ἐστέρητο κάλλους ἐπιδεξάμενον. Πᾶν δέ τρεπόμενον, ἤ ἀλλοιούμενον, ἤ ἐλλιπές εἴδους, αὐτοτελές εἶναι οὐ δύναται. Τό δέ μή ὄν αὐτοτελές, ἑτέρου πάντως προσδεηθήσεται, τοῦ παρέχοντος αὐτῷ τήν τελειότητα, καί ἔστι τέλειον μέν τό τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ᾿ οὐκ αὐτοτελές, διά τό μή φύσει, μεθέξει δέ τό τέλειον