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For he says that he praises and embraces the one, both as being first and as conquering the other, but the other he considers despicable and abolished and defeated, since it has superfluous and therefore spurious antitheses, which we (p. 298) least of all deem worthy to call the wisdom of God. But this one, which also holds to false opinion, we would not deem it unworthy to also call wicked, such as is that of Plato, with its uncreated matter and self-sufficient ideas and creators, the later-born daemons, thus they persuade that the same thing is both good and not good, both holy and not, and simply opposing itself in vain through superfluity, and while it attempts to speak about every proposed subject, it accomplishes almost nothing intelligent, such are also the things revered by them, which according to the holy Samuel from childhood “will accomplish nothing.” But if you, wishing to make war on those who live in peace and have renounced superfluous antitheses, you make excuses in sins, innovating dogmas and names that assist you towards being contentious and fond of battle, shall we readily follow, having disregarded the thoughts and words that are familiar to us and commonly thought best? This will not be, this will not be. For who indeed of all other men and of all who have been born of men, if they were present, would have offered you an obedient ear as you speak and argue that a perfect man and philosopher and purified person is the one who knows all things, so that from this you might conclude that one must seek to learn, if someone professes to know something, whether he be pious or not, and that you might declare imperfect and impure the one who has not learned geometry from Euclid, arithmetic from another, and calculation from you, and having consorted with Ptolemy for music and astronomy through his books, and has studied the Aristotelian treatises for dialectic and physiology? For who of those now or of those who have ever had sense does not know that God alone is the one who knows all things?

And so that I may now dismiss the rest of these new teachings and bring the discourse back to the matter at hand, who does not know that philosophy is one thing in words, and another in (p. 300) deeds, and that of each of these there are many and various differences, through which wisdom appears as foolish and not, carnal and spiritual, disputed and undisputed, temporary and eternal, each clearly being at a very great distance from the other? “But I,” he says, “praise wisdom-itself, the idea of true knowledge, which is one.” But, my good man, this might perhaps be called wisdom-itself alone, but wisdom or philosophy alone, no. However, when you yourself, beginning your arguments on behalf of philosophy, say that “there have been given to us by God both the oracles of the theurgists and the teachings of philosophy,” you certainly do not subordinate the oracles of the theurgists to that philosophy. For how would you speak of these things and the things under it, if you did not distinguish those from it? What then do you call philosophy there? Is it that of the Greeks or the idea, which you mentioned here? But if it is that of the Greeks, then you happen to be extolling this one, but also contradicting yourself, stating the opposite here: “these are not the things which, bearing the name of philosophy, we extol, whatever so-and-so or so-and-so opined or wrote or taught, nor are these philosophy for us, but the very idea of knowledge,” and furthermore, because here you insist that one thing is called philosophy, the idea itself, while there you yourself speak of another, that of the Greeks. But if not this one, but you also there call the idea of knowledge philosophy, that is, the one which generally contains all knowledge, then the theurgic oracles, clearly separated from it by you there, are deprived of all knowledge and would not be productive of any knowledge, and according to you, being altogether distinct from knowledge, they were added to philosophy there only for the sake of deception. And what necessary need would there be of these, of the philosophical studies that both introduce and lead up to the knowledge of beings, which indeed of all hierarchy, or rather to say of all divine economy

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μέν γάρ ἐπαινεῖν φησι καί ἀσπάζεσθαι πρώτην τε οὖσαν καί τήν ἑτέραν νικῶσαν, τήν δέ ὑπεροπτέαν ἡγεῖται καί κατηργημένην καί ἡττημένην, ἅτε περιττάς ἔχουσαν καί διά τοῦτο κιβδήλους τάς ἀντιθέσεις, ἥν καί ἠμεῖς (σελ. 298) Θεοῦ καλεῖν σοφίαν ἀξιοῦμεν ἥκιστα˙ τήν δέ, καί κακοδοξίας ἀντεχομένην, οὐκ ἄν ἀπαξιώσαιμεν καί πονηράν προσειπεῖν, ὁποία ἐστίν ἡ τοῦ Πλάτωνος, μετά τῆς ἀκτίστου ὕλης καί τῶν αὐθυπάρκτων ἰδεῶν καί τῶν δημιουργῶν, τῶν ὑστερογενῶν δαιμόνων, ἔτσι καί τό αὐτό πείθουσι εἶναι καλόν τε καί μή καλόν, ὅσιόν τε καί μή, καί ἁπλῶς αὐτή ἑαυτῇ διά περιττότητα μάτην ἐναντιουμένη, καί λέγειν μέν περί παντός ἐπιχειροῦσα τοῦ προτεθέντος, περαίνουσα δέ σχεδόν συνετόν οὐδέν, οἷά ἐστι καί τά σεβόμενα παρ᾿ αὐτῶν, ἅ κατά τόν ἐκ παιδός ἱερόν Σαμουήλ «περανοῦσιν οὐθέν». Εἰ δέ σύ, τοῖς εἰρήνην ἄγουσι καί ταῖς περιτταῖς ἀντιθέσεσιν ἀποταξαμένοις θέλων πολεμεῖν, προφασίζῃ προφάσεις ἐν ἁμαρτίαις, δόγματα καινοτομῶν καί ὀνόματα συναιρόμενά σοι πρός τό φίλερι καί φιλόμαχον, ἡμεῖς ἑτοίμως ἑψόμεθα, τῶν συντρόφων ἡμῖν καί κοινῇ δοκούντων ἀρίστων νοημάτων τε καί ρημάτων ὀλιγορήσαντες; Οὐκ ἔσται τοῦτο, οὐκ ἔσται. Τίς γάρ δή καί τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ἀνθρώπων καί τῶν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γενομένων ἁπάντων, εἰ περιῆσαν, ὑπέσχεν ἄν σοι πειθήνιον οὖς λέγοντι καί κατασκευάζοντι ὅτι τέλειος ἄνθρωπος καί φιλόσοφος καί κεκαθαρμένος ἐστίν ὁ πάντα εἰδώς, ἵν᾿ ἐντεῦθεν συναγάγῃς τά δεῖν ζητεῖν μανθάνειν, εἴ τις ἐπαγγέλλεταί τι εἰδέναι, κἄν θεοσεβής ᾖ κἄν μή, καί ἀτελῆ καί ἄναγνον ἀποφήνῃς τόν μή μεμαθηκότα παρ᾿ Εὐκλείδου μέν τήν γεωμετρίαν, ἀριθμητικήν δέ παρ᾿ ἄλλου, παρά δέ σοῦ τήν λογιστικήν, μουσικήν δέ καί ἀστρονομίαν Πτολεμαίῳ διά τῶν κατ᾿ αὐτόν βιβλίων συγγεγονότα, διαλεκτικήν τε καί φυσιολογίαν τάς ἀριστοτελικάς πραγματείας ἐκμελετήσαντα; Τίς γάρ οὐκ οἶδε τῶν νῦν ἤ τῶν πώποτε νοῦν ἐχόντων Θεόν εἶναι μόνον τόν τά πάντα εἰδότα;

Καί ἵνα τἄλλα τῶν καινῶν ἀκουσμάτων νῦν ἀφῶ καί πρός τό προκείμενον ἐπαναγάγω τόν λόγον, τίς οὐκ οἶδε καί φιλοσοφίαν ἑτέραν μέν τήν ἐν λόγοις, ἑτέραν δέ τήν ἐν (σελ. 300) πράξεσι, καί τούτων ἑκατέρας πολλάς καί ποικίλας διαφοράς, δι᾿ ὧν μωρά τε καί μή, σαρκική τε καί πνευματική, ἀντιλεγομένη καί ἀναντίρρητος, πρόσκαιρος καί αἰώνιος ἀναφαίνεται σοφία, πλεῖστον ἑκατέρα σχεδόν τῆς ἑτέρας διεστηκυῖα σαφῶς; «Ἀλλ᾿ ἐγώ», φησί, «τήν αὐτοσοφίαν αὐτήν ἐπαινῶ, τήν τῆς ἀληθοῦς γνώσεως ἰδέαν, ἥτις μία ἐστίν». Ἀλλ᾿ ὦγαθέ μόνη μέν αὐτοσοφία ἴσως ἀν αὕτη κληθείη, μόνη δέ σοφία ἤ φιλοσοφία, οὔ. Ὅταν μέντοι τῶν ὑπέρ φιλοσοφίας λόγων αὐτός ἀρχόμενος «δεδόσθαι», λέγῃς «ἡμῖν πρός Θεοῦ τά τε τῶν θεουργῶν λόγια καί τά φιλοσοφίαν μαθήματα», τά τῶν θεουργῶν λόγια πάντως οὐχ ὑπό τήν φιλοσοφίαν τάττεις ἐκείνην. Πῶς γάρ ἄν ἔλεγες ταῦτα καί τά ὑπό ταύτην, εἰ μή διῄρεις αὐτῆς ἐκεῖνα; Τί τοίνυν ὀνομάζεις φιλοσοφίαν ἐκεῖ; πότερον τήν Ἑλλήνων ἤ τήν ἰδέαν, ἥν ἐνταῦθ᾿ εἶπες; Ἀλλ᾿ εἰ μέν τήν τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οὐκοῦν καί ταύτην ἐξυμνῶν τυγχάνεις, ἀλλά καί σαυτῷ ἀντικείμενος, ἐνταῦθ᾿ ὑπεναντίως φάσκων «οὐ ταῦτά ἐστιν, ἐφ᾿ ἅ τό τῆς φιλοσοφίας φέροντες ὄνομα ἐξυμνοῦμεν, ὅσα ὁ δεῖνα ἤ ὁ δεῖνα ἐδόξασεν ἤ συνέγραψεν ἤ ἐδίδαξεν, οὐδέ ταῦτα φιλοσοφία ἡμῖν ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾿ αὐτή ἡ τῆς γνώσεως ἰδέᾳ», προσέτι καί ὅτι μίαν μέν ἐνταῦθ᾿ ἰσχυρίζῃ καλεῖσθαι φιλοσοφίαν, τήν ἰδέαν αὐτήν, ἐκεῖ καί ἄλλην αὐτός λέγων, τήν τῶν Ἑλλήνων. Εἰ δέ μή ταύτην, ἀλλά κἀκεῖ τήν ἰδέαν τῆς γνώσεως λέγεις φιλοσοφίαν, τήν γενικῶς δηλαδή πᾶσαν περιέχουσαν γνῶσιν, τά παρά σοῦ ταύτης ἐκεῖ σαφῶς ἀποδιαιρούμενα θεουργικά λόγια πάσης γνώσεως ἐστέρηται καί παρεκτικά γνώσεως οὐδεμιᾶς ἄν εἴη, καθόλου δέ τῆς γνώσεως ἀποδιεσταλμένα κατά σέ καί πρός φενακισμόν μόνον τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ προσετέθησαν ἐκεῖ. Τίς δ᾿ ἄν εἴη καί χρεία τούτων ἀναγκαῖα, τῶν κατά φιλοσοφίαν μαθημάτων καί εἰσαγόντων καί ἀναγόντων εἰς τήν γνῶσιν τῶν ὄντων, ἥ δή πάσης ἱεραρχίας, ταὐτόν δ᾿ εἰπεῖν πάσης θείας οἰκονομίας