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He willed not only those things which He willed naturally as God (for it is not of the Godhead to will to eat, drink, and such things), but also the things constitutive of human nature, not by opposition of will, but in the property of the natures; for He willed these things naturally then, when His divine will willed and permitted the flesh to suffer and to do its own things. That the will belongs naturally to man is clear from this. Leaving aside the divine, there are three kinds of life: the vegetative, the sensory, the intellectual. The property of the vegetative, then, is nutritive, augmentative, and generative movement; of the sensory, movement according to impulse; of the rational and intellectual, that which is of free will. If, therefore, nutritive movement belongs by nature to the vegetative, and movement according to impulse to the sensory, then that which is of free will belongs by nature to the rational and intellectual; and free will is nothing other than the will; therefore the Word, having become flesh, ensouled, intellectual, and with free will, became also possessed of a will. Furthermore, natural things are also unlearned; for no one learns to reason or to live or to be hungry or to be thirsty or to sleep. Nor do we learn to will; so that to will is natural. And again: If in irrational creatures nature leads, but in man it is led, he being moved authoritatively according to will, then man is by nature possessed of a will. And again: If man was made in the image of the blessed and super-essential Godhead, and the divine nature is by nature possessed of free will and will, then man also, as its image, is by nature possessed of free will and will. For the Fathers defined free will as will. Furthermore, if the will exists in all men, and does not exist in some but not in others, and that which is commonly observed in all characterizes the nature in the individuals under it, then man is by nature possessed of a will. And again: If nature does not admit of more and less, and the will exists equally in all, and not more in some and less in others, then man is by nature possessed of a will; so that if man is by nature possessed of a will, the Lord also, not only as He is God, but also as He became man, is by nature possessed of a will. For just as He assumed our nature, so also He assumed by nature our will, and according to this the Fathers said that He fashioned our will in Himself. If the will is not natural, it will be either hypostatic or contrary to nature; but if it is hypostatic, the Son will thus have a different will from the Father; for the hypostatic is characteristic of the hypostasis alone; if it is contrary to nature, the will will be a falling away from nature; for things contrary to nature are destructive of things according to nature. Does the God and Father of all will as Father or as God? But if He wills as Father, His will will be different from that of the Son; for the Son is not Father. But if He wills as God, and the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God, then the will is of the nature, that is, natural. Further, if according to the Fathers, those whose will is one, their essence is also one, but the will of the Godhead of Christ and of His manhood is one, then their essence will also be one and the same. And again: If according to the Fathers the difference of nature is not manifested in the one will, it is necessary either for those who say one will not to speak of a natural difference in Christ, or for those who speak of a natural difference not to speak of one will. And again: If, as the divine Gospel says, the Lord, having come into the region of Tyre and Sidon, "and having entered a house, He wished no one to know, and He could not be hidden," if His divine will is all-powerful, yet having willed to be hidden He was not able, then it was as man that He willed and was not able, and He possessed a will also as man. And again: "Having come," it says, "to the place" "He said: I thirst." "And they gave Him wine mixed with gall, and having tasted it He would not drink." If, then, as God He thirsted and having tasted would not drink, then He is subject to passion as God; for both thirst and taste are a passion. But if not as God, then certainly as man He possessed a will. And the blessed Apostle Paul: "Becoming," he says, "obedient unto death, even death on a cross." Obedience is the submission of an existing will, not of a non-existing one; for that which is irrational is not obedient or

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αὐτοῦ οὐχὶ μόνα θέλοντος, ἃ φυσικῶς ὡς θεὸς ἤθελεν (οὐ γὰρ θεότητος τὸ θέλειν φαγεῖν, πιεῖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα), ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ συστατικὰ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως, οὐκ ἐναντιότητι γνώμης, ἀλλ' ἐν ἰδιότητι τῶν φύσεων· τότε γὰρ ταῦτα φυσικῶς ἤθελεν, ὅτε ἡ θεία αὐτοῦ θέλησις ἤθελε καὶ παρεχώρει τῇ σαρκὶ πάσχειν καὶ πράττειν τὰ ἴδια. Ὅτι δὲ φυσικῶς πρόσεστι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἡ θέλησις, ἐντεῦθεν δῆλον. Ὑπεξαιρουμένης τῆς θείας τρία εἴδη ζωῆς εἰσιν· ἡ φυτική, ἡ αἰσθητική, ἡ νοερά. Τῆς μὲν οὖν φυτικῆς ἴδιον ἡ θρεπτική, ἡ αὐξητική, ἡ γεννητικὴ κίνησις· τῆς δὲ αἰσθητικῆς ἡ καθ' ὁρμὴν κίνησις· τῆς δὲ λογικῆς καὶ νοερᾶς ἡ αὐτεξούσιος. Εἰ οὖν κατὰ φύσιν πρόσεστι τῇ φυτικῇ ἡ θρεπτικὴ καὶ τῇ αἰσθητικῇ ἡ καθ' ὁρμὴν κίνησις, κατὰ φύσιν ἄρα πρόσεστι καὶ τῇ λογικῇ καὶ νοερᾷ ἡ αὐτεξούσιος· αὐτεξουσιότης δὲ οὐδὲν ἕτερόν ἐστιν εἰ μὴ ἡ θέλησις· γεγονὼς τοίνυν ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἔμψυχος, νοερὰ καὶ αὐτεξούσιος, γέγονε καὶ θελητικός. Ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἀδίδακτά εἰσι τὰ φυσικά· οὐδεὶς γὰρ λογίζεσθαι ἢ ζῆν ἢ πεινῆν ἢ διψῆν ἢ ὑπνοῖν μανθάνει. Οὔτε δὲ θέλειν μανθάνομεν· ὥστε φυσικὸν τὸ θέλειν. Καὶ πάλιν· Εἰ ἐν τοῖς ἀλόγοις ἄγει μὲν ἡ φύσις, ἄγεται δὲ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐξουσιαστικῶς κατὰ θέλησιν κινουμένῳ, ἄρα φύσει θελητικὸς ὁ ἄνθρωπος. Καὶ πάλιν· Εἰ κατ' εἰκόνα τῆς μακαρίας καὶ ὑπερουσίου θεότητος ὁ ἄνθρωπος γεγένηται, αὐτεξούσιος δὲ φύσει καὶ θελητικὴ ἡ θεία φύσις, ἄρα καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὡς αὐτῆς εἰκὼν αὐτεξούσιος φύσει καὶ θελητικός. Τὸ γὰρ αὐτεξούσιον θέλησιν ὡρίσαντο οἱ πατέρες. Ἔτι δὲ εἰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἐνυπάρχει τὸ θέλειν καὶ οὐ τοῖς μὲν ὑπάρχει, τοῖς δὲ οὐκ ἐνυπάρχει, τὸ δὲ κοινῶς πᾶσιν ἐνθεωρούμενον φύσιν χαρακτηρίζει ἐν τοῖς ὑπ' αὐτὸ ἀτόμοις, ἄρα φύσει θελητικὸς ὁ ἄνθρωπος. Καὶ αὖθις· Εἰ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ἡ φύσις οὐκ ἐπιδέχεται, ἐπίσης δὲ πᾶσιν ἐνυπάρχει τὸ θέλειν καὶ οὐ τοῖς μὲν πλέον, τοῖς δὲ ἔλαττον, ἄρα φύσει θελητικὸς ὁ ἄνθρωπος· ὥστε εἰ φύσει θελητικὸς ὁ ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ὁ κύριος, οὐ μόνον καθὸ θεός, ἀλλὰ καὶ καθὸ ἄνθρωπος γέγονε, φύσει θελητικός ἐστιν. Ὥσπερ γὰρ τὴν ἡμετέραν φύσιν ἀνέλαβεν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἡμέτερον θέλημα φύσει ἀνείληφεν, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο οἱ πατέρες τὸ ἡμέτερον ἐν αὐτῷ τυπῶσαι αὐτὸν ἔφησαν θέλημα. Εἰ φυσικὸν οὐκ ἔστι τὸ θέλημα, ἢ ὑποστατικὸν ἔσται ἢ παρὰ φύσιν· ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ὑποστατικόν, ἑτερόβουλος οὕτω γε ἔσται ὁ υἱὸς τῷ πατρί· μόνης γὰρ ὑποστάσεως χαρακτηριστικὸν τὸ ὑποστατικόν· εἰ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν, ἔκπτωσις τῆς φύσεως ἔσται τὸ θέλημα· φθαρτικὰ γὰρ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν τὰ παρὰ φύσιν. Ὁ τῶν ὅλων θεὸς καὶ πατὴρ καθὸ πατὴρ θέλει ἢ καθὸ θεός. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν καθὸ πατήρ, ἄλλο αὐτοῦ ἔσται παρὰ τὸ τοῦ υἱοῦ θέλημα· οὐ γὰρ πατὴρ ὁ υἱός. Εἰ δὲ καθὸ θεός, θεὸς δὲ ὁ υἱός, θεὸς δὲ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον· ἄρα τὸ θέλημα φύσεως ἤγουν φυσικόν. Ἔτι εἰ κατὰ τοὺς πατέρας, ὧν τὸ θέλημα ἕν, τούτων καὶ ἡ οὐσία μία, ἓν δὲ θέλημα τῆς θεότητος τοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος αὐτοῦ, ἄρα μία καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ τούτων ἔσται καὶ ἡ οὐσία. Καὶ πάλιν· Εἰ κατὰ τοὺς πατέρας ἡ τῆς φύσεως διαφορὰ τῷ ἑνὶ θελήματι οὐ διαφαίνεται, ἀνάγκη ἢ ἓν θέλημα λέγοντας φυσικὴν ἐν Χριστῷ μὴ λέγειν διαφορὰν ἢ φυσικὴν λέγοντας διαφορὰν ἓν θέλημα μὴ λέγειν. Καὶ αὖθις· Εἰ, καθώς φησι τὸ θεῖον εὐαγγέλιον, ἐλθὼν ὁ κύριος εἰς τὰ μέρη Τύρου καὶ Σιδῶνος «καὶ εἰσελθὼν εἰς οἶκον οὐδένα ἠθέλησε γνῶναι καὶ οὐκ ἠδυνήθη λαθεῖν», εἰ τὸ θεῖον αὐτοῦ θέλημα παντοδύναμον, θελήσας δὲ λαθεῖν οὐ δεδύνηται, ἄρα καθὸ ἄνθρωπος θελήσας οὐκ ἠδυνήθη καὶ θελητικὸς ἦν καὶ καθὸ ἄνθρωπος. Καὶ πάλιν· «Ἐλθών», φησίν, «εἰς τὸν τόπον» «εἶπε· ∆ιψῶ». «Καὶ ἔδωκαν αὐτῷ οἶνον μετὰ χολῆς μεμιγμένον, καὶ γευσάμενος οὐκ ἠθέλησε πιεῖν». Εἰ μὲν οὖν καθὸ θεὸς ἐδίψησε καὶ γευσάμενος οὐκ ἠθέλησε πιεῖν, ἐμπαθὴς ἄρα καθὸ θεός· πάθος γὰρ ἥ τε δίψα καὶ ἡ γεῦσις. Εἰ δὲ οὐ καθὸ θεός, πάντως καθὸ ἄνθρωπος θελητικὸς ἦν. Καὶ ὁ μακάριος δὲ Παῦλος ὁ ἀπόστολος· «Γενόμενος», φησίν, «ὑπήκοος μέχρι θανάτου, θανάτου δὲ σταυροῦ». Ἡ ὑπακοὴ τοῦ ὄντος θελήματός ἐστιν ὑποταγή, οὐ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος· οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἄλογον ὑπήκοον ἢ