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Moreover; if they say that the will is that which is willed, and we are what is willed and willable by nature; for we happen to be God's creation, then God has no other will by nature than only us, coming to be and passing away, just as we do; and before we existed, being bereft of all will. And the same will be concluded in our case, and (15A_248> there will not be in us anything proper and natural, but only that which is willed from without, which is and is not; good and not so, it will be fashioned. And how is what is willed also something from outside? For because of the one moved by will towards it, and not because of itself, is it called willed and willable. So that if he who has the natural will wills nothing of existing things, for him there is nothing willed or willable. What argument then is there for those who insist that the will is that which is willed, or declare that it is so stated by the holy Fathers?

0189 But let it be said so according to them, for our argument is not about a difference of names, but of pious thoughts; but let them answer what we fittingly ask, whether the divine will is by nature other than the human will; and this other than that, even if it is called and named ten thousand times; let them teach this, and steady our intellect, shaken by what is unknown; and let us not be too vexed by their coinages of names, but rather let us even contribute something of our own in these matters. For if they are not one and another in essence, it is clear that they are one and the same by nature. And if this is so, then of necessity the nature is also one and unchangeable. For where there is no natural otherness of wills, there is none at all of essence and nature. But if they are by nature one and another, they are certainly different; and if they are different, how is it not necessary to confess the number in which they consist? For the denial of this works the utter disappearance of the will itself, and of the differing things, as if they were not. For how is it possible both to exist and not to be numbered, and for what reason? Or how can the wills exist by nature but not be numbered, if the natures themselves reasonably would not cease from being numbered? For what is right in the case of the natures, being connatural and constitutive of the realities, it is fitting that this should also apply to the wills themselves, and either let them take away number from these too (15A_250> as something which according to them is ruinous, or, as it is in no way harmful, let it be included for those as well. To signify the uniting natural difference in them, for which reason we use it even for the essences; or let them show how, through their refusal of number, they do not work a universal abolition or confusion of the Savior's natural human will.

And how is the incarnate Word a perfect man, without a natural will? For to be deified by the union with God does not remove from its essential being the very nature of the flesh animated by a rational and intellectual soul; just as the extreme and thorough co-mingling and union with the fire does not remove the iron from its own nature; but it both undergoes the properties of fire, since by the union it has become fire; and again it is heavy by nature, and it cuts, because it has not suffered any damage to its own nature, nor has it been removed at all from its natural energy; although existing with fire in the same and one hypostasis, and acting without separation, both the things according to its own nature; I mean the cutting; and again the things according to the union, which is the burning. For the cutting belongs to it, just as the cutting belongs to the fire, on account of their extreme interpenetration and communication into one another; and we are in no way prevented either from naming or numbering its nature, I mean that of the iron, even if it is seen with fire, 0192 nor its natural energy, even if it is perceived with burning, and has no separation from it, but appears and is known in a unified way with it and in it. What then is the reason, for not numbering what is naturally present to the nature, that is, the will, and thereby to attribute our own imperfection to the more-than-perfect and pre-perfect God the Word incarnate, although all things equally, by the good pleasure of the Father, and the cooperation of the Holy Spirit for our salvation,

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Ἄλλως τε· εἰ θέλημά φασι τό θεληθέν, θεληθέν δέ καί θελητόν κατά φύσιν ἡμεῖς· Θεοῦ γάρ κτίσμα τυγχάνομεν, οὐκ ἄλλο λοιπόν ἤ μόνον ἡμᾶς θέλημα κατά φύσιν ἔχει Θεός, γινόμενόν τε καί ἀπογινόμενον, καθά καί ἡμεῖς· πρίν δέ εἶναι, παντός ὤν θελήματος ἔρημος. Τό αὐτό δέ καί ἐπί ἡμῶν συναχθήσεται, καί οἰκεῖον (15Α_248> μέν ἡμῖν καί φυσικόν οὐ προσέσται, μόνον δέ τό ἔξωθεν θεληθέν, ὄν τε καί μή ὄν· καλόν καί μή τοιοῦτον, περιπλασθήσεται· πῶς ( πρός) δέ καί θεληθέν τε τῶν ἐκτός ὑπάρχει. ∆ιά γάρ τόν πρός αὐτό θελήσει κινούμενον, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ δι᾿ αὐτό λέγεται, θεληθέν καί θελητόν. Ὡς ἐάν μηδέν θελήσῃ τῶν ὄντων, ὁ τήν φυσικήν θέλησιν ἔχων, οὐδέν αὐτῷ θεληθέν ἤ θελητόν. Τίς οὖν ὁ λόγος τοῖς θέλημα τό θεληθέν ἰσχυριζομένοις ὑπάρχειν , ἤ λέγεσθαι πρός τῶν ἁγίων Πατέρων ἀποφαινομένοις;

0189 Ἔστω δέ καί οὕτω λεγόμενον κατ᾿ αὐτούς, οὐ γάρ περί διαφορᾶς ὀνομάτων ἡμῖν, ἀλλ' εὐσεβῶν νοημάτων ὁ λόγος· ἐκεῖνο δέ προσηκόντως ἐρομένοις ἀποκριθῶσιν, εἰ ἄλλο κατά φύσιν ἐστί τό θεῖον πρός τό ἀνθρώπινον θέλημα· καί ἄλλο πρός ἐκεῖνο τοῦτο, κἄν εἰ μυρίως καλῆται καί ὀνομάζηται· τοῦτο διδάξωσι, καί κραδαινομένην ἡμῶν ἐπί τῷ ἀγνώστῳ στηρίζωσι τήν διάνοιαν· καί οἱ λίαν αὐτῶν ταῖς ὀνοματοθεσίαις δυσχεράνομεν, ἀλλ᾿ εἴ τι καί παρ᾿ ἑαυτῶν ἐν τούτοις συνεισενέγκομεν. Εἰ γάρ ἄλλο καί ἄλλο κατ᾿οὐσίαν οὐκ ἔστι, δῆλον ὡς ἕν φύσει καί ταὐτόν. Καί εἰ τοῦτο, καί ἡ φύσις ἐξ ἀνάγκης μία καί ἀπαράλλακτος. Οὗ γάρ ἑτερότης φυσική θελημάτων οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδ' οὐσίας τό παράπαν καί φύσεως. Εἰ δέ ἄλλο φύσει καί ἄλλο, διάφορα πάντως· καί εἰ διάφορα, πῶς τόν ἐν πόσῳ τούτων ἀριθμόν οὐχ ὁμολογῆσαι χρεών; Ἡ γάρ τούτου ἐξάρνησις, αὐτῆς τε πάμπαν ἀφανισμόν, καί τῶν διαφερόντων, ὡς οὐκ ὄντων, ἐργάζεται. Πῶς γάρ καί εἶναι δυνατόν καί μή ἀριθμεῖσθαι, καί δι᾿ ἥντινα τήν αἰτίαν; ἤ πῶς ὄντα μέν κατά φύσιν, οὐκ ἀριθμούμενα δέ τά θελήματα τήν αὐτήν, εἴπερ εὐλόγως μή παύσοιντο τοῦ ἀριθμεῖσθαι καὐταί αἱ φύσεις; Τό γάρ ἐπ᾿ ἐκείνων καλόν, ἐμφύτων ὄντων καί συστατικῶν τῶν πραγμάτων, καί ἐπ᾿ αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν προσήκει τοῖς πράγμασι, καί ἤ κἀκ τούτων ἀνέλωσι τόν ἀριθμόν, ὡς ὅτι (15Α_250> κατ᾿ αὐτούς λυμαινόμενον, ἤ μηδαμῶς παραβλάπτοντα, καί ἐπ᾿ ἐκείνων περιληφθῇ. Πρός δήλωσιν τῆς ἑνούσης αὐτοῖς ἐμφύτου διαφορᾶς, δι᾿ ἥν αὐτῷ κἄν ταῖς οὐσίαις προσχρώμεθα· ἤ δείξωσι, πῶς μή ἀναίρεσιν πάντωνς ἤ σύγχυσιν, τοῦ κατά ἄνθρωπον φυσικοῦ τοῦ Σωτῆρος θελήματος ἀπεργάζονται, διά τῆς κατά τόν ἀριθμόν παραιτήσεως.

Καί πῶς τέλειος ἄνθρωπος ὁ σαρκωθείς Λόγος, θελήματος ἐκτός φυσικοῦ; Τό γάρ θεωθῆναι τῇ πρός Θεόν ἑνώσει, καθά καί τήν φύσιν αὐτήν τῆς λογικῶς τε καί νοερῶς ἐψυχωμένης σαρκός, τῆς κατ᾿ οὐσίαν ὀντότητος οὐκ ἐξίστησιν· ὥσπερ οὐδέ τῆς οἰκείας τόν σίδηρον, ἡ ἄκρα καί δι᾿ ὅλου πρός τό πῦρ συνανάκρασίς τε καί ἕνωσις· ἀλλά πάσχει μέν τά πυρός, ἐπειδή πῦρ τῇ ἑνώσει γεγένηται· βρίθει δέ πάλιν κατά φύσιν, καί τέμνει, ὅτι μή τῆς οἰκείας λώβην πέπονθε φύσεως, ἤ φυσικῆς ἐνεργείας ἐξέστη τό σύνολον· καίτοι μετά πυρός ὑπάρχων κατά τήν αὐτήν καί μίαν ὑπόστασιν, καί ἀδιαστάτως δρῶν, τά τε κατά φύσιν ἰδίαν· λέγω δέ τήν τομήν· καί τά καθ᾿ ἕνωσιν αὖθις, ὅπερ ἐστίν ἡ καῦσις. Αὐτοῦ γάρ ὑπάρχει, καθάπερ καί τοῦ πυρός ἡ τομή, διά τήν ἄκραν τούτων αἰς ἄλληλα περιχώρησίν τε καί ἀντίδοσιν· καί οὔτε τήν φύσιν αὐτοῦ, φημί δέ τοῦ σιδήρου, κἄν μετά πυρός ὁρᾶται, 0192 κωλυόμεθα τό παράπαν ὀνομάζειν ἤ ἀριθμεῖν, οὔτε τήν φυσικήν ἐνέργειαν, εἰ καί μετά καύσεως καθορᾶται, καί μηδεμίαν ἔχει πρός ταύτην διάστασιν, ἀλλ᾿ ἑνοειδῶς σύν αὐτῇ τε καί ἐν αὐτῇ διαφαίνεται καί γνωρίζεται. Τίς οὖν ὁ λόγος, τοῦ τό φυσικῶς τῇ φύσει προσόν μή ἀριθμεῖν, τουτέστι τό θέλημα, καί ταύτῃ τό καθ᾿ ἡμᾶς ἀτελές τῷ ὑπερτελεῖ καί προτελείῳ Θεῷ Λόγῳ σεσαρκωμένῳ προσμαρτυρεῖν, καίτοι πάντων ἐπίσης, εὐδοκίᾳ Πατρός, καί συνεργείᾳ Πνεύματος ἁγίου διά τήν ἡμῶν σωτηρίαν,