Opuscula psychologica, theologica, daemonologica
After the judgment of the thoughts, an exact discernment of how the thoughts happen to be, whether they are good or otherwise but imagination is the
to divide for us, by the established terms, the sesquitertian ratios into both the sesquioctave ratios and the leimmata, we would have stopped at thes
having split it, he bent each one into a circle, bringing them together middle to middle with each other like a chi, having joined 7 them both to them
left, or rather the one is an image of mind, the other of soul. And in the soul itself, the right is that which is turned toward the intelligible thin
regarding the explanation of the Platonic psychogony, this we now discharge for you as a kind of debt. For Plato's statement that the division of thes
and of exegesis. And there is a letter of mine placed among my books that has traced out and carefully examined the meaning in the sayings. But it is
a ruler drives a team of two then of the 14 horses, one of them is noble and good and of such stock, but the other is from opposite stock and is oppo
a body from one of the seeing things, such that it is able to be extended as far as the stars. But it was better, he says, than to say that the extern
through which it is not swept into material disorder, but is joined to the divine light, holds it in its own place and makes it unmixed with matter, l
of knowledge. For there is something intelligible, which you must understand with the flower of the intellect. And he says that the one in us is twofo
agrees, but among them the salty is more than the drinkable. They say, for example, that every soul is either divine or changing from intellect to min
to be deemed worthy of pardon in repenting. If the soul is a body according to some of the ancients, what is it that contains it? every body is three-
distinction. Two kinds of air according to Aristotle, the vaporous from the exhalation of water and the smoky from the extinguishing of fire. The latt
Plato. Pleasure is not a coming-to-be for coming-to-be is of things that are not, while pleasure is of things that are. And coming-to-be is swift and
is natural, while habit is acquired and taught. Providence is the care for existing things that comes from God. Epicurus says: the blessed and incorr
but such powers are simply and imperceptibly desired. What then? Do we have three souls? Solution: just as the soul, when united to the body, seems to
When this is dimmed they also are dimmed the soul flourishes when this 34 withers. Further, everything desires to preserve its own substrate. If the
actuality, as physicians, others in relation to something, others a double or one-and-a-half ratio. Potentiality is found in substance, as a man in th
concerning form, matter and cause, for example the matter of the celestial bodies is not the four elements, but a certain fifth, spherical one, as be
as knowledge (for knowledge is a transition from defined things to defined things for this reason it is also knowledge, as leading the mind to a stat
this, for indeed the flesh also moves downwards and is none of the elements. Aporia: but matter, that is the element, is not soul, but the form that c
definitions have as their beginning the most general things, as their end the most specific things. If, then, these are finite, so are the definitions
and it acts according to one part and another. It seems to act in these ways as being one. For if it is divided, it is necessary for the parts to be e
the rest, but this is about hot and soft, heavy and light, rare and dense, and many opposites. In humans, the cause of local motion is intellect, in i
is nourished {which} is twofold: either as Matter or as an instrument. And the instrument is twofold: either moving and being moved, like the innate h
is equal in distance to the zodiac signs. Light is not a body. for if it were a body, how would it be possible for it to have instantaneous movement,
we see the introduction of the forms of things seen entering the sight, but how do we see the interval of the air in between? Solution: It is not that
with a violent collision. In soft things no sound is produced, because the air is broken up in their pores and dispersed as in sponges. In things that
a buzzing which is conveyed back to the sense of hearing. Others say that the sound occurring in the ears after the blockage is of the external air th
For instance, fish, not having this, are cooled through their gills. Those that have a windpipe also have a lung. Fish have neither these nor a heart.
the sense organs of touch, it is clear for every sense organ is both separated and known. Aristotle speaks of the senses both as one each and as many
Aristotle in On the Soul : if sensation ceased, the sense-organ would also cease. But if the second is not, neither is the first. Sensation and sense-
Some add also a sixth, the attentive [faculty], as when a man says, I perceived, I thought, I opined. To this part they also add the activities of t
We can say ten, but not indeed opine it, so that opinion is not up to us. But neither do we imagine what we wish for we see at night what we do not w
in the case of children, the one according to state, and the one in act, as the one governing all things or the one entering from without. Plato says
theoretical versus the practical. The theoretical corresponds to a vision discerning of forms, while the practical corresponds to a vision not only kn
organs. Moreover, at night the nutritive faculty is more active, but the locomotive faculty is not at all. A difficulty: the vegetative faculty produc
simpler, or rather the things inherent in the matter, into which the matter is also divided, which are also prop[erly] called its elements. I say then
he hints that it is not completed from both of the things mixed, but is produced in the union of the soul and the body, not by the soul itself giving
closing the senses, so as to know unknowingly the transcendent substance of that which is. For according to their own opinions, the philosopher who ha
he himself will also pardon his own student for the apparent 78 opposition to him and others will come here again to bear witness for us, the philoso
it grows and is naturally constituted to decay, must in every way grow along with and decay along with the other in a connate manner for that by whic
a demonstration, so also the soul in an infant's body and a more imperfect one, if it were in another, perfect body, would immediately have shown its
I shall use the argument. In what do you say virtue is inherent? or again, is it superimposed on the formless and incorporeal and uncompounded nature,
Porphyry has philosophized in harmony with this. For in discussing the soul, he says: “Just as insomniacs, by the very act of wanting to sleep and wat
have they cast off? Perhaps those who hold the contrary opinion will vex us with these things. But their objection is like a spider's web, which will
to have received watchwords from the first father, nor that they possess the fullness of many bosoms, nor would I accept that they stand before the bo
both the Sibylline and the Orphic ones, and those according to which the Berytian Bulls came to be and Amous the Egyptian, and Socrates and Plato (for
of the bonds by which they were bound, and after this, turning their minds upward, they will approach God. And if the account told about the Sibyl wer
has the front part? What then do you think? a mind scattered in so great a size is from this cause for him both slack and weak, and the soul is simply
would remember any of the things here. But as many of the souls as were allotted to more humble portions and their whole mind has not been snatched aw
Let us not altogether reject the analogy of the eye in the case of the soul, let it be and be called a more precise substance of the soul but if some
The manner of the entry of souls, and likewise of their release or separation from hence, both are most difficult or hard to explain for of the first
but by such powers the soul is led like some kind of thing moved by another, being drawn towards whatever the leaders happen to lead it, but then rath
For that which is according to reason, knowledge is readily at hand, but that which is contrary to reason, is so because it has received such a nature
of beasts, but perhaps the matter which reason has shown not to exist. Therefore our bodies will be resurrected, and there will be nothing to prevent
fitting and gluing it to that by means of a suitable analogy, not placing the rational and intellectual substance into any of the animals for this is
are generated from these powers alone, for this reason, having abandoned the others, they divided the substance of the soul into these alone. But if y
it is in fourths, when one might contemplate these both in the third order of the intellectual virtues and in the fourth of the paradigmatic virtues,
and so interpreting the Platonic opinion, but they do not seem to me to have grasped the precise meaning of his doctrine. But if I shall clarify for y
and with nothing separating them, it is necessary for the one to be ordered, and the other to order and the one which is ordered has its form divided
what is hard and resistant in them has been smoothed out by me. But what follows from this must be attributed to them alone for, proposing to speak a
proceeds from it and returns to it.” Then indeed he works out the point by division. For if it only remained, it would in no way differ from its cause
in our sacred writings, neither a whole soul nor any whole nature, apart from the partial ones, has been dogmatically established1. I for my part reje
by the energy, then also the substance is perfected according to it, and these things stand in each other according to one energy. For he who does not
having a life activated according to intellect and reason the psychic is defined according to reason 124 and takes care of divisible souls the physi
tormenting them. But there are, they say, both on earth divine daimons and in the air, guardians of the animals there, and <in> the water, extending t
make it superior to the confusion of life, but, if possible, may you not even leave behind in the terrestrial world the very body which you have put o
cast under your mind: for there is no plant of truth on earth» that is: do not busy your mind with the great measures of the earth, as the geographer
Gregory by reason and contemplation leads the soul up to the more divine things by reason that is according to us, the more intellectual and better,
such a lion-bearing fount of heaven and the stars, but the ruling part of its own existence conceals the vision of them. Chaldaean Oracle. From all si
often appearing, they feign the semblance of some goodness towards the one being initiated. Chaldean Oracle. The soul of mortals will draw God into it
they can. Whence everything they say and show is false and insubstantial for they know existing things through forms but that which knows future thi
and fear is the holding back of his goodness towards us for the sake of the economy. Chaldean Oracle. The Father snatched himself away, not even enclo
they are possessed by passions. Therefore, it is necessary for these also to receive their part of the whole judgment and, having been filled up with
for it is higher than being venerated, than being uttered, and than being conceived. A Chaldean Oracle. The Iynges, being conceived by the Father, the
an unknown password, spoken and unspoken. And they often bring the soul down 148 into the world for many reasons, either through the shedding of its w
of truth and of love. After which are the demiurgic fountains, such as that of the ideas, according to which the cosmos and the things in it have shap
enclosing the triad towards itself and they call these also intelligible. After these, another order of the intelligible and at the same time intelle
to the setting [sun], and the pit to the one just at mid-heaven. And thus, gently separating the membrane of the liver, [which is placed] upon the org
parts of philosophy is necessary. For according to moral philosophy it is necessary to assume that not all things are and come to be by necessity, but
knowledge and sees not only the essences themselves, but also their powers and their activities, both those according to nature and those contrary to
he acquired. For even before the birth of both, God knew that the one would be good, and the other would turn out bad and this knowledge is an unchan
from the one who knows, and it revolves around the thing known and is made like the one who knows. I mean something like this: the knowledge of the so
they fabricate. For I too had a certain little man, ignoble in soul, but by no means the least of storytellers to him, at any rate, such phantoms pre
of beasts, but perhaps the matter which reason has shown not to exist. Therefore our bodies will be resurrected, and there will be nothing to prevent it, because the matter in them is not predetermined. From the same: In what way does Plato think souls inhabit the bodies of irrational animals, to the most pious emperor lord Andronikos {Palaiologos} Who are they who now dare to interpret Plato and to explain his cycles of souls, their descents and ascents, and in one place the risings <through> the aether, and in another the wanderings through Hades 105, and all the different things he posits about souls in his various dialogues, and especially what he recounts as myth, so to speak, in the *Timaeus*—Cocytus and Acheron and muddy, impassable streams and certain other things that terrify the souls of men, making monstrous claims in this discourse? And if I myself should say something about the man, I would not even persuade myself that I have understood the man's secrets, except that I divine his doctrines. Therefore, neither the mouth of Hades is presented as true by him, nor the sojourn of souls in Hades, nor anything else of all the corporeal and material things he says about an incorporeal and immaterial nature. But since for him there is a twofold kind of soul—one rational and intellectual, the other subordinate to these, but of a different form from the souls of other animals, and the one descends from above from the demiurge, while the others are from the stellar order and power and from what he calls the "younger gods"—he splits his account concerning both kinds, and some he fits, being related in reason, to the noble soul, but others he creates from the secondary substance. And since the first soul is only intellectual and rational, while the other is composed of these four elements—opinion, imagination, sensation, nature—which powers do not accomplish a straight course, but make certain refractions and turnings around themselves, concerning the first he innovates nothing, but the second soul, inasmuch as it uses opinionative nourishment and has put forth the form of imagination according to the lesser premise and for the most part delights in sensations and is, as it were, moist and flabby, he leads down into the recesses of the earth and it is carried across by some mouth and is thrown into confusion by streams and is terrified by surging rivers and all that he elaborates concerning it. This soul, however, not having journeyed with the first, but being either pleasure-loving or money-loving or bewitched by some other of the passions, he also sets over irrational bodies; for having been made irrational in a way by the passions, it has reasonably been joined to the more irrational 106 part. But the rational soul, even if it follows along with the irrational soul, since it is not transformed into that nature, how could it preside over an irrational body? For if the instrument must be proper to the presiding soul, how could the irrational body be fitted to the rational soul? But if someone wishes to mock Plato, I would not blame him; for what have I to do with Plato or any other Greek philosopher who falsifies the truth? Yet I would defend the man to this extent, that the wise man, seeing the rational soul also being shaped by the passions—so that one becomes lion-like on account of spirit, another is made akin to another of the animals on account of desires innate to it, and another becomes idle and barren and, as it were, un-treed on account of neglect of better things—just as he was accustomed to conceal many things, he leads one down into donkeys, another into spirited horses, another into wanton bulls, and another he sows into trees and again another into a bush, according to what each is suited to either by its passions or its inactivities,
θηρίων, ἀλλ' ἡ ὕλη ἴσως ἣν οὐκ ὂν ὁ λόγος ἀπέδειξεν. ἀναστήσεται οὖν τὰ ἡμέτερα σώματα καὶ οὐδὲν ἔσται τὸ κωλῦον διὰ τὸ μὴ
ὡρισμένην τὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς ὕλην ὑπάρχειν. Τοῦ αὐτοῦ· τίνα τρόπον ὁ Πλάτων οἴεται εἰσοικίζεσθαι τὰς ψυχὰς τοῖς τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων
σώμασι, πρὸς τὸν εὐσεβέστατον βασιλέα κῦρ Ἀνδρόνικον {τὸν Παλαιολόγον} Τίνες ποτέ εἰσιν οἱ τολμῶντες νῦν ἑρμηνεύειν τὸν Πλάτωνα
καὶ τὰς περιόδους αὐτῷ τῶν ψυχῶν ἐξηγεῖσθαι τάς τε καθόδους καὶ τὰς ἀνόδους, καὶ πῇ μὲν τὰς <διὰ> τοῦ αἰθέρος ἀναγωγάς, πῇ
δὲ τὰς διὰ τοῦ ᾅδου 105 περιαγωγάς, καὶ ὁπόσα ἐκεῖνος διάφορα ἐν τοῖς διαφόροις λόγοις περὶ τῶν ψυχῶν ὑποτίθεται, καὶ μάλιστα
ἅπερ ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ, ἵν' οὕτως εἴπω, διαμυθολογεῖ, Κωκυτοὺς καὶ Ἀχέροντας ῥεύματά τε θολερὰ καὶ δύσβατα καὶ ἕτερ' ἄττα τὰς ψυχὰς
τῶν ἀνθρώπων καταδειμαίνοντα ἐν τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ τερατευόμενος; κἂν αὐτός τι περὶ τἀνδρὸς ἐρῶ, οὐκ ἂν οὐδ' ἐμαυτὸν συμπείσαιμι
ὡς συννενόηκα τὰ ἀπόρρητα τοῦ ἀνδρός, εἰ μὴ ὅτι καταμαντεύομαι τῶν ἐκείνου δογμάτων. Οὔτε οὖν τὸ στόμιον τοῦ ᾅδου παρ' αὐτῷ
ἀληθεύεται οὔτε ἡ ἐν ᾅδου διατριβὴ τῶν ψυχῶν οὔτε ἄλλο τι τῶν ὅσα σωματικὰ ἐκείνῳ καὶ ἔνυλα περὶ ἀσωμάτου καὶ ἀύλου φύσεως.
ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ διττὸν παρ' ἐκείνῳ γένος τῶν ψυχῶν, τὸ μὲν λογικόν τε καὶ νοερόν, τὸ δ' ὑποτεταγμένον τούτοις, ἑτεροειδὲς δὲ παρὰ
τὰς τῶν ἑτέρων ζῴων ψυχάς, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄνωθεν ἀπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ κάτεισι, τὰ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀστρῴας τάξεως καὶ δυνάμεως καὶ τῶν
ὡς ἐκεῖνός φησι «νέων θεῶν», σχίζεται περὶ ἄμφω τὼ γένει, καὶ τοὺς μὲν τῷ λόγῳ προσαλλήλους καθαρμόζει τῇ γενναίᾳ ψυχῇ, τοὺς
δὲ τῇ ἀπὸ τῶν δευτέρων ὑποστάσει δημιουργῶν. καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἡ μὲν πρώτη ψυχὴ νοερά ἐστι μόνως καὶ λογική, ἡ δὲ ἑτέρα ἐκ τῶν τεττάρων
τούτων στοιχείων συνήρτηται, δόξης, φαντασίας, αἰσθήσεως, φύσεως, αἵτινες δὴ τῶν δυνάμεων οὐκ εὐθεῖαν περαίνουσιν, ἀλλὰ κλάσεις
τινὰς καὶ στροφὰς ποιοῦνται περὶ αὐτάς, περὶ μὲν τῆς πρώτης οὐδέν τι καινοτομεῖ, τὴν δέ γε δευτέραν ψυχήν, ἅτε δοξαστικῇ χρωμένην
τροφῇ καὶ τὸ τῆς φαντασίας εἶδος προβεβλημένην κατὰ τὴν ἐλάττονα πρότασιν καὶ τὰ πολλὰ αἰσθήσεσι χαίρουσαν καὶ οἷον ὑγρὰν
καὶ πλαδαρὰν οὖσαν, εἰς τοὺς μυχοὺς κατάγει τῆς γῆς καὶ στομίῳ τινὶ διαπεραιοῦται καὶ διαταράττει ῥεύμασι καὶ δεδίττεται κυμαίνουσι
ποταμοῖς καὶ ὁπόσα ἐκεῖνος περὶ αὐτὴν πραγματεύεται. ταύτην μέντοι γε τὴν ψυχήν, μὴ συμπορευθεῖσαν τῇ πρώτῃ, ἀλλ' ἢ φιληδόνως
ἢ φιλοχρημάτως ἔχουσαν ἢ ἄλλῳ τῳ τῶν παθῶν καταθελχθεῖσαν, καὶ ἀλόγοις ἐφιστάνει σώμασιν· ἀλογωθεῖσαν γὰρ τρόπον τινὰ ὑπὸ
τῶν παθῶν εἰκότως καὶ τῷ ἀλογωτέρῳ συμβεβλῆσθαι 106 μέρει. ἡ δέ γε λογικὴ κἂν τῇ ἀλόγῳ συνακολουθήσῃ ψυχῇ, ἐπειδὴ οὐ μεθίσταται
πρὸς ἐκείνην τὴν φύσιν, πῶς ἂν ἀλόγου προσταίη σώματος; εἰ γὰρ τὸ ὄργανον οἰκεῖον δεῖ εἶναι τῇ ἐφεστηκυίᾳ ψυχῇ, πῶς ἂν τὸ
ἄλογον σῶμα τῇ λογικῇ ψυχῇ προσαρμόσειεν; Εἰ δέ τις καταμωκᾶσθαι βούλεται Πλάτωνα, τοῦτον μὲν οὐκ ἂν μεμψαίμην ἐγώ· τί γάρ
μοι καὶ Πλάτωνι ἢ ἑτέρῳ φιλοσόφῳ Ἕλληνι τὴν ἀλήθειαν διαψευδομένῳ; τοσοῦτον δὲ ὑπεραγωνισαίμην τἀνδρός, ὅτι καὶ τὴν λογικὴν
ψυχὴν τοῖς πάθεσι διαμορφωθεῖσαν ἰδὼν ὁ σοφός, ὡς τὴν μὲν λεοντώδη γενέσθαι διὰ τὸν θυμόν, τὴν δὲ ἄλλῳ τῶν ζῴων οἰκειωθεῖσαν
διὰ τὰς ἐμφύτους ἐκείνῳ ἐπιθυμίας, τὴν δὲ διὰ τὴν τῶν κρειττόνων ἀμελετησίαν ἀργὴν καὶ ἄγονον γενομένην καὶ οἷον ἀποδενδρωθεῖσαν,
ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνος εἰώθει ἀποκρύπτεσθαι τὰ πολλά, τὴν μὲν εἰς ὄνους κατάγει, τὴν δὲ εἰς ἵππους θυμοειδεῖς, τὴν δὲ εἰς ταύρους ὑβρίζοντας,
καὶ ἄλλην εἰς δένδρα κατασπείρει καὶ αὖθις ἑτέραν εἰς θάμνον, πρὸς ὃ ἑκάστη οἰκείως ἔχει ἢ τοῖς πάθεσιν ἢ ταῖς ἀπραξίαις,
