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will be completely destroyed. But if they say that He provides only for this, that not all particular things should perish, so that the species may be saved, they are unaware that they are saying that there is also some providence for individuals; for by providing for these, as they themselves say, He preserves the species and the genera. But they say that He is not ignorant, but He does not wish to provide. But not wishing comes about for two reasons, either because of sloth or because of unseemliness. And who, unless he were mad, would bring an accusation of sloth against God? For again, sloth is born of these two things, pleasure and cowardice; for either being drawn away by some pleasure we are slothful, or we shrink back because of fear. But it is not lawful to think either of these things concerning God. But if they should decline to charge Him with sloth, and say that it is not fitting for God—for it is unworthy of so great a blessedness to descend to base and small things and, as it were, to be defiled by material and voluntary absurdities, and for this reason He does not wish to—they are unaware that they are attaching the two worst passions to God, contempt and pollution; for either because of contempt the Creator overlooks the rule and administration of particular things, which is most absurd to say, or He avoids pollution, as they themselves say. But if they say that the sun is not defiled by the rays of the sun, which have a nature to draw all that is moist, nor the rays themselves when they shine upon filth, but remain unstained and pure, how do they suppose God is defiled by the things done here? These are not the doctrines of men who know the nature of God; for the divine is established as untouchable and incorruptible and undefiled and superior to all change, for pollution and all such things are the works of some change. And how is it not most absurd to show that a craftsman of any art, and especially a physician, who cares for the universals, leaves nothing of the particulars, not even the smallest thing, uncrafted and uncared for, knowing that the part contributes to the whole, but to show that the Creator God is even more ignorant than craftsmen? But then He wishes to, but is not able. And how is it not plainly outrageous to say that God is weak and unable to do good? Moreover, one might say that God is unable to provide for individuals in two ways, either because He is not naturally able, or because particular things are not receptive of providence. But that He is naturally able to provide, they themselves agree through what they say, that He provides for universals; moreover, it is not possible for the inferior to reach the superior, but the power of the superior descends to save even to the last and the insensible; for all things depend on the divine will and from there draw their permanence and salvation. But that the existence of individuals and populations is also receptive of providence is clear from the animals that are governed by certain authorities and leaderships, of which there are many kinds, for indeed bees and ants and most of the gregarious animals are ordered under certain leaders whom they follow in obedience; and one might especially understand this by looking into the polity of men, for it appears to be receptive of the administrations and cares of lawgivers and rulers. But how could that which is receptive of these be unreceptive of the providence of the Creator? And it is no small proof that individuals also receive providence that the knowledge of it has been naturally sown in men, for when constrained by necessity we immediately flee to the divine and to prayers, as if nature were leading us without teaching to the help from this source (and nature would not lead us without teaching to that which has no nature to come to be); for even in sudden disturbances and fears, without premeditation, before even considering anything, we cry out to God. And everything that follows anything naturally has a strong proof, admitting no contradiction. From where, then, were those who hold these opinions led to this argument? First, by thinking that the soul is dissolved along with the body, and second, by not being able to discover the reason for particular providence. But that the soul is not mortal, nor do human affairs extend only to this life

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καθόλου διαφθαρήσεται. εἰ δὲ τούτου προνοεῖν μόνου φήσουσιν αὐτὸν τοῦ μὴ πάντα τὰ κατὰ μέρος ἀπολέσθαι, ἵνα σῴζηται τὰ εἴδη, λανθάνουσιν ἑαυτοὺς λέγοντες εἶναί τινα καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα πρόνοιαν· τούτων γὰρ προνοῶν, ὡς αὐτοὶ λέγουσι, διαφυλάττει τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ γένη. ἀλλά φασιν ὡς οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ μέν, οὐ βούλεται δὲ προνοεῖν. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι διὰ δύο γίνεται προφάσεις, ἢ διὰ ῥαθυμίαν ἢ διὰ τὸ ἀπρεπές. καὶ τίς ἂν μὴ μαινόμενος ῥαθυμίας αἰτίαν ἐπαγάγοι θεῷ; πάλιν γὰρ ὑπὸ δύο τούτων ῥαθυμία τίκτεται, ἡδονῆς καὶ δειλίας· ἢ γὰρ ὑφ' ἡδονῆς τινὸς περιελκόμενοι ῥαθυμοῦμεν ἢ διὰ φόβον ἀφιστάμεθα. οὐδέτερον δὲ τούτων θεμιτὸν διανοηθῆναι περὶ θεοῦ. εἰ δὲ ῥαθυμίαν μὲν ἐπάγειν παραιτοῖντο, λέγοιεν δὲ μὴ πρέπειν θεῷ, ἀνάξιον γὰρ εἶναι τῆς τοσαύτης μακαριότητος τοῖς εὐτελέσι καὶ μικροῖς συγκαταβαίνειν καὶ οἱονεὶ συμβεβηλοῦσθαι ταῖς ὑλικαῖς τε καὶ προαιρετικαῖς ἀτοπίαις, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μὴ βούλεσθαι, ἀγνοοῦσι δύο πάθη τὰ χείριστα τῷ θεῷ περιάπτοντες, ὑπεροψίαν καὶ μολυσμόν· ἢ γὰρ δι' ὑπεροψίαν ὁ δημιουργὸς ὑπερορᾷ τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ διοικήσεως τῶν κατὰ μέρος, ὅπερ ἀτοπώτατον εἰπεῖν, ἢ τὸν μολυσμὸν ἐκκλίνων, ὡς αὐτοί φασιν. εἰ δὲ τῶν ἡλιακῶν ἀκτίνων, φύσιν ἐχουσῶν ἕλκειν πᾶν τὸ ὑγρόν, οὔ φασι καταμολύνεσθαι τὸν ἥλιον οὐδὲ τὰς ἀκτῖνας αὐτὰς ὅταν τοῖς βορβόροις ἐλλάμπωσιν, ἀλλὰ μένειν ἀχράντους καὶ καθαράς, πῶς τὸν θεὸν ἡγοῦνται συμβεβηλοῦσθαι τοῖς τῇδε πραττόμενοις; οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνθρώπων φυσίν εἰδότων θεοῦ ταῦτα τὰ δόγματα· ἀνέπαφον γὰρ καὶ ἀδιάφθορον καὶ ἀμίαντον καὶ πάσης ἀλλοιώσεως κρεῖττον τὸ θεῖον καθέστηκεν, ὁ γὰρ μολυσμὸς καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τροπῆς τινα ἔργα. πῶς δὲ οὐκ ἀτοπώτατον τεχνίτην μὲν οἱασδήποτε τέχνης, καὶ μάλιστα ἰατρόν, ἐπιμελούμενον τῶν καθόλου, μηδὲν τῶν κατὰ μέρος μηδὲ τὸ σμικρότατον ἐᾶν ἀτέχναστον καὶ ἀνεπιμέλητον, εἰδότα ὡς εἰς τὸ πᾶν συντελεῖ τὸ μέρος, τὸν δὲ δημιουργὸν θεὸν καὶ τῶν τεχνιτῶν ἀποφαίνειν ἀμαθέστερον; ἀλλ' ἄρα βούλεται μέν, οὐ δύναται δέ. καὶ πῶς οὐκ ἄντικρυς ἀπεμφαῖνον ἀσθενῆ λέγειν τὸν θεὸν καὶ ἀδύνατον εὖ ποιεῖν; ἄλλως τε κατὰ δύο τρόπους φαίη τις ἂν τὸν θεὸν μὴ δύνασθαι προνοεῖν τῶν ἀτόμων, ἢ τῷ αὐτὸν μὴ πεφυκέναι, ἢ τῷ τὰ κατὰ μέρος ἀνεπίδεκτα προνοίας εἶναι. ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν αὐτὸς πέφυκε προνοεῖν καὶ αὐτοὶ συνομολογοῦσι δι' ὧν φασιν αὐτὸν τῶν καθόλου προνοεῖν· ἄλλως τε τὰ μὲν καταδεέστερα φθάνειν εἰς τὰ ὑπερκείμενα οὐχ οἷά τέ ἐστιν, τῶν δὲ κρειττόνων ἡ δύναμις ἄχρι καὶ τῶν τελευταίων καὶ τῶν ἀναισθήτων σώζουσα κάτεισι· πάντα γὰρ ἤρτηται τοῦ θείου θελήματος καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἀρύεται τὴν διαμονὴν καὶ σωτηρίαν. ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἡ τῶν ἀτόμων καὶ πεπληθυσμένων ὑπόστασις προνοίας ἐστὶ δεκτικὴ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν ζῴων τῶν ἀρχαῖς τισι καὶ ἡγεμονίαις διοικουμένων, ὧν πολλὰ μὲν εἴδη, καὶ γὰρ μέλισσαι καὶ μύρμηκες καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν συναγελαζομένων ὑπό τισιν ἡγεμόσι τέτακται οἷς ἀκολουθεῖ πειθόμενα· μάλιστα δ' ἄν τις τοῦτο κατανοήσειεν εἰς τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων πολιτείαν ἐμβλέψας, φαίνεται γὰρ τὰς τῶν νομοθετῶν καὶ τὰς τῶν ἀρχόντων ἐπιδεχομένη διοικήσεις καὶ ἐπιμελείας. ἡ δὲ τούτων δεκτικὴ πῶς ἂν εἴη τῆς τοῦ δημιουργοῦ προνοίας ἀνεπίδεκτος; τεκμήριον δὲ οὐ σμικρὸν τοῦ καὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα προνοίας τυγχάνειν τὸ φυσικῶς ἐγκατεσπάρθαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὴν γνῶσιν αὐτῆς, ὑπ' ἀνάγκης γὰρ συσχεθέντες εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὰς εὐχὰς καταφεύγομεν ὡς ἂν τῆς φύσεως ἀγούσης ἡμᾶς ἀδιδάκτως ἐπὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τούτου βοήθειαν (οὐκ ἂν δὲ ἡμᾶς ἀδιδάκτως ἦγεν ἡ φύσις ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ φύσιν ἔχον γίνεσθαι)· καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἐξαίφνης ταραχαῖς καὶ φόβοις ἀπροαιρέτως, πρίν τι καὶ σκέψασθαι, τὸν θεὸν ἐπιβοώμεθα. πᾶν δὲ τὸ ὁτῳοῦν φυσικῶς ἑπόμενον ἰσχυρὰν ἔχει τὴν ἀπόδειξιν, οὐδεμίαν ἀντιλογίαν ἐπιδεχόμενον. πόθεν οὖν προήχθησαν ἐπὶ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον οἱ ταῦτα δοξάζοντες; πρῶτον μὲν τῷ νομίζειν συνδιαλύεσθαι τῷ σώματι τὴν ψυχήν, δεύτερον δὲ τῷ μὴ δύνασθαι τὸν λόγον ἐξευρεῖν τῆς κατὰ μέρος προνοίας. ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ ψυχὴ θνητὴ οὐδὲ μέχρι τοῦ βίου τούτου τὰ κατὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον