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58

we will call him disobedient; but the Lord became obedient to the Father not insofar as he was God, but insofar as he was man. “For insofar as he is God, he is neither obedient nor disobedient; for these things belong to those under authority,” as the theologian Gregory said. Therefore, Christ has a will also insofar as he is man. And in saying that the will is natural, we do not say this is compelled, but of free choice; for if it is rational, it is in every way also of free choice. For not only does the divine and uncreated nature have nothing compelled, but neither does the intelligent and created nature. And this is clear: for God, being by nature good and by nature creator and by nature God, is not these things by necessity. For who is it that brings on the necessity? But it is necessary to know that "free choice" is spoken of homonymously: in one way concerning God, in another concerning angels, and in another concerning men. For concerning God, it is in a super-essential way; and concerning angels, as the ready choice accompanies the state and admits absolutely no interval of time (for having free choice by nature, he uses it without impediment, having neither the opposition from bodies nor the one who assaults him), but concerning men, as the state is preconceived in time before the undertaking; for man is of free choice and has free choice by nature, but he also has the assault from the devil and the movement of the body. Therefore, on account of the assault and the weight of the body, the ready choice lags behind the state. If, therefore, Adam obeyed by willing and ate by willing, then the will is the first to be affected in us; but if the will is the first to be affected, and the Word made flesh did not assume this with the nature, then we have not been set outside of sin. Furthermore, if the power of the nature's free choice is his work, and he did not assume this, either he condemned his own creation as not good or he envied us our healing through it, depriving us of complete healing, and showing himself to be subject to passion by not willing or by not being able to save completely. But it is impossible to speak of one composite thing from the two wills as we speak of the composite hypostasis from the natures. First, because compositions are of things that exist in hypostasis and not of things considered in another's account and not their own; second, because if we speak of a composition of the wills and energies, we will also be forced to speak of a composition of the other natural properties, of the uncreated and the created, the invisible and the visible, and such things. And how will the composite of the wills be called a will (for it is impossible for the composite thing to be called by the name of the things composing it), since we would also call the composite of the natures a nature and not a hypostasis? Furthermore, if we speak of one composite will in Christ, we separate him from the will of the Father; for the Father's will is not composite. It remains, therefore, to say that only the hypostasis of Christ is composite and common, just as of the natures, so also of his natural properties. But to speak of 'gnome' and 'proairesis' concerning the Lord is impossible, if indeed we wish to speak precisely. For 'gnome' is a disposition toward what has been judged, after inquiry and deliberation or counsel and judgment concerning what is unknown. After which is 'proairesis,' selecting and choosing one thing before another. But the Lord, not being a mere man but also God and knowing all things, was without need of consideration and inquiry and counsel and judgment, and by nature had an affinity for the good and an aversion to evil. Thus indeed Isaiah also says, that "before the child knows or chooses evil, he shall choose the good; because before the child knows good or evil, he disobeys wickedness to choose the good." For the "before" declares that not in our manner, by inquiring and deliberating, but being God and divinely enduring what is according to the flesh, that is, being united hypostatically to the flesh, by the very fact of being and of knowing all things, he had the good from nature; for the virtues are natural and exist naturally and equally in all, even if we do not all equally energize the things of nature. For we were driven from what is according to nature to what is contrary to nature through the transgression. But the Lord has led us back from what is contrary to nature to what is according to nature; for this is the

58

παρήκοον λέξομεν· ὑπήκοος δὲ γενόμενος τῷ πατρὶ ὁ κύριος οὐ καθὸ θεὸς γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ καθὸ ἄνθρωπος. «Καθὸ γὰρ θεὸς οὔτε ὑπήκοος οὔτε παρήκοος· τῶν ὑπὸ χεῖρα γὰρ ταῦτα», καθὼς ὁ θεηγόρος ἔφη Γρηγόριος. Θελητικὸς ἄρα καὶ καθὸ ἄνθρωπος ὁ Χριστός. Φυσικὸν δὲ τὸ θέλημα λέγοντες, οὐκ ἠναγκασμένον τοῦτό φαμεν, ἀλλ' αὐτεξούσιον· εἰ γὰρ λογικόν, πάντως καὶ αὐτεξούσιον. Οὐ μόνον γὰρ ἡ θεία καὶ ἄκτιστος φύσις οὐδὲν ἠναγκασμένον ἔχει, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἡ νοερὰ καὶ κτιστή. Τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον· φύσει γὰρ ὢν ἀγαθὸς ὁ θεὸς καὶ φύσει δημιουργὸς καὶ φύσει θεὸς οὐκ ἀνάγκῃ ταῦτά ἐστι. Τίς γὰρ ὁ τὴν ἀνάγκην ἐπάγων; ∆εῖ δὲ εἰδέναι, ὡς αὐτεξουσιότης ὁμωνύμως λέγεται, ἄλλως μὲν ἐπὶ θεοῦ, ἄλλως δὲ ἐπὶ ἀγγέλων, καὶ ἄλλως ἐπὶ ἀνθρώπων. Ἐπὶ θεοῦ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερουσίως, ἐπὶ δὲ ἀγγέλων ὡς συντρεχούσης τῇ ἕξει τῆς προχειρήσεως καὶ παρενθήκην ὅλως χρόνου μὴ παραδεχομένης (ἔχων γὰρ φυσικῶς τὸ αὐτεξούσιον ἀπαρεμποδίστως τούτῳ κέχρηται, μηδὲ τὴν ἐκ σωμάτων ἀντιπάθειαν ἔχων μηδὲ τὸν προσβάλλοντα), ἐπὶ δὲ ἀνθρώπων ὡς χρονικῶς τῆς ἕξεως προεπινοουμένης τῆς ἐγχειρήσεως· αὐτεξούσιος μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ φυσικῶς ἔχει τὸ αὐτεξούσιον, ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ διαβόλου προσβολὴν καὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος κίνησιν. ∆ιὰ οὖν τὴν προσβολὴν καὶ τὸ βάρος τοῦ σώματος ἐφυστερίζει ἡ προχείρησις τῆς ἕξεως. Εἰ οὖν θέλων ὁ Ἀδὰμ ὑπήκουσε καὶ θελήσας ἔφαγεν, ἄρα πρωτοπαθὴς ἐν ἡμῖν ἡ θέλησις· εἰ δὲ πρωτοπαθὴς ἡ θέλησις, ταύτην δὲ μετὰ τῆς φύσεως ὁ λόγος σαρκωθεὶς οὐκ ἀνέλαβεν, οὐκ ἄρα ἔξω τῆς ἁμαρτίας γεγόναμεν. Ἔτι δὲ εἰ ἔργον αὐτοῦ ἡ αὐτεξούσιος τῆς φύσεως ὑπάρχει δύναμις, ταύτην δὲ οὐκ ἀνέλαβεν, ἢ καταγνοὺς τῆς οἰκείας δημιουργίας ὡς οὐ καλῆς ἢ φθονήσας ἡμῖν τῆς κατ' αὐτὴν θεραπείας, ἡμᾶς μὲν τῆς παντελοῦς ἀποστερῶν θεραπείας, ἑαυτὸν δὲ ὑπὸ πάθος ὄντα δεικνὺς τῷ μὴ θέλειν ἢ τῷ μὴ δύνασθαι τελείως σῴζειν. Ἀδύνατον δὲ ἕν τι σύνθετον ἐκ τῶν δύο θελημάτων λέγειν ὥσπερ ἐκ τῶν φύσεων σύνθετον τὴν ὑπόστασιν. Πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι αἱ συνθέσεις τῶν ἐν ὑποστάσει ὄντων καὶ οὐ τῶν ἑτέρῳ λόγῳ καὶ οὐκ ἰδίῳ θεωρουμένων εἰσί· δεύτερον δέ, ὅτι, εἰ τῶν θελημάτων καὶ ἐνεργειῶν σύνθεσιν λέξομεν, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων φυσικῶν ἰδιωμάτων σύνθεσιν εἰπεῖν ἀναγκασθησόμεθα, τοῦ ἀκτίστου καὶ κτιστοῦ, τοῦ ἀοράτου καὶ ὁρατοῦ καὶ τῶν τοιούτων. Πῶς δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐκ τῶν θελημάτων σύνθετον θέλημα προσαγορευθήσεται (ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὸ σύνθετον τῇ τῶν συντεθέντων ὀνομάζεσθαι προσηγορίᾳ), ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἐκ τῶν φύσεων σύνθετον φύσιν προσαγορεύσομεν καὶ οὐχ ὑπόστασιν; Ἔτι δὲ καὶ εἰ ἓν σύνθετον θέλημα ἐπὶ Χριστοῦ λέξομεν, θελήματι τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτὸν χωρίζομεν· οὐ γὰρ σύνθετον τὸ τοῦ πατρὸς θέλημα. Λείπεται τοίνυν εἰπεῖν μόνην τὴν ὑπόστασιν τοῦ Χριστοῦ σύνθετον καὶ κοινὴν ὥσπερ τῶν φύσεων, οὕτω καὶ τῶν φυσικῶν αὐτοῦ. Γνώμην δὲ καὶ προαίρεσιν ἐπὶ τοῦ κυρίου λέγειν ἀδύνατον, εἴπερ κυριολεκτεῖν βουλόμεθα. Ἡ γνώμη γὰρ μετὰ τὴν περὶ τοῦ ἀγνοουμένου ζήτησιν καὶ βούλευσιν ἤτοι βουλὴν καὶ κρίσιν πρὸς τὸ κριθέν ἐστι διάθεσις. Μεθ' ἣν ἡ προαίρεσις ἐκλεγομένη καὶ αἱρουμένη πρὸ τοῦ ἑτέρου τὸ ἕτερον. Ὁ δὲ κύριος οὐ φιλὸς ὢν ἄνθρωπος ἀλλὰ καὶ θεὸς καὶ πάντα εἰδὼς ἀνενδεὴς σκέψεως καὶ ζητήσεως καὶ βουλῆς ὑπῆρχε καὶ κρίσεως καὶ φυσικῶς τήν τε πρὸς τὸ καλὸν εἶχεν οἰκείωσιν καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὸ κακὸν ἀλλοτρίωσιν. Οὕτω γοῦν καὶ Ἡσαΐας φησίν, ὅτι «πρὶν ἢ γνῶναι τὸ παιδίον ἢ προελέσθαι πονηρά, ἐκλέξεται τὸ ἀγαθόν· διότι πρὶν ἢ γνῶναι τὸ παιδίον ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, ἀπειθεῖ πονηρίᾳ τοῦ ἐκλέξασθαι τὸ ἀγαθόν». Τὸ γὰρ «πρὶν» δηλοῖ, ὅτι οὐ καθ' ἡμᾶς ζητήσας καὶ βουλευσάμενος ἀλλὰ θεὸς ὢν καὶ θεϊκῶς καὶ τὸ κατὰ σάρκα ὑποστάς, τουτέστι καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἡνωμένος τῇ σαρκί, αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι καὶ τὸ πάντα εἰδέναι τὸ ἐκ φύσεως εἶχεν ἀγαθόν· φυσικαὶ γάρ εἰσιν αἱ ἀρεταὶ καὶ φυσικῶς καὶ ἐπίσης πᾶσιν ἐνυπάρχουσιν, εἰ καὶ μὴ πάντες ἐπίσης ἐνεργοῦμεν τὰ τῆς φύσεως. Ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν γὰρ εἰς τὸ παρὰ φύσιν διὰ τῆς παραβάσεως ἠλάσα μεν. Ὁ δὲ κύριος ἐκ τοῦ παρὰ φύσιν εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἡμᾶς ἐπανήγαγε· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ