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through an indivisible union, having partaken of the things of nature, just as, therefore, of the nature itself completely, except for sin alone, (15A_252> because it was not of nature, but of inclination, of a nature moved contrary to reason and law, a deviation and a slip?

And for this reason especially, it seems to me, the said monk has rightly paid attention, having distinguished the gnomic will from the natural. For the one, according to his own sound definition, is an appetitive power for that which is according to nature. For whatever exists, and especially rational beings, naturally desires that which is according to nature, and having received this from God, has essentially the power for its own subsistence. For if it does not have the appetite for that which is according to nature, of that which in no way is, from where and how, since it has no existence or motion at all? For only non-being is inert and without substance; and in no way does any power or motion of it exist in things that are. The other, however, has become a self-chosen impulse, making deviations to either side; and it is not a determinant of nature, but properly of person and hypostasis. And discerning this, the divisive and man-worshipping Nestorius impiously dogmatized a union of inclinations; so that he might confirm each hypostasis through the other, and that for him the mere man might be preserved, having made the union, as he says, by a certain inclination and self-chosen movement towards God the Word, from which he also constitutes a sameness of will, or rather, a plurality of wills, to speak more properly; inasmuch as also by each movement of the gnomic will, he proceeds partially from the imperfect to the perfect, being carried along and advancing; but not from the ineffable conception itself, when the Godhead of the Word, whole and complete with all that is its own, was united to our whole nature and all that pertains to it, in one and the same hypostasis.

So that, therefore, the said monk might accurately discern the integrity of the nature in the incarnate God, and might cast out that which is opposed: he defined the natural 0193 in His case; but he excluded the gnomic will, giving no room for division to be in dissent (15A_254> in this, nor any entry for fantasy, because that does not exist. But if anyone happens to contend, that it is not possible for the two wills to be spoken of in Him otherwise than in opposition; if as different in essence, I too accept it, but if as opposed, the argument is false. For not everything different is necessarily also opposed. For that which is opposed comes from an inclination moved irrationally; while that which is different has become the work of a nature governed by reason; and the one is divisive of nature, while the other is clearly constitutive. Essential difference, therefore, is for the constitution of things in nature, not opposition, (but rather) for their dissolution. For nature does not have what is contrary to nature; nor is there any reason in that which is in dissent.

Besides, if the two wills are always contrary and opposed, how is it that in the case of rational beings divided in nature and hypostasis, this does not always and in every way occur? For we sometimes assent to these, although they are gnomic, and to God, and to angels, and to one another, but we have not on this account already fallen away from our inclination, and from the will according to it. For if of these, and of the clear assent to others, if we hold this, we also adhere to the other gnomic. If, then, this is so here, and no opposition is seen at all, although the gnomic wills are preserved in existence and in number, and the friendly disposition in relation; how, in the case of the one and same incarnate God the Word, who became perfectly human for our sake, will there be opposition in the wills that belong to him naturally and essentially? And how do they say these are contrary, because of their number, or because of their very existence? But if for this reason, let them also do away with the nature of the flesh, as being opposed to the Word on account of its existence. For it is much stronger, as is clear to all, for opposition,

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καθ᾿ ἕνωσιν τήν ἀδιάστατον τῶν τῆς φύσεως κεκοινωνηκότι, καθάπερ οὖν καὐτῆς τελείως τῆς φύσεως, πλήν μόνης τῆς ἁμαρτίας, (15Α_252> ὅτι μηδέ τῆς φύσεως ἦν, ἀλλά γνώμης, παρά τόν λόγον καί τόν νόμον κεκινημένης τῆς φύσεως, ἐκτροπή καί ὀλίσθημα;

Καί μοι δεόντως μάλιστα τούτου γε χάριν ὁ λεχθείς ἐπιστήσας φαίνεται μοναχός, τοῦ φυσικοῦ τό γνωμικόν διαστείλας θελήματος. Τό μέν γάρ, κατά τόν αὐτοῦ καλῶς ἔχοντα ὁρισμόν, ∆ύναμις ὑπάρχει τοῦ κατά φύσιν ὄντος ὀρεκτική. Πᾶν γάρ εἴ τι τῶν ὄντων καί μάλιστα λογικῶν, φυσικῶς τοῦ κατά φύσιν ὄντος ὀρέγεται, καί τούτου παρά Θεοῦ λαβόν κατ᾿ οὐσίαν ἔχει τήν δύναμιν, πρός σύστασιν τήν ἑαυτοῦ. Εἰ γάρ τοῦ κατά φύσιν ὄντος οὐκ ἔχει τήν ὄρεξιν, τοῦ μηδαμῶς ὄντος, πόθεν καί πῶς, μηδόλως ὕπαρξιν ἤ κίνησιν ἔχοντος; Μόνον γάρ ἀδρανές τό μή ὄν καί ἀνούσιον· καί οὐδαμῶς οὐδέ μία τούτου δύναμις ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ὑπάρχει, καί κίνησις. Τό δέ, αὐθαίρετος ὁρμή καθέστηκε, τάς ἐφ᾿ ἑκάτερα ποιουμένη παρεκτροπάς· καί οὐ φύσεως ὑπάρχον ἀφοριστικόν, ἀλλά προσώπου κυρίως καί ὑποστάσεως. Καί τοῦτό γε διαγνούς ὁ διῃρημένος καί ἀνθρωπολάτρης Νεστόριος, γνωμῶν ἕνωσιν ἀσεβῶς ἐδογμάτισεν· ἵν᾿ ἑκατέραν δι᾿ ἑκατέρας ὑπόστασιν ἐπικυρώσῃ, καί ὁ ψιλός ἄνθρωπος αὐτῷ τηρηθῇ, γνώμῃ τινί καί αὐθαιρέτῳ κινήσει τῇ πρός τόν Θεόν Λόγον, ὡς αὐτός φησι, τήν ἕνωσιν ποιησάμενος, ἐξ ἧς καί τήν ταυτοβουλίαν συνίστησιν, ἤ πολυβουλίαν, εἰπεῖν οἰκειότερον· ὅσῳ καί καθ᾿ ἑκάστης τοῦ γνωμικοῦ θελήματος κίνησιν, κατά μέρος ἐκ τῶν ἀτελῶν ἐπί τά ἐντελῆ κατ᾿ αὐτόν ἴεται, φερομένη τε καί προκόπτουσα· ἀλλ᾿ οὐκ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς ἀφράστου συλλήψεως, ὅλης τελείως μετά τῶν αὐτῆς ἁπάντων, πρός ὅλην καί τά κατ᾿ αὐτήν ἅπαντα, τήν ἡμετέραν φύσιν τῆς τοῦ Λόγου θεότητος, καθ᾿ ὑπόστασιν μίαν καί τήν αὐτήν ἑνωθείσης.

Ὡς ἄν τοίνυν καί τό ἐνελές διακριβώσῃ τῆς φύσεως ἐπί τοῦ σαρκωθέντος Θεοῦ, καί τό ἀντικείνενον διαῤῥίψῃ ὁ λεχθείς μοναχός· τό μέν φυσικόν 0193 ὥρισεν ἐπ᾿ αὐτοῦ· τό δέ γνωμικόν ἀποδιώρισε θέλημα, μήτε τῇ διαιρέσει χώραν δούς τῷ στασιάζειν ἐν (15Α_254> τούτῳ, μήτε τῇ φαντασίᾳ παρείσδυσιν, τῷ μή ὑπάρχειν ἐκεῖνο. Εἰ δέ τις τυχόν ἰσχυρίζεται, μή ἄν ἄλλως ἀπ᾿ αὐτοῦ δυνατόν, ἤ κατ᾿ ἐναντίωσιν τά δύο θελήματα λέγεσθαι· εἰ μέν ὡς κατ᾿ οὐσίαν διάφορα, κἀγώ δέχομαι, εἰ δέ ὡς ἀντικείμενα, ψευδής ὁ λόγος. Οὐ γάρ εἴ τι διάφορον πάντως καί ἀντικείμενον. Τό γάρ ἀντικείμενον, γνώμης παραλόγως δηλαδή κινουμένης· τό δέ τό δέ διάφορον, φύσεως λόγῳ κρατουμένης ἔργον καθέστηκε· καί τό μέν φύσεως στασιαστικόν, τό δέ προδήλως συστατικόν. ∆ιαφορά τοιγαροῦν οὐσιώδης, εἰς σύστασιν τῶν ἐν τῇ φύσει πράγμάτων ἐστίν, οὐ μή ἐναντίωσις, (ἀλλά ) πρός τήν τούτων διάλυσιν. Οὐ γάρ ἔχει ἡ φύσις τό παρά φύσιν· οὐδέ λόγος οὐδείς τοῦ στασιάζοντος.

Ἄλλως τε, εἰ τά δύο θελήματα πάντως ἐναντία καί ἀντικείμενα, πῶς ἐπί τε τῶν φύσει καί ὑποστάσει διῃρημένων λογικῶν, οὐ τοῦτο πάντη τε καί πάντως συμβαίνει. Συννεύομεν γάρ ἔστιν ὅτε τούτοις, καίτοι γνωμικοῖς οὖσι, καί Θεῷ, καί ἀγγέλοις, καί ἀλλήλοις, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ διά τοῦτο τῆς γνώμης ἤδη, καί τοῦ κατ᾿ αὐτήν θελήματος, διαπεπτώκαμεν. Εἰ γάρ τούτων, καί τῆς πρός τούς ἄλλους δηλονότι συννεύσεως, εἴπερ ἕως ταύτην ἔχομεν, καί τῶν ἄλλων γνωμικῶν ἀντεχόμεθα. Εἰ οὖν ἐνταῦθα τοῦτο, καί οὐδαμῶς ἀντίταξις καθορᾶται, καίτοι σωζομένων ὑπάρξει τε καί ἀριθμῷ τῶν γνωμικῶν θελημάτων, καί τήν φιλικήν ἐν σχέσει διάθεσιν· πῶς ἐπί τοῦ αὐτοῦ καί ἑνός σαρκωθέντος Θεοῦ Λόγου, καί τελείως δι᾿ ἡμᾶς ἐνανθρωπήσαντος, ἐν τοῖς φυσικῶς προσοῦσιν αὐτῷ κατ᾿ οὐσίαν θελήμασιν, ἐναντίωσις ἔσται. Πῶς δέ ταῦτά φασιν ἐναντία, δι᾿ αὐτόν γε τόν ἀριθμόν, ἤ καί δι᾿ αὐτό τό ὑπάρχειν. Εἰ δέ διά τοῦτο, καί τήν φύσιν ἀνέλωσι τῆς σαρκός, ἀντικειμένην τῷ Λόγῳ διά τήν ὕπαρξιν. Πολλῷ γάρ ἰσχυρότερον, ὡς πᾶσιν εὔδηλον, εἰς ἀντίταξιν,