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the education of the Greeks is a debatable matter, how could we accept you saying that it leads to one and the same form and end as the wisdom given by God, that which is truly true, truly saving, which does not pass away with this age?

(p. 298) After his boastful speech, as if he had taken us as accountable, since we contradict the sayings falsified by him, he proclaims against the very rational heavens, I mean the apostles. For while the brother of God clearly speaks of two wisdoms, the one from above, the other from below, and the one pure and gentle, the other soulish and demonic, and while Paul indicates two wisdoms by saying "for since in the wisdom of God the world through wisdom did not know God," he himself expressly fights against those who speak of two or even more wisdoms, and the reason is that "no one yet," he says, "has defined the knowledge of this or that person as wisdom." But indeed the brother of God, O philosopher, defined the knowledge of one who shows his works from a good manner of life as a wisdom that is pure and heavenly, and defined the knowledge of one not living in a good manner of life as a wisdom that is soulish and demonic and earthly. Reasonably so; for the same thing, changing along with the ways of those who possess it, has produced opposite wisdoms in souls. And besides, if the science of no one is philosophy, then no one anywhere is a philosopher and you have destroyed yourself by your own words, O philosopher, or I know not what to call you, since according to you philosophy has its foundation in no soul, and no one at all is named after it.

What of the one who says "the first wisdom is to despise the wisdom that consists in speech and in spurious and superfluous antitheses," which he says he both praises and "embraces," "as having conquered the wisdom that is being brought to nothing"? Does he not show that there are different wisdoms? For he says he praises and embraces the one, as being first and conquering the other, but he considers the other to be despicable and abolished and defeated, since it has superfluous and for this reason spurious antitheses, which we (p. 298) least of all deem worthy to call the wisdom of God. But the one that also holds to evil opinion, we would not think it unworthy to also call it wicked, such as is that of Plato, with the uncreated matter and the self-sufficient ideas and the demiurges, the later-born daemons, so they persuade that the same thing is both good and not good, holy and not, and in short it vainly opposes itself through superfluity, and while it attempts to speak about everything proposed, it accomplishes almost nothing intelligent, such as are also the things revered by them, which according to the sacred Samuel from his childhood "accomplish nothing." But if you, wishing to make war on those who live in peace and have renounced superfluous antitheses, make pretexts in sins, innovating doctrines and names that aid you towards contentiousness and love of battle, will we readily follow, having slighted the thoughts and sayings which are familiar to us and commonly thought to be best? This will not be, it will not be. For who indeed of all other men and of all who have been born of men, if they were present, would have lent you an obedient ear as you say and construct the argument that a perfect man and philosopher and purified person is the one who knows all things, so that from this you might conclude that one must seek to learn if anyone professes to know anything, whether he be godly or not, and you might declare imperfect and impure the one who has not learned geometry from Euclid, and arithmetic from another, and from you calculation, and who has consorted with Ptolemy through his books for music and astronomy, and who has thoroughly studied the Aristotelian treatises for dialectic and physiology? For who of those now or of those who have ever had sense does not know that God alone is the one who knows all things?

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ἀμφισβητήσιμον ἡ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἔχει παιδεία, πῶς ἄν σε παραδεξαίμεθα λέγοντα πρός ἕν καί ταὐτό φέρειν ταύτην εἶδός τε καί τέλος τῇ παρά τοῦ Θεοῦ δεδομένῃ σοφίᾳ, τῇ ὄντως ἀληθεῖ, τῇ ὄντως σωτηρίῳ, τῇ τῷ αἰῶνι τούτῳ μή συνδιαλυομένη;

(σελ. 298) Μετά δή τό μεγαλορρημονῆσαι, ὡς ὑπευθύνους ἡμᾶς λαβών, ἅτε τοῖς παρακεχαραγμένοις ὑπ᾿ αὐτοῦ ρητοῖς ἀντιλέγοντας, πρός αὐτούς διακηρύττεται τούς λογικούς οὐρανούς, τούς ἀποστόλους λέγω. Τοῦ μέν γάρ ἀδελφοθέου δύο σαφῶς λέγοντος σοφίας, τήν μέν ἄνωθεν, τήν δέ κάτωθεν, καί τήν μέν ἁγνήν καί ἐπιεικῆ, τήν δέ ψυχικήν καί δαιμονιώδη, καί τοῦ Παύλου δύο σοφίας ἐμφήναντος τῷ λέγειν «ἐπεί ἐν τῇ σοφίᾳ τοῦ Θεοῦ οὐκ ἔγνω ὁ κόσμος διά τῆς σοφίας τόν Θεόν», αὐτός διαρρήδην μάχεται τοῖς δύο ἤ καί πλείους λέγουσι σοφίας, καί τό αἴτιον ὅτι «μηδείς πω», φησίν, «ὡρίσατο τήν τοῦ δεῖνος ἤ τοῦ δεῖνος γνῶσιν σοφίαν». Ἀλλά μήν ὁ ἀδελφόθεος, ὤ φιλόσοφε, τήν μέν γνῶσιν τοῦ ἐκ τῆς καλῆς ἀναστροφῆς δεικνύντος τά ἔργα αὐτοῦ σοφίαν ὡρίσατο ἁγνήν καί οὐράνιον, τήν δέ γνῶσιν τοῦ μή ζῶντος ἐν ἀναστροφῇ καλῇ σοφίαν ὡρίσατο ψυχικήν καί δαιμονιώδη καί ἐπίγειον. Εἰκότως˙ ἡ γάρ αὐτή τοῖς τρόποις τῶν κεκτημένων συμμεταβάλλουσα, τάς ἐναντίας σοφίας ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐνειργάσατο˙ ἄλλως τε, εἰ μηδενός ἐπιστήμη φιλοσοφία ἐστίν, οὐδέ φιλόσοφος ἐστιν οὐδείς οὐδαμοῦ καί ἀπολώλεκας σύ σαυτόν διά τούς σαυτοῦ λόγους, ὤ φιλόσοφε, ἤ οὐκ οἶδ᾿ ὅπως σε ὀνομάσω, ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ ψυχῇ κατά σέ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἐχούσης ἵδρυσιν, μηδ᾿ ἐπωνύμου ταύτης τῶν ἁπάντων οὐδενός ὄντος.

Τί δ᾿ ὁ λέγων «σοφία πρώτη σοφίας ὑπερορᾶν τῆς ἐν λόγῳ κειμένης καί ταῖς κιβδήλοις καί περιτταῖς ἀντιθέσεσιν», ἥν καί ἐπαινεῖν καί «ἀσπάζεσθαι», φησίν, «ὡς τήν καταργουμέην σοφίαν νικήσασαν»; Ἆρ᾿ οὐ διαφόρους εἶναι σοφίας δείκνυσι; Τήν μέν γάρ ἐπαινεῖν φησι καί ἀσπάζεσθαι πρώτην τε οὖσαν καί τήν ἑτέραν νικῶσαν, τήν δέ ὑπεροπτέαν ἡγεῖται καί κατηργημένην καί ἡττημένην, ἅτε περιττάς ἔχουσαν καί διά τοῦτο κιβδήλους τάς ἀντιθέσεις, ἥν καί ἠμεῖς (σελ. 298) Θεοῦ καλεῖν σοφίαν ἀξιοῦμεν ἥκιστα˙ τήν δέ, καί κακοδοξίας ἀντεχομένην, οὐκ ἄν ἀπαξιώσαιμεν καί πονηράν προσειπεῖν, ὁποία ἐστίν ἡ τοῦ Πλάτωνος, μετά τῆς ἀκτίστου ὕλης καί τῶν αὐθυπάρκτων ἰδεῶν καί τῶν δημιουργῶν, τῶν ὑστερογενῶν δαιμόνων, ἔτσι καί τό αὐτό πείθουσι εἶναι καλόν τε καί μή καλόν, ὅσιόν τε καί μή, καί ἁπλῶς αὐτή ἑαυτῇ διά περιττότητα μάτην ἐναντιουμένη, καί λέγειν μέν περί παντός ἐπιχειροῦσα τοῦ προτεθέντος, περαίνουσα δέ σχεδόν συνετόν οὐδέν, οἷά ἐστι καί τά σεβόμενα παρ᾿ αὐτῶν, ἅ κατά τόν ἐκ παιδός ἱερόν Σαμουήλ «περανοῦσιν οὐθέν». Εἰ δέ σύ, τοῖς εἰρήνην ἄγουσι καί ταῖς περιτταῖς ἀντιθέσεσιν ἀποταξαμένοις θέλων πολεμεῖν, προφασίζῃ προφάσεις ἐν ἁμαρτίαις, δόγματα καινοτομῶν καί ὀνόματα συναιρόμενά σοι πρός τό φίλερι καί φιλόμαχον, ἡμεῖς ἑτοίμως ἑψόμεθα, τῶν συντρόφων ἡμῖν καί κοινῇ δοκούντων ἀρίστων νοημάτων τε καί ρημάτων ὀλιγορήσαντες; Οὐκ ἔσται τοῦτο, οὐκ ἔσται. Τίς γάρ δή καί τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ἀνθρώπων καί τῶν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γενομένων ἁπάντων, εἰ περιῆσαν, ὑπέσχεν ἄν σοι πειθήνιον οὖς λέγοντι καί κατασκευάζοντι ὅτι τέλειος ἄνθρωπος καί φιλόσοφος καί κεκαθαρμένος ἐστίν ὁ πάντα εἰδώς, ἵν᾿ ἐντεῦθεν συναγάγῃς τά δεῖν ζητεῖν μανθάνειν, εἴ τις ἐπαγγέλλεταί τι εἰδέναι, κἄν θεοσεβής ᾖ κἄν μή, καί ἀτελῆ καί ἄναγνον ἀποφήνῃς τόν μή μεμαθηκότα παρ᾿ Εὐκλείδου μέν τήν γεωμετρίαν, ἀριθμητικήν δέ παρ᾿ ἄλλου, παρά δέ σοῦ τήν λογιστικήν, μουσικήν δέ καί ἀστρονομίαν Πτολεμαίῳ διά τῶν κατ᾿ αὐτόν βιβλίων συγγεγονότα, διαλεκτικήν τε καί φυσιολογίαν τάς ἀριστοτελικάς πραγματείας ἐκμελετήσαντα; Τίς γάρ οὐκ οἶδε τῶν νῦν ἤ τῶν πώποτε νοῦν ἐχόντων Θεόν εἶναι μόνον τόν τά πάντα εἰδότα;