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the subject of what is in a subject (15A_256> has been established. But if only because of number, they should also make the natures of this desolate, and not count even one of them? And let them again decline it for the same reason, also in the case of the three hypostases of the one and unoriginate Godhead, so that it too may not be at odds with itself, but it is absurd to assign such power to what is absolutely nothing, not a substance, not a quality, not anything else that exists. But it is more absurd to both blame the very existence of the natural will, and from this to construct its abolition. And this, with the others in the 0196 nature being a foremost innate power of natural properties and movements. For according to this alone, we naturally desire to be and to live, and to move, and to think, and to speak, and to perceive, and to partake of food, of sleep and rest, and not to be in pain, nor to die, and simply to have perfectly the states of all the things that constitute nature, and the deprivations of those things that destroy it.

And it seems to me that in this too the devout monk acted fittingly, according to his definition, adding: "And of the things essentially belonging to nature, it is cohesive of all properties." For the essential and innate will in us always holds all things together, and desires to hold them together, and to have the deprivation of nothing; or rather, we do, both through it and according to it. And I think that the one who takes some account of reality, and not of appearance, will certainly agree that God Incarnate, as man, has a natural and human will; and that according to it He naturally wills each of the things enumerated, for the confirmation of His flesh animated with a mind and reason, if indeed He became a perfect man, lacking none of our properties, except sin alone. But having all that we have, without omission, the things which by nature are constitutive of our essence, just as also those of the unoriginate and divine essence, through which He properly made Himself known as being at once man and God (15A_258>, preserving perfectly the natural kinship both to us and to the Father after the union.

For to say that only at the time of the saving passion, when He was truly prefiguring our state in Himself, and as a man was declining death, He was shown to have two wills, seems to me assertive, not demonstrative. For how was it at this time only, and not before it, and for what reason? For if He had it then, He had it also from the beginning, from when He became man, and did not improvise it later. But if He did not have it from the beginning, not even at the time of the passion, but only feigned the refusal, and in addition to this the other things through which we have been saved, such as the tear, the prayer, the sorrow, the agony, the cross, the death, the burial. For if one of the natural things in Him according to us which save us is annulled, neither will the others stand. For how not that one, but these? And what is the reason? And what sort of opposition is there in praying, and willingly of a natural I mean, that according to the flesh, to make a demonstration of weakness through shrinking, and not to resist at all, but to say: "If it is possible." And: "Not what I will, but what you will." and to join to the shrinking the strong and eager movement against death? For He was truly prefiguring our state in Himself, through the natural agony for a short time, 0197 in order to free us from this too, and to confirm the nature of His own flesh, and to make the economy clear of all illusion; but again He immediately presented the greatest impulse against death, and the ultimate connaturality and union of His human will with His own and the Father's will, by judging this and saying: "Not my will, but yours be done." By this He repelled division, and by that again, confusion.

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τό ὑποκείμενον τοῦ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ (15Α_256> καθέστηκεν. Εἰ δέ διά μόνον τόν ἀριθμόν, καί τούτου τάς φύσεις ἐρήμους ποιήσωσι, καί μηδέ μίαν αὐτῶν ἀριθμείτωσαν; παραιτείσθωσαν δέ καί πάλιν αὐτόν διά τήν αὐτήν, κἀπί τῶν τῆς μιᾶς καί ἀνάρχου θεότητος τριῶν ὑποστάσεων, ἵνα μή κἀκείνη στασιάζῃ πρός ἑαυτήν, ἀλλ᾿ ἄτοπόν γε τῷ μηδέν ὄντι τό σύνολον, οὐκ οὐσία, οὐ ποιόν, οὐκ ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄντων, ἰσχύν τοσαύτην ἀποκληροῦν· ἀτοπώτερον δέ, καί τήν ὕπαρξιν αὐτήν τοῦ φυσικοῦ θελήματος αἰτιᾶσθαι, κἀντεῦθεν τήν ἀναίρεσιν αὐτοῦ κατασκευάζειν. Καί ταῦτα, τῶν ἄλλων ἐν τῇ 0196 φύσει πρωτίστην οὖσαν φυσικῶν ἰδιωμάτων καί κινημάτων ἔμφυτον δύναμιν. Κατά ταύτην γάρ μόνην, τοῦ εἶναι καί ζῇν, καί κινεῖσθαι, καί νοεῖν, καί λαλεῖν, καί αἰσθάνεσθαι, καί μετέχειν τροφῆς, ὕπνου τε καί ἀναπαύσεως, καί μή ἀλγύνεσθαι, μηδέ θνήσκειν, καί ἁπλῶς ἁπάντων τῶν συνιστώντων τήν φύσιν, ἔχειν τελείως τάς ἕξεις, καί τῶν λυμαινομένων τάς στερήσεις, φυσικῶς ἐφιέμεθα.

Καί μοι φαίνεται κἀν τούτῳ προσηκόντως ποιήσας, κατά τόν αὐτοῦ ὁρισμόν ὁ εὐλαβής μοναχός, καί προσθείς τό· " Καί τῶν οὐσιωδῶς τῇ φύσει προσόντων, συνεκτικήν πάντων ἰδιωμάτων». Πάντα γάρ ἀεί συνέχει, καί συνέχειν ἐφίεται , καί οὐδενός ἔχειν τήν στέρησιν, τό οὐσιῶδες ἐν ἡμῖν καί ἔμφυτον θέλημα· μᾶλλον δέ ἡμεῖς, δι᾿ αὐτοῦ τε καί κατ᾿ αὐτό· καί οἶμαι τόν καί ποσῶς τοῦ ὄντος, ἀλλά μή τοῦ δοκοῦντος λόγον ποιούμενον συνθήσεσθαι πάντως δή, καί ὡς ἄνθρωπον τόν σαρκωθέντα Θεόν φυσικόν ἔχειν καί ἀνθρώπινον θέλημα· καί τῶν ἀπηριθμημένων ἕκαστον θέλειν κατ᾿ αὐτό φυσικῶς, πρός πίστωσιν τῆς νοερῶς αὐτοῦ καί λογικῶς ἐψυχωμένης σαρκός, εἴπερ τέλειος ἄνθρωπος γέγονε, μηδενί τῶν ἡμετέρων λειπόμενος, πλήν μόνης τῆς ἁμαρτίας· ἀλλά πάντα ἔχων ὅσα καί ἡμεῖς, ἀπαραλείπτως τό κατά φύσιν συστατικά τῆς ἡμετέρας οὐσίας, ὥσπερ οὖν καί τά τῆς ἀνάρχου καί θείας, δι᾿ ὧν ἄνθρωπον ἑαυτόν ὁμοῦ καί Θεόν (15Α_258> ὄντα κυρίως ἐγνώριζε, καί τήν πρός ἡμᾶς, καί τόν Πατέρα τελείως φυσικήν συγγένειαν διασώζοντα μετά τήν ἕνωσιν.

Τό γάρ δή λέγειν, ὡς ἐν τῷ καιρῷ μόνῳ τοῦ σωτηρίου πάθους, ἡνίκα τό ἡμέτερον ἐτύπου πραγματικῶς ἐν ἑαυτῷ, καί ὡς ἄνθρωπος παρῃτεῖτο τόν θάνατον, δύο θελήματα ἔχων ἐδείκνυτο, ἀποφαντικόν, οὐκ ἀποδεικτικόν μοι δοκεῖ. Πῶς γάρ ἐν τούτῳ μόνῳ τῷ καιρῷ, καί μή πρό τούτου, καί δι᾿ ἥντινα τήν αἰτίαν. Εἰ μέν γάρ εἶχε τότε, καί ἀπ᾿ ἀρχῆς εἶχεν ἐξ οὖ γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλ᾿ οὐχ ὕστερον ἐσχεδίασεν· εἰ δέ ἀπ᾿ ἀρχῆς οὐκ εἶχεν, οὐ δέ κατά τόν καιρόν τοῦ πάθους, ἀλλά μόνον ἐφάντασε τήν παραίτησιν, καί πρός ταύτῃ τά λοιπά δι᾿ ὧν σεσώσμεθα, οἷον τό δάκρυον, τήν εὐχήν, τήν λύπην, τήν ἀγωνίαν, τόν σταυρόν, τόν θάνατον, τήν ταφήν· ἑνός γάρ ἀκυρουμένου τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ καθ᾿ ἡμᾶς φυσικῶν σωζομένων, οὐδέ τά ἄλλα στήσεται. Πῶς γάρ οὐκ ἐκεῖνο μέν, ταῦτα δέ; Καί τίς ὁ λόγος; ἐναντίωσις δέ ποῖα τό προσεύχεσθαι, καί φυσικῆς ἐκουσίως; τῆς κατά τήν σάρκα λέγω, πρόσδειξιν ἀσθενείας ποιεῖσθαι διά τῆς συστολῆς, καί μή ἀντιτείνειν ὅλως, ἀλλά λέγειν· Εἰ δυνατόν. Καί· Μή τί ἐγώ θέλω, ἀλλ᾿ εἴ τι σύ· καί συνάπτειν τῇ συστολῇ τήν ἰσχυράν κατά τοῦ θανάτου καί πρόθυμον κίνησιν; Ἐτύπου μέν γάρ πραγματικῶς ἐν ἑαυτῷ τό ἡμέτερον, διά τῆς φυσικῆς πρός μικρόν ἀγωνίας 0197 ἵνα καί ταύτης ἡμᾶς ἐλευθερώσῃ, καί τῆς οἰκείας σαρκός τήν φύσιν πιστώσηται, καί πᾶσι καθαράν τήν οἰκονομίαν φαντασίας ἐργάσηται· παρίστη δέ πάλιν εὐθύς τήν κατά τοῦ θανάτου μεγίστην ὁρμήν, καί τήν ἄκραν τοῦ κατ᾿ αὐτόν ἀνθρωπικοῦ, πρός τό οἰκεῖον αὐτοῦ καί Πατρικόν θέλημα, συμφυίαν καί ἕνωσιν, τῷ ἐπικρῖναι τοῦτο καί φάσκειν· Μή τό ἐμόν, ἀλλά τό σόν γενέσθω. Ταύτῃ μέν τήν διαίρεσιν ἀπωθούμενος, ἐκείνῃ δέ πάλιν τήν σύγχυσιν.