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And so that I may now leave aside the other novelties I have heard and bring my discourse back to the subject at hand, who does not know that there is one philosophy in words, and another in (p. 300) deeds, and that for each of these there are many and varied distinctions, through which wisdom appears foolish and not so, carnal and spiritual, contradicted and irrefutable, temporal and eternal, each one clearly standing almost entirely apart from the other? "But I," he says, "praise wisdom-itself, the idea of true knowledge, which is one." But, my good man, this might perhaps be called wisdom-itself alone, but not wisdom or philosophy alone. However, when you yourself, beginning your arguments on behalf of philosophy, say that "both the oracles of the theurgists and the teachings of philosophy have been given to us by God," you certainly do not subordinate the oracles of the theurgists to that philosophy. For how could you speak of "these things and those under this," if you did not separate those from it? What, then, do you call philosophy there? Is it that of the Greeks or the idea which you mentioned here? But if it is that of the Greeks, then you happen to be extolling it, but also contradicting yourself, by stating the opposite here: "these are not the things which, bearing the name of philosophy, we extol, whatever so-and-so or so-and-so opined or wrote or taught, nor are these things philosophy for us, but the very idea of knowledge," and furthermore, because here you insist that only one thing is called philosophy, the idea itself, while there you yourself speak of another, that of the Greeks. But if not this one, but there too you call the idea of knowledge philosophy, that is, the one which generally contains all knowledge, then the theurgic oracles, clearly separated by you from it there, are deprived of all knowledge and could not be providers of any knowledge, and being, according to you, entirely separated from knowledge, were added to philosophy there only for deception. And what necessary need would there be of these, when the philosophical teachings both introduce and lead up to the knowledge of beings, which is indeed the end of all hierarchy, or to say the same thing, of all divine economy and activity, (p. 302) as you yourself declare in many places of your discourses as you proceed? Why then do you rouse your anger against us who say with Paul that the wisdom of the Greeks has been abolished and made foolish? For the wisdom of some is not wisdom-itself.

But let us see what sort of wisdom-itself you are clearly advocating here too. Is it the one that has its being in the so-called philosophers and in their writings? And yet you yourself say that the knowledge of the philosophers is not and is not called philosophy, nor are the writings of so-and-so or so-and-so, but that some of these things are not philosophy itself, but the result of philosophy. And you were driven to the necessity of saying this, in order to show one single idea of knowledge, as you say, and not many things called philosophies. Therefore, if none of those things is philosophy, then according to you, the wisdom-itself you speak of does not have its being in them either. For in whatever things it has its being, from it they would be named, just as we all are called men from the universal form that has its being in us. If, then, this wisdom-itself of yours is not in those things, where will it have its being? In God? and yet again, proceeding, you yourself say that the philosophy you extol is foolishness with God; therefore not the one existing in Him in an ineffable manner, which you yourself call wisdom-itself, but neither is it in the things created by Him, since that could never be called philosophy; but your argument is on behalf of philosophy. If, then, this has its being neither in God nor in men, yet it exists as an idea, it must therefore have its subsistence in itself; and Plato will be revived for us again with the twitterings of his evil doctrine.

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Καί ἵνα τἄλλα τῶν καινῶν ἀκουσμάτων νῦν ἀφῶ καί πρός τό προκείμενον ἐπαναγάγω τόν λόγον, τίς οὐκ οἶδε καί φιλοσοφίαν ἑτέραν μέν τήν ἐν λόγοις, ἑτέραν δέ τήν ἐν (σελ. 300) πράξεσι, καί τούτων ἑκατέρας πολλάς καί ποικίλας διαφοράς, δι᾿ ὧν μωρά τε καί μή, σαρκική τε καί πνευματική, ἀντιλεγομένη καί ἀναντίρρητος, πρόσκαιρος καί αἰώνιος ἀναφαίνεται σοφία, πλεῖστον ἑκατέρα σχεδόν τῆς ἑτέρας διεστηκυῖα σαφῶς; «Ἀλλ᾿ ἐγώ», φησί, «τήν αὐτοσοφίαν αὐτήν ἐπαινῶ, τήν τῆς ἀληθοῦς γνώσεως ἰδέαν, ἥτις μία ἐστίν». Ἀλλ᾿ ὦγαθέ μόνη μέν αὐτοσοφία ἴσως ἀν αὕτη κληθείη, μόνη δέ σοφία ἤ φιλοσοφία, οὔ. Ὅταν μέντοι τῶν ὑπέρ φιλοσοφίας λόγων αὐτός ἀρχόμενος «δεδόσθαι», λέγῃς «ἡμῖν πρός Θεοῦ τά τε τῶν θεουργῶν λόγια καί τά φιλοσοφίαν μαθήματα», τά τῶν θεουργῶν λόγια πάντως οὐχ ὑπό τήν φιλοσοφίαν τάττεις ἐκείνην. Πῶς γάρ ἄν ἔλεγες ταῦτα καί τά ὑπό ταύτην, εἰ μή διῄρεις αὐτῆς ἐκεῖνα; Τί τοίνυν ὀνομάζεις φιλοσοφίαν ἐκεῖ; πότερον τήν Ἑλλήνων ἤ τήν ἰδέαν, ἥν ἐνταῦθ᾿ εἶπες; Ἀλλ᾿ εἰ μέν τήν τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οὐκοῦν καί ταύτην ἐξυμνῶν τυγχάνεις, ἀλλά καί σαυτῷ ἀντικείμενος, ἐνταῦθ᾿ ὑπεναντίως φάσκων «οὐ ταῦτά ἐστιν, ἐφ᾿ ἅ τό τῆς φιλοσοφίας φέροντες ὄνομα ἐξυμνοῦμεν, ὅσα ὁ δεῖνα ἤ ὁ δεῖνα ἐδόξασεν ἤ συνέγραψεν ἤ ἐδίδαξεν, οὐδέ ταῦτα φιλοσοφία ἡμῖν ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾿ αὐτή ἡ τῆς γνώσεως ἰδέᾳ», προσέτι καί ὅτι μίαν μέν ἐνταῦθ᾿ ἰσχυρίζῃ καλεῖσθαι φιλοσοφίαν, τήν ἰδέαν αὐτήν, ἐκεῖ καί ἄλλην αὐτός λέγων, τήν τῶν Ἑλλήνων. Εἰ δέ μή ταύτην, ἀλλά κἀκεῖ τήν ἰδέαν τῆς γνώσεως λέγεις φιλοσοφίαν, τήν γενικῶς δηλαδή πᾶσαν περιέχουσαν γνῶσιν, τά παρά σοῦ ταύτης ἐκεῖ σαφῶς ἀποδιαιρούμενα θεουργικά λόγια πάσης γνώσεως ἐστέρηται καί παρεκτικά γνώσεως οὐδεμιᾶς ἄν εἴη, καθόλου δέ τῆς γνώσεως ἀποδιεσταλμένα κατά σέ καί πρός φενακισμόν μόνον τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ προσετέθησαν ἐκεῖ. Τίς δ᾿ ἄν εἴη καί χρεία τούτων ἀναγκαῖα, τῶν κατά φιλοσοφίαν μαθημάτων καί εἰσαγόντων καί ἀναγόντων εἰς τήν γνῶσιν τῶν ὄντων, ἥ δή πάσης ἱεραρχίας, ταὐτόν δ᾿ εἰπεῖν πάσης θείας οἰκονομίας καί ἐνεργείας, τέλος ἐστίν, (σελ. 302) ὡς αὐτός πολλαχοῦ τῶν λόγων ἀποφαίνῃ προϊών; Τί τοίνυν καθ᾿ ἡμῶν τούς θυμούς ἐγείρεις τήν τῶν Ἑλλήνων σοφίαν κατηργημένην καί μεμωραμένην μετά Παύλου λεγόντων; Οὐ γάρ ἡ τινῶν σοφία αὐτοσοφία ἐστίν.

Ἀλλά γάρ ἴδωμεν καί τίνα κἀνταῦθα δῆλος εἶ πρεσβεύων αὐτοσοφίαν. Ἆρα τήν ἐν τοῖς ὀνομαζομένοις φιλοσόφοις κἀν τοῖς τούτων συγγράμμασιν ἔχουσαν τό εἶναι; Καί μήν αὐτός φής μή εἶναι μηδέ λέγεσθαι φιλοσοφίαν τήν γνῶσιν τῶν φιλοσόφων, μηδέ τά τοῦ δεῖνος ἤ τοῦ δεῖνος συγγράμματα, ἀλλ᾿ ἔστιν ἅ τούτων, οὐκ αὐτά φιλοσοφίαν, ἀλλ᾿ ἀποτέλεσμα φιλοσοφίας εἶναι. Τοῦτο δ᾿ εἰς ἀνάγκην περιέστης εἰπεῖν, ἵνα δείξῃς μίαν μόνην ἥν φής γνώσεως ἰδέαν, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ πολλάς λεγομένας φιλοσοφίας. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μηδέν ἐκείνων φιλοσοφία ἐστίν, οὐδ᾿ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχει τό εἶναι κατά σέ, ἤν λέγεις αὐτοσοφίαν. Ἐν οἷς γάρ ἔχει τό εἶναι, ἀπ᾿ αὐτῆς ἄν ἐκεῖνα κληθεῖεν, ὥσπερ καί ἄνθρωποι πάντες ἡμεῖς ἀπό τοῦ καθόλου εἴδους ἀκούομεν ἐν ἡμῖν ἔχοντος τό εἶναι. Εἰ τοίνυν μή ἐν ἐκείνοις ἡ αὐτοσοφία σοι αὕτη, ποῦ σχήσει τό εἶναι; Ἐν τῷ Θεῷ; καί μήν πάλιν αὐτός προϊών λέγεις μωρίαν εἶναι παρά τῷ Θεῷ, ἥν ἐξαίρεις φιλοσοφίαν˙ οὔκουν ἡ ἐν αὐτῷ τό ἄφραστον ἐνοῦσα τρόπον, ἥν αὐτός λέγεις αὐτοσοφίαν, ἀλλ᾿ οὐδ᾿ ἐν τοῖς ὑπ᾿ αὐτοῦ γεγενημένοις, ἐπεί μηδέ φιλοσοφία ποτ᾿ ἄν ἐκεῖνο κληθείη˙ σοί δ᾿ ὑπέρ φιλοσοφίας ὁ λόγος. Εἰ τοίνυν αὕτη μήτ᾿ ἐν θεῷ μήτ᾿ ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἔχει τό εἶναι, ἔστι δ᾿ ὅμως ἰδέα οὖσα, καθ᾿ ἑαυτήν οὐκοῦν ἐστιν ὑφεστῶσα˙ καί Πλάτων ἡμῖν αὖθις ἀναβιώσεται μετά τῶν τῆς κακοδοξίας τερετισμάτων.