60

when a part is being corrupted, it is surely clear to everyone that the universals will not stand either. For the parts are in the wholes, and the wholes are and subsist in the parts. And no argument will contradict this; except that, as if bound by the truth, they too, unwillingly, declare the power of providence and demonstrate that it extends through all things by means of the very things they have striven to establish. For in saying that only the universals are guided by providence, they are unaware that they are also saying that there is providence for the particulars, being led by necessity toward the truth which they strive to flee. For if they say that the universals are deemed worthy of providence for the sake of 1192 their permanence, (14∆_250> they introduce the idea that the particulars are much more worthy of it, in which the permanence and subsistence of the universals reside. For these are mutually implied because of their naturally indissoluble relation to each other, and as one is preserved for the sake of permanence, the other is not alien to this safeguarding; and again, if one falls away from the safeguarding for permanence, it follows that the other does not obtain it either.

Besides, it is said in three ways that God does not exercise providence over all existing things. For they say that either He is ignorant of the method of providence, or is unwilling, or is unable. But indeed, according to the common notions of all, God, being good and supremely good, always and in every way wills what is good and for all; and being wise and supremely wise, or rather the fount of all wisdom, He in every way knows what is expedient; and being powerful, or rather infinitely powerful, He in every way acts in a manner befitting God in all things which are known to Him and have been well and expediently willed, showing Himself as good and wise and powerful through all things, both visible and invisible, both universal and particular, both small and great, and of all things that have their being according to any substance whatsoever, remitting nothing of the infinity of His goodness and wisdom and power, and preserving all things according to the principle of being of each, both in relation to themselves and to each other, according to the indissoluble relative harmony and permanence of all things.

What then, do we not understand nature itself, in and of itself, as being a clear teacher concerning the existence of God's providence over all things? For nature itself gives no small proof that the knowledge of providence has been sown in us naturally, whenever, as if pushing us untaught toward God through prayers in sudden circumstances, it prepares us to seek salvation from there. For having been suddenly seized by necessity without conscious choice, before even considering anything, we cry out to God, as if (14∆_252> providence itself were drawing us to itself even without reasonings, and overcoming the speed of the intellectual power within us, and showing beforehand that divine help is stronger than all things. But nature would not lead us without conscious choice toward that which has no nature to exist. But everything that follows anything whatsoever by nature, as is clear to all, has a strong and invincible power for the demonstration of the truth. But if, because the principle of providence for particulars is incomprehensible to us, as indeed it is according to the saying, 'O the unsearchable judgments of Him and His ways past finding out,' they were to say for this reason that providence does not exist at all, they would not be speaking correctly, in my judgment.

For if the difference and incomprehensible variety among human beings, of each to another, is great, as is the constant change of each one within himself, both in lives and habits and opinions and choices and desires, and in knowledge and 1193 needs and pursuits and in the very reasonings of the soul which are almost infinite, changing along with all the things that happen every day and hour (for this creature, man, is quick to turn, changing swiftly with the times and needs), it is altogether necessary that providence also, which has by foreknowledge comprehended all particular things in their compass, should appear diverse and varied and manifold, and co-extensive for each person with the incomprehensibility of the multitude of things

60

μέρος διαφθειρομένων παντί που δῆλόν ἐστιν ὡς οὐδέ τά καθόλου στήσεται. Τά μέρη γάρ ἐν ταῖς ὁλόγησι, καί αἱ ὁλότητες ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι καί εἰσί καί ὑφεστήκασι. Καί οὐδείς ἀντερεῖ λόγος· πλήν ὅτι ὑπό τῆς ἀληθείας ὥσπερ δεσμούμενοι ἄκοντες καί αὐτοί τῆς προνοίας τήν δύναμιν ἐξαγγέλλουσι καί διά πάντων διήκειν κατασκευάζουσι δι᾿ ὧν αὐτοῖς κατεσπούδασαν. Λέγοντες γάρ ὑπό τῆς προνοίας ἄγεσθαι μόνα τά καθόλου, λελήθασιν ἑαυτούς καί τῶν κατα μέρος εἶναι πρόνοιαν λέγοντες, ἐξ ἀνάγκης πρός τήν ἀλήθειαν, ἥν φεύγειν σπουδάζουσιν, ὑπαγόμενοι. Εἰ γάρ χάριν 1192 διαμονῆς τά καθόλου (14∆_250> προνοίας ἀξιοῦσθαί φασι, ταύτης πολλῷ πρότερον ἀξιοῦσθαι τά κατά μέρος εἰσάγουσιν, ἐν οἶς ἡ τῶν καθόλου διαμονή καί ὑπόστασις. Συνεισάγεται γάρ ἀλλήλοις ταῦτα διά τήν κατά φύσιν ἀδιάλυτον πρός ἄλληλα σχέσιν, καί θατέρου πρός διαμονήν συντητουμένου, μηδέ τό ἕτερον ταύτης εἶναι τῆς φυλακῆς ἀλλότριον, καί ἑνός πάλιν τῆς πρός διαμονήν φυλακῆς διαπίπτοντες μηδέ τό ἄλλο ταύτης τυγχάνειν λέγει ἀκόλουθον.

Ἄλλως τε δέ κατά τρεῖς τρόπους τό μή πάντων τῶν ὄντων προνοεῖν τόν Θεόν λέγεται. Ἤ γάρ ἀγνοεῖν αὐτόν λέγουσι τῆς προνοίας τήν μέθοδον, ἤ μή βούλεσθαι, ἤ μή δύνασθαι. Ἀλλά μήν κατά τάς κοινάς πάντων ἐννοίας ἀγαθός ὤν καί ὑπεράγαθος ὁ Θεός ἀεί πάντως τά καλά βούλεται καί πᾶσι, καί σοφός ὑπάρχων καί ὑπέρσοφος, μᾶλλον δέ πάσης σοφίας πηγή, γινώσκει πάντως τά συμφέροντα, καί δυνατός ὤν, μᾶλλον δέ ἀπειροδύναμος, ἐνεργεῖ πάντως θεοπρεπῶς ἐν πᾶσι τά ἐγνωσμένα αὐτῷ καί βεβουλημένα καλῶς καί συμφέροντα, ὡς ἀγαθός καί σοφός καί δυνατός, δεικνούμενος διά πάντων τῶν τε ὁρατῶν καί τῶν ἀοράτων, καί τῶν καθόλου καί τῶν μερικῶν, καί τῶν μικρῶν καί τῶν μεγάλων, καί πάντων τῶν κατά πᾶσαν τήν οἱανοῦν οὐσίαν τό εἶναι ἐχόντων, μηδέν ὑφιείς τῆς κατά τήν ἀγαθότητα καί τήν σοφίαν καί τήν δύναμιν ἀπειρίας, καί πάντα κατά τόν ἑκάστων τοῦ εἶναι λόγον πρός τε ἑαυτά καί ἄλληλα κατά τήν ἀδιάλυτον πάντων σχετικήν ἁρμονίαν τε καί διαμονήν συντηρῶν.

Τί δέ, αὐτήν καθ᾿ ἑαυτήν οὐ κατανοοῦμεν τήν φύσιν περί τοῦ εἶναι τήν ἐπί πάντα τοῦ Θεοῦ πρόνοιαν σαφῶς οὖσαν διδάσκαλον; Τεκμήριον γάρ οὐ μικρόν τοῦ φυσικῶς ἡμῖν ἐνεσπάρθαι τήν τῆς προνοίας γνῶσιν ἡ φύσις αὐτή δίδωσιν, ὁπηνίκα ἄν ἡμᾶς ἀδιδάκτως ὥσπερ ὠθοῦσα πρός τόν Θεόν διά τῶν εὐχῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξαίφνης περιστάσεσιν ἐκεῖθεν ζητεῖν τήν σωτηρίαν παρασκευάζει. Ὑπ᾿ ἀνάγκης γάρ ἄφνω συλληφθέντες ἀπροαιρέτως, πρίς τινα καί σκέψασθαι, τόν Θεόν ἐπιβοώμεθα, ὡς ἄν (14∆_252> τῆς προνοίας αὐτῆς πρός ἑαυτήν καί λογισμῶν χωρίς ἑλκούσης ἡμᾶς, καί τό τάχος τῆς ἐν ἡμῖν νοερᾶς νικώσης δυνάμεως, καί πάντων ἰσχυροτέραν τήν θείαν προδεικνυούσης βοήθειαν. Οὐκ ἄν δέ ἡμᾶς ἦγεν ἀπροαιρέτως ἡ φύσις ἐπί τό μή φύσιν ἔχον γίνεσθαι. Πᾶν δέ τό ὁτῳοῦν φυσικῶς ἑπόμενον, ὡς πᾶσιν ἄδηλον, ἰσχυράν ἔχει καί ἀκαταμάχητον κατά τήν ἀπόδειξιν τῆς ἀληθείας τήν δύναμιν. Εἰ δέ ὅτι ἀκατάληπτος ἡμῖν τῆς τῶν κατά μέρος προνοίας ὁ λόγος, ὥσπερ οὖν καί ἔστι κατά τό, Ὦ ἀνεξερεύνητα τά κρίματα αὐτοῦ καί ἀνεξιχνίαστοι αἱ ὁδοί αὐτοῦ, διά τοῦτο φαῖεν μηδέ πρόνοιαν εἶναι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐροῦσι κατά τόν ἐμόν λόγον.

Εἰ γάρ πολλή τίς ἐστιν ἡ διαφορά καί ἀκατάληπτος τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἑκάστου πρός ἕκαστον καί ἡ πρός ἑαυτόν ἑκάστου ἑναλλαγή, ἔν τε βίοις καί ἤθεσι καί γνώμαις καί προαιρέσεσι καί ἐπιθυμίαις, ἐπιστήμαις τε καί 1193 χρείαις καί ἐπιτηδεύμασι καί αὐτοῖς τοῖς κατά ψυχήν λογισμοῖς ἀπείροις οὖσι σχεδόν, καί πᾶσι τοῖς καθ᾿ ἑκάστην ἡμέραν καί ὥραν ἐπισυμβαίνουσι συμμεταβαλλομένου (ἀγχίστροφον γάρ τοῦτο τό ζῶον ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὀξέως τοῖς καιροῖς καί ταῖς χρείαις συμμεταβαλλόμενον), ἀνάγκη πᾶσα καί τήν πρόνοιαν, προγνωστικῶς πάντα συνειληφυῖαν κατά περιγραφήν τά καθ᾿ ἕκαστα, διάφορόν τε καί ποικίλην φαίνεσθαι καί πολυσχιδῆ, καί τῇ τῶν πεπληθυσμένων ἀκαταληψίᾳ συνεκτεινομένην ἑκάστῳ