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61

the lack of this, which either makes the nature not be a nature, or all natures the same as one another, and instead of all, one, having been jumbled together and thoroughly confused by the removal of that which constitutes them. For if they say the Word is not without an operation in what pertains to us, it is clear that they say He has an innate and human operation. For how else could it be? For it is not possible to operate without a natural operation; just as it is not possible to exist without essence and nature. But it is entirely necessary that the one who operates does not have only one innate operation, if he is double in nature; since the one who subsists would also certainly have one nature, even if he is composite in hypostasis. For if the one is on account of the relation, then this is certainly on account of the same relation. For we see this being brought to bear singularly in both cases. For the operation is referred to the one who operates, and the nature in turn is referred to the one who subsists. Therefore, if on account of the union and the singularity of the person, they say the operation of the one who operates is one, it is necessary to declare on account of this that the nature of the one who subsists is also one, lest they be caught dogmatizing a relative union, saying it is a union of operations, but not also of natures. For it is not possible for them to unite these to a hypostasis, but to an essence and nature, insofar as it relates to the 0201 natural operations, which are united to him into nothing other than an operation. Since just as the natural difference of these [operations] makes two operators, according to them, so indeed in every way the innate otherness of the essences will also bring together two who subsist. Either, therefore, let them conflate these [operations] also into one nature; or let them in no way introduce a division to those [natures], which are naturally essences and are numbered. For what does not happen in the former, could never happen in the latter. But the natural difference is indeed shown (15Α_266> through their number; but the division is set aside through the ultimate union. For it is not possible to know that a divine or human nature even exists, let alone that it differs from another, apart from its essential operation. For the definition of the thing is properly the principle of its essential power; when this is taken away, the subject is also completely taken away with it. And for this reason we confess these to be naturally preserved in the incarnate Word; the one, in the flesh's contact with divine things; the other, in turn, shown with authority in the experience of human things; so that we might also confess along with them the natures of which they are essential operations.

To whom is it not clear, that in the case of the same essence and nature, it is not possible to see a difference of existence or of natural operation? For no nature differs from itself; for this is somehow impossible. But in an individual and person, entirely and in every way, if it is composite; for we see both the different natures from which it is composed, and the natural movements by which it is known to operate according to nature, confirming its own existence, and it actually presents one thing and another, the things from which it is, through the natural operation of one and the other; on account of which, for the one who looks away from this, I mean the individual, and willfully runs past the natures in order to abolish the natural operations, we find that the attack is not so much burdensome in this, as it is cooperating. For if the individual is not in every way enclosed in one natural operation, just as it is not enclosed in one nature—for who says so, or is able to demonstrate it?—it is clear that it has essential movements equal in number to the natures, that is essences, within it, and no one will contradict it. And I pass over saying that the composite person in Christ is not even called an individual in the proper sense. For it does not have a relation to the division from the most general genus proceeding through the subordinate genera to the most specific species, 0204 and circumscribing its own progression within it. Wherefore (15Α_268> for this reason, according to the most wise Cyril, the name Christ has neither the force of a definition—for it is not an individual, predicated of a species containing many who differ in number—nor indeed does it signify the essence of anything. For it is not an individual, referred to a species or genus, or circumscribed essentially by these; but a composite hypostasis, the natural of the

61

ἔλλειψις ταύτης, ἤ οὐδέ φύσιν εἶναι ποιεῖ τήν φύσιν, ἤ τάς πάσας ἀλλήλαις ταυτόν, καί ἀντί πάντων μίαν, τῇ ἀπολείψει τῆς συνιστώσης συμφυρείσας δι᾿ ὅλου συγχυθείσας. Εἰ γάρ οὐκ ἀνέργητον λέγουσι τό καθ' ἡμᾶς τόν Λόγον, δῆλον ὡς ἔμφυτον καί ἀνθρωπίνην ἐνέργειαν ἔχοντα τοῦτόν φασι. Πῶς γάρ ἄν ἄλλως; Οὐ γάρ ἐνεργεῖν δυνατόν φυσικῆς ἐνεργείας χωρίς· ὥσπερ οὐδέ ὑπάρχειν οὐσίας δίχα καί φύσεως. Ἀλλ' οὐδέ μίαν μόνον, ἄν περ ᾗ τήν φύσιν διπλοῦς, τήν ἔμφυτον ἔχειν ἐνέργειαν τόν ἐνεργοῦντα, πᾶσα ἀνάγκη· ἐπεί καί φύσιν μίαν πάντως τόν ὑφεστῶτα, κἄν σύνθετος ᾗ τήν ὑπόστασιν. Εἰ γάρ διά τήν σχέσιν ἐκεῖνο, διά τήν αὐτήν πάντως καί τοῦτο. Μοναδικῶς γάρ ἐπ' ἀμφοῖν ταύτην φερομένην ὁρῶμεν. Ἥ τε γάρ ἐνέργεια πρός τόν ἐνεργοῦντα, καί πρός τόν ὑφεστῶτα πάλιν ἡ φύσις ἀνάγεται. Χρή τοίνυν εἴπερ διά τήν ἕνωσιν καί τό μοναδικόν τοῦ προσώπου, μίαν τοῦ ἐνεργοῦντός φασι τήν ἐνέργειαν, μίαν διά τοῦτο καί φύσιν τοῦ ἐφεστῶτος διαγορεύειν, ἵνα μή σχετικήν τήν ἕνωσιν δογματίζοντες φωραθεῖεν, ἐνεργειῶν ταύτην, ἀλλ᾿ οὐχί καί φύσεων λέγοντες. Οὐ γάρ πρός ὑπόστασιν ταύτας αὐτούς ἑνοῦν δυνατόν, ἀλλ᾿ οὐσίαν καί φύσιν ὅσον ἐπί ταῖς 0201 φυσικαῖς ἐνεργείαις, οὐκ εἰς ἄλλο τι πλήν ἐνεργείας πρός αὐτόν ἑνουμένας. Ἐπεί ὥσπερ ἡ τούτων φυσική διαφορά, δύο τούς ἐνεργοῦντας ποιεῖ κατ᾿ αὐτούς, οὕτω δήπου πάντως, καί ἡ τῶν οὐσιῶν ἔμφυτος ἑτερότης, δύο τούς ὑφεστῶτας συνάξει. Ἤ τοίνυν πρός μίαν φύσιν καί ταύτας συμφύρωσιν· ἤ μηδαμῶς ἐκείναις, οὐσίαις τε οὔσαις φυσικῶς καί ἀριθμουμέναις, διαίρεσιν ἐπεισφρήσωσιν. Ὅπερ γάρ ἐν ἐκείναις οὐ γίνεται, οὐδέ ἐν ταύταις συμβαίνῃ ποτ᾿ ἄν. Ἀλλά δηλοῦται (15Α_266> μέν ἡ φυσική διαφορά, διά τοῦ κατ᾿ αὐτάς ἀριθμοῦ· ἐξίσταται δέ ἡ διαίρεσις διά τῆς ἄκρας ἑνώσεως. Οὐ γάρ δυνατόν θείαν ἤ ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν, ὅτι κἄν ἔστι γνωρίσαι, μή ὅτι γε διαφέρειν πρός ἄλλην, οὐσιώδους ἐνεργείας ἐκτός. Ὅρος γάρ τοῦ πράγματος, ὁ λόγος τῆς οὐσιώδους δυνάμεως κυρίως ἐστίν· ἧς ἀναιρουμένης, συναναιρεῖται πάντως καί τό ὑποκείμενον. Καί διά τοῦτο ταύτας ὁμολογοῦμεν ἐπί τοῦ σαρκωθέντος Λόγου φυσικῶς σωζομένας· τήν μέν, ἐν τῇ σαρκός προσβολῇ τῶν θείων· τήν δέ πάλιν, ἐν τῇ πείρᾳ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἐξουσιαστικῶς δεικνυμένην· ἵνα καί τάς φύσεις, ὧν εἰσίν οὐσιώδεις ἐνέργειαι, ταύταις συνομολογήσωμεν.

Τίνι δέ δῆλον οὐκ ἔστιν, ὡς ἐπί μέν οὐσίας καί φύσεως τῆς αὐτῆς, διαφοράν ὑπάρξεως ἤ φυσικῆς ἐνεργείας, οὐκ ἔστιν ἰδεῖν; Οὐδεμία γάρ πρός ἑαυτήν διαφέρει· τοῦτο γάρ πως ἀμήχανον. Ἐν ἀτόμῳ δέ καί προσώπῳ πάντη τε καί πάντως, εἴπερ σύνθετον· καί διαφόρους τε γάρ φύσεις, τάς ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκεν, καθορῶμεν, καί τάς φυσικάς κινήσεις, αἷς ἐνεργοῦν κατά φύσιν γνωρίζεται, τήν οἰκείαν πιστούμενος ὕπαρξιν, καί ἄλλο καί ἄλλο τά ἐξ ὧν ἐστι, διά τῆς κατ᾿ ἄλλο καί ἄλλο φυσικῆς ἐνεργείας πραγματικῶς παριστᾷ, δι᾿ οὗ, τοῦ πρός αὐτό, φημί δέ τό ἄτομον, ἀποσκοποῦντος, καί τάς φύσεις ἑκοντί παρατρέχοντος, διά τό τάς φυσικάς ἀνελεῖν ἐνεργείας, τήν καταδρομήν, οὐ μᾶλλον ἐν τούτῳ βαροῦσαν, ἤ συνεργοῦσαν εὑρίσκομεν. Εἰ γάρ οὐκ εἰς μίαν φυσικήν τό ἄτομον περικλείεται πάντως ἐνέργειαν, ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδέ φύσιν· τίς γάρ ὁ λέγων, ἤ παραστῆσαι δυνάμενος; δῆλον ὡς ταῖς κατ᾿ αὐτό φύσεσιν ἤγουν οὐσίαις, ἰσαρίθμους ἔχει τάς οὐσιώδεις κινήσεις, καί οὐδείς ἀντερεῖ. Καί παρῶ λέγειν, ὡς οὐδέ ἄτομον κυρίως τό κατά Χριστόν σύνθετον λέγεται πρόσωπον. Οὐ γάρ σχέσιν ἔχει πρός τήν ἐκ τοῦ γενικωτάτου γένους διά τῶν ὑπάλληλα καθιεμένην γενῶν πρός τό εἰδικώτατον εἶδος διαίρεσιν, 0204 καί ἐν αὐτῷ τήν οἰκείαν πρόοδον περιγράφουσαν. Ὅθεν (15Α_268> διά τοῦτο, κατά τόν σοφώτατον Κύριλλον, τό Χριστός ὄνομα, οὔτε ὅρου δύναμον ἔχει· οὐδέ γάρ ἄτομον ἐστι, πρός εἶδος ἐστι πολλῶν ἀριθμῷ διαφερόντων κατηγορούμενον, οὔτε μήν τήν τινός οὐσίαν δηλοῖ. Οὐδέ γάρ ἄτομον ἐστί, πρός εἶδος ἤ γενός ἀναγόμενον, ἤ κατ᾿ οὐσίαν ὑπό τούτων περιγραφόμενον· ἀλλ᾿ ὑπόστασις σύνθετος, τήν φυσικήν τῶν