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having become simple and undivided in substance, and according to the state of the virtues imitating, as far as is possible, the goodness that exists in the same way, and having put aside the property of the naturally divisible powers through the grace of the united God.

62. AN EXPLANATION CONCERNING THE PASSIONATE PART OF THE SOUL, AND ITS

GENERAL DIVISIONS... An explanation concerning the passionate part of the soul, and its general

divisions and subdivisions. For, as they say, the passionate part of the soul is divided into that which is obedient to reason,

and that which is not obedient to reason. And that which is (14∆_258> not obedient to reason they divide into the nutritive, which they call physical, and into the physical, which they call vital, neither of which is led by obedience to reason; and it is called not obedient to reason because it is not its nature to be led by reason. For to grow, or to be healthy, or to live, is not within our power. But that which is obedient to reason is divided into two, both the appetitive and the irascible. And they call it obedient to reason because it is its nature in the virtuous to be led and to be subject to reason. Again, they divide the appetitive into pleasure and pain. For appetite, when it attains its object, produces pleasure, but when it fails, pain. And again, in another way, they say that appetite, being divided, makes four species in all, including itself: appetite, pleasure, fear, and pain. And since of things that exist, some are good and some are bad, and these are either present or future, an expected good he called appetite, but a present one pleasure; and again, an expected evil, fear, but a present one, pain; so that both are and are considered to be 1197 concerning good things, whether truly existing or supposed, pleasure and appetite; but concerning bad things, pain and fear.

Again, they divide pain into four: into distress, into burden, into envy, into pity. And they say that distress is a pain that produces speechlessness in whomever it occurs, on account of the deep passage of the reasoning faculty; but burden is a pain that weighs down and troubles over unwilled occurrences; and envy is pain at another's goods; but pity is pain at another's evils. And they said that all pain is evil by its own nature. For even if the virtuous man is pained at another's evils, as being merciful, yet it is not primarily according to intention, but consequently according to circumstance. But the contemplative man remains impassible even in these things, having joined himself to God, and having become alienated from present things here.

Again, they divide fear into six: into hesitation, into reverence, into shame, into dismay, into consternation, into anguish. And (14∆_260> they say that hesitation is the fear of a future action, and reverence is the fear at the expectation of blame, and shame is the fear at a shameful deed that has been done, and dismay is the fear of a great apparition, and consternation is the fear from great tidings that takes away sensation, and anguish is the fear of failure, that is, of miscarriage. For fearing to miscarry, we are in anguish. And some also call it cowardice.

Again, they say that anger is a boiling of the blood around the heart because of a desire for retaliation. And they divide this also into three: into wrath, which some have called bile and choler, and into rage, and into rancor. And they say that wrath is an anger having a beginning and motion towards action, or an active anger; and bile is the defense against the one who caused pain through another; but choler is the pursuit against the one who caused pain by the one who was pained himself; and rage is an anger growing old (and it is said from 'to remain' and 'to be held in the memory'), and rancor is an anger watching for an opportunity for revenge; and this too is said from 'to lie in wait'. And they divide each of these

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ἁπλῆν καί ἀδιαίρετον κατά τήν οὐσίαν γεγενημένος, καί κατά τήν ἕξιν τῶν ἀρετῶν τήν ὡσαύτως ἔχουσαν ἀγαθότητα κατά τό ἐφικτόν ἐκμιμούμενος, καί τήν ἰδιότητα τῶν κατά φύσιν μεριστῶν δυνάμεων διά τήν τοῦ ἑνωθέντος Θεοῦ χάριν ἀποθέμενος.

ΞΒ (62). ΕΞΗΓΗΣΙΣ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΠΑΘΗΤΙΚΟΥ ΤΗΣ ΨΥΧΗΣ, ΚΑΙ ΤΩΝ ΑΥΤΟΥ

ΚΑΘΟΛΙΚΩΝ ∆ΙΑΙΡΕΣΕΩΝ... Ἐξήγησις περί τοῦ παθητικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς, καί τῶν αὐτοῦ καθολικῶν

διαιρέσεών τε καί ὑποδιαιρέσεων. ∆ιαιρεῖται γάρ, ὡς φασι, τό παθητικόν τῆς ψυχῆς εἴς τε τό ἐπιπειθές λόγῳ,

καί τό μή πειθόμενον λόγῳ. Καί τό μέν λόγῳ (14∆_258> μή πειθόμενον διαιροῦσιν εἰς τό θρεπτικόν, ὅ καλοῦσι φυσικόν, καί εἰς τό φυσικόν, ὅ καλοῦσι ζωτικόν, ὧν οὐδέτερον λόγῳ πειθόμενον ἄγεται· οὐκ ἐπιπειθές δέ λόγῳ καλεῖται, ἐπειδή μή πέφυκεν ἄγεσθαι λόγῳ. Τό γάρ αὐξάνειν, ἤ ὑγιαίνειν, ἤ ζῇν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ἡμῖν. Τό δέ ἐπιπειθές λόγῳ διαιρεῖται εἰς δύο, τό τε ἐπιθυμητικόν καί τό θυμικόν. Ἐπιπειθές δέ λόγῳ καλοῦσιν αὐτό, διότι λόγῳ πέφυκεν ἐν τοῖς σπουδαίοις ἄγεσθαί τε καί ὑποτάσσεσθαι. Πάλιν δέ τό ἐπιθυμητικόν διαιροῦσιν εἰς ἡδονήν καί λύπην. Ἐπιτυγχάνουσα γάρ ἐπιθυμία ἡδονήν ἐργάζεται, ἀποτυγχάνουσα δέ λύπην. Καί πάλιν καθ᾿ ἕτερον τρόπον φασί τήν ἐπιθυμίαν διαιρουμένην τέσσαρα σύν ἑαυτῇ τά πάντα εἴδη ποιεῖν, ἐπιθυμίαν, ἡδονήν, φόβον, καί λύπην. Καί ἐπειδή τῶν ὄντων τά μέν ἐστιν ἀγαθά, τά δέ φαῦλα, ταῦτα δέ ἤ παρόντα ἤ μέλλοντά ἐστι, προσδοκώμενον μέν ἀγαθόν ἐπιθυμίαν ἐκάλεσε, παρόν δέ ἡδονήν, καί πάλιν προσδοκώμενον κακόν φόβον, παρόν δέ λύπην· ὡς εἶναί τε καί θεωρεῖσθαι 1197 περί μέν τά καλά, εἴτε τά ὄντως ὄντα, εἴτε τά νομιζόμενα, τήν ἡδονήν καί τήν ἐπιθυμίαν, περί δέ τά φαῦλα τήν λύπην καί τό φόβον.

Πάλιν δέ τήν λύπην διαιροῦσιν εἰς τέσσαρα, εἰς ἄχος, εἰς ἄχθος, εἰς φθόνον, εἰς ἔλεον. Καί τό μέν ἄχος εἶναί φασι λύπην ἀφωνίαν ἐμποιοῦσαν οἷς ἄν ἐγγένηται, διά τήν εἰς βάθος πάροδον τοῦ λογιστικοῦ· τό δέ ἄχθος λύπην βαροῦσάν τε καί διοχλοῦσαν ἐπ᾿ ἀβουλήτοις συμβάσεσι· τόν δέ φθόνον λύπην ἐπ᾿ ἀλλοτρίοις ἀγαθοῖς· τό δέ ἔλεος λύπην ἐπ' ἀλλοτρίοις κακοῖς. Κακόν δέ πᾶσαν λύπην ἔφασαν τῇ ἑαυτῆς φύσει. Κἄν γάρ ὁ σπουδαῖος ἐπ᾿ ἀλλοτρίοις λυπῆται κακοῖς, ὡς ἐλεήμων, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ προηγουμένως κατά πρόθεσιν, ἀλλ᾿ ἐφεπομένως κατά περίστασιν. Ὁ δέ θεωρητικός κἄν τούτοις ἀπαθής διαμένει, συνάψας ἑαυτόν τῷ Θεῷ, καί τῶν τῇδε παρόντων ἀλλοτριώσας.

Τόν δέ φόβον πάλιν διαιροῦσιν εἰς ἕξ, εἰς ὄκνον, εἰς αἰδώ, εἰς αἰσχύνην, εἰς κατάπληξιν, εἰς ἔκπληξιν, εἰς ἀγωνίαν. Καί (14∆_260> τόν μέν ὄκνον εἶναί φασι, φόβον μελλούσης ἐνεργείας, τήν αἰδώ δέ φόβον ἐπί προσδοκίᾳ ψόγου, τήν δέ αἰσχύνην φόβον ἐπ᾿ αἰσχρῷ πεπραγμένῳ, τήν δέ κατάπληξιν, φόβον μεγάλης φαντασίας, τήν δέ ἔκπληξιν φόβον ἐκ μεγάλων ἀκουσμάτων τήν αἴσθησιν ἀφαιρούμενον, τήν ἀγωνίαν δέ φόβον διαπτώσεως, τουτέστιν ἀποτυχίας. Φοβούμενοι γάρ ἀποτυχεῖν ἀγωνιῶμεν. Καλοῦσι δέ τινες αὐτήν καί δειλίαν.

Τόν δέ θυμόν πάλιν εἶναι λέγουσι ζέσιν τοῦ περικαρδίου αἵματος δι᾿ ὄρεξιν ἀντιλυπήσεως. ∆ιαιροῦσι δέ καί τοῦτον εἰς τρία, εἰς ὀργήν, ἥν τινες ἐκάλεσαν χολήν καί χόλον, καί εἰς μῆνιν, καί εἰς κότον. Καί τήν μέν ὀργήν εἶναί φασι θυμόν πρός ἐνέργειαν ἀρχήν καί κίνησιν ἔχοντα, ἤ θυμόν ἐνεργούμενον· τήν δέ χολήν τήν δι᾿ ἄλλου ἄμυναν τοῦ λυπήσαντος· τό δέ χόλον τήν δι᾿ ἑαυτοῦ τοῦ λυπηθέντος ἐπεξέλευσιν εἰς τόν λυπήσαντα· τήν δέ μῆνιν θυμόν εἰς παλαίωσιν (εἴρηται δέ παρά τό μένειν καί τῇ μνήμῃ παρακατέχεσθαι), τόν δέ κότον θυμόν ἐπιτηροῦντα καιρόν εἰς τιμωρίαν· εἴρηται δέ παρά τό κεῖσθαι καί οὗτος. ∆ιαιροῦσι δέ καί τούτων ἕκαστον