Chapter 57

Every opposite is opposite either as a thing or as an assertion. If it is opposite as an assertion to an assertion, then it makes for affirmation and negation. Now, affirmation is the stating of what belongs to something, as, for example, ‘he is noble. Negation, on the other hand, is the stating of what does not belong to something, as, for example, ‘he is not noble. Both of these are called statements. If, however, the opposites are opposed as things, then either they are stated as of convertibles and constitute relatives which mutually induce and cancel each other, or they are not stated as of convertibles and do not have any relation. These last either change into each other, both being equally natural, and constitute such contraries as heat and cold; or the one changes into the other, whereas the other does not change. The former is natural, but the latter is unnatural and constitutes opposites by privation and habit, such as are sight and blindness. For sight is a habit, as from having, but blindness is a privation of the habit—the sight, that is.

Some contraries have no intermediate, whereas others have. Those which have no intermediate are those of which one or the other, that is to say, one of them, must necessarily be in their subject, or, in other words, in those things of which they are predicated. An example would be sickness and health in the subject body of an animal, for it is absolutely necessary for that body to have either sickness or health.

By sickness we mean every disorder of the nature. Now, those which have an intermediate are those of which one or the other must not necessarily be in the subject, or in the things of which they are predicated. An example is that of white and black, for these are contraries, yet it is not at all necessary for one of them to be in the body, because it is not necessary for every body to be either white or black—there are gray bodies and tawny ones. There is indeed an exception to this in the case of opposites belonging by definition to some nature, as heat does to fire and cold to snow. Now, in the case of those contraries which have intermediates, some of the intermediates have names, as the mean between white and black is called gray. Others, however, have no names, as the mean between just and unjust has no name. In such a case the mean is made known by the negation of both of the opposites, as, for example, ‘neither just nor unjust.’

The contraries have certain accompanying peculiarities. The first is that evil is necessarily contrary to good, while to evil sometimes good is contrary and sometimes another evil. Thus, to moderation (immoderation is contrary, but to immoderation sometimes moderation) is contrary and sometimes stolidity. Stolidity is that state in which the affections are neither moved nor aroused. Thus, immoderation is a defect of moderation, while stolidity is an excess. And the excess is contrary to the defect. The second peculiarity is that it is impossible for contraries to be in the same individuals simultaneously, for it is impossible for Socrates to be well and sick at the same time, or for the same one of his members to be simultaneously hot and cold. The third peculiarity is that the contraries will be in the same subject, whether this be the same in genus, in species, or in number.

They are in a subject which is the same in genus, as white and black in a simple body; the same in species, as health and sickness in an animal body; and the same in number, as is obvious—since the same body can be susceptible to contraries through a change of itself. The fourth is that contraries either come under the same genus, as white and black under color; or under contrary genera, as justice and injustice come under good and evil, which are contrary genera; or the contraries themselves are genera, as good and evil are contrary genera.

[44] {Περὶ ἀντικειμένων.} Πᾶν ἀντικείμενον ἢ ὡς πρᾶγμα ἀντίκειται ἢ ὡς λόγος. Καὶ εἰ μὲν ὡς λόγος λόγῳ, ποιεῖ κατάφασιν καὶ ἀπόφασιν. Κατάφασις μὲν οὖν ἐστι τὸ εἰπεῖν, τί τινι ὑπάρχει, οἷον καλός ἐστιν, ἀπόφασις δὲ τὸ εἰπεῖν, τί τινι οὐχ ὑπάρχει, οἷον οὐκ ἔστι καλός: λέγονται δὲ ἀμφότερα ἀπόφανσις. Εἰ δὲ ὡς πρᾶγμα ἀντίκεινται, ἢ ὡς πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγονται καὶ ποιεῖ τὰ πρός τι, ἅτινα καὶ συνεισάγουσιν ἄλληλα καὶ συναναιροῦσιν, ἢ οὐ πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσι σχέσιν. Καὶ ταῦτα ἢ οὐ μεταβάλλει εἰς ἄλληλα, ὅμως δὲ ἄμφω κατὰ φύσιν εἰσὶ καὶ ποιεῖ τὰ ἐναντία ὡς ἡ θερμότης καὶ ἡ ψύξις, ἢ τὸ μὲν μεταβάλλει εἰς τὸ ἕτερον, τὸ δὲ ἕτερον οὐ μεταβάλλει. Καὶ τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν ἐστι κατὰ φύσιν τὸ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν, καὶ ποιεῖ τὰ κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ ἕξιν ἀντικείμενα ὡς ὄψις καὶ τυφλότης: ἕξις μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ὄψις ὡς ἐκ τοῦ ἔχειν, στέρησις δὲ τῆς ἕξεως ἤγουν τῆς ὁράσεως ἡ τυφλότης. Τῶν δὲ ἐναντίων τὰ μέν εἰσιν ἄμεσα, τὰ δὲ ἔμμεσα. Ἄμεσα μὲν οὖν εἰσιν, ὧν ἀναγκαῖον τὸ ἕτερον ἤγουν τὸ ἓν ὑπάρχειν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ αὐτοῖς ἢ τοῦτοις, ὧν κατηγοροῦνται, οἷον νόσος καὶ ὑγίεια ἐν σώματι ζῴου ὑποκειμένῳ, καὶ ἀνάγκη πάντως ἐν τῷ σώματι ἢ νόσον εἶναι ἢ ὑγίειαν: νόσον δέ φαμεν πᾶσαν τὴν παρατροπὴν τῆς φύσεως. _Ἔμμεσα δέ, ὧν οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ ἕτερον ὑπάρχειν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ ἢ τούτοις, ὧν κατηγοροῦνται, ὡς τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν: ἐναντία γάρ εἰσι, καὶ οὐ πάντως ἀνάγκη ἓν αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν τῷ σώματι: οὐ γὰρ ἀνάγκη πᾶν σῶμα ἢ λευκὸν εἶναι ἢ μέλαν, εἰσὶ γὰρ σώματα φαιὰ καὶ πυῤῥά: _ εἰ μὴ ἄρα τὸ ἓν τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἀφωρισμένως φύσει ὑπάρχει τινὶ ὡς ἡ θερμότης τῷ πυρὶ καὶ ἡ ψύξις τῇ χιόνι. Τῶν μὲν οὖν ἐμμέσων τὰ μὲν ἔχουσιν ὀνόματα, ὡς τὸ μέσον τοῦ λευκοῦ καὶ τοῦ μέλανος λέγεται φαιόν, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὀνόματα: τὸ μέσον γὰρ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου οὐκ ἔχει ὄνομα, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀποφάσει ἑκατέρου τὸ ἀνὰ μέσον γνωρίζεται οἷον οὐδὲ δίκαιον οὐδὲ ἄδικον. Ἀκολουθοῦσι δὲ τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἰδιώματα τέσσαρα: πρῶτον, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ἀγαθῷ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ κακὸν ἐναντίον, τῷ δὲ κακῷ ποτὲ μὲν ἀγαθόν, ποτὲ δὲ ἄλλο κακόν: τῇ μὲν γὰρ σωφροσύνῃ ἐναντίον ἡ ἀκολασία, τῇ δὲ ἀκολασίᾳ ποτὲ μὲν σωφροσύνη, ποτὲ δὲ ἠλιθιότης. Ἠλιθιότης δέ ἐστι τὸ μὴ κινεῖσθαι μηδὲ ἐγείρεσθαι τὰ πάθη. Ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀκολασία ἔλλειψίς ἐστι τῆς σωφροσύνης, ἡ δὲ ἠλιθιότης ὑπερβολή, ἐναντία δὲ ἡ ὑπερβολὴ τῇ ἐλλείψει. _δεύτερον, ὅτι ἀδύνατον ἅμα τὰ ἐναντία ἐπὶ τῶν ἀτόμων εἶναι κατὰ τὸ αὐτό, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ἅμα Σωκράτην ὑγιαίνειν καὶ νοσεῖν, ἢ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ μέλος θερμαίνεσθαι ἅμα καὶ ψύχεσθαι. _τρίτον, ὅτι τὰ ἐναντία ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὑποκειμένῳ ἢ γένει ἢ εἴδει ἢ ἀριθμῷ, γένει μὲν ὡς ἐν ἁπλῷ σώματι τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν, εἴδει δὲ ὡς ἐν σώματι ζῴου ὑγίεια καὶ νόσος, ἀριθμῷ δὲ δῆλον: τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ σῶμα τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι δεκτικὸν ἐνδέχεται κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ μεταβολήν. _τέταρτον, ὅτι τὰ ἐναντία ἢ ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος ὡς τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν ὑπὸ τὸ χρῶμα, ἢ ὑπὸ τὰ ἐναντία γένη ὡς δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀδικία ὑπὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν, ἅτινα ἐναντία εἰσίν, ἢ αὐτὰ τὰ ἐναντία γένη εἰσὶν ὡς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακὸν ἐναντία ὄντα γένη.