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64

it is impossible for him not to be, that is, it is inadmissible for him not to be. Therefore, for God to be unable, that is, for God to be powerless, cannot come to be. For just as light, insofar as it is light, cannot become darkness, so too these things are impossible for God because of his unsurpassable truth. Thus, therefore, God does not know not-knowing by way of privation, as in, God has not experienced (14S_294> it; that is, he does not know what not-knowing itself is, or being ignorant of something. And by way of privation he does not know ignorance; for ignorance is a privation, not a substance, but outside of the essence around which the privation occurs; for it is the lack of what ought to be present. Therefore, God is deprived of being ignorant, and he never knows not-knowing; for if we were not to say by way of privation that God does not know ignorance, not-knowing would be found to be of his essence, and his ignorance would be essential, and God would be found to be darkness; for ignorance is darkness. Thus you will understand in a lofty way both, "it is impossible for God to lie," and, "the Son can do nothing of himself, unless he sees the Father doing something," which is similar to saying: It is impossible, when the Father wills certain things, for the Son to will other things. For the will of the only adorable Trinity is one according to the Godhead; for neither are we ignorant that the Son of God, and God, the one of the all-hymned and all-pure Trinity, having become man, assumed a human will, natural and sinless.

And not-being is not: A negation placed against a negation makes an affirmation. Therefore, he who says that not-being is not in God, concludes that he is. Thus therefore he says, 'he cannot not be able,' and likewise, 'he does not know not-knowing,' from which it is concluded that he in every way knows and is able. And he well added here 'by way of privation'; for these things are not said by way of super-eminence, but privatively, that is, 'he is not able' and 'he does not know'.

§ 7. And justice is hymned: In what respect God (14S_296> is justice. And the definition of justice is, a virtue distributive of what is according to worth or of the proper function of the parts of the soul; or a mean between excess and deficiency; or a state that allots equality; or a state that aims at the common advantage; or the knowledge of things to be allotted, and not, and of neither.

They are reviled: "Concerning those who speak injustice against God," as the psalmist says. Here he spoke opportunely, showing their words to be strange; for being self-moved, that is, having free will, and rulers of their own impulses, why, they say, have we been made with free will; and are not rather even unwillingly prevented from sinning, being ignorant that they wish to be stones moved by another, and, having earthy bodies, why do we not remain in sameness, they say, that is, unchanged, being immortal, and using what is material and temporary? This is a mark of those who are ignorant of the nature of sensible and intelligible things and who are sick with much irrationality; for our body, being material and temporary and subject to change, reasonably had need of similar things, I mean temporary and material ones; but the soul, created immaterial and immortal, reasonably has free will on account of its similarity to the creator; not understanding these things in each case, the revilers find fault with divine providence, seeing such good order; for this is what 'and in general they assign the things of others to others' indicates.

To the self-moved: To those with free will. § 8. But someone might say: To those who say, How is God not unjust who

allows the just to be mistreated by the wicked? (14S_298> Otherwise: Here he examines a main point proposed to us by another;

for he says: Someone might say, and the rest, resolving it piously and in a God-loving way; for he says for what reason God, being just, allows holy men to be wronged by the unjust and the greedy (for we see many just men enduring losses, whether in money,

64

ἀναχώρητόν ἐστι μή εἶναι αὐτόν, ἤγουν ἀνένδεκτον μή εἶναι αὐτόν. Οὐκοῦν καί τό μή δύνασθαι τόν Θεόν, τουτέστι τό ἀδύνατον εἶναι τόν Θεόν, οὐ δυνατόν γενέσθαι. Ὥσπερ γάρ τό φῶς, καθ' ὅ φῶς, οὐ δύναται σκότος γενέσθαι, οὕτω καί ταῦτα ἀδύνατα τῷ Θεῷ διά τήν ἀνυπέρβλητον ἀλήθειαν. Οὕτως οὖν οὐκ οἶδεν ὁ Θεός κατά στέρησιν τό μή εἰδέναι, οἷον οὐ πεπείραται (14S_294> ὁ Θεός· ὅ ἐστιν, οὐκ οἶδε τί ἐστιν αὐτό τό μή εἰδέναι, ἤτοι ἀγνοεῖν τι. Κατά στέρησιν δέ οὐκ οἶδε τό ἀγνοεῖν· στέρησις γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ἄγνοια, οὐχ ὑπόστασις, ἀλλ' ἔξωθεν τῆς οὐσίας, περί ἥν συμβαίνει ἡ στέρησις· ἔλλειψις γάρ ἐστι τοῦ ὀφείλοντος παρεῖναι. Οὐκοῦν ἐστέρηται ὁ Θεός τοῦ ἀγνοεῖν, καί οὐδέποτε οἶδε τό μή εἰδέναι· εἰ γάρ μή κατά στέρησιν εἴποιμεν μή εἰδέναι τόν Θεόν τήν ἄγνοιαν, εὑρίσκεται τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῦ τό μή εἰδέναι, καί ἦν ἄν οὐσιώδης αὐτοῦ ἡ ἄγνοια, καί εὑρίσκεται ὁ Θεός σκότος· ἡ γάρ ἄγνοια σκότος ἐστιν. Οὕτως ὑψηλῶς νοήσεις καί τό, «ἀδύνατον ψεύσασθαι Θεόν», καί τό, «οὐ δύναται ποιεῖν ὁ Υἱός οὐδέν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ, ἐάν μή τι βλέπῃ τόν Πατέρα ποιοῦντα», ὅπερ ὅμοιόν ἐστι τῷ εἰπεῖν· Ἀμήχανόν ἐστιν ἕτερα βουλομένου τοῦ Πατρός, ἕτερα βουληθῆναι τόν Υἱόν. Ἕν γάρ θέλημα τῆς μόνης προσκυνητῆς Τριάδος κατά τήν θεότητα· οὐδέ γάρ ἀγνοοῦμεν, ὅτι περ ὁ Υἱός τοῦ Θεοῦ, καί Θεός, ὁ εἷς τῆς πανυμνήτου καί παναχράντου Τριάδος γενόμενος ἄνθρωπος, προσέλαβεν ἀνθρώπινον θέλημα φυσικόν καί ἀναμάρτητον.

Καί τό μή εἶναι οὐκ ἔστιν: Ἀπόφασις κατά ἀποφάσεως τιθεμένη κατάφασιν ποιεῖ. Ὁ οὖν λέγων, ὅτι τό μή εἶναι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν Θεῷ, τό εἶναι αὐτόν συνάγει. Οὕτως οὖν φησιν, 'οὑ δύναται μή δύνασθαι', ὡσαύτως καί τό 'μή εἰδέναι οὐκ οἶδεν', ἐξ ὧν συνάγεται τό πάντως αὐτόν εἰδέναι καί δύνασθαι. Καλῶς δέ προσέθηκεν ἐνταῦθα τό κατά στέρησιν· οὐ γάρ ὑπεροχικῶς ταῦτα λέγονται, ἀλλά στερητικῶς, τό, 'οὐ δύναται' καί 'οὐκ οἶδε'.

§ 7. ∆ικαιοσύνη δέ ὑμνεῖται: Κατά τί δικαιοσύνη ἐστίν ὁ (14S_296> Θεός. Ὅρος δέ δικαιοσύνης ἐστίν, ἀρετή διανεμητική τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν ἤ ἰδιοπραγίαν τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μερῶν· ἤ μεσότης πλεονεξίας καί μειονεξίας· ἤ ἕξις ἀπονεμητική ἰσότητος· ἤ ἕξις τοῦ κοινῇ συμφέροντος ἐστοχασμένη· ἤ ἐπιστήμη ἀπονεμητέων, καί μή, καί οὐδετέρων.

∆ιαλοιδοροῦνται: «Περί τῶν λαλούντων κατά τοῦ Θεοῦ ἀδικίαν», ὥς φησιν ὁ ψαλμῳδός. Ἐνταῦθα εὐκαίρως εἶπεν, ἀλλόκοτα τά αὐτῶν δεικνύς ρήματα· αὐτοκίνητοι γάρ ὄντες, τουτέστιν αὐτεξούσιοι, καί τῶν ἰδίων ὁρμῶν ἄρχοντες, διά τί, φασίν, αὐτεξούσιοι γεγόναμεν· καί οὐ μᾶλλον καί ἄκοντες κωλυόμεθα ἁμαρτάνειν, ἀγνοοῦντες ὅτι λίθοι ἑτεροκίνητοι βούλονται εἶναι, καί, γήινα σώματα ἔχοντες, διά τί μή ἐν ταυτότητι, φασί, μένομεν, τουτέστιν ἄτρεπτοι, ἀθάνατοι ὄντες, καί χρώμενοι τοῖς ὑλικοῖς καί προσκαίροις; Ὅπερ ἀγνοούντων ἐστί φύσιν αἰσθητῶν καί νοητῶν καί πολλήν ἀλογίαν νοσούντων· τό γάρ σῶμα ἡμῶν ὑλικόν καί πρόσκαιρον καί τρεπτόν ὑπάρχον, εἰκότως ἐδέετο τῶν ὁμοίων, προσκαίρων φημί καί ὑλικῶν· ἡ δέ ψυχή ἄϋλος καί ἀθάνατος κτισθεῖσα, εἰκότως τό αὐτεξούσιον ἔχει διά τήν πρός τόν δημιουργόν ὁμοιότητα· ἅπερ μή νοοῦντες ἐν ἑκατέρῳ οἱ λοίδοροι μέμφονται τήν θείαν πρόνοιαν, τοσαύτην ὁρῶντες εὐταξίαν· τοῦτο γάρ δηλοῖ τό, 'καί ὅλως τά ἄλλων ἄλλοις ἀποδιδόασιν'.

Αὐτοκινήτοις: Αὐτεξουσίοις. § 8. Ἀλλ' εἴποι ἄν τις: Πρός τούς λέγοντας, Πῶς οὐκ ἄδικος ὁ Θεός ὁ

συγχωρῶν τούς δικαίους ὑπό τῶν φαύλων κακοῦσθαι; (14S_298> Ἄλλως: Ἐνταῦθα ζητεῖ κεφάλαιον προτεθέν ἡμῖν ὑπό ἑτέρου·

φησί γάρ· Εἴποι ἄν τις, καί τά λοιπά, λυόμενος εὐσεβῶς καί θεοφιλῶς· λέγει γάρ δι' ἥν αἰτίαν συγχωρεῖ ὁ Θεός, δίκαιος ὤν, ἀδικεῖσθαι τούς ὁσίους ἄνδρας ὑπό ἀδίκων καί πλεονεκτῶν (πολλούς γάρ ὁρῶμεν δικαίους ζημίας ὑπομένοντας, ἤ ἐν χρήμασιν,