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of the turning of Adam's choice. (14Β_274> Therefore He alone is free among the dead, not having the sin on account of which death came to be.

43 (43). CONCERNING THE TREE OF LIFE AND THE TREE OF DISOBEDIENCE. 43. QUESTION 43 If the tree of life is said by Scripture to be wisdom, and the work of wisdom is

to discern and to know “the tree of the knowledge of good and evil,” how then does it differ from the tree of life?

Response. Although the teachers of the Church, being able to say many things concerning the present question through the grace in

them, have considered it better to honor the passage with silence instead, because the mind of the many is unable to attain to the depth of what is written, and so have not endured to say anything deeper. And if some have spoken, first discerning the capacity of their hearers, they have spoken in part for the benefit of those being taught, and have left the greater part unexamined. Therefore, I too intended to pass over the passage in silence, had I not suspected that your God-loving soul would be grieved. Nevertheless, for your sake I will say what can be suitable for all, and fitting for minds both small and great.

The tree of life and the one that is not such, from the very fact that one is named the tree of life, and the other not of life but only of the knowledge of good and evil, have a great and ineffable difference. For the tree of life is in every way productive of life, but the tree not of life is evidently productive of death. For that which is not productive of life, from the fact that it is not called the tree of life, would clearly be productive of death; for nothing else is distinguished in opposition to life.

(14Β_276> And in another way, as wisdom, the tree of life has a very great difference from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, which is neither wisdom nor is it so named. For the property of wisdom is intellect and reason, but the property of the disposition opposed to wisdom is irrationality and sense-perception. Therefore, since man, being composed of an intellectual soul and a sensible body, came into being, let the intellect of the soul, in which the substance of wisdom exists, be, by one interpretation, the tree of life, and let the sense-perception of the body, in which the movement of irrationality clearly exists, be the tree of the knowledge of good and evil; which man, having received the divine commandment not to touch it by experience through action, did not keep.

Both trees according to Scripture are discerning of certain things, that is, the intellect and sense-perception. For instance, the intellect has the power of discerning intelligible and sensible things, temporal and eternal things, or rather, being the discerning power of the soul, it persuades it to cleave to some things, and to rise above others. But sense-perception has the power of discerning the pleasure and pain of bodies, or rather, being the power of ensouled and sensible bodies, it persuades one to be drawn to the one, and to send away the other. If, then, man partakes only of the sensible discernment of bodies according to pleasure and pain, transgressing the divine commandment, he eats of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, that is, irrationality according to sense-perception, having only the discernment that constitutes bodies, by which, as good, he clings to pleasure, and as evil, he abstains from pain; but if he partakes only of the wholly intellectual discernment which distinguishes eternal things from temporal things, keeping the divine commandment, he eats of the tree of life, I mean the wisdom which is constituted according to the intellect, having only the discernment that constitutes the soul, by which, as good, he clings to the glory of eternal things, and as evil, he abstains from the corruption of temporal things.

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τραπείσης τοῦ Ἀδάμ προαιρέσεως. (14Β_274> ∆ιό καί μόνος ἐν νεκροῖς ἐλεύθερος, οὐκ ἔχων τήν, δι᾿ ἥν ὁ θάνατος γέγονεν, ἁμαρτίαν.

ΜΓ (43). ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΞΥΛΟΥ ΤΗΣ ΖΩΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΥ ΞΥΛΟΥ ΤΗΣ ΠΑΡΑΚΟΗΣ. 43. ΕΡΩΤΗΣΙΣ ΜΓ' Εἰ τὸ ξύλον τῆς ζωῆς ἡ σοφία λέγεται εἶναι παρὰ τῇ Γραφῇ, ἔργον δὲ σοφίας

τὸ διακρίνειν καὶ γνῶναι «τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τοῦ πονηροῦ ξύλον», τί διαφέρει λοιπὸν τοῦ ξύλου τῆς ζωῆς;

Ἀπόκρισις. Πολλὰ μὲν εἰπεῖν δυνάμενοι περὶ τοῦ προκειμένου ζητήματος διὰ τῆς ἐν

αὐτοῖς χάριτος οἱ τῆς Ἐκκλησίας διδάσκαλοι, σιωπῇ μᾶλλον τιμήσαντες τὸν τόπον ἡγήσαντο κρεῖττον, διὰ τὴν τῶν πολλῶν διάνοιαν μὴ δυναμένην ἐφικέσθαι τοῦ βάθους τῶν γεγραμμένων, μηδὲν βαθύτερον εἰπεῖν ἀνασχόμενοι. Εἰ δὲ καὶ εἶπόν τινες, πρότερον διακρίναντες τῶν ἀκουόντων τὴν δύναμιν, οὕτω μέρος πρὸς λυσιτέλειαν τῶν διδασκομένων εἰρηκότες, τὸ πλεῖστον κατέλιπον ἀνεξέταστον. ∆ιὸ κἀγὼ σιωπῇ μᾶλλον τὸν τόπον παρελθεῖν διενοούμην, εἰ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι τὴν ὑμετέραν φιλόθεον ψυχὴν ὑπενόησα. Πλὴν ἀλλ᾽ ὑμῶν χάριν ἐρῶ τὸ πᾶσιν δυνάμενον εἶναι κατάλληλον καὶ μικροῖς καὶ μεγάλοις τὴν διάνοιαν πρόσφορον.

Τὸ ξύλον τῆς ζωῆς καὶ τὸ μὴ τοιοῦτον, ἐξ αὐτοῦ μόνου τοῦ τὸ μὲν ζωῆς ξύλον ὀνομασθῆναι, τὸ δὲ οὐ ζωῆς ἀλλὰ μόνον γνωστὸν καλοῦ καὶ πονηροῦ, πολλὴν καὶ ἄφατον ἔχουσι τὴν διαφοράν. Τὸ γὰρ τῆς ζωῆς ξύλον πάντως καὶ ζωῆς ἐστι ποιητικόν, τὸ δὲ μὴ ζωῆς ξύλον δηλονότι θανάτου ποιητικόν. Τὸ γὰρ μὴ ποιητικὸν ζωῆς ἐκ τοῦ μὴ προσαγορευθῆναι ζωῆς ξύλον θανάτου σαφῶς ἂν εἴη ποιητικόν· ἄλλο γὰρ οὐδὲν τῇ ζωῇ κατ᾽ ἐναντίωσιν ἀντιδιαιρεῖται.

(14Β_276> Ἄλλως τε δὲ καὶ ὡς σοφία τὸ ξύλον τῆς ζωῆς πλείστην ἔχει διαφορὰν πρὸς τὸ ξύλον τὸ γνωστὸν καλοῦ καὶ πονηροῦ, τὸ μήτε ὂν σοφία μήτε ὠνομασμένον. Τῆς μὲν γὰρ σοφίας ἴδιον νοῦς καὶ λόγος, τῆς δὲ τῇ σοφίᾳ κατὰ τὸ ἐναντίον ἀντικειμένης ἕξεως ἴδιον ἀλογία καὶ αἴσθησις. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ ἐκ ψυχῆς νοερᾶς καὶ σώματος αἰσθητικοῦ συνεστὼς πρὸς γένεσιν ἦλθεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἔστω κατὰ μίαν ἐπιβολὴν ξύλον ζωῆς ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς νοῦς, ἐν ᾧ τῆς σοφίας ὑπάρχει τὸ χρῆμα, ξύλον δὲ γνωστὸν καλοῦ καὶ πονηροῦ ἡ τοῦ σώματος αἴσθησις, ἐν ᾗ τῆς ἀλογίας ὑπάρχει σαφῶς ἡ κίνησις· ἧς κατὰ τὴν πεῖραν μὴ ἅψασθαι δι᾽ ἐνεργείας ὁ ἄνθρωπος τὴν θείαν λαβὼν ἐντολὴν οὐκ ἐφύλαξεν.

Ἀμφότερα δὲ τὰ ξύλα κατὰ τὴν Γραφὴν τινῶν εἰσι διακριτικά, ἤγουν ὁ νοῦς καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις. Οἷον, ὁ μὲν νοῦς ἔχει δύναμιν διακριτικὴν νοητῶν καὶ αἰσθητῶν, προσκαίρων καὶ αἰωνίων, μᾶλλον δέ, ψυχῆς ὑπάρχων δύναμις διακριτική, τῶν μὲν αὐτὴν ἀντέχεσθαι πείθει, τῶν δὲ ὑπεραίρεσθαι. Ἡ δὲ αἴσθησις ἔχει δύναμιν διακριτικὴν ἡδονῆς σωμάτων καὶ ὀδύνης, μᾶλλον δέ, δύναμις ὑπάρχουσα ἐμψύχων καὶ αἰσθητικῶν σωμάτων, τὴν μὲν ἐπισπᾶσθαι πείθει, τὴν δὲ ἀποπέμπεσθαι. Ἐὰν μὲν οὖν ὁ ἄνθρωπος μόνης τῆς καθ᾽ ἡδονὴν καὶ ὀδύνην αἰσθητικῆς τῶν σωμάτων γένηται διακρίσεως, τὴν θείαν παραβὰς ἐντολήν, ἐσθίει τὸ ξύλον τὸ γνωστὸν καλοῦ τε καὶ πονηροῦ, τουτέστι τὴν κατ᾽ αἴσθησιν ἀλογίαν, μόνην ἔχων τὴν συστατικὴν τῶν σωμάτων διάκρισιν, καθ᾽ ἥν, ὡς μὲν καλοῦ, τῆς ἡδονῆς ἀντέχεται, ὡς δὲ κακοῦ, τῆς ὀδύνης ἀπέχεται· ἐὰν δὲ μόνης τῆς τῶν αἰωνίων διακρινούσης τὰ πρόσκαιρα διόλου νοερᾶς γένηται διακρίσεως, τὴν θείαν φυλάξας ἐντολήν, ἐσθίει τὸ ξύλον τῆς ζωῆς, τὴν κατὰ νοῦν λέγω συνισταμένην σοφίαν, μόνην ἔχων τὴν συστατικὴν τῆς ψυχῆς διάκρισιν, καθ᾽ ἥν, ὡς μὲν καλοῦ, τῆς τῶν αἰωνίων ἀντέχεται δόξης, ὡς δὲ κακοῦ, τῆς τῶν προσκαίρων ἀπέχεται φθορᾶς.