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things constitutive of a person, differ by the principle of their substance, or nature; as is the case with the human soul and body, and of all things which have their coming together with one another according to hypostasis. For these things are not consubstantial with one another.

Therefore, those things united according to one and the same substance, or nature, that is, being of one and the same substance and nature, are certainly consubstantial with one another, and of different hypostases; consubstantial, on the one hand, by the principle of the essential commonality which is contemplated in them without change in natural identity; according to which one is not more than another that which it is and is said to be; and all admit the one and the same definition and principle of the substance. But of different hypostases, by the principle of the personal otherness that distinguishes them, according to which one is distinguished from another, not coinciding with one another in the characteristic properties according to hypostasis; but each, by the collection of properties particular to it, bears a most particular principle of its own [existence] according to hypostasis; according to which it does not admit communion with things of the same nature and same substance. But those things united according to one and the same hypostasis, or person, that is, those things being constitutive of one and the same according to a union of hypostasis, are of the same hypostasis with one another and of different substances. Of the same hypostasis, on the one hand, by the principle of the personal indivisible monad which is completed from them by union; according to which the properties that divide one from the other by the particularity proper to its substance, at their coming together with one another at the same time as their being, it makes characteristic of the one hypostasis completed from them; according to which their identity with one another is contemplated, admitting no difference whatsoever; as is the case with the human soul and body. For the properties that distinguish a certain body from other bodies, and a certain soul from other souls, coming together by union, both characterize at the same time and distinguish from other men the hypostasis completed from them, of Peter, say, or Paul; but not the soul of Peter or (15Β_292> of Paul from its own body. For both soul and body are the same with one another, by the principle of the one hypostasis completed from them by union; because neither of these subsisted by itself, separated from the other, before the composition from them into the genesis of the species. For at the same time is the genesis, at the same time the composition, and at the same time the completion of the species from them by composition. But of different substances, by the principle of their natural otherness with respect to one another; according to which they in no way admit 0553 according to substance one another's definitions and principles; but the one renders the principle of its own substance different and other and not coinciding with the principle of the other; according to which, preserving the essential difference of soul and body, we do not confound the hypostasis completed from them, which would admit of annihilation by the turning and change of the one into the other of the parts, that is, natures, from which it was composed.

And if, according to the coming together of soul and body at the same time for the genesis of the species, the particular man is naturally brought to completion; on the one hand, by the principle of the natural commonality of his own parts, preserving with other men the consubstantial; on the other hand, by the principle of the particularity of the same [parts], keeping with other men the being of different hypostases; being united, on the one hand, by the natural commonality of his own parts to other men, with whom he bears one and the same nature according to species; and being divided, on the other hand, by the particularity of the parts according to hypostasis from the rest of men, with whom he bears a person that is other and different according to hypostasis; by which principle he is distinguished from other men, keeping the unity of his own personal, indivisible monad completely undifferentiated; and by which principle he is naturally united to other men, preserving the difference of the essential otherness of his own parts unconfused; from this is clear to us, and having nothing enigmatic, the [account] concerning the incarnation, that is

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συμπληρωτικά προσώπου, τῷ λόγῳ τῆς οὐσίας ἤτοι φύσεως διαφέρουσιν· ὡς ἐπί ψυχῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ἔχει καί σώματος, καί τῶν ὅσα καθ᾿ ὑπόστασιν ἐσχήκασι τήν πρός ἄλληλα σύνοδον. Οὐ γάρ ἀλλήλοις ὁμοούσια ταῦτα τυγχάνουσιν.

Τά τοίνυν κατά μίαν καί τήν αὐτήν οὐσίαν, ἤγουν φύσιν ἡνωμένα, τουτέστι μιᾶς καί τῆς αὐτῆς οὐσίας ὄντα καί φύσεως, ὁμοούσια μέν ἀλλήλοις πάντως εἰσί, καί ἑτεροϋπόστατα· ὁμοούσια μέν, τῷ λόγῳ τῆς ἀπαραλλάκτως αὐτοῖς ἐν ταυτότητι φυσικῇ ἐνθεωρουμένης οὐσιώδους κοινότητος· καθ᾿ ὅν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλος ἄλλου μᾶλλον τοῦθ᾿ ὅπερ ἐστί τε καί λέγεται· πάντες δέ τόν ἕνα καί τόν αὐτόν ἐπιδέχονται τῆς οὐσίας ὅρον τε καί λόγον. Ἑτεροϋπόστατα δέ, τῷ λόγῳ τῆς αὐτά διακρινούσης προσωπικῆς ἑτερότητος, καθ᾿ ὅν ἄλλος ἄλλου διακέκριται, μή συμβαίνοντες ἀλλήλοις τοῖς καθ᾿ ὑπόστασιν χαρακτηριστικοῖς ἰδιώμασιν· ἀλλ᾿ ἕκαστος τῷ κατ' αὐτόν ἀθροισμῷ τῶν ἰδιωμάτων ἰδικώτατον τῆς οἰκείας καθ᾿ ὑπόστασιν ἐπιφέρεται λόγον· καθ᾿ ὅν τήν πρός τά ὁμοφυῆ καί ὁμοούσια κοινωνίαν οὐκ ἐπιδέχεται. Τά δέ κατά μίαν καί τήν αὐτήν ὑπόστασιν ἤγουν πρόσωπον ἡνωμένα, τουτέστι, τά μιᾶς καί τῆς αὐτῆς ὄντα συμπληρωτικά καθ᾿ ἕνωσιν ὑποστάσεως, ὁμοϋπόστατα μέν ἀλλήλοις εἰσί καί ἑτεροούσια. Ὁμοϋπόστατα μέν, τῷ λόγῳ τῆς καθ᾿ ἕνωσιν ἐξ αὐτῶν συμπληρουμένης προσωπικῆς ἀδιαιρέτου μονάδος· καθ᾿ ὅν τά διαιροῦντα θάτερον τῆς κατ᾿ οὐσίαν οἰκείας καινότητος ἰδιώματα, κατά τήν ἅμα τῷ εἶναι πρός ἄλληλα σύνοδον, ποιεῖται χαρακτηριστικά τῆς ἐξ αὐτῶν συμπληρουμένης μίας ὑποστάσεως· καθ᾿ ἥν ἡ πρός ἄλληλα θεωρεῖται ταυτότης, τήν οἱανοῦν μή δεχομένη διαφοράν· ὡς ἐπί ψυχῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ἔχει καί σώματος. Τά γάρ ἀφορίζοντα τό τινος σῶμα τῶν λοιπῶν σωμάτων, καί τήν τοῦ τινος ψυχήν τῶν λοιπῶν ψυχῶν ἰδιώματα, συνδραμόντα καθ᾿ ἕνωσιν, χαρακτηρίζει μέν κατά ταὐτόν ἅμα καί ἀφορίζει τῶν λοιπῶν ἀνθρώπων τήν ἐξ αὐτῶν συμπληρωθεῖσαν ὑπόστασιν, Πέτρου φέρε εἰπεῖν ἤ Παύλου· ἀλλ' οὐ τήν Πέτρου ἤ (15Β_292> Παύλου ψυχήν ἀπό τοῦ οἰκείου σώματος. Ἄμφω γάρ ἀλλήλοις ταὐτόν ψυχή τε καί σῶμα, τῷ λόγῳ τῆς καθ᾿ ἕνωσιν ἐξ αὐτῶν συμπληρουμένης μιᾶς ὑποστάσεως· ὅτι μή καθ᾿ αὑτά τούτων ἑκάτερον ὑπέστη θατέρων κεχωρισμένον, πρό τῆς ἐξ αὐτῶν εἰς γένεσιν εἴδους συνθέσεως. Ἅμα γάρ γένεσις, ἅμα σύνθεσις, ἅμα καί ἡ κατά σύνθεσιν ἐξ αὐτῶν τοῦ εἴδους συμπλήρωσις. Ἑτεροουσία δέ, τῷ λόγῳ τῆς πρός ἄλληλα φυσικῆς ἑτερότητος· καθ᾿ ὅν οὐδαμῶς ἐπιδέχονται 0553 κατ᾿ οὐσίαν τούς ἀλλήλων ὅρους τε καί λόγους· ἀλλ᾿ ἕτερον καί ἕτερον ἀποδίδωσι θάτερον τῆς οἰκείας οὐσίας πρός τόν θατέρου λόγον ἀσύμπτωτον· καθ᾿ ὅν τήν ψυχῆς καί σώματος οὐσιώδη σώζοντες διαφοράν, οὐ συγχέομεν τήν ἐξ αὐτῶν συμπληρουμένην ὑπόστασιν, τῇ πρός θάτερον θατέρου περιτροπῇ τε καί μεταβολῆ τῶν ἐξ ὧν συνετέθη μερῶν ἤγουν φύσεων, τόν ἀφανισμόν δεχομένην.

Εἰ δέ κατά τήν ἅμα πρός εἴδους γένεσιν ψυχῆς τε καί σώματος σύνοδον, ὁ τίς ἀποτελεῖσθαι πέφυκεν ἄνθρωπος· τῷ μέν λόγῳ τῆς τῶν οἰκείων μερῶν φυσικῆς κοινότητος, πρός ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους σώζων τό ὁμοούσιον· τῷ δέ λόγῳ τῆς τῶν αὐτῶν ἰδιότητος, πρός τούς ἄλλους φυλάττων ἀνθρώπους τό ἑτεροϋπόστατον· ἑνούμενος μέν τῇ κατά φύσιν κοινότητι τῶν οἰκείων μερῶν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις, πρός οὕς μίαν καί τήν αὐτήν κατ᾿ εἶδος ἐπιφέρεται φύσιν· διαιρούμενος δέ τῇ καθ᾿ ὑπόστασιν τῶν μερῶν ἰδιότητι τῶν λοιπῶν ἀνθρώπων, πρός οὕς ἕτερόν τε κατά τήν ὑπόστασιν καί διάφορον, ἐπιφέρεται πρόσωπον· ᾧ διακρίνεται λόγῳ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων, τήν ἑνότητα τῆς οἰκείας προσωπικῆς ἀδιαιρέτου μονάδος φυλάττων παντελῶς ἀδιάφορον· καί ᾧ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἑνοῦσθαι λόγῳ πέφυκεν ἀνθρώποις, τήν διαφοράν τῆς τῶν οἰκείων μερῶν οὐσιώδους ἑτερότητος σώζων ἀσύγχυτον· σαφής ἐντεῦθεν ἡμῖν, καί μηδέν ἔχων γριφῶδες ὁ περί τῆς σαρκώσεως, ἤγουν