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intellection, according to which the so-called indivisible and non-quantitative and unified knowledge is constituted, this one has truly, through the things that are seen and the good order within them, formed an impression of their maker and sustainer and originator, as is possible for a human, and has known God, not according to what His essence and hypostasis might be (for this is impossible and unattainable), but having learned according to the fact that He alone is.

And it seems to me that the teacher hints at these things through sight and the natural law, according to the cause that has been given—after having passed through all that is according to sense in the schema of position and form and impression and appearance, and, if I do not seem to be superfluous, having gone completely outside the very difference in the principles of beings, and having placed himself as a kind of boundary between God and all things after God, understanding the one as transcendent and remaining completely intangible and having no intellection that can reach Him, and the others being left behind and traversed by the abundance of knowledge according to the intellect and having appeared inferior to the concept of what He is, as certainly and truly beyond them—but not positing sight and the natural law as the same thing, as some have thought. For both, having their activity in the same things, can admit of a conceptual distinction from one another, because the one is supported irrationally only by contact with visible things, being unable to go further, while the other both investigates these things with connected reason and transcends them well and wisely with the intellect, by which especially the natural law, through sight, has introduced the concept and faith concerning God's existence.

He therefore called "sight" the application of sense perception simply, but not qualifiedly, to (14∆_290> sensible things (for it is not characteristic of simple sense perception to deduce one thing from another), and "natural law" the natural activity that occurs through sense perception according to intellect and reason, 1217 according to which the ascent from lesser things to the better occurs by way of a harmonious examination. But the things that are seen are said by the teacher to be moved and borne immovably: according to the principle by which they came to be, they have their nature and power and activity, their order and permanence, unchangeably, and do not in any way depart from their natural property nor change into another nor become confused; but again they are moved according to the principle of flux and reflux, and by increase and decrease in quantity and by alteration in quality, and, to speak properly, by succession from one another, as the preceding ones always give way to those that follow. And simply, to speak concisely, all beings, according to the principle by which they subsist and exist, are completely static and immovable, but according to the principle of the things contemplated concerning them, by which the economy of this universe is clearly constituted and conducted, all things are evidently moved and are unstable.

But they say that motion is not the same as locomotion. For they say that motion belongs rather to things subject to generation and corruption, as admitting of more and less in the things contemplated concerning them (although it is possible for it to be said properly of all created things together), whereas locomotion is the unwearying revolution of a substance moving in a circle. I do not know whether it is safe for one who has the courage to speak about the universe to say that it acts naturally or is acted upon, except that, to speak properly, to be borne along belongs to what is acted upon. For none of the beings is completely self-acting, because none is uncaused. And that which is not uncaused is certainly moved by a cause, being acted upon (14∆_292>—that is, being moved naturally by the cause for which and towards which it makes its motion. For none of the things that are moved is moved in any way whatsoever without a cause.

And the beginning of all natural motion is the generation of the things that are moved, and the beginning of the generation of the things that are moved is God, as the author of generation. And the end of the natural generation of things that have been generated is rest, which He brings about in every case after the passage of the

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νόησιν, καθ᾿ ἥν ἡ ἀμερής λεγομένη καί ἄποσος καί ἑνιαία γνῶσις συνέστηκεν, οὗτος ἀληθῶς διά τῶν ὁρωμένων καί τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς εὐταξίας τόν ποιητήν τούτων καί συνοχέα καί ἀρχηγόν, ὡς ἀνθρώπῳ δυνατόν, ἀνετυπώσατο, καί ἔγνω Θεόν, οὐ κατά τό τί ποτε τήν οὐσίαν εἶναι καί τήν ὑπόστασιν (τοῦτο γάρ ἀμήχανον καί ἀνεπιχείρητον), ἀλλά κατ᾿ αὐτό τό μόνον εἶναι μαθών.

Καί ταῦτα μετά πᾶσαν τήν κατ᾿ αἴσθησιν ἐν σχήματι θέσεώς τε καί μορφῆς καί τυπώσεως καί φαντασίας διάβασιν, καί εἰ μή τῷ περιττός εἶναι δοκῶ, καί αὐτῆς ἔξω παντελῶς τῆς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις τῶν ὄντων διαφορᾶς γενόμενος, καί οἷον μεθόριον ἑαυτόν παρενθείς Θεοῦ τε καί πάντων τῶν μετά Θεόν, τόν μέν ὡς ὑπερέχοντος καί ἀψαύστου δι᾿ ὅλου μένοντος καί μηδεμίαν φθάνουσαν αὐτόν ἔχοντος νόησιν, τῶν δέ καταλελειμμένων καί τῇ περιουσίᾳ τῆς κατά νοῦν γνώσεως διαβαθέντων καί κατωτέρων ἐννοίας φανέντων τῷ τί ποτε εἶναι βεβαίως ὑπέρ αὐτά καί ἀληθῶς ἐννοῆσαι, ταῦτά μοι δοκεῖ διά τῆς ὄψεως καί τοῦ φυσικοῦ νόμου κατά τήν ἀποδοθεῖσαν αἰτίαν ὁ διδάσκαλος παραινίττεσθαι, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ ταὐτόν τίθεσθαι, καθώς τινες ᾠήθησαν, τήν ὄψιν τε καί τόν φυσικόν νόμον. Ἄμφω γάρ περί τά αὐτά τήν ἐνέργειαν ἔχοντα τήν ἀπ᾿ ἀλλήλων δύναται κατ᾿ ἐπίνοιαν δέχεσθαι διάκρισιν, τῷ τήν μέν ἀλόγως τῇ προσψαύσει τῶν ὁρατῶν μόνον στηρίζεσθαι περαιτέρω βαίνειν οὐκ ἔχουσαν, τόν δέ τῷ τε συνημμένῳ λόγῳ ταῦτα πολυπραγμονεῖν καί τῷ νῷ καλῶς τε καί σοφῶς ὑπερβαίνειν, καθ᾿ ὅ μάλιστα τήν περί τοῦ εἶναι Θεόν ἔννοιάν τε καί πίστιν ὁ φυσικός διά τῆς ὄψεως εἰσαγήοχε νόμος.

Ὄψιν οὖν ἐκάλεσε τήν ἁπλῶς, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ τήν πῶς, πρός τά (14∆_290> αἰσθητά τῆς αἰσθήσεως προσβολήν (οὐ γάρ αἰσθήσεως ἀπλῶς τό ἔκ τινος ἕτερόν τι συλλογίζεσθαι καθέστηκεν ἴδιον) , νόμον δέ φυσικόν τήν διά τῆς αἰσθήσεως γινομένην κατά νοῦν καί λόγον φυσικήν ἐνέργειαν, 1217 καθ᾿ ἥν ἡ πρός τό κρεῖττον μετ᾿ ἐμμελοῦς ἐξετάσεως καθ᾿ ὁδόν ἀπό τῶν ἡττόνων ἀνάβασις γίνεται. Ἀκινήτως δέ κινεῖσθαί τε καί φέρεσθαι τά ὁρώμενα εἴρηται τῷ διδασκάλῳ τῷ μέν λόγῳ, ᾧ γέγονε ταῦτα, κατά τε φύσιν καί δύναμιν καί ἐνέργειαν, τάξιν τε καί διαμονήν ἀμεταστάτως ἔχειν, καί μή ἐξίστασθαι καθ᾿ ὁτιοῦν τῆς φυσικῆς ἰδιότητος καί μεταβάλλειν εἰς ἄλλο καί φύρεσθαι, κινεῖσθαι δέ πάλιν τῷ κατά ῥοήν καί ἀποῤῥοήν λόγῳ, αὐξήσει τε τῇ περί τό ποσόν καί μειώσει καί τῇ περί τό ποιόν ἀλλοιώσει, καί κυρίως εἰπεῖν, τῇ ἐξ ἀλλήλων διαδοχῇ, ὑπεξισταμένων ἀεί τοῖς ἐπιγνομένοις τῶν προειληφότων. Καί ἁπλῶς ἵνα συνελών εἴπω, πάντα τά ὄντα καθ᾿ ὅν μέν ὑπέστησάν τε καί εἰσί λόγον, στάσιμά τε παντελῶς εἰσι καί ἀκίνητα, τῷ δέ τῶν περί αὐτά θεωρουμένων λόγῳ, καθ᾿ ὅν ἡ τοῦ παντός τούτου σαφῶς οἰκονομία συνέστηκέ τε καί διεξάγεται, πάντα κινεῖται δηλονότι καί ἀστατεῖ.

Οὐ ταὐτόν δέ φασιν εἶναι τῇ φορᾷ τήν κίνησιν. Τήν μέν γάρ κίνησιν μᾶλλον εἶναί φασι τῶν ὑπό γένεσιν καί φθοράν, ὡς ἐπιδεχομένων τοῖς περί αὐτά θεωρουμένοις τό μᾶλλον καί τό ἧττον (κἄν ἐπί πάντων ὁμοῦ τῶν γενητῶν κυρίως λέγεσθαι δυνατόν), τήν δέ φοράν τῆς κατά κύκλον κινουμένης οὐσίας καί ἀκαμάτως τήν περιδίνησιν. Οὐκ οἶδα πότερον θαῤῤήσαντι περί τό πᾶν φυσικῶς ἐνεργούσης λέγειν ἐστίν ἀσφαλές ἤ ἐνεργουμένης, πλήν ὅτι κυρίως εἰπεῖν ἐστιν ἐνεργουμένης τό φέρεσθαι. Οὐδέν γάρ τῶν ὄντων παντελῶς ἐστιν αὐτενέργητον, ὅτι μηδέ ἀναίτιον, τό δέ μή ἀναίτιον, κινεῖται πάντως δι᾿ αἰτίαν, ἐνεργούμενον (14∆_292> δηλονότι τό κινεῖσθαι φυσικῶς ὑπό τῆς αἰτίας, δι᾿ ἥν καί πρός ἥν ποιεῖται τήν κίνησιν. Ἀναιτίως γάρ οὐδαμῶς κινεῖται καθ᾿ οἱονδήτινα τρόπον τῶν κινουμένων οὐδέν.

Ἀρχή δέ πάσης κινήσεως φυσικῆς ἐστιν ἡ τῶν κινουμένων γένεσις, ἀρχή δέ τῆς τῶν κινουμένων γενέσεως ὁ Θεός, ὡς γενεσιουργός. Τῆς δέ τῶν γεγενημένων φυσικῆς γενέσεως τέλος ἡ στάσις ἐστίν, ἥν ποιεῖ πάντως μετά τήν διάβασιν τῶν