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the infinity of finite things, in which, because there is no interval, all motion of things naturally moved is made, no longer having where or how or toward what to be moved, as it has God, who defines even the very infinity of all definitive motion, as its end and as its cause. Therefore, God is the beginning and end of all generation and motion of beings, as they have come to be from Him, are moved through Him, and will make their rest in Him. But generation is preconceived for all natural motion of beings, and motion is naturally preconceived for all rest. If, then, generation is naturally preconceived for motion, and rest is naturally post-conceived for motion, it is obviously impossible for generation and rest to exist simultaneously, since they have motion naturally separating them in the middle. For rest is not a natural activity of the generation of things that are moved, but the end of the power or activity related to it, or however one may wish to say this. 1220 For things that have come to be have come to be for the sake of activity, and every activity is toward some end, so that it may not be incomplete. For that which lacks an end among natural activities is not perfect, and the end of natural activities is the cessation of motion toward the cause of things that have come to be.

For example, so that we may understand from one thing the mode of motion for all beings: the soul, being an intellectual and rational substance, both understands and reasons, having the intellect as its power, understanding as its motion, and the concept as its activity. For this is the limit of the understanding of both the one who understands and the thing understood, being as it were the defining (14∆_294> of the relation of the extremes to one another. For in understanding, the soul ceases from understanding that which has been understood after its understanding. For that which has been properly understood once no longer calls forth again the soul's power to be understood, and thus for each concept it accepts a cessation of a certain kind of understanding upon the concept of the thing understood. When, therefore, it has traversed in understanding all the concepts of all things understood, both sensible and intelligible, it ceases, just as from all things understood, so also from all understanding and relation to all things relative and intelligible, no longer having anything at all to understand, after the understanding of things naturally capable of being understood, after which, beyond intellect and reason and knowledge, without understanding, unknowingly and ineffably, through a simple approach, it will be united to God, not understanding at all, nor indeed reasoning about God.

For He is not one of the things understood, so that the soul might be able to have an understanding of Him according to some relation, but according to the simple, as it were non-relative, and beyond-understanding union, and some ineffable and uninterpretable principle, which only God knows, who bestows this unspeakable grace upon the worthy, and those who are destined to experience it later, when all things will be free from turning and all alteration, when the motion of beings in any way whatsoever concerning anything has completely received its limit, which is the infinity around God, in which all things that are moved receive rest. For infinity is around God, but is not God, who is also incomparably beyond this. Justly, then, I think, he who dogmatizes about the pre-existence of souls is worthy of the greatest blame, as is he who legislates a universally motionless henad of rational beings, mixing in a Hellenic manner things that should not be mixed, and saying that rest is simultaneous in existence with the generation of rational beings. For it does not accord with the true account that generation be preconceived for rest, which according to him is by nature motionless, nor that rest be post-conceived for a motionless generation, nor indeed that rest be co-conceived with generation. For rest is not a power of generation (14∆_296>, so that it might be co-conceived with the generation of things that have come to be, but it is the end of the activity according to the power of the generation of things that have come to be; and simply, to speak concisely, rest, being among relative things, is spoken of not in relation to generation, but in relation to motion, to which it also admits of a contrast, having in no way a reference to generation, to which

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πεπερασμένων ἡ ἀπειρία, ἐν ᾗ διά τό μή εἶναι διάστημα πᾶσα ποιεῖται κίνησις τῶν φυσικῶν κινουμένων, οὐκ ἔχουσα λοιπόν ὅποι τε καί πῶς καί πρός τί κινηθῆναι, ὡς τόν ὁρίζοντα καί αὐτήν τήν πάσης ὁριστικήν κινήσεως ἀπειρίαν Θεόν τέλος ὡς αἴτιον ἔχουσα. Πάσης οὖν γενέσεώς τε καί κινήσεως τῶν ὄντων, ἀρχή καί τέλος ἐστίν ὁ Θεός, ὡς ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεγενημένων καί δι᾿ αὐτοῦ κινουμένων, καί εἰς αὐτόν τήν στάσιν ποιησομένων. Πάσης δέ φυσικῆς τῶν ὄντων κινήσεως προεπινοεῖται ἡ γένεσις, πάσης δέ στάσεως προεπινοεῖται κατά φύσιν ἡ κίνησις. Εἰ οὖν κινήσεως προεπινοεῖται κατά φύσιν ἡ γένεσις, κινήσεως δέ μετεπινοεῖται κατά φύσιν ἡ στάσις, γένεσις δηλονότι καί στάσις εἶναι τῶν ἅμα κατά τήν ὕπαρξιν ἀμήχανον, ἀλλήλων αὐτάς φυσικῶς διείργουσαν ἔχουσαι κατά τό μέσον τήν κίνησιν. Οὐ γάρ φυσική ἐνέργεια τῆς γενέσεως τῶν κινουμένων ἡ στάσις ἐστίν, ἀλλά τέλος τῆς κατ᾿ αὐτήν δυνάμεως ἤ ἐνεργείας, ἤ ὅπως ἄν τις ἐθέλει τοῦτο λέγειν. 1220 Ἐπ᾿ ἐνεργείᾳ γάρ τά γενόμενα γέγονε, πᾶσα δέ ἐνέργεια πρός τι τέλος ἐστίν, ἵνα μή ἀτελής. Τό γάρ τέλος μή ἔχον τῶν κατά φύσιν ἐνεργειῶν οὐδέ τέλειόν ἐστι, τέλος δέ τῶν κατά φύσιν ἐνεργειῶν, ἡ τῆς πρός τό αἴτιον τῶν γεγενημένων κινήσεως στάσις.

Οἷον ἵνα ἐξ ἑνός τόν ἐπί πάντων τῶν ὄντων κατανοήσωμεν τῆς κινήσεως τρόπον, ἡ ψυχή, οὐσία νοερά τε καί λογική ὑπάρχουσα, καί νοεῖ καί λογίζεται, δύναμιν ἔχουσα τόν νοῦν, κίνησιν δέ τήν νόησιν, ἐνέργειαν δέ τό νόημα. Πέρας γάρ τοῦτο τῆς τε τοῦ νοοῦντος καί τοῦ νουμένου νοήσεώς ἐστιν, ὡς περιοριστικόν (14∆_294> τῆς πρός ἄλληλα τῶν ἄκρων ὑπάρχον σχέσεως. Νοοῦσα γάρ ἡ ψυχή ἴσταται τοῦ νοεῖν ἐκεῖνο τό νοηθέν μετά τήν αὐτοῦ νόησιν. Τό γάρ νοηθέν κυρίως ἅπαξ, οὐκ ἔτι τήν πρός τό νοηθῆναι πάλιν ἐκκαλεῖται τῆς ψυχῆς δύναμιν, καί καθ᾿ ἕκαστον νόημα οὕτω στάσιν δέχεται τῆς ποίας ἐπί τῷ νοήματι τοῦ νοηθέντος νοήσεως. Ἡνίκα οὖν πάντα τά νοήματα τῶν νοουμένων πάντων αἰσθητῶν τε καί νοητῶν κατά τήν νόησιν παρέλθῃ, παύεται, ὥσπερ τῶν νοουμένων ἁπάντων, οὕτω καί τῆς ὅλης νοήσεώς τε καί σχέσεως πρός τά σχετά πάντα καί νοητά, οὐκ ἔχουσα λοιπόν τί νοῆσαι τό παράπαν, μετά τήν τῶν νοηθῆναι φυσικῶς δυναμένων νόησιν, μεθ᾿ ἥν ὑπέρ νοῦν καί λόγον καί γνῶσιν ἀνοήτως, ἀγνώστως τε καί ἀφράστως κατά ἁπλῆν προσβολήν ἑνωθήσεται τῷ Θεῷ, οὐ νοοῦσα παντάπασιν, οὔτε μήν τόν Θεόν λογιζομένη.

Οὐ γάρ ἐστί τι τῶν νοουμένων, ἵνα κατά τινα σχέσιν ἡ ψυχή τήν αὐτοῦ δύνηται νόησιν ἔχειν, ἀλλά κατά τήν ἁπλῆν, ὡς ἄσχετον, καί ὑπέρ νόησιν ἕνωσιν, καί τινα λόγον ἄῤῥητόν τε καί ἀνερμήνευτον, ὅν μόνος οἶδεν ὁ τήν ἄφατον ταύτην χάριν τοῖς ἀξίοις δωρούμενος Θεός, καί οἱ ταύτην ὕστερον πείσεσθαι μέλλοντες, ἡνίκα πάντα τροπῆς ἐλεύθερα καί ἀλλοιώσεως ἔσται πάσης, τῆς καθ᾿ ὁτιοῦν περί τι κινήσεως τῶν ὄντων παντελῶς πέρας λαβούσης τήν περί Θεόν ἀπειρίαν, ἐν ᾗ τά κινούμενα πάντα δέχεται στάσιν. Περί Θεόν γάρ, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ Θεός, ἡ ἀπειρία, ὅστις καί ταύτης ἀσυγκρίτως ὑπέρκειται. ∆ικαίως γοῦν, οἶμαι, μέμψεως ἄξιος πλείστης ὁ τήν προΰπαρξιν τῶν ψυχῶν δογματίζων ἐστί, καί τήν ἀκίνητον καθόλου τῶν λογικῶν ἑνάδα θεσπίζων, φύρων ἑλληνικῶς τά μή φυρόμενα, καί λέγων ἅμα κατά τήν ὕπαρξιν εἶναι τῇ γενέσει τῶν λογικῶν τήν στάσιν. Οὐ γάρ συμβαίνει τῷ ἀληθεῖ λόγῳ τήν γένεσιν προεπινοεῖσθαι τῆς στάσεως, ἀκίνητον φύσει κατ᾿ αὐτόν ὑπάρχουσαν, οὔτε μετεπινοεῖσθαι στάσιν ἀκινήτου γενέσεως, οὔτε μήν συνεπινοεῖσθαι τῇ γενέσει τήν στάσιν. Οὐ γάρ δύναμις τῆς γενέσεως (14∆_296> ἡ στάσις ἐστίν, ἵνα συνεπινοηθῇ τῇ γενέσει τῶν γεγενημένων, ἀλλά τῆς κατά δύναμιν ἐνεργείας τῆς τῶν γεγενημένων γενέσεως τέλος ὑπάρχει, καί ἁπλῶς, ἵνα συνελών εἴπω, τῶν πρός τι οὖσα ἡ στάσις, οὐ πρός γένεσιν, ἀλλά πρός κίνησιν λέγεται, πρός ἥν και ἀντιδιαστολήν ἐπιδέχεται, οὐδαμῶς τήν πρός γένεσιν ἀναφοράν ἔχουσα, πρός ἥν