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But if someone should say: And if nothing natural is contrary, how did the Father, speaking about our natural will—if it was this and not some other will that he mentioned—not say that it always follows God, but that it is "often resisting and struggling against?" For either it is not natural, being an adversary, or it is not an adversary, being natural. And so another [will] has been established, as in a natural quality, in relation to the human willing of the Savior; since this latter is by no means [contrary], while the former is contrary. We say that insofar as it is natural, it is not contrary; but insofar as it is not moved naturally by us, it is clearly contrary, and often resisting, which is also followed by sinning. For what is contrary to reason and law exists by a mode of motion involving misuse, but not by the principle of the power according to nature; since when it is formed and moved suitably, even if it does not have that which is united to God, it at least has what is congruent and not resisting. For just as there is no principle in nature for what is above nature, so there is none for what is contrary to nature and rebellious. Hence the teacher did not declare that it does not (15Α_314> follow entirely and always, but he qualified it by saying: "Not always, and for the most part," to which is implicitly added, sometimes and rarely, because of the difficulty for the many in being led to virtue. For the human willing of the Savior, even though it was natural, was not merely like ours, just as his humanity itself was not, being, in a way beyond us, perfectly deified by the union, to which sinlessness is properly attached. But ours is manifestly mere, and by no means sinless, on account of the deviation happening here and there; not altering the nature, but diverting the motion, or to speak more truly, changing its mode. And this is clear from doing many things irrationally, and in no way falling into an irrational substance from the innate rational substance that unites it.

0237 Therefore our humanity is not other, and the Savior's humanity other; nor is the willing other, at least according to the principle of nature, even if it is otherwise beyond us; for divinely, the one subsisted, and the other was formed, through the perfect union with the divine. But to fit again most suitably each of the blameworthy things in us, such as contrariety, or opposition, and whatever belongs to this list, even if in thought they inseparably separate the natures and approach the successive nature, to include the humanity of Christ in these things is by no means permissible. For if not even in us is it considered suitable, but contrary to nature and reason, how can one attach it to that [humanity], even by conception or further conception, so to speak? But only by appropriation, through pity, as the head of the whole body, just as a physician [appropriates] the sufferings of the sick, until God who became man for our sakes should free us from these. Completely consuming and destroying them in us by the power of his embodiment. For the account of the passions is twofold: the one of censure; the other of dishonor; and the one characterizes our nature (15Α_316>, while the other entirely disfigures it. The former, therefore, as a man willing for our sake, he essentially accepted, both confirming the nature and undoing the condemnation against us; but the latter, again, as the lover of mankind, he economically appropriated, which is known in us and in our insubordinate mode, so that having utterly consumed it from us, as fire consumes wax, or the sun the mist of the earth, he might impart his own qualities, and from thence prepare us to be impassible, and incorruptible according to the promise. It is necessary, therefore, both to accept, as is most fitting, the zeal and the labor of one who studies such things for the sake of piety, and to exhort him to a more exact observance of the patristic words, on account of the detractors of good things, who out of excessive folly do not even concede that which it is not possible for them to refute even if they wished.

But as for Honorius, the Pope of the Romans, I do not think that he denies the duality of the natural wills in Christ, in the letter written to Sergius, on account of

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Εἰ δέ τις ἐρεῖ· Καί εἰ μηδέν φυσικόν ὑπεναντίον, πῶς περί τοῦ καθ᾿ ἡμᾶς ἐμφύτου θελήματος, εἴπερ αὐτοῦ, καί οὐκ ἄλλου τυχόν, ἐμνημόνευσεν ὁ Πατήρ, καί οὐ πάντως εἴρηκεν ἑπομένου Θεῷ, ἀλλ᾿ "Ἀντιπίπτοντος ὡς τά πολλά καί ἀντιπαλαίοντος;" Ἤ γάρ οὐ φυσικόν ὡς ἀντίπαλον, ἤ οὐκ ἀντίπαλον ὡς ὄν φυσικόν. Καί ἄλλο λοιπόν ὡς ἐν ποιότητι φυσικῇ πρός τό θέλειν τοῦ κατά τόν Σωτῆρα ἀνθρωπίνου καθέστηκεν· εἴπερ τοῦτο μέν, οὐδαμῶς· ἐκεῖνο δέ, ὑπεναντίον. Φαμέν, ὅτιπερ καθό μέν φυσικόν, οὐχ ὑπεναντίον· καθό δέ μή φυσικῶς πρός ἡμῶν κινεῖται, σαφῶς ὑπεναντίον, καί ὡς τά πολλά ἀντιπίπτον, ᾧ καί τό ἁμαρτάνειν ἐφέπεται. Τῷ γάρ κατά παράχρησιν τῆς κινήσεως τρόπῳ, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ τῷ κατά φύσιν τῆς δυνάμεως λόγῳ, τό παρά λόγον καί νόμον ὑφίσταται· ἐπεί προσφυῶς τυπούμενόν τε καί κινούμενον, εἰ καί τό ἡνωμένον πρός Θεόν οὐκ ἔχει, ἀλλά γε τό συμβαῖνον καί μή ἀντιπίπτον. Ὡς γάρ οὐδείς ἐν τῇ φύσει λόγος τοῦ ὑπέρ φύσειν, οὕτως οὐδέ τοῦ παρά φύσιν καί στασιάζοντος. Ἔνθεν οὐδέ ὡς οὐχ (15Α_314> ἕπεται πάντη τε καί πάντως ἀπεφήνατο ὁ διδάσκαλος, ἀλλ᾿ ἐκόλασε φήσας· " Ὡς οὐ πάντως, καί ὡς τά πολλά», ᾧ προσυπακούεται τό, ἔστιν ὅτε καί ὀλιγάκις, διά τό πρός ἀρετήν τῶν πολλῶν δυσανάγωγον. Τό γάρ τοῦ κατά τόν Σωτῆρα ἀνθρωπίνου θέλειν, εἰ καί φυσικόν ἦν, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ ψιλόν ἦν καθ᾿ ἡμᾶς, ὥσπερ οὐδ᾿ αὐτό τό ἀνθρώπινον, ὡς ὑπέρ ἡμᾶς, τῇ ἑνώσει κατάκρον θεωθέν, ᾧ καί τό ἀναμάρτητον κυρίως ἐπήρτηται. Τό δέ ἡμέτερον προδήλως ψιλόν, καί οὐδαμῶς ἀναμάρτητον, διά τήν τῇδε κἀκεῖσε γινομένην παρέγκλησιν· οὐ φύσιν μέν παραλλάττουσαν, κίνησιν δέ παρατρέπουσαν, ἤ μᾶλλον εἰπεῖν ἀληθέστερον, τόν ταύτης τρόπον ἀμείβουσαν. Καί δῆλον, ἐκ τοῦ πολλά παραλόγως ποιεῖν, καί μηδαμῶς εἰς ἄλογον μεταπίπτειν οὐσίαν ἐκ τῆς ἑνούσης ἐμφύτου λογικῆς.

0237 Οὐν ἔστι οὖν ἄλλο τό καθ᾿ ἡμᾶς, καί ἄλλο τό κατά τόν Σωτῆρα ἀνθρώπινον· οὐδέ τό θέλειν ἄλλο, κατά γε τόν τῆς φύσεως λόγον, εἰ καί ἄλλως ὑπέρ ἡμᾶς· θεϊκῶς γάρ, ὁ μέν ὑπέστη, τό δέ ἐτυπώθη, διά τῆς πρός τό θεῖον ἄκρας ἑνώσεως. Το προσαρμόζειν δέ πάλιν μάλιτα προσφυῶς τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν διαβεβλημένων ἕκαστον, οἷον τήν ἐναντίωσιν, ἤ τήν ἀντίταξιν, καί ὅσα τοῦδε τοῦ καταλόγου τυγχάνει, κἀν ἐπινοίᾳ τάς φύσεις ἀχωρίστως χωρίζοντες τῇ ἑξῆς φύσει προσέρχονται, συμπαραλαμβάνειν, οὐ μή θέμις ἐν τούτοις ἐστί τήν κατά Χριστόν ἀνθρωπότητα. Εἰ γάρ οὔτε ἐν ἡμῖν προσφυῶς, ἀλλά παρά φύσιν θεωρεῖται καί λόγον, πῶς ἐν ἐκείνῃ κἄν δι᾿ ἐπινοίας ἤ προσεπινοίας, ἵν᾿ οὕτως εἴπω, προσάπτειν ἔστιν; ἀλλ᾿ οἰκειώσει μόνον, δι᾿ οἶκτον ὡς κεφαλῇ τοῦ παντός σώματος, καθάπερ καί ἰατρῷ τά πάθη τοῦ κάμνοντος, ἕως ἄν τούτων ἡμᾶς ὁ δι᾿ ἡμᾶς ἐνανθρωπήσας ἐλευθερώσῃ Θεός. Πλήν τελείως ἡμῶν δαπανῶν καί ἐξαφανίζων τῇ δυνάμει τῆς κατ᾿ αὐτόν σωματώσεως. ∆ιττός γάρ ὁ περί παθῶν λόγος· ὁ μέν τῆς ἐπιτιμίας· ὁ δέ τῆς ἀτιμίας· καί ὁ μέν φύσιν τήν ἡμετέραν (15Α_316> χαρακτηρίζων, ὁ δέ δι᾿ ὅλου παραχαράττων. Ἐκεῖνο μέν οὖν ὡς ἄνθρωπος δι᾿ ἡμᾶς θέλων οὐσιωδῶς κατεδέξατο, ὁμοῦ τε τήν φύσιν πιστούμενος, καί τό καθ᾿ ἡμῶν λύων κατάκριμα· τοῦτον δέ πάλιν, ὡς φιλάνθρωπος, οἰκονομικῶς ᾠκειώσατο, ἐν ἡμῖν τε καί τῷ ἡμετέρω ἀνυποτάκτῳ γνωριζόμενον τρόπῳ, ἵν᾿ ὡς κηρόν πῦρ, ἤ ὡς ἀτμίδα γῆς ἥλιος, πάμπαν ἡμῶν ἐξαναλώσας, τῶν οἰκείων ποιήσηται τήν μετάδοσιν, καί ἀπαθεῖς μέν ἐντεῦθεν, ἀφθάρτους δέ κατά τήν ὑπόσχεσιν ἡμᾶς παρασκευάσῃ. ∆εῖ τοίνυν τόν τε ζῆλον ὁμοῦ καί τόν πόνον τοῦ τά τοιαῦτα σπουδάζοντος ὑπέρ εὐσεβείας μάλιστα κατά τό εἰκός ἀποδέξασθαι, προτρέπειν δέ πρός ἀκριβεστέραν τῶν πατρικῶν λόγων ἐμμέλειαν, διά τούς ἐπηρεαστάς τῶν καλῶν, οὐδ᾿ αὐτό συγχωροῦντας ἐκ περιττῆς ἀνοίας, ὅ μή δέ βουλομένοις αὐτοῖς ἑλεῖν δυνατόν.

Τόν δέ γε τῆςῬωμαίων πάπαν Ὀνώριον, οὐ καταγορεύειν οἶμαι τῆς τῶν ἐμφύτων θελημάτων ἐπί Χριστοῦ δυάδος, ἐν τῇ γραφείσῃ πρός Σέργιον ἐπιστολῇ διά