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ΟS (76). ..».... FOR IT IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SAY BODY, ... IN ORDER TO ALSO REPRESENT THESE THINGS ABOUT IT ..». (14∆_300> From the same discourse, on the text, "For just as it is not sufficient to say body, or that
one has been born, in order to represent and to reveal these things about which they are, but one must also state the subject of these things, if one is to represent the meaning perfectly and sufficiently; for either a man or an ox or a horse is this thing that is in a body and is perishable."
Since the saint saw the heretics having only one struggle, the
super-essential nature to foolishly bring down to themselves, and attempting with technical methods, by a grasp of knowledge according to them, to master, as they thought, the unmasterable power, which is equally uncontainable for all creation, throughout the whole discourse he preferred to speak of God by means of privations and negations, enduring absolutely no position or affirmation, lest, seizing upon this, like shameless dogs with a bite they might madly sink their venomous teeth into the word of truth, taking the occasion to propose and reason sophistically in any way, and to be able to bring their own endeavor to a conclusion, making use of whatever positive statement about God was given to them in the discourse. For this reason he declares God to be neither body, nor immaterial body, nor completely incorporeal, nor in the whole, nor in some part of the whole, nor above the whole, and, to put it simply, nothing at all and in nothing in any way whatsoever, as is true, of things seen or contained or spoken or thought or able to be known in any way, slapping them away from every comprehensive notion about God as to what the essence is.
Then, more persuasively leading them toward piety, and wishing to show from the investigation of secondary things and those incomparably far from God that it is not permissible for anyone to dare even to think about God at all, let alone to speak, he says these things. And indeed (14∆_302> also for the establishment of what has already been said to them by way of privation and negation, so that from this they, being conscious that even the precise comprehension of the least of created things surpasses the power of our rational activity, might be able to restrain the irrational impulse of their rashness concerning much greater things, having learned in small things the weakness of their nature. 1225 For if we examine some element, say a man or a horse or an ox, it is not sufficient for perfect comprehension to call the element a body, or to call the man or the ox or the horse only "generated" or "perishable," but one must also represent the subject of these things, which is generated and perishes and has qualities. But a body or generation or corruption, in no way being a subject, since according to this it would follow by necessity, if something is a body, that it is also an element, and if something is generated or perishable, that it is a man or an ox or a horse. For it is not the case that if something is a body, it is necessarily also an element or a man or an ox or a horse.
For if something is an element, it is necessarily also a body; but it is not the case that if something is a body, it is necessarily also an element. Nor, if something is a body or generated or perishable, is it necessarily also a man, since in that case a man would also necessarily be everything that is a body, and everything that is generated or perishes. For if something is a man, it is necessarily also a body and generated and perishes, but it is not the case that if something is a body or generated or perishable, it is necessarily also a man. For it does not necessarily follow, since man would necessarily be an element and an ox and a horse, and everything else that is corporeal and generated and perishes. For particulars are never predicated of universals, nor species of genera, nor the contained of the containing, and for this reason (14∆_304> nor do the universals convert with the particular
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ΟS (76). ..».... ΩΣ ΓΑΡ ΟΥΚ ΑΡΚΕΙ ΤΟ ΣΩΜΑ ΕΙΠΕΙΝ, ... ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟ ΚΑΙ ΠΕΡΙ Ο ΤΑΥΤΑ ΠΑΡΑΣΤΗΣΑΙ ΤΕ ..». (14∆_300> Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου, εἰς τό, «Ὡς γάρ οὐκ ἀρκεῖ τό σῶμα εἰπεῖν, ἤ τό
γεγεννῆσθαι, πρός τό καί περί ὅ ταῦτα παραστῆσαί τε καί δηλῶσαι, ἀλλά δεῖ καί τό ὑποκείμενον τούτοις εἰπεῖν, εἰ μέλλοι τελείως καί ἀποχρώντως τό νοούμενον παραστήσασθαι· ἤ γάρ ἄνθρωπος ἤ βοῦς ἤ ἵππος τοῦτο τό ἐν σώματι καί φθειρόμενον».
Ἐπείπερ ἐώρα τούς αἱρετικούς ὁ ἅγιος ἕνα μόνον ἔχοντας ἀγῶνα, τήν
ὑπερούσιον ἑαυτοῖς ἀνοήτως συγκαταβάλλειν φύσιν, καί τεχνικαῖς μεθόδοις περιλήψει τῆς κατ᾿ αὐτούς γνώσεως κρατεῖν ἐπιχειροῦντας, ὡς ᾤοντο, τήν ἀκράτητον δύναμιν, καί πάσῃ τῇ κτίσει κατά τό ἴσον ἀχώρητον, δι᾿ ὅλου τοῦ λόγου τάς στερήσεις τε καί τάς ἀποφάσεις προὐτίμησεν ἐπί Θεοῦ λέγειν, μηδεμίας παντελῶς ἀνασχόμενος θέσεως ἤ καταφάσεως, ἵνα μή ταύτης λαβόμενοι ὡς ἀναιδεῖς κύνες δήγματι τούς ἰοβόλους ὀδόντας μανικῶς τῷ λόγῳ τῆς ἀληθείας ἐμβάλλωσιν, ἀφορμήν τοῦ ὁπωσοῦν προτείνειν καί παραλογίζεσθαι, καί τό οἰκεῖον εἰς πέρας ἀγαγεῖν δυνηθῆναι σπούδασμα, τήν ὁποιανοῦν περί Θεοῦ δοθεῖσαν αὐτοῖς τοῦ λόγου θέσιν ποιούμενοι. ∆ιά τοῦτο οὔτε σῶμα, οὔτε ἄϋλον σῶμα, οὔτε ἀσώματον παντελῶς, οὔτε ἐν τῷ παντί, οὔτε ἔν τινι τοῦ παντός, οὔτε ὑπέρ τό πᾶν, καί ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν, οὐδέν τό παράπαν καί ἐν οὐδενί καθ᾿ οἱονδήποτε τρόπον, ὡς ἔστιν ἀληθές, τῶν ὁρομένων ἤ χωρουμένων ἤ λεγομένων ἤ νοουμένων ἤ γνωσθεῖναι καθ᾿ ὁτιοῦν δυναμένων, εἶναι τόν Θεόν ἀποφαίνεται, πάσης αὐτούς τῆς περί Θεοῦ καταληπτικῆς κατά τό τί ποτε εἶναι τήν οὐσίαν ἐννοίας ἀποῤῥαπίζων.
Ἔπειτα δυσωπητικώτερον αὐτούς ἐνάγων πρός εὐσέβειαν, καί ἐκ τῆς περί τά δεύτερα καί μακράν ἀσυγκρίτως ἀπό Θεοῦ ἐρεύνης τό καθόλου περί Θεοῦ τολμηρῶς μηδέ ἐννοεῖν, μήτιγε λέγειν, εἶναί τινι θεμιτόν δεῖξαι βουλόμενος, ταῦτά φησι. Καί μήν (14∆_302> καί πρός σύστασιν τῶν ἤδη πρός αὐτούς κατά στέρησίν τε καί ἀπόφασιν εἰρημένων, ὥστε αὐτούς συνειδότας ἐντεῦθεν, ὡς καί ἡ τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασιν ἀκριβής κατάληψις τῆς καθ᾿ ἡμᾶς λογικῆς ἐνεργείας ὑπερβαίνει τήν δύναμιν, τῆς περί τά πολλῷ μείζω θρασύτητος τόν ἀλόγιστον δυνηθῆναι φοράν ἐπισχεῖν, ἐν τοῖς μικροῖς τό ἀσθενές μαθόντας τῆς φύσεως. 1225 Εἰ γάρ ἐξετάζουσιν ἡμῖν στοιχεῖόν τι, φέρε εἰπεῖν ἤ ἄνθρωπον ἤ ἵππον ἤ βοῦν, οὐκ ἀρκεῖ πρός τελείαν κατάληψιν τό σῶμα λέγειν τό στοιχεῖον, ἤ γεννητόν μόνον ἤ φθαρτόν τόν ἄνθρωπον ἤ τόν βοῦν ἤ τόν ἵππον, ἀλλά δεῖ παραστῆσαι καί τό τούτοις ὑποκείμενον, ὅπερ γεννᾶται καί φθείρεται καί πεποίωται. Σῶμα δέ ἤ γέννησις ἤ φθορά, οὐδαμῶς ὑπάρχον, ἐπεί ἔσται κατά τοῦτο ἀνάγκης ἀκολουθία, εἴ τι σῶμα, καί στοιχεῖον εἶναι, καί εἴ τι γεννητόν ἤ φθαρτόν, ἤ ἄνθρωπος εἶναι ἤ βοῦς ἤ ἵππος. Οὐ γάρ εἴ τι σῶμα, πάντως ἐξ ἀνάγκης καί στοιχεῖον ἤ ἄνθρωπος ἤ βοῦς ἤ ἵππος.
Εἴ τι μέν γάρ στοιχεῖον, πάντως ἐξ ἀνάγκης καί σῶμα, οὐκ εἴ τι δέ σῶμα, πάντως ἐξ ἀνάγκης καί στοιχεῖον. Οὔτε εἴ τι σῶμα ἤ γεννητόν ἤ φθαρτόν, πάντως ἐξ ἀνάγκης καί ἄνθρωπος, ἐπεί οὕτω γε καί ἄνθρωπος ἔσται πάντως ἐξ ἀνάγκης πᾶν εἴ τι σῶμα, καί πᾶν εἴ τι γεννώμενόν ἐστιν ἤ φθειρόμενον. Εἴ τι μέν γάρ ἄνθρωπος, πάντως ἐξ ἀνάγκης καί σῶμα καί γεννώμενον καί φθειρόμενον, οὐκ εἴ τι δέ σῶμα ἤ γεννητόν ἤ φθαρτόν, πάντως ἐξ ἀνάγκης καί ἄνθρωπος. Οὔτε γάρ ἕπεται πάντως, ἐπεί ἔσται ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καί στοιχεῖον καί βοῦς καί ἵππος, καί πᾶν εἴ τι ἄλλο ἐνσώματον καί γεννώμενον καί φθειρόμενον. Οὐ γάρ κατηγορεῖταί ποτε τά μερικά κατά τῶν καθόλου, οὔτε τά εἴδη τῶν γενῶν, οὔτε τῶν περιεχόντων τά περιεχόμενα, καί διά τοῦτο (14∆_304> οὐδέ ἀντιστρέφει τά καθόλου τοῖς ἐπί