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by which they are divided and united in countless ways, both in relation to themselves and to each other, in thought and in action?

And again, what is the principle of each individual's substance, nature, form, shape, composition, power, activity, passion? and what again is the universal principle that effects the connection between the extremes through the mean, according to the limit of each, so that both the mind and the object of thought may be joined and mutually comprehended through the mean of intellection, which is a unitive relation of things divided, around the concept formed from both, and that absolutely nothing after God 1229 may be shown in this respect to be free from circumscription? just as also all sensible things and things that perceive, that is, the faculties of sense, through the mean of sensation, which is a common relation of the divided extremes—the latter apprehending the sensible objects through it, and the former falling under the perception of those that perceive—around the sense organ, in which the limit of the power of each according to the relation has been established, and around which the extremes are naturally united to each other through the mean relation.

When we attempt to investigate the principles of these things, or any one of them, we remain utterly faint and speechless in our reasoning, having nothing on which to fix our mind precisely, except the divine power. And this is what was said, I think, by the saint, training our mind toward piety, "By a little, then, not even the precise understanding of creation." But the phrase, "But far before these, the nature that is beyond them and from which they come, is both incomprehensible and uncircumscribable," must be applied in common to creation and to the nature that is beyond these and from which these things, that is, created things, come—the "incomprehensible and uncircumscribable." But the phrase, "Not that it is, but (14∆_310> what" it is, having been introduced, is an anticipation of a counter-argument. For lest the one to whom the argument is addressed should attack him, saying, "If, then, our object of worship is in every way incomprehensible, then the preaching of the Christians is empty, and our faith is also empty, being supported by nothing," he says these things, anticipating the abusive argument or person. I did not say that this nature, about which the argument is, is incomprehensible in that it exists, but what it exists as, and he adds for the confirmation of the argument, "For there is a great difference between being persuaded that something is and knowing what that thing is," that is, there is a great difference between being persuaded about something that it exists and knowing the precise comprehension of its substance. Do not, therefore, he says, when we have fairly said that the divine substance is incomprehensible, maliciously transfer the argument, so as to introduce us as saying it is incomprehensible as to its very existence, and from this conclude that we in every way advocate atheism.

And after a little he says, For what will you suppose the Divine to be, if you trust in rational approaches at all (that is, if you think that by running around with reason you are able to enclose the object of inquiry in some knowledge)? "Is it a body (that is, Is it a body)? And how can that which is infinite and undefined and without shape and intangible and invisible be so?" so that it may be understood clearly, since the common notions have prevailed, that the Divine is infinite, which is to have no limit. For this is proper to that which is defined by four limits: by a point and a line, a surface and a solid, 1229 and moreover by three dimensions, length and breadth and depth, and by six limits themselves, each obviously being circumscribed by two, as length by the above and the below, breadth by the right and the left, and depth by the forward and the backward limit. And again, since the same common notions introduce God as undefined, that is, not admitting of a developmental exposition of what the subject is composed, nor indeed position in place, or beginning or end in time, (14∆_312> moreover also without shape, as for instance that it is not spherical or square or upright or inclined downward, yes, and also intangible and invisible, as not falling under sense perception (for these things are properties of bodies),

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οἷς πρός ἑαυτά τε καί πρός ἄλληλα μυρίοις κατ᾿ ἐπίνοιάν τε καί ἐνέργειαν διαιροῦνταί τε καί ἑνοῦνται τρόποις;

Καί αὖθις τίς ὁ λόγος τῆς τοῦ καθ᾿ ἕκαστον οὐσίας, φύσεως, εἴδους, σχήματος, συνθέσεως, δυνάμεως, ἐνεργείας, πάθους; τίς δέ πάλιν ὁ καθόλου τοῖς ἄκροις κατά τό ἑκάστου πέρας διά τοῦ μέσου τήν πρός ἄλληλα συνάφειαν ἐνεργῶν λόγος, ἵνα τόν τε νοῦν καί τό νοούμενον διά τῆς μέσης νοήσεως, σχέσεως οὔσης ἑνωτικῆς τῶν διῃρημένων περί τό ἐξ ἀμφοῖν νόημα, συναφθῇ καί περιληφθῇ ἀλλήλοις ἑκάτερα, καί μηδέν τό παράπαν 1229 κατά τοῦτο δειχθῆ τῶν μετά Θεόν περιγραφῆς ὑπάρχον ἐλεύθερον; ὥσπερ καί τά αἰσθητά πάντα καί τά αἰσθανόμενα, ἤγουν αἰσθητικά, διά τῆς μέσης αἰσθήσεως, σχέσεως οὔσης κοινῆς τῶν διῃρημένων ἄκρων, τῶν μέν ὡς δι᾿ αὐτῆς ἀντιλαμβανομένων τῶν αἰσθητῶν, τῶν δέ δι᾿ αὐτῆς ὑποπιπτόντων τοῖς αἰσθανομένοις, περί τό αἰσθητήριον, ἐν ᾧ τό πέρας τῆς ἑκάστου κατά τήν σχέσιν δυνάμεως ὑπάρχον καθέστηκε, καί περί ὅ ἀλλήλοις τά ἄκρα διά τῆς μέσης σχέσεως ἑνοῦσθαι πέφυκε.

Τούτων, ἤ τινος τούτων ἐρευνᾷν ἐπιχειροῦντες τούς λόγους, ἄτονοι παντελῶς καί ἄφωνοι περί τόν λόγον μένομεν, οὐκ ἔχοντες ᾧ τινι τόν νοῦν ἀκριβῶς ἐπερεισόμεθα, πλήν τῆς θείας δυνάμεως. Καί τοῦτό ἐστι τό εἰρημένον, ὡς οἶμαι, τῷ ἁγίῳ, γυμνάζοντι τόν ἡμέτερον νοῦν πρός εὐσέβειαν, " Κατά μικρόν γοῦν, οὐδέ ἡ τῆς κτίσεως ἀκριβής κατανόησις». Τό δέ, " Ἀλλά πολύ πρό τούτων ἡ ὑπέρ ταῦτα καί ἐξ ἧς ταῦτα φύσις, ἄληπτός τε καί ἀπερίληπτος», κατά κοινοῦ θετέον τῆς κτίσεως καί τῆς ὑπέρ ταῦτα καί ἀφ᾿ ἧστινος ταῦτα, δηλαδή τά κτίσματα, φύσεως τό " Ἄληπτός τε καί ἀπερίληπτος». Τό δέ, "Οὐχ ὅτι ἔστιν, ἀλλ᾿ (14∆_310> ἥτις" ἐστίν, ἐνεχθέν προκατάληψίς ἐστιν ἀνθυποφορᾶς. Ἵνα γάρ μή καταδράμῃ αὐτοῦ πρός ὅν ὁ λόγος, φάσκων, Οὐκοῦν εἰ ἄληπτον πάντη τό σέβας ἡμῶν, κενόν ἄρα τό Χτιστιανῶν κήρυγμα, κενή δέ καί ἡ πίστις, κατ᾿ οὐδενός στηριζομένη, ταῦτά φησι προλαμβάνων τόν ἐπηρεαστήν λόγον ἤ ἄνθρωπον. Οὐκ ἔφην ἄληπτον εἶναι ταύτην τήν φύσιν, περί ἧς ὁ λόγος, ὅτιπερ ὑπάρχει, ἀλλά τί ὑπάρχει, καί προσεπάγει πρός τἤν τοῦ λόγου βεβαίωσιν τό, "Πολύ γάρ διαφέρει τοῦ εἶναί τι πεπεῖσθαι τό τί ποτέ ἐστι τοῦτο εἰδέναι», τουτέστι, πολλή πρόσεστιν ἡ διαφορά τοῦ πεπεῖσθαι περί τινος ὅτιπερ ὑπάρχει πρός τό εἰδέναι τήν ἀκριβῆ τῆς οὐσίας τούτου κατάληψιν. Μή οὖν, φησίν, εὐγνωμόνως ἡμῶν εἰπόντων ἄληπτον εἶναι τήν θείαν οὐσίαν, κακούργως τόν λόγον μεταβιβάσῃς, εἰς τό δῆθεν εἰσάγειν ἡμᾶς ἄληπτον αὐτήν, εἰς αὐτήν τήν ὕπαρξιν, κἀκ τούτου συνάξῃς ἀθεΐαν ἡμᾶς πάντη πρεσβεύειν.

Καί μετά τινά φησιν, Τί γάρ ὑπολήψῃ τό Θεῖον, εἴπερ ὅλως ταῖς λογικαῖς πιστεύσεις ἐφόδοις (τουτέστιν, εἰ οἴει τῷ λόγῳ περιτρέχων ἐναποκλείειν γνώσει τινί δύνασθαι τό ζητούμενον); " Πότερον σῶμα (τουτέστιν, Ἆρα σῶμα); Καί πῶς τό ἄπειρον καί ἀόριστον καί ἀσχημάτιστον καί ἀναφές καί ἀόρατον;" ἵνα σαφηνιζόμενον νοηθῇ, οὕτως τῶν κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν κεκτρατηκυιῶν, ἄπειρον εἶναι τό Θεῖον, ὅπερ ἐστί πέρας μή ἔχειν. Τοῦτο γάρ τοῦ τέτρασι διειλημμένου πέρασιν ἴδιον, κέντρῳ καί γραμμῇ, ἐπιφανείᾳ καί στερῷ, 1229 προσέτι δέ καί διαστήμασι τρισί, μήκει καί πλάτει καί βάθει, καί αὐτοῖς ἕξ διειλημμένοις πέρασιν, ἑκάστου δηλονότι δυσί περιγραφομένου, οἶον τό μέν μῆκος τῷ ἄνῳ τε καί τῷ κάτῳ, τό δέ πλάτος τῷ δεξιῷ καί τῷ ἀριστερῷ, τό δέ βάθος τῷ ἐμπρός πέρατι καί τῷ ὀπίσῳ. Καί πάλιν, τῶν αὐτῶν κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν ἀόριστον τόν Θεόν εἰσαγουσῶν, τουτέστι μή ἐπιδεχόμενον διεξοδεύουσαν ἀνάπτυξιν, ἐκ τίνων συνέστηκε τό ὑποκείμενον, μήτε μήν τήν ἐν τόπῳ θέσιν, ἤ τήν ἐν χρόνῳ ἀρχήν ἤ τέλος, (14∆_312> προσέτι καί ἀσχημάτιστον, οἶον ὅτι οὐ σφαιροειδές ἤ τετράγωνον ἤ ὄρθιον ἤ κάτω νενευκός, ναί μήν καί ἀναφές καί ἀόρατον, ὡς αἰσθήσει μή ὑποπίπτον (ταῦτα γάρ σωμάτων ἴδια),