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it is absurd from what has been refuted to suppose that the divine is a body and has a necessity to be divided into as many parts as it is again brought together as a body.

For the Divine is in every way without parts, because it is also completely without quantity, and completely without quantity, because it is also in every way simple, and in every way simple, because it is also in every way without dimension, and in every way without dimension because it is also in every way infinite, and in every way infinite, because it is also in every way unmoved (for that which has nowhere to be moved is never moved in any way), and in every way unmoved, because it is also completely without beginning (for it has nothing before it and greater, nor anything with it and equal, nor anything after it, able to be measured against it and contain it), and in every way without beginning, because it is also in every way unbegotten, and in every way unbegotten, because it is also completely one and most single, and in every way one and most single, because it is also completely unrelated, and for this reason altogether ineffable and unknowable, and the most single limit of all knowledge moving toward it well and in a God-befitting manner, having as its only true knowledge the fact of not being known.

OZ (77). ..».... FOR IF NON-BEING IS NOWHERE, THAT WHICH HAPPENS TO BE NOWHERE IS NOT EVEN A BEING, BUT IF

IT IS SOMEWHERE..». From the same discourse, on the text, «For if non-being is nowhere, that which happens to be nowhere

is not even a being, but if it is somewhere, in any case, since it exists, it is either in the all, or beyond the all». For which reason, perhaps the hearer will say, The teacher made the converse ambiguous

by adding the adverb "τυχόν," it being clear to all (14∆_314> according to logical suppositions, that 'that which is nowhere is nothing' is rightly and altogether confessed. To him we shall say, according to the poverty of our intellect, that wishing to restrain Eunomius and his followers from their great madness, since they say they know God as He knows Himself, he led them away to an absurd opinion through such arguments. For either there is an absolute necessity for those who say they know God as He knows Himself to add where the one known must be, for a perfect comprehension of the one known, and thus God, according to them, would differ in no way at all from any of the other beings, 1233 being Himself also circumscribed by place, than which what could be more absurd? Or, not saying where, they must say He does not exist at all, according to the supposition of his argument, than which what could be more godless? (for how and what could that be which does not in some way have its being somewhere?) Or the consequence of the argument forces them of necessity to say that He is everywhere and is nowhere, and for this reason, that the Divine is and exists, but what it is and how it exists, they do not know. For if, according to them, *where* the Divine is is unknown, much more will the Divine itself, what it is in essence, be more unknowable. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary for them, being pious, to confess that what is not known is not anywhere.

For this reason, I think, while condescending to the followers of Eunomius, the teacher made the converse ambiguous, by placing the adverb "τυχόν," and illuminating for us to understand that 'nowhere' does not in every case introduce that which is in no way and nowhere a being. For we say that God exists, and happens to be nowhere, in that He is not essentially circumscribed in place according to his existence, and yet exists absolutely, in that He is completely needed by all of beings in order to be, without which He both was and is, and always will be able to be, or rather He is (14∆_316> always. For He who exists even before beings exist does not have beings by position. For if among us craftsmen do not have their being hypostatically circumscribed in their artifacts in every way according to their existence, this perishable thing, and to speak more truly and properly, a thing that never is, what might one say concerning the power that is ineffable and unknowable and uncontainable by all, and is always alike in the same way?

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παράλογον ἐκ τῶν ἀνασκευασθέντων ὑπειληφέναι τό θεῖον εἶναι σῶμα καί ἀνάγκην ἔχειν εἰς τοσαῦτα μερίζεσθαι εἰς ὅσα πάλιν ὡς σῶμα συνάγεται.

Ἀμερές γάρ πάντη τό Θεῖόν ἐστιν, ὅτι καί παντελῶς ἄποσον, ἄποσον δέ παντελῶς, ὅτι καί πάντη ἁπλοῦν, ἁπλοῦν δέ πάντη, ὅτι καί ἀδιάστατον πάντη, ἀδιάστατον δέ πάντη ὅτι καί πάντη ἄπειρον, ἄπειρον δέ πάντη, ὅτι καί πάντη ἀκίνητον (οὐ κινεῖται γάρ πάντη πώποτε τό μή ἔχον τοῦ κινηθῆναι), ἀκίνητον δέ πάντη, ὅτι καί παντελῶς ἄναρχον (οὐ γάρ ἔχει τι πρό αὐτοῦ καί μεῖζον, οὔτε τι σύν αὐτῷ καί ἴσον, οὔτε τι μετ᾿ αὐτό, καί παραμετρεῖσθαι καί χωρεῖν αὐτό δυνάμενον), ἄναρχον δέ πάντη, ὅτι καί ἀγέννητον πάντη, ἀγέννητον δέ πάντη, ὅτι καί παντελῶς ἕν καί μονώτατον, ἕν δέ πάντη καί μονώτατον, ὅτι καί παντελῶς ἄσχετον, καί διά τοῦτο παντάπασιν ἄῤῥητόν τε καί ἄγνωστον, καί πάσης τῆς τῶν ἐπ᾿ αὐτό καλῶς τε καί ἄγνωστον, καί πάσης τῆς τῶν ἐπ᾿ αὐτό καλῶς τε καί θεοπρεπῶς κινουμένων γνώσεως πέρας μονώτατον, μονωτάτην γνῶσιν ἔχον ἀληθῆ τό μή γινώσκεσθαι.

ΟΖ (77). ..».... ΕΙ ΓΑΡ ΤΟ ΜΗ ΟΝ ΟΥ∆ΑΜΟΥ, ΤΟ ΜΗ∆ΑΜΟΥ ΤΥΧΟΝ ΟΥ∆Ε ΟΝ, ΕΙ ∆Ε

ΕΣΤΙ ΠΟΥ..». Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου, εἰς τό, «Εἰ γάρ τό μή ὄν οὐδαμοῦ, τό μηδαμοῦ τυχόν

οὐδέ ὄν, εἰ δέ ἔστι που, πάντως, ἐπείπερ ἔστιν, ἤ ἐν τῷ παντί, ἤ ὑπέρ τό πᾶν». ∆ι᾿ ἥν αἰτίαν, ἴσως ὁ ἀκούων ἐρεῖ, Τήν ἀντιστροφήν ἀμφίβολον ὁ διδάσκαλος

ἔθετο, προσθείς τό "τυχόν" ἐπίῤῥημα, πᾶσι (14∆_314> δήλου ὄντος, κατά τάς λογικάς ὑποθέσεις, τοῦ, τό μηδαμοῦ ὄν μηδέν εἶναι, δικαίως παντάπασιν ὁμολογεῖσθαι. Πρός ὅν κατά τό τῆς πτωχῆς ἡμῶν διανοίας ἐπιδεές ἐροῦμεν, ὅτι Εὐνόμιον καί τούς ἀμφ᾿ αὐτόν, λέγοντες εἰδέναι τόν Θεόν ὡς αὐτός ἑαυτόν, τῆς πολλῆς ἐπισχεῖν μανίας βουλόμενος εἰς ἄτοπον δόξαν διά τῶν τοιούτων ἀπήγαγε λόγων. Ἤ γάρ λέγοντας εἰδέναι τόν Θεόν ὡς αὐτός ἑαυτόν, καί τό ποῦ χρή τόν γινωσκόμενον εἶναι προσεπάγειν αὐτούς πάντως ἀνάγκη, πρός τελείαν τοῦ γινωσκομένου κατάληψιν, καί οὐδέν οὐδενός τῶν ὄντων τό παράπαν οὕτω γε διενήνοχε 1233 κατ᾿ αὐτούς ὁ Θεός, τόπῳ καί αὐτός περιγραφόμενος, οὗ τί γένοιτ᾿ ἄν ἀτοπώτερον; ἤ μή λέγοντας ποῦ, ἤ μηδέ εἶναι τό σύνολον λέγειν, κατά τήν αὐτοῦ τοῦ λόγου ὑπόθεσιν, οὗ τί γένοιτ᾿ ἄν ἀθεώτερον; (πῶς γάρ καί τί ἄν εἴη τό μή πάντως ποῦ τό εἶναι ἔχον;) ἤ πάντως εἶναι ἐξ ἀνάγκης αὐτούς ἡ ἀκολουθία τοῦ λόγου λέγειν βιάζεται καί μηδαμοῦ εἶναι, καί διά τοῦτο εἶναι μέν καί ὑπάρχειν τό Θεῖον, τί δέ εἶναι καί ὑπάρχειν μή εἰδέναι. Εἰ γάρ τό ποῦ τό Θεῖον εἶναι κατ᾿ αὐτούς ἄγνωστον, πολλῷ μᾶλλον αὐτό τό Θεῖον, ὅ τί ποτε κατ᾿ οὐσίαν ἐστίν, ἀγνωστότερον ἔσται. ∆ιό μηδέ που εἶναι τό μή γινωσκόμενον εὐσεβοῦντας αὐτούς ἀνάγκη πάντως ὁμολογεῖν.

∆ιά ταύτην, ὡς οἶμαι, τήν αἰτίαν συμπεριφερόμενος μέν τοῖς περί Εὐνόμιον ἀμφέβαλε τήν ἀντιστροφήν ὁ διδάσκαλος, τό "τυχόν" ἐπίῤῥημα θέμενος, καί ἡμῖν καταλαμπάνων νοεῖν ὅτιπερ οὐ πάντως τό μηδαμοῦ τό μηδαμῆ μηδαμῶς ὄν εἰσάγει. Θεόν γάρ ἡμεῖς εἶναί φαμεν, καί μηδαμοῦ τυγχάνειν, τῷ μή ὡς ἐν τόπῳ οὐσιωδῶς κατά τήν ὕπαρξιν περιγράφεσθαι, καί πάντως εἶναι, τῷ δεῖσθαι παντελῶς τοῦ παντός τῶν ὄντων πρός τό εἶναι, ὧν χωρίς καί ἦν καί ἔστι, καί ἀεί εἶναι δυνήσεται, μᾶλλον δέ ἔστιν (14∆_316> ἀεί. Οὐ γάρ θέσειν ἔχει τά ὄντα ὁ καί πρίν εἶναι τά ὄντα ὑπάρχων. Εἰ γάρ παρ᾿ ἡμῖν οὐκ ἐν τοῖς τεχνητοῖς πάντως τό εἶναι κατά τήν ὕπαρξιν ὑποστατικῶς ἔχουσιν οἱ τεχνῖται περιγεγραμμένον τό φθειρόμενον τοῦτο πρᾶγμα, καί ἀληθέστερον κυρίως εἰπεῖν μηδέποτε ὄν, τί ἄν τις φαίη περί τῆς ἀῤῥήτου καί ἀγνώστου καί ἀχωρήτου πᾶσιν ὁμοίως καί ἀεί ὡσαύτως ἐχούσης δυνάμεως;