to think and to call, but never demonstrative, I am far from positing. For the inscriptions of the patristic sayings do not allow us to accept this, and even if someone were to object rather contentiously and reject the inscriptions as spurious, we will show him that the very sayings themselves witness to this, "one Father, one Son, one Holy Spirit," so that this is united to them to the extent that a monad has affinity with a monad; "and not from this alone," he says, "is the proof of communion"; and where, after having concluded, has he demonstrated by proclaiming, and where is it placed in between, the phrase 'we demonstrate', and where, while also promising (p. 416) "you seek proofs," he says, "I am ready to provide them." And what is brought forward after this promise? Some saying of those handed down by God or divinely inspired and whatever might follow from these and be concluded from them. For what God is, no one of sound mind has ever said or sought or conceived. But that He is, and that He is one person, and that He is not one thing, and that He has not gone beyond the Trinity, and many other things considered concerning Him, it is possible both to seek and to demonstrate. For if not these things, it is not possible to learn about God at all. But if we learn and seek this also from those who know and understand well, then some things of God are known, and others are sought, and there are some which are also demonstrated, but others are entirely incomprehensible and unsearchable: the manner of generation, of procession, of a procession at once perfect and without departure, of a division at once indivisible and perfect, and the other things of which we have scientific knowledge through faith. "For just as sense-perception among things perceptible by the senses does not need rational proof, so too faith in such matters does not need demonstration. And it is nearly an equal and no lesser evil to think one knows things beyond the mind and not to declare "the knowable of God" to be such, and likewise that which is to be sought or demonstrated. For it is possible to be at a loss concerning not a few common notions and axioms, which, by providing knowledge in a way superior to demonstration, become demonstrative first principles for one who knows how to use them.

For it is known and confessed by all that God is perfect and not irrational, from which it is demonstrated that He is one person and not one thing. When we say, therefore, that God is perfect, the perfect one is one person, and intend to string together the other things in harmony with the fathers, how the perfect one is one person, if one of those ignorant of these demonstrative matters should approach, saying that there is no demonstration in the case of singulars, he will immediately hear from us that it is not universal; for how could it be in the case of non-universals? (p. 418) But it is no less a true demonstration, for this demonstration is both necessary in the case of singulars and more unerring. For in the case of universals deception might rather occur, since such a demonstration is pursued through imagination, all the subjects being difficult to compare and to comprehend. But indeed, even in cases where the common term is anonymous, in the same way there might be a demonstration both for some species of the universal and for each one of the particulars demonstrations are made, not universal, for how could they be? but true and necessary. For the Greeks, then, theology is plausible reasoning, which is why every theological syllogism that seems so to them is dialectical, from reputable opinions reputable, which is to say plausible from plausible things. For they know nothing certain or secure about God, "but they became futile in their thinking." But we do not set out to theologize from reputable principles, but hold unalterably to them, as they are taught by God. How then shall we call such a syllogism not demonstrative, but dialectical? And yet if someone of those who introduce dialectic into what is said about God, which is expressly forbidden by the theologian fathers, if someone, then, even of these should analyze the sound syllogisms, he would find the universal least of all in them; for the subject at hand is singular and so is everything that belongs to it alone properly

οἴεσθαί τε καί καλεῖν, ἀποδεικτικόν δέ οὐδέποτε, πολλοῦ δέω τίθεσθαι. Αἵ τε γάρ ἐπιγραφαί τῶν πατρικῶν φωνῶν οὐκ ἐῶσι τοῦτο παραδέξασθαι, κἄν τις φιλονεικότερον ἐνιστῆται καί τάς ἐπιγραφάς ὡς παρεγγράπτους παραγράφηται, ἡμεῖς καί αὐτάς δείξομεν αὐτῷ τοῦτο μαρτυρούσας τάς φωνάς, «εἷς Πατήρ, εἷς Υἱός, ἕν Πνεῦμα ἅγιον», ὥστε κατά τοσοῦτον τοῦτο ἐκείνοις ἥνωται, καθόσον ἔχει μονάς πρός μονάδα τήν οἰκειότητα˙ «καί οὐκ ἐντεῦθεν» φησί «μόνον ἡ τῆς κοινωνίας ἀπόδειξις»˙ καί ποῦ μέν, μετά τό συναγαγεῖν, ἀποδέδεικται βοώσας, ποῦ δέ μεταξύ κείμενον, τό ἀποδείκνυμεν, ποῦ δέ καί ἐπαγγελλομένας (σελ. 416) ζητεῖς φησί τάς ἀποδείξεις, ἕτοιμος παρασχεῖν. Καί τί τό μετά τήν ἐπαγγελίαν ταύτην ἐπαγόμενον; Λόγιόν τι τῶν θεοπαραδότων ἤ καί θεοπνεύστων καί πᾶν ὅ,τι ἄν τούτοις ἔποιτο καί ἐκ τούτων συμπεραίνοιτο. Τί μέν γάρ ἐστι Θεός, οὐδείς πώποτε τῶν εὖ φρονούντων οὔτ᾿ εἶπεν οὔτ᾿ ἐζήτησεν, οὔτ᾿ ἐνενόησεν. Ὅτι δέ ἔστι καί ὅτι εἷς ἐστι καί ὅτι οὐχ ἕν ἐστι καί ὅτι τήν Τριάδα οὐχ ὑπερβέβηκε καί πολλ᾿ ἕτερα τῶν περί αὐτόν θεωρουμένων, ἔστι ζητῆσαί τε καί ἀποδεῖξαι. Εἰ γάρ μή ταῦτα, οὐδέ μαθεῖν ὅλως ἔστι τό περί Θεοῦ. Εἰ δέ μανθάνομεν καί ζητοῦμεν καί τοῦτο παρά τῶν εὖ εἰδότων καί ἐπισταμένων, τά μέν ἄρα τοῦ Θεοῦ γινώσκεται, τά δέ ζητεῖται, ἔστι δ᾿ ἅ καί ἀποδείκνυται, ἕτερα δέ εἰσιν ἀπερινόητα πάντῃ καί ἀνεξερεύνητα˙ τρόπος γεννήσεως, ἐκπορεύσεως, τελείας ἅμα καί ἀνεκφοιτήτου προελεύσεως, ἀδιαιρέτου τε ἅμα καί τελείας διαιρέσεως, καί τ᾿ ἄλλ᾿ ὧν διά πίστεως ἐπιστημόνως ἔχομεν. «Ὥς γάρ αἴσθησις ἐν τοῖς ὑπ᾿αἴσθησιν λογικῆς οὐ δεῖται δείξεως, οὕτως οὐδέ πίστις ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀποδείξεως. Μικροῦ δ᾿ ἴσον καί οὐδέν ἔλαττόν ἐστι κακόν, τά τε ὑπέρ νοῦν οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι καί «τό τοῦ Θεοῦ γνωστόν» μή τοιοῦτον ἀποφαίνεσθαι, ὡσαύτως καί τό ζητητόν ἤ ἀποδεκτόν. Ἔστι γάρ κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν καί ἀξιωμάτων ἀπορῆσαι οὐκ ὀλίγων, ἅ κρείττω ἤ κατά ἀπόδειξιν παρεχόμενα τήν ἐπιστήμην ἀποδεικτικαί τῷ ἐπισταμένῳ χρήσασθαι γίνονται ἀρχαί.

Πᾶσι γάρ ἐστιν ἐγνωσμένον τε καί ἀνωμολογημένον ὅτι ὁ Θεός τέλειός ἐστι καί οὐκ ἄλογος, ἐξ ὧν εἷς καί οὐχ ἕν ἀποδείκνυται. Λεγόντων οὖν ἡμῶν ὅτι ὁ Θεός τέλειος, ὁ τέλειος εἷς, καί τ᾿ ἄλλα συνείρειν διανοουμένων συμφώνως τοῖς πατράσιν, ὅπως εἷς ὁ τέλειος, εἴ τις τῶν ἀνεπιστημόνων τούτων ἀποδεικτικῶν προσίσταιτο λέγων ἐπί τῶν μοναδικῶν ἀπόδειξιν μή εἶναι, παρ᾿ ἡμῶν εὐθύς ἀκούσεται ὡς καθόλου μέν οὐκ ἔστι˙ πῶς γάρ ἐπί τῶν μή καθόλου; (σελ. 418) Ἀψευδής δέ οὐδέν ἧττον ἀπόδειξίς ἐστι, καί γάρ ἀναγκαία καί ἐπί τῶν μοναδικῶν καί ἀνεξαπάτητος μᾶλλον αὕτη ἡ ἀπόδειξις. Ἐπί γάρ τῶν καθόλου γένοιτ᾿ ἄν μᾶλλον ἡ ἀπάτη, διά τῆς φαντασίας θηρωμένης τῆς τοιαύτης ἀποδείξεως, δυσξυμβλήτων τε καί δυσπεριλήπτων ὄντων πάντων τῶν ὑποκειμένων. Οὐ μήν ἀλλά καί ἐφ᾿ ὧν τό κοινόν ἀνώνυμον, τόν αὐτόν τρόπον γένοιτ᾿ ἄν ἀπόδειξις καί ἐπί τινος εἴδους τοῦ καθόλου καί ἐφ᾿ ἑνός ἑκάστου γε τῶν μερικῶν ἀποδείξεις γίνονται, καθόλου μέν οὔ, πῶς γάρ; ἀψευδεῖς δέ καί ἀναγκαῖαι. Ἕλλησι μέν οὖν πιθανολογία ἡ θεολογία, διό καί διαλεκτικός ἅπας ὁ δοκῶν αὐτοῖς θεολογικός συλλογισμός, ἐξ ἐνδόξων ἔνδοξος, ταὐτόν δέ εἰπεῖν πιθανός ἐκ πιθανῶν. Οὐδέν γάρ ἴσασι περί Θεοῦ βέβαιον οὐδ᾿ ἀσφαλές, «ἀλλ᾿ ἐματαιώθησαν ἐν τοῖς διαλογισμοῖς αὐτῶν». Ἡμεῖς δέ οὐκ ἐξ ἐνδόξων ἐπί τό θεολογεῖν ὁρμώμεθα ἀρχῶν, ἀλλ᾿ ἀμεταπείστως περί ταύτας ἔχομεν, θεοδιδάκτους οὔσας. Πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἀποδεικτικόν, ἀλλά διαλεκτικόν τόν τοιοῦτον συλλογισμόν ἐροῦμεν; Καί μήν εἴ τις τῶν τήν διαλεκτικήν ἐν τοῖς περί Θεοῦ λεγομένοις εἰσαγόντων, ὅ παρά τῶν θεολόγων ρητῶς ἀπηγόρευται πατέρων, εἴ τις τοίνυν καί τούτων τούς εὖ ἔχοντας ἀναλύσειε συλλογισμούς, ἥκιστ᾿ ἐν τούτοις εὑρήσει τό καθόλου˙ τό τε γάρ προκείμενον μοναδικόν ἐστι καί πᾶν ὅ,τι τῶν αὐτῷ προσόντων μόνῳ κυρίως