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79

TWO HUNDRED CHAPTERS ON THEOLOGY* (14__446> and the incarnate economy of the Son of God 1084 FIRST CENTURY 1.1 (a) One God, without beginning, incomprehensible, possessing the whole power of being

absolutely; entirely repelling the notion of when and how He is; as He is inaccessible to all, and known to none of beings by natural manifestation.

1.2 (b) God is not, for Himself, as it is possible for us to know; neither beginning, nor middle, nor end, nor anything at all other of the things naturally contemplated after Him; for He is indefinite and unmoved and infinite, being infinitely beyond all essence and power and energy.

1.3 (c) Every essence, introducing its own definition with itself, is by nature a beginning of the motion contemplated in it according to power. And every natural motion towards energy, being conceived after the essence, but conceived before the energy, is a middle, as it is naturally apprehended in the middle of both; and every energy, being naturally described by the principle according to it, is the end of the essential motion conceptually before it.

(14__448> 1.4 (d) God is not essence, according to what is called essence simply or in some way, so as to be a beginning; nor power according to what is called power simply or in some way, so as to be a middle; nor energy, according to what is called energy simply or in some way, so as to be the end of the essential motion conceptually conceived before it according to power; but an essence-creating and supra-essential reality; and a power-creating and supra-powerful foundation; and of all energy an active and unending state; and, to speak concisely, creative of all essence and power and energy, of beginning and middle and end.

1085 1.5 (e) The beginning and the middle and the end are characteristics of things divisible by time; and one might truthfully say, also of things seen together in an age. For time, having its motion measured, is described by number; but the age, having the category of 'when' conceived together with its existence, suffers extension, as having taken a beginning of being. And if time and age are not without beginning, much more so are the things contained in them.

1.6 (f) One and only by nature is God who is always properly, enclosing in Himself in every way the whole of what it is to be properly, as also properly superior to being itself. If this is so, in no way does any of the things said to be have at all that which is properly to be. Therefore nothing different in essence is ever contemplated with Him from eternity; not an age, not time, nor any of the things that dwell in these. For they never coincide with one another, that which is properly and that which is not properly.

1.7 (g) Every beginning and middle and end, has in every way wholly accepted the category of the relative; but God, being infinitely infinitely superior to every relation whatsoever, is reasonably neither beginning nor middle (14__450> nor end;

79

ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΑ Σ' (200) ΠΕΡΙ ΘΕΟΛΟΓΙΑΣ* (14__446> καί τῆς ἐνσάρκου οἰκονομίας τοῦ Υἱοῦ Θεοῦ 1084 ΕΚΑΤΟΝΤΑΣ Α' 1.1 (α΄) Εἷς Θεός, ἄναρχος, ἀκατάληπτος, ὅλην ἔχων τοῦ εἶναι τήν δύναμιν

διόλου· τήν, πότε καί πῶς εἶναι παντάπασιν ἀπωθούμενος ἔννοιαν· ὡς πᾶσιν ἄβατος, καί μηδενί τῶν ὄντων ἐκ φυσικῆς ἐμφάσεως διεγνωσμένος.

1.2 (β΄) Ὁ Θεός, οὐκ ἔστι δι᾿ ἑαυτόν, ὡς ἡμᾶς εἰδέναι δυνατόν· οὔτε ἀρχή, οὔτε μεσότης, οὔτε τέλος, οὔτε τι τό σύνολον ἕτερον τῶν τοῖς μετ᾿ αὐτόν φυσικῶς ἐνθεωρουμένων· ἀόριστος γάρ ἐστι καί ἀκίνητος καί ἄπειρος, ὡς πάσης οὐσίας καί δυνάμεως καί ἐνεργείας ὑπερέκεινα ἀπείρως ὤν.

1.3 (γ΄) Πᾶσα οὐσία τόν ἑαυτῆς ὅρον ἑαυτῇ συνεισάγουσα, ἀρχή πέφυκεν εἶναι, τῆς ἐπιθεωρουμένης αὐτῇ κατά δύναμιν κινήσεως. Πᾶσα δέ φυσική πρός ἐνέργειαν κίνησις, τῆς μέν οὐσίας μετεπινοουμένη· προεπινοουμένη δέ τῆς ἐνεργείας, μεσότης ἐστίν, ὡς ἀμφοῖν κατά τό μέσον φυσικῶς διειλημμένη· καί πᾶσα ἐνέργεια τῷ κατ᾿ αὐτήν λόγῳ φυσικῶς περιγραφομένη, τέλος ἐστί τῆς πρό αὐτῆς κατ᾿ ἐπίνοιαν οὐσιώδους κινήσεως.

(14__448> 1.4 (δ΄) Οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ Θεός οὐσία, κατά τήν ἁπλῶς ἤ πῶς λεγομένην οὐσίαν, ἵνα καί ἀρχή· οὔτε δύναμις κατά τήν ἁπλῶς ἤ πῶς λεγομένην δύναμιν, ἵνα καί μεσότης· οὔτε ἐνέργεια, κατά τήν ἁπλῶς ἤ πῶς λεγομένην ἐνέργειαν, ἵνα καί τέλος ἐστί τῆς κατά δύναμιν προεπινοουμένης οὐσιώδους κινήσεως· ἀλλ᾿ οὐσιοποιός καί ὑπερούσιος ὀντότης· καί δυναμοποιός καί ὑπερδύναμος ἵδρυσις· καί πάσης ἐνεργείας δραστική καί ἀτελεύτητος ἕξις· καί συντόμως εἰπεῖν, πάσης οὐσίας καί δυνάμεως καί ἐνεργείας, ἀρχῆς τε καί μεσότητος καί τέλους ποιητική.

1085 1.5 (ε΄) Ἡ ἀρχή καί ἡ μεσότης καί τό τέλος, τῶν χρόνῳ διαιρετῶν εἰσι γνωρίσματα· εἴποι δ᾿ ἄν τις ἀληθεύων, καί τῶν ἐν αἰῶνι συνορωμένων. Ὁ μέν γάρ χρόνος, μετρουμένην ἔχων τήν κίνησιν, ἀριθμῷ περιγράφεται· ὁ αἰών δέ συνεπινοουμένην ἔχων τῇ ὑπάρξει τήν πότε κατηγορίαν, πάσχει διάστασιν, ὡς ἀρχήν τοῦ εἶναι λαβών. Εἰ δέ χρόνος καί αἰών οὐκ ἄναρχα, πολλῷ μᾶλλον τά ἐν τούτοις περιεχόμενα.

1.6 (στ΄) Εἷς καί μόνος κατά φύσιν ἀεί κυρίως ἐστίν ὁ Θεός, ὅλον τό κυρίως εἶναι κατά πάντα τρόπον ἑαυτῷ περικλείων, ὡς καί αὐτοῦ τοῦ εἶναι κυρίως ὑπέρτερος. Εἰ δέ τοῦτο, οὐδαμῶς οὐδέν οὐδαμοῦ τῶν εἶναι λεγομένων τό σύνολον ἔχει τό, κυρίως εἶναι. Οὐκοῦν οὐδέν αὐτῷ τό παράπαν ἐξ ἀϊδίου συνθεωρεῖται κατ᾿ οὐσίαν διάφορον· οὐκ αἰών, οὐ χρόνος, οὐδέ τι τῶν τούτοις ἐνδιαιτωμένων. Οὐ γάρ συμβαίνουσιν ἀλλήλοις πώποτε, τό κυρίως εἶναι καί οὐ κυρίως.

1.7 (ζ΄) Ἀρχή πᾶσα καί μεσότης καί τέλος, εἰς ἅπαν τήν σχετικήν δι᾿ ὅλου κατηγορίαν οὐκ ἤρνηται· Θεός δέ καθόλου πάσης σχέσεως ὑπάρχων ἀπειράκις ἀπείρως ἀνώτερος, οὔτε ἀρχή οὔτε μεσότης (14__450> οὔτε τέλος εἰκότως ἐστίν·