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80

For instance, the one hundred and fifty Fathers did not permit, through their own voices and dogmas, Eunomius and Macedonius who wished to corrupt the doctrine of theology contained in it. And so too, the blessed Cyril did not allow Nestorius who was contriving to divide the economy; just as, therefore, the venerable Fathers in Chalcedon also prevented Eutyches who wished to confuse it. How then, for the sake of the good, along with those—I mean the synods—do you not also accept this one, for the same and equal good; or, as haters of the good, do you slander this one and thereby slander those as well? Which indeed you especially do in deeds, but are cautious in words, so that with pretexts of piety, pretending to revere those against this one, you might through this one destroy those as well, bringing the same accusation against them because of the same action. Who then of you will endure such arrogance against piety and the pious? etc.

CHAPTERS CONCERNING ESSENCE AND NATURE, AND HYPOSTASIS AND PERSON (15A_348> That essence indeed signifies the form and the nature, which 0261 is in

itself, but hypostasis indicates a certain particular of the essence. That essence and what is in essence are not the same; just as hypostasis and what is in a hypostasis are not,

although both are contemplated in each other, but they are one thing and another. For what is in essence is that which is contemplated in the nature, and does not exist in itself; but what is in a hypostasis signifies that which is itself in a hypostasis, and does not happen to be in itself by itself; that is, what has not come together into some one thing from incomplete parts, but from a complete and an incomplete, contemplated in the union by way of confusion.

That hypostasis defines a person by its characteristic properties. But the enhypostatic signifies an accident that is not in itself; but that which has its being in another, and is not contemplated in itself, nor does it subsist by itself, but is always contemplated in relation to the hypostasis, just as the qualities, both those called essential and non-essential; which are not essence, nor by themselves, but exist in the essence, and without it they have no being.

That just as no other of the qualities, that is, of the essential and non-essential, is an essence, or a thing subsisting by itself, but they always possess their characteristic in relation to the essence, like color in a body, and knowledge in a soul; for it is not possible to say that color appears without a body, or that knowledge is actualized without a soul; (15A_350> so too it is not possible to conceive of the enhypostatic or the inessential without an essence or a hypostasis. For they do not have existence in themselves, but are always contemplated in relation to the hypostasis.

That for some to say there is no nature without a hypostasis is rightly said by them, but is not rightly understood; and to reduce what is not without a hypostasis to a hypostasis, and not rather [to understand it] as contemplated in the hypostasis.

That just as if someone says, There is no body without shape or without color, he speaks correctly, 0264 but he does not conclude correctly, saying that the shape or the color is a body, and not that it is contemplated in a body; so if someone should say by name: There is no nature without a hypostasis; then, by reducing what is not without a hypostasis to a hypostasis, he does not distinguish correctly.

That a nature could never be without a hypostasis, but nature is not hypostasis; nor is that which is not without a hypostasis considered as a hypostasis. Since the reverse is not true. For hypostasis is in every case also nature; just as shape is in every case body. For it is not possible to conceive of a hypostasis without a nature; nor again a shape or a color without a body; but nature is not in every case also hypostasis.

That nature holds the common principle of being, but hypostasis also [holds] that of being in itself.

80

Αὐτίκα γοῦν τόν τῆς θεολογίας ἐν αὐτῷ κείμενον λόγον ἐν αὐτῷ κείμενον λόγον παραβλάψαι βεβουλημένους Εὐνόμιόν τε καί Μακεδόνιον, οἱ ἑκατόν πεντήκοντα Πατέρες οὐ συνεχώρησαν διά τῶν οἰκείων φωνῶν καί δογμάτων. Οὕτω δέ καί τόν τῆς οἰκονομίας Νεστόριον διαιρεῖν μηχνώμενον, ὁ μακάριος οὐκ εἴασε Κύριλλος· ὥσπερ οὖν καί Εὐτυχέα συγχεῖν ἐθελήσαντα διεκώλυσαν οἱ ἐν Χαλκηδόνι τίμιοι Πατέρες. Πῶς οὖν ὑπέρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ σύν ἐκείναις, φημή δέ ταῖς συνόδοις, καί ταύτην οὐκ ἀποδέχεσθε, διά τό αὐτό καί ἴσον καλόν· ἤ ταύτην ὡς μισόκαλοι διαλοιδοροῦντες συνδιαλοιδορεῖτε κἀκείνας; ὅ δή μάλιστα ποιοῦντες τοῖς πράγμασιν, εὐλαβεῖσθε τοῖς ῥήμασιν, ἵν᾿ εὐσεβείας πλάσμασιν ἐκεῖνας δῆθεν κατά ταύτης σεμνύναντες, διά ταύτης κἀκείνας λυμήνησθε, τό ἴσον αὐταῖς διά τήν ἴσην πρᾶξιν ἐπιφέροντες ἔγκλημα. Τίς οὖν ὑμῶν τήν τοσαύτην ὑποίσοι κατά τῆς εὐσεβείας καί τῶν εὐσεβούντων αὐθάδειαν; κ. τ. ἑ.

ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΑ ΠΕΡΙ ΟΥΣΙΑΣ ΚΑΙ ΦΥΣΕΩΣ, ΥΠΟΣΤΑΣΕΩΣ ΤΕ ΚΑΙ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΟΥ (15Α_348> Ὅτι οὐσία μέν τό εἶδος καί τήν φύσιν, ὅπερ 0261 ἐστί καθ᾿

ἑαυτήν, δηλοῖ, ὑπόστασις δέ, τόν τινα τῆς οὐσίας ἐμφαίνει. Ὅτι οὐσία καί ἐνούσιον, οὐ ταὐτόν· ὥσπερ οὐδέ ὑπόστασις καί ἐνυπόστατον,

εἰ καί ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἄμφω θεωρεῖται, ἀλλ᾿ ἄλλο καί ἄλλο. Ἐνούσιον μέν γάρ ἐστι, τό ἐν τῇ φύσει θεωρούμενον, καί οὐ καθ᾿ ἑαυτό ὑπάρχον· ἐνυπόστατον δέ, αὐτό τό ἐν ὑποστάσει ὄν, καί οὐκ ἐν ἑαυτῷ καθ᾿ ἑαυτό τυγχάνον, δηλοῖ· τουτέστι, τό μή ἐξ ἀτελῶν μερῶν εἰς ἕν τι συνελθόν, ἀλλ᾿ ἐκ τελείου καί ἀτελοῦς, ἐν τῇ κατά σύγχυσιν συνόδῳ θεωρούμενον.

Ὅτι ἡ μέν ὑπόστασις πρόσωπον ἀφορίζει τοῖς χαρακτηριστικοῖς ἰδιώμασι. Τό δέ ἐνυπόστατον, τό μή ὄν καθ᾿ ἑαυτό συμβεβηκός δηλοῖ· ἀλλ᾿ ὅπερ ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἔχει τό εἶναι, καί οὐκ ἐν ἑαυτῷ θεωρεῖται, οὐδέ ἔστι καθ᾿ ἑαυτό ὑφεστός, ἀλλά περί τήν ὑπόστασιν πάντοτε θεωρούμενον, ὥσπερ αἱ ποιότητες, αἵ τε οὐσιώδεις καί ἐπουσιώδεις καλούμεναι· αἵτινες οὐκ εἰσίν οὐσία, οὐδέ καθ᾿ ἑαυτά, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ τυγχάνουσι, καί δίχα ταύτης τό εἶναι οὐκ ἔχουσιν.

Ὅτι ὥσπερ οὐδ᾿ ἑτέρα τῶν ποιοτήτων, ἤγουν οὐσιωδῶν καί ἐπουσιωδῶν, ἐστίν οὐσία, ἤ πρᾶγμα ὑφεστώς καθ᾿ ἑαυτό, ἀλλ' ἀεί περί τήν οὐσίαν τό χαρακτηριστικόν κέκτηνται, ὥσπερ χρῶμα ἐν σώματι, καί ἐπιστήμη ἐν ψυχῇ· οὐδέ γάρ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν χρῶμα δίχα σώματος φαίνεσθαι, ἤ ἐπιστήμην δίχα ψυχῆς ἐνεργεῖσθαι· (15Α_350> οὕτως οὐδέ ἐνυπόστατον ἤ ἐνούσιον ἔστιν νοῆσαι δίχα οὐσίας ἤ ὑποστάσεως. Οὐ γάρ καθ᾿ ἑαυτά τήν ὕπαρξιν ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ᾿ ἀεί περί τήν ὑπόστασιν θεωροῦνται.

Ὅτι τό λέγειν τινάς, μή εἶναί φύσιν ἀνυπόστατον, ὀρθῶς μέν λέγεται παρ᾿ αὐτοῖς, οὐκ ὀρθῶς δέ νενόηται· καί τό μή ἀνυπόστατον εἰς ὑπόστασιν φέρειν, καί οὐχί μᾶλλον ἐν τῇ ὑποστάσει θεωρεῖσθαι.

Ὅτι ὥσπερ εἴ τις λέγει, Οὐκ ἔστι σῶμα ἀσχημάτιστον ἤ ἀχρωμάτιστον, ὀρθῶς μέν λέγει, 0264 οὐ μήν ὀρθῶς συνπεραίνει, τό σχῆμα, ἤ τό χρῶμα σῶμα λέγων εἶναι, ἀλλ᾿ οὐχί ἐν σώματι θεωρεῖσθαι· οὕτως εἴ τις ὀνομάσει λέγων· Οὐκ ἔστι φύσις ἀνυπόστατος· εἶτα τό μή ἀνυπόστατον εἰς ὑπόστασιν συνάγων, οὐκ ὀρθῶς διακρίνει.

Ὅτι φύσις μέν οὐκ ἄν εἴη ποτέ ἀνυπόστατος, οὐ μήν ἡ φύσις ὑπόστασις· οὐδέ τό μή ἀνυπόστατον εἰς ὑπόστασιν θεωρεῖται. Ἐπειδή οὐδέ ἀντιστρέφει. Ἡ μέν γάρ ὑπόστασις, πάντως καί φύσις· ὥσπερ καί τό σχῆμα, πάντως σῶμα. Οὐκ ἔστι γάρ ὑπόστασιν νοῆσαι ἄνευ φύσεως· οὐ δέ πάλιν σχῆμα ἤ χρῶμα ἄνευ σώματος·· ἡ δέ φύσις, οὐ πάντως καί ὑπόστασις.

Ὅτι ἡ μέν φύσις τόν τοῦ εἶναι λόγον κοινόν ἐπέχει, ἡ δέ ὑπόστασις καί τόν τοῦ καθ᾿ ἑαυτό εἶναι.