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having yourself advised others also to be on guard against the deceit from words, to hold in praise both the thought and the father of the thought, and to make yourself not an accuser of those words, but an interpreter. For if someone, reckoning that he is responding to the apparent meaning, should write a denunciation of the one who commands the mortification of the body, as if teaching men to become suicides, will you yourself exonerate this man, unless he should repent of his condemnation along with the adversaries? I do not think so. But what of when Basil the Great (that I may use an example similar to those accused by you), what then when this man said that the mind is diffused abroad and brought back again, shall we speak ill of him as saying that the immutable substance of the mind is diffused and that which never departs from itself is brought back, or shall we understand that by "mind" he means its transitive energies, whatever these may be?

But the philosopher, being prevented by my refuting words from accusing based on the apparent meaning, and being eager to proceed entirely against the intelligible meaning, and having refashioned for himself the contest against what was written by us on behalf of that venerable man, has not forgotten his slanderous art even here, or rather was somehow unable to forget it. For how could he have contradicted things that are irrefutable because of the truth within them and leveled the charge of impiety against the pious, without weaving slander into these things? When we then said that the heart is the first fleshly reasoning instrument, (p. 404) according to Macarius the Great, whose sayings declaring this we set forth there, this man, erasing the word "fleshly" and bringing forward the divine Gregory of Nyssa, who says that the intellectual substance is mingled with the subtle and light-like part of the sensitive nature, consistently infers from this that the saint says it uses this as a first instrument, but inconsistently attacks what was said by us, saying that these things are contrary to the saint's words, which state that the heart, and not that light-like thing, is the first reasoning instrument. But if you were to add "fleshly," O sophist, just as we have said, you will remove the alleged contradiction and you will see the saints in harmony with one another and us with them, having been taught by them; for the light-like part of human sensation is not flesh.

But he also devised another contradiction of our words with the Nyssen, that since we say the heart is the instrument of instruments in the body, and that the mind uses this instrument through it, we show the union of the mind and the body to be knowable, which is said by him to be incomprehensible. What then of him, when he says that the sensitive faculty is attached to the vegetative, which is intermediate between the intellectual and the more material substance, and then that the blending of the mind occurs with the most subtle part of the sensitive faculty, and that it uses this as a first instrument and through it the rest of the body? Has he not more, and much more, than we, made the manner of the mind's connection to the body knowable and expressible? How then does he say this is incomprehensible and inexpressible? Does he then also seem to your wisdom to contradict himself? And how could he not, according to you, if you at least know how to be consistent with yourself? But I think that while there is in (p. 406) such matters contact and use and blending, yet what this is and how it could be accomplished for an intellectual nature in relation to a bodily form or a body, is impossible for all men together to understand and to express. Thus the fathers agree both with themselves and with one another, and we with them. But you, who rejoice in contradictions, as it seems, desire that they too should seem to be in opposition, for which reason you also oppose us, who show that they speak in harmony with one another.

For while Macarius the Great, having been taught by the energy of grace, teaches us that the mind and all the thoughts of the soul are in the heart as in an instrument, and the Nyssen that it is not within the body, as it is bodiless, we

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τήν ἀπό τῶν ρημάτων ἀπάτην αὐτός καί τοῖς ἄλλοις φυλάττεσθαι παρηγγύας, τήν τε διάνοιαν καί τόν πατέρα τῆς διανοίας ἐν ἐπαίνῳ τίθεσθαι καί τῶν ρημάτων ἐκείνων οὐ κατήγορον, ἀλλ᾿ ἐξηγητήν ποιεῖν σαυτόν. Εἰ γάρ τοῦτό τις ὑπολογιζόμενος, ὅτι πρός τό φαινόμενον ἀπαντᾷ, καταλογογραφήσειε τοῦ ἐντελλομένου τήν τοῦ σώματος νέκρωσιν, ὡς αὐτόχειρας γίνεσθαι τούς ἀνθρώπους διδάσκοντος, ἆρ᾿ ἄν αὐτός ἐξαιρήσῃ τοῦτον, εἰ μή μεταβουλεύσαιτο τῆς μετά τῶν ἀντιθέων καταδίκης; Οὐκ ἔγωγε οἶμαι. Τί δ᾿ ὅτε Βασίλειος ὁ μέγας (ἵνα παραπλησίῳ τοῖς ὑπό σοῦ κατηγορουμένοις παραδείγματι χρήσωμαι), τί τοίνυν ὅθ᾿ οὗτος εἶπε τόν νοῦν ἔξω διαχεῖσθαι καί ἐπανάγεσθαι πάλιν, κακῶς ἐροῦμεν αὐτόν ὡς τήν τοῦ νοῦ ἀμετάβατον οὐσίαν διαχεῖσθαι λέγοντα καί τήν μηδέποτε ἑαυτόν ἀπολείπουσαν ἐπανάγεσθαι, ἤ νοῦν νοήσομεν αὐτόν λέγειν τάς μεταβατικάς αὐτοῦ ἐνεργείας, αἵ δή ποτέ εἰσιν αὗται;

Ἀλλ᾿ ὁ φιλόσοφος ἀπό τοῦ φαινομένου κατηγορεῖν ὑπό τῶν ἐμῶν λόγων ἐξελεγχόντων εἰρχθείς καί κατά τοῦ νοουμένου ὅλος χωρῆσαι προθυμηθείς, κατά τε τῶν ὑπέρ τοῦ σεπτοῦ ἀνδρός ἐκείνου γεγραμμένων ἡμῖν τόν ἀγῶνα μετασκευάσας αὑτῷ, τῆς συκοφαντικῆς αὐτοῦ κἀνταῦθα τέχνης οὐκ ἐπιλέληστο, μᾶλλον δ᾿ ἐπιλελῆσθαί πως οὐκ ἐδυνήθη. Πῶς γάρ ἀντειπεῖν τοῖς διά τήν ἐνοῦσαν ἀλήθειαν ἀντιρρήτοις οὖσιν ἔσχεν ἄν καί δυσσεβείας ἔγκλημα προστρίψαι τοῖς εὐσεβέσι, μή τήν συκοφαντίαν τούτοις ἐνείρας; Ἡμῶν τοίνυν πρῶτον σαρκικόν λογιστικόν ὄργανον τήν καρδίαν εἰπόντων, (σελ. 404) κατά τόν μέγαν Μακάριον, οὗ καί τάς τοῦτο δηλούσας ρήσεις ἐκεῖ προὐθέμεθα, τό "σαρκικόν" ἀπαλείψας οὗτος καί τόν Νύσσης θεῖον Γρηγόριοιν παραγαγών λέγοντα τῷ λεπτῷ καί φωτοειδεῖ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς φύσεως ἀνακίρνασθαι τήν νοεράν οὐσίαν, ἀκολούθως μέν συνάγει τούτῳ καί ὡς ὀργάνῳ πρώτῳ χρῆσθαι φάναι τόν ἅγιον, ἀνακολούθως δέ τοῖς ὑφ᾿ ἡμῶν λεγομένοις ἐπιτίθεται, λέγων ἐναντίως ἔχειν ταῦτα τοῖς τοῦ ἁγίου ρήμασι, φάσκοντα τήν καρδίαν, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ τό φωτοειδές ἐκεῖνο, πρῶτον ὄργανον λογιστικόν. Ἀλλ᾿ εἰ τό "σαρκικόν" προσθείης, ὦ σοφιστά, καθάπερ εἰρήκαμεν ἡμεῖς, μακράν ποιήσεις τήν διαβεβλημένην ἐναντιότητα καί συμφώνως ὄψει τούς ἁγίους ἀλλήλοις καί ἡμᾶς αὐτοῖς ὑπ᾿ αὐτῶν δεδιδαγμένους˙ οὐ γάρ ἐστι σάρξ τό τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης αἰσθήσεως φωτοειδές.

Ἀλλά καί ἑτέραν ἐπενόησε τῶν ἡμετέρων ρημάτων πρός τόν Νύσσης ἐναντίωσιν, ὡς, ἐπεί φαμεν ὄργανον μέν ὀργάνων τήν καρδίαν ἐν σώματι, χρῆσθαι δέ τόν νοῦν δι᾿ αὐτῆς τούτῳ τῷ ὀργάνῳ, γνωστήν δείκνυμεν οὖσαν τήν τοῦ νοῦ καί τοῦ σώματος ἕνωσιν, παρ᾿ ἐκείνου λεγομένην ἀπερινόητον. Τί γοῦν ἐκεῖνος, ὅταν λέγῃ προσφυῆναι μέν τῷ αὐξητικῷ τό τό αἰσθητικόν, μέσως ἔχοντι τῆς τε νοερᾶς καί ὑλωδεστέρας οὐσίας, εἶτα πρός τό τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ λεπτομερέστερον τήν ἀνάκρασιν γίνεσθαι τοῦ νοῦ καί τούτῳ ὡς ὀργάνῳ πρώτῳ χρῆσθαι καί δι᾿ αὐτοῦ τῷ σώματι; Ἆρ᾿ οὐ μᾶλλον ἡμῶν καί πολλῷ μᾶλλον γνωστόν καί ρητόν ἐποιήσατο τόν τρόπον τῆς τοῦ νοῦ πρός τό σῶμα συναφείας; Πῶς οὖν λέγει ταύτην ἀνεπινόητον καί ἀνέκφραστον; Ἄρα καί αὐτός ἀντιλέγειν ἑαυτῷ τῇ σῇ σοφίᾳ δοκεῖ. Καί πῶς οὐ κατά σέ, εἴπερ σεαυτῷ γοῦν ἕπεσθαι γινώσκεις; Ἀλλ᾿ ἐγᾦμαι ὡς ἐπαφήν μέν ἐπί (σελ. 406) τῶν τοιούτων καί χρῆσιν καί ἀνάκρασιν, τίς δέ αὕτη καί πῶς ἄν τελεσθείη νοερᾶς φύσεως πρός σωματοειδές ἤ σῶμα, νοῆσαί τε καί φράσαι κοινῇ πᾶσιν ἀμήχανον ἀνθρώποις. Οὕτω σφίσι τε αὐτοῖς καί ἀλλήλοις ὁμολογοῦσιν οἱ πατέρες καί ἡμεῖς αὐτοῖς. Σύ δ᾿ ὁ ταῖς ἀντιθέσεσι χαίρων, ὡς ἔοικε, κἀκείνους ἀντικεῖσθαι δοκεῖν ἐφίεσαι, διό καί ἡμῖν ἀντίκεισαι, συμφθεγγομένους αὐτούς ἀλλήλοις δεικνύσι.

Τοῦ γάρ μεγάλου Μακαρίου τῇ τῆς χάριτος ἐνεργείᾳ διαδαχθέντος καί ἡμᾶς διδάσκοντος εἶναι τόν νοῦν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ καί τούς λογισμούς πάντας τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡς ἐν ὀργάνῳ, τοῦ δέ Νύσσης μή εἶναι ἐντός τοῦ σώματος τοῦτον, ὡς ἀσώματον, ἡμεῖς