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as the Fathers have defined for themselves and for us, and we too, blessed ones, are diligent to keep.

d. This one will, it is necessary for them, blessed ones, to say is either natural or hypostatic; since the constitution of beings is considered in essence and hypostasis. For what else could one say besides these things (15Α_366> [for whom it was not permitted]? But if they say it is natural, they will also say one nature of the Logos and the flesh, even unwillingly. But if hypostatic, they will be compelled, because of the three holy hypostases, to speak also of three wills, if they have resolved to be consistent with themselves.

e. If the will of the nature of the Logos is creative of all things that have come to be; and if this, according to them, blessed ones, is also the will of the flesh, the flesh of the Logos will also clearly be the creator of the things that have come to be. And so the common opinion of Christians, that it is created, is abolished. For how is it a creature, that which creates from non-being, and possesses the distinctive property of the divine nature.

f. If because of the one will of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, their one nature was also demonstrated by the God-inspired Fathers; and there is one will, according to them, blessed ones, of the Logos and of the flesh, then there will also thus be one nature of the Logos and of the flesh. But if in the case of the flesh and the Logos, the one will does not entail one nature, neither in the case of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit will the one will entail the one nature, and our faith is empty, the preaching of the Fathers is empty.

g. This one will is either of choice or natural. But if it is natural, there will also be one nature, as has already been shown, of the flesh and of the Logos; 0273 but if of choice, just as by hypostasis, so also by mind will Christ be separated from the Father and the Spirit.

h. If according to the great Cyril, things that are of the same essence (15Α_368> and nature are also of the same will, how can things that are not of the same nature be of the same will?

i. If the not willing to die, according to the golden-mouthed John, the flesh has as a natural property; and with all the properties naturally belonging to it the Logos united it to himself unchangeably according to hypostasis, how, by denying the properties naturally belonging to it, do they not also deny the nature along with its natural properties?

j. If they say that with the will a person is also introduced, and because of this, fearing a fear that is not, they do not endure to speak of two wills in Christ, so that two persons are not necessarily introduced by them, they will be forced, if they wish to show the argument of their own dogma to be coherent, either because of the one will of the Godhead, to also say one person; since according to them, a person also necessarily follows the will; or because of the three persons, and three wills, to introduce both the confusion of Sabellius and the division of Arius.

But since, blessed ones, homonymy often becomes a cause of error, with the hearer passing over to another meaning than that which the discourse indicated, I beseech your understanding in Christ, for the sake of a clear and unconfused declaration of the things signified, to clarify for you before all things, if there is a will at all, and to which signified things, or realities, such a name is applied; and if some of the realities designated by it are composite, and others simple; and which are the composite ones. And if indeed the composite ones have parts that are contemporaneous or not contemporaneous; and which are prior to which; and which are subsequent to which. And what is the demonstrative and definitive (15Α_370> account of each part, so that we may have an understanding, to accept the one will. For the discourse of the Fathers is not about sounds, but about realities. Hence we find the Fathers conceding sounds, but concepts, not at all. In addition to these things, what is choice, and what is mind; and what is of the mind

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ὡς αὐτοί ἑαυτοῖς οἱ Πατέρες καί ἡμῖν διωρίσαντο, καί ἡμεῖς, εὐλογημένοι, φυλάσσειν σπουδάζομεν.

δ´. Τοῦτο τό ἕν θέλημα, ἤ φυσικόν ἤ ὑποστατικόν ἀνάγκη αὐτούς, εὐλογημένοι, λέγειν· εἴπερ ἡ τῶν ὄντων σύστασις ἐν οὐσίᾳ καί ὑποστάσει θεωρεῖται. Τί γάρ ἄν καί εἴη παρά ταῦτα (15Α_366> ἕτερον λέγειν, [οἷς οὐ ἐξῆν]; Ἀλλ᾿ εἰ μέν φυσικόν αὐτό εἴπωσι, καί μίαν φύσιν λέξουσιν τοῦ Λόγου καί τῆς σαρκός, καί μή θέλοντες. Εἰ δέ ὑποστατικόν, ἀναγκασθήσονται διά τάς ἁγίας τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις, τρία λέγειν καί τά θελήματα, εἴπερ ἑαυτοῖς στοιχεῖν διέγνωσαν.

ε´. Εἰ τό τῆς φύσεως τοῦ Λόγου θέλημα, δημιουργικόν πάντων τῶν γεγονότων· τοῦτο δέ κατ᾿ αὐτούς, εὐλογημένοι, καί τῆς σαρκός τυγχάνει θέλημα, δημιουργός ἔσται προδήλως τῶν γεγονότων καί ἡ τοῦ Λόγου σάρξ. Καί ἀνῄρηται οὕτω γε ἡ κοινή δόξα τῶν Χριστιανῶν, τό κτιστήν αὐτήν εἶναι. Πῶς γάρ κτίσμα τό ἐκ μή ὄντων κτίζον, καί τό ἐξαίρετον τῆς θείας φύσεως ἰδίωμα ἔχον.

s´. Εἰ διά τό ἕν θέλημα Πατρός καί Υἱοῦ καί ἁγίου Πνεύματος, καί μία φύσις αὐτῶν ἐδείχθη ὑπό τῶν θεολήπτων Πατέρων· ἕν δέ θέλημα κατ᾿ αὐτούς, εὐλογημένοι, τοῦ Λόγου καί τῆς σαρκός, καί μία φύσις ἔσται γε οὕτω καί τοῦ Λόγου καί τῆς σαρκός. Εἰ δέ ἐπί τῆς σαρκός καί τοῦ Λόγου, τό ἕν θέλημα τήν κίαν φύσιν οὐ συνάγει, οὐδέ ἐπί Πατρός καί Υἱοῦ καί ἁγίου Πνεύματος, τό ἕν θέλημα τήν μίαν φύσιν συνάξει, καί κενή ἡ πίστις ἡμῶν, κενόν τό τῶν Πατέρων κήρυγμα.

ζ´. Τοῦτο τό ἕν θέλημα, ἤ προαιρετικόν τυγχάνει, ἤ φυσικόν. Ἀλλ᾿ εἰ μέν φυσικόν καί μία φύσις ἔσται, ὡς καί ἤδη ἐδείχθη, τῆς σαρκός καί τοῦ Λόγου· 0273 εἰ δέ προαιρετικόν, ὥσπερ τῆ ὑποστάσει, οὕτω καί τῇ γνώμῃ χωρισθήσεται Πατρός καί Πνεύματος ὁ Χριστός.

η´. Εἰ κατά τόν μέγαν Κύριλλον, τά τῆς αὐτῆς ὄντα οὐσίας (15Α_368> καί φύσεως, καί τοῦ αὐτοῦ τυγχάνουσι θελήματος, πῶς τά τῆς αὐτῆς μή ὄντα φύσεως, τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἶναι θελήματος δύνανται;

θ´. Εἰ τό μή θέλειν ἀποθανεῖν, κατά τό χρυσοῦν στόμα Ἰωάννου, φυσικόν ἔχει ἡ σάρξ· μετά πάντων δέ τῶν φυσικῶς προσόντων αὐτῇ ἰδιωμάτων ὁ Λόγος ἥνωσεν αὐτήν ἑαυτῷ ἀτρέπτως καθ᾿ ὑπόστασιν, πῶς τά φυσικῶς προσόντα αὐτῇ ἀρνούμενοι, οὐχί καί τήν φύσιν τοῖς φυσικοῖς ἰδιώμασι συναρνοῦνται;

ι´. Εἰ τῷ θελήματι καί πρόσωπον συνεισάγεσθαι λέγουσι, καί διά τοῦτο τόν οὐκ ὄντα φοβούμενοι φόβον, δύο θελήματα ἐπί Χριστοῦ λέγειν οὐκ ἀνέχονται, ἵνα μή καί δύο πρόσωπα ἐξ ἀνάγκης αὐτοῖς συνεισαχθῇ, βιασθήσονται, εἴπερ εὐσυνάρτητον τόν τοῦ οἰκείου δόγματος λόγον δεῖξαι βούλονται, ἤ διά τό ἕν θέλημα τῆς Θεότητος, καί ἕν λέγειν πρόσωπον· ἐπειδή τῷ θελήματι κατ᾿ αὐτούς ἐξ ἀνάγκης καί πρόσωπον ἕπεται· ἤ διά τά τρία πρόσωπα, καί τρία θελήματα, Σαβελλίου τέ τήν συναίρεσιν καί Ἀρείου τήν διαίρεσιν εἰσάγειν.

Ἐπειδή δέ, εὐλογημένοι, ἡ ὁμωνυμία αἴτιον πολλάκις πλάνης γίνεται, τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ πρός ἑτέραν σημασίαν μεταβαίνοντος, παρ᾿ ἥν ὑπέφηνεν ὁ λόγος, παρακαλῶ τήν ὑμετέραν ἐν Χριστῷ σύνεσιν, διά τήν εὐκρινῆ καί ἀσύγχυτον τῶν σημαινομένων πραγμάτων δήλωσιν, σαφηνίσαι ὑμῖν πρό πάντων , εἰ ὅλως ἐστί θέλημα, καί ἐπί ποίων σημαινομένων ἤγουν πραγμάτων φέρεται τό τοιοῦτον ὄνομα· καί εἰ τά μέν τῶν ὑπ'αὐτό προσαγορευομένων πραγμάτων σύνθετά εἰσι, τά δέ ἁπλᾶ· καί ποῖα δέ τά σύνθετα. Καί εἰ ἄρα τά σύνθετα, ὁμόχρονα ἔχουσι τά μέρη, ἤ οὐχ ὁμόχρονα· καί ποῖα ποίων προγενέστερα· ποῖα δέ ποίων μεταγενέστερα. Καί τίς ὁ ἀποδεικτικός ἑκάστου μέρους καί ὁριστικός (15Α_370> λόγος, ἵνα ἔχωμεν νοούμενον, τό ἕν θέλημα δέχεσθαι. Οὐ γάρ περί φωνῶν ὁ λόγος τοῖς Πατράσιν, ἀλλά περί πραγμάτων. Ὅθεν φωνάς μέν παραχωροῦντας τούς Πατέρας εὕρομεν· ἐννοίας δέ, οὐδαμῶς. Πρός ἐπί τούτοις δέ, τί προαίρεσις, καί τί γνώμη· τί δέ γνωμικόν