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and mystically that one must never think this Good to be barren of Reason and Wisdom, or of sanctifying Power, which are consubstantial and hypostatic, lest the Divine be supposed to be a composite of these things, as if they were accidents, and not be believed to be these things existing eternally. Therefore the Godhead is said to be moved as the cause of the investigation into the manner in which it exists. For without illumination 1261 to attain to the Godhead is among the impossible things. And again it is said to be moved because of the partial manifestation of the more perfect Word concerning it according to the Holy Scripture, beginning from confessing the Father, and proceeding to confess the Son together with the Father, and receiving the Holy Spirit together with the Father and the Son, and leading those who are taught to worship together a perfect Trinity in a perfect monad, that is, one substance and godhead and power and energy in three hypostases.

PG (83). ..».... «BUT ANOTHER THING, I THINK, IS THE ONE WHO WILLS AND THE WILL, THE ONE WHO BEGETS AND THE BEGETTING,

..». From the same oration, on the text: "But another thing, I think, is the one who wills and the will, the one who begets and the begetting, the one who speaks and the word, if we are not drunk; the former are the one who moves, the latter are like the motion. Therefore the thing willed is not of the will (14∆_358>, nor the thing begotten of the begetting (for it does not necessarily follow), nor the thing heard of the utterance, but of the one who wills and of the one who begets and of the one who speaks. But the things of God are even beyond all these, for whom begetting is perhaps the will to beget».

Against the Arians who employ every means to make their blasphemy against the Only-begotten easily assailable, and who say that the only-begotten Son is the Son of will, but not of the Father, the wise teacher says these things, showing that their every contrivance against the truth is from this point easily dissolved. For if we say that the powers of the soul, which one might perhaps call complementary to its substance, are able to act in the substance with which they coexist, yet they are not able to be moved necessarily into effective action without the consent of the one who wills. And if it were granted hypothetically that they have their own will to act from their natural motion, without the inclination of the one who, so to speak, possesses them, they would have no power at all to act effectively from their own impulse. For the work does not necessarily follow the power, if it does not have the inclination of that of which it is the power, which contributes to it its end in actual deed, since it is in itself non-hypostatic. In vain they put forward the will, since it is not effective of anything without the one who both possesses it and wills. And this is what the teacher says. For the thing willed does not necessarily, of course, follow the will, and likewise the other effects the other powers, without the contribution of the subject in which they exist.

If, then, from our own examples you infer divine things, O sirs, then accept, adhering at least to your own (14∆_360> hypotheses, that things coexisting with each other through a mediating relation are necessarily simultaneous; I mean the one who wills and the thing willed, the one who begets and the one begotten, according to the relation, 1264 that is to say the will and the begetting, coexisting with each other. For just as there is no sight without the seer and the seen, nor thought without the thinker and the thought, so neither is there begetting without the begetter and the begotten, nor will without the one willing and the one willed, because the thing willed does not follow upon the will, as was shown, without the contribution of the one who wills. But if these things are simultaneous in relation, for the relation between them is immutable, then the begotten Son was simultaneous with the begetting Father, who is ever Father, through begetting, even according to you, admitting in any way whatever no interval between

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τε καί κρυφίως αὐτῷ μή δεῖν ἄγονον εἶναι πώποτε φρονεῖν τοῦτο τό ἀγαθόν λόγου καί σοφίας, ἤ ἁγιαστικῆς δυνάμεως, ὁμοουσίων τε καί ἐνυποστάτων, ἵνα μή σύνθετον ἐκ τούτων ὑποληφθῇ τό Θεῖον ὡς συμβεβηκότων, καί οὐχί ταῦτα ὑπάρχον ἀεί πιστευθῇ. Κινεῖσθαι οὖν ἡ Θεότης λέγεται ὡς αἰτία τῆς καθ᾿ ὅν ὑπάρχει τρόπον ἐξετάσεως. Ἄνευ γάρ ἐλλάμψεως 1261 ἐπιβάλλειν θεότητι τῶν ἀμηχάνων ἐστί. Λέγεται δέ κινεῖσθαι πάλιν καί διά τήν κατά μέρος φανέρωσιν τοῦ περί αὐτῆς τελεωτέρου Λόγου κατά τήν ἁγίαν Γραφήν, ἀπό τοῦ Πατέρα ὁμολογεῖν ἀρχομένου, καί εἰς Υἱόν συνομολογεῖν Πατρί προβαίνοντος, καί Πατρί καί Υἱῷ συμπαραδέχεσθαι τό Πνεῦμα τό ἅγιον, καί συμπροσκυνεῖν τούς διδασκομένους ἐνάγοντος Τριάδα τελείαν μονάδι τελείᾳ, ἤγουν μίαν οὐσίαν καί θεότητα καί δύναμιν καί ἐνέργειαν ἐν τρισίν ὑποστάσεσιν.

ΠΓ (83). ..».... «ΑΛΛ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ, ΟΙΜΑΙ, ΘΕΛΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΘΕΛΗΣΙΣ, ΓΕΝΝΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΓΕΝΝΗΣΙΣ,

..». Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου, εἰς τό· " Ἀλλ᾿ ἕτερον, οἶμαι, θέλων καί θέλησις, γεννῶν

καί γέννησις, λέγων καί λόγος, εἰ μή μεθύομεν· τά μέν ὁ κινούμενος, τά δέ οἷον ἡ κίνησις. Οὔκουν θελήσεως (14∆_358> τό θεληθέν, οὐδέ τό γεννηθέν γεννήσεως ( οὐδέ γάρ ἕπεται πάντως ), οὐ δέ τό ἀκουσθέν ἐκφωνήσεως, ἀλλά τοῦ θέλοντος καί τοῦ γεννῶντος καί τοῦ λέγοντος. Τά τοῦ Θεοῦ δέ καί ὑπέρ πάντα ταῦτα, ᾧ γέννησίς ἐστιν ἴσως ἡ τοῦ γεννᾷν θέλησις».

Πρός τούς Ἀρειανούς πάντα κινοῦντας τρόπον πρός τό εὐεπίβατον αὐτοῖς

εἶναι τήν κατά τοῦ Μονογενοῦς βλασφημίαν, καί λέγοντας θελήσεως, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ Πατρός Υἱόν εἶναι τόν μονογενῇ Υἱόν, ταῦτα φησιν ὁ σοφός διδάσκαλος, εὐδιάλυτον οὖσαν δεικνύς πᾶσαν αὐτῶν ἐντεῦθεν τήν κατά τῆς ἀληθείας μηχανήν. Εἰ γάρ τάς τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεις, ἄς ἴσως φαίη τις εἶναι συμπληρωτικάς τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς, δύνασθαι μέν ταύτας ἐνεργεῖν λέγομεν ἐν ᾗ σύνεισιν οὐσίᾳ, μή μέντοι καί κινεῖσθαι πάντως κατ᾿ ἐνέργειαν ἀποτελεσματικήν χωρίς τῆς τοῦ θέλοντος ἐπινεύσεως δύνασθαι. Εἰ δέ καί δοθείη καθ᾿ ὑπόθεσιν τό ἴδιον ἐθέλειν αὐτάς ἐνεργεῖν ἐκ τῆς φυσικῆς κινήσεως, χωρίς τῆς τοῦ ταύτας, ἵν᾿ οὕτως εἴπω, κεκτημένου ῥοπῆς μηδέν ἰσχεῖν αὐτάς καθάπαξ ἀποτελεσματικῶς ἐνεργεῖν τῆς ἰδίας ὁρμῆς. Οὐ γάρ ἀκολουθεῖ πάντως τῇ δυνάμει τό ἔργον, μή ἐχούσῃ τήν τοῦ οὗ ἐστι δύναμις ῥοπήν, συνεισφέρουσαν αὐτῇ τό κατ᾿ ἐνέργειαν ἐν πράγματι τέλος, καθ᾿ ἑαυτήν οὔσῃ ἀνυποστάτῳ. Μάτην τήν θέλησιν προεβάλοντο, μή οὖσάν τινος ἀποτελεστικήν, χωρίς τοῦ αὐτήν ἔχοντός τε και θέλοντος. Καί τοῦτό ἐστιν ὅ φησιν ὁ διδάσκαλος. Οὐδέ γάρ ἕπεται πάντως δηλονότι τῇ θελήσει τό θεληθέν, καί ταῖς λοιπαῖς ὡσαύτως τά λοιπά, χωρίς τῆς τοῦ ταύταις ὑποκειμένου ἐν ᾧ καί εἰσί συνεισφορᾶς.

Εἰ τοίνυν ἐκ τῶν καθ᾿ ἡμᾶς παραδειγμάτων τεκμαίρεσθε τά θεῖα, ὦ οὗτοι, δέξασθε ταῖς ὑμῶν γοῦν αὐτῶν στοιχοῦντες (14∆_360> ὑποθέσεσι τῶν ἅμα πάντως εἶναι τά κατά τήν μέσην σχέσιν ἀλλήλοις συνόντα, λέγω δή τόν θέλοντα καί τό θεληθέν, τόν γεννῶντα καί τό γεννηθέν, κατά τήν σχέσιν, 1264 φημί δέ τήν θέλησιν καί τήν γέννησιν, ἀλλήλοις συνόντα. Ὡς γάρ τοῦ ὁρῶντος καί τοῦ ὁρωμένου χωρίς οὐκ ἔστιν ὅρασις, οὔτε τοῦ νοοῦντος καί τοῦ νοουμένου νόησις, οὕτως οὐδέ τοῦ γεννῶντος καί τοῦ γεννωμένου γέννησις, οὐδέ τοῦ θέλοντος καί τοῦ θελομένου θέλησις, ὅτι μηδέ ἕπεται θελήσει τό θεληθέν, ὡς ἐδείχθη, χωρίς τῆς τοῦ θέλοντος συνεισφορᾶς. Εἰ δέ τῶν ἅμα ταῦτά ἐστι κατά τήν σχέσιν, ἀκίνητος γάρ ἡ ἐπ᾿ ἀμφοῖν σχέσις, ἅμα ἦν ἄρα τῷ γεννῶντι Πατρί, ἀεί ὄντι Πατρί, διά γεννήσεως, καί καθ᾿ ὑμᾶς ὁ γεννώμενος Υἱός, μή παραδεχόμενος καθ᾿ οἱονδήποτε τρόπον μεταξύ