having testified to the correct view, but having summarized and abridged it in a more moderate and more common and more concise way, as much as possible, I will use the argument concerning these things and according to the starting points almost given by you, so that the cause of these very arguments may also be accounted to you.

So that you may know that we held these views even before these arguments, I will set forth this of my own, which you yourself, I know not why, have praised, so that not even this is simply my own: “No one is good, except one, God, the only just, the only wise, the blessed and only potentate, who alone has immortality, dwelling in unapproachable light; therefore nothing of the things that follow God could be more than Him, and each of them is monadic, and whatever might be predicated of these, is not universal.” For the supra-essential and supra-good and supra-wise and supra-luminous, of what else are they but of that supra-divine essence and wisdom and goodness and of that light? How then could a syllogism be formed from monadics, without the universal? And if a syllogism could not be formed, how could it be dialectical, O best of men? Yet it will be sophistic, having only the form and appearance, but not being. And your dialectic, therefore, has grown forth like woolly down, and all your syllogisms, if indeed they are not even deprived of the name of syllogisms, (p. 474) are sophistic, not being, but appearing, or rather, not even this, but let it be granted nevertheless; and the propositions added from the reasons existing in us, since they are not the cause of the conclusion, how could they be the cause of faith in it? But if he concedes, what is the reason according to which, wishing to name his own syllogism dialectical, he both takes things that are not universal as universal and posits that the concepts within us provide faith to the oracles and considers the syllogism the cause of faith, but not of knowledge, and simply concedes all things that do not even accord with the principles of the art, but to those who call it demonstrative, he thinks nothing should be conceded?

Furthermore, since in those things in which you seem to refute us, you say that the monadic is twofold and homonymous for no other reason than that it has one sense for each of the sensible things among us and another sense for God, learn that all things said of God are in this way twofold and homonymous; for none of the things said of Him is in the same way as for each of the things among us, not only of sensible things but not even of intelligible things, so that in all your syllogisms you attempt to deceive the listeners by means of this twofoldness; therefore all of yours are sophistic, but not dialectical. Furthermore, if God is monadic, and such a monadic as is not one out of many, and in this one there is no "this something" and subject, and without these there is no proposition; if there is no proposition, there will be no syllogism either, not to mention dialectical, but not even sophistic. Your dialectical syllogisms, therefore, as you yourself call them, having been shown to be neither dialectical nor sophistic, what then shall we name them? Unspeakable, or even unthinkable.

For instance, the syllogism which you say is exceedingly precise for you, “Of the Father and the Son there is one energy, of whom there is one energy, there is one power, of whom there is one power, there is the same essence and nature, (p. 476) therefore of the Father and the Son, there is the same essence and nature.” To those who propose this, the answer is to those who inquire: for someone else setting this forth thus would not be censured by us; but as it is yours, we shall examine it from your own principles. For "of whom," of which ones do you speak? For if you mean of all, is this not also exceedingly faulty? For you arrange by this means things removed from all multitude and you think it right to teach about the uncreated nature from created things. Moreover, you also attempt to deceive us sophistically through the twofold manner of the energy; for not even you yourself would say that the one power and energy of the Son and the Father is in the same way as my energy and power and yours is one. But if not of all, how is your most precise syllogism itself not illogical, being deprived of the universal? To

τό ὀρθόν προσμαρτυρήσας, ἀλλά μετριώτερον καί κοινότερον καί ἐπιτομώτερον συνελών καί ὑποτεμών, ὥς οἷόν τε, τῷ περί τούτων χρήσομαι λόγῳ καί κατά τάς ὑπό σοῦ σχεδόν δεδομένας ἀφορμάς, ὅπως σοι λογίζηται καί τουτωνί τῶν λόγων τό αἴτιον.

Ὥς ἄν δέ καί πρό τῶν λόγων τούτων ταῦτα δοξάζοντας ἡμᾶς εἰδείης, ἐκεῖνο προθήσω τῶν ἐμῶν, ὅ καί αὐτός οὐκ οἶδ᾿ ὅτι παθών ἐπήνεσας, ὥστ᾿ οὐδέ τοῦτο ἁπλῶς ἐμόν˙ «Οὐδείς ἀγαθός, εἰ μή εἷς ὁ Θεός, ὁ μόνος δίκαιος, ὁ μόνος σοφός, ὁ μακάριος καί μόνος δυνάστης, ὁ μόνος ἔχων ἀθανασίαν, φῶς οἰκῶν ἀπρόσιτον˙ οὐδέν οὖν τῶν ἑπομένων τῷ Θεῷ ἐπί πλέον εἴη ἄν αὐτοῦ, καί αὐτῶν δ᾿ ἕκαστον μοναδικόν, καί ὅ,τι ἄν κατηγοροῖτο τούτων, οὐ καθόλου». Τό γάρ ὑπερούσιον καί ὑπεράγαθον καί ὑπέρσοφον καί ὑπέρφωτον τίνος γε ἄλλου ἤ τῆς ὑπερθέου οὐσίας καί σοφίας καί ἀγαθότητος καί τοῦ φωτός ἐκείνου; Πῶς οὖν ἐκ μοναδικῶν γένοιτ᾿ ἄν συλλογισμός, ἄνευ τοῦ καθόλου; Εἰ δέ συλλογισμός οὐκ ἄν γένοιτ᾿ διαλεκτικός, ὦ βέλτιστε, πῶς ἄν γένοιτο; Σοφιστικός δ᾿ ὅμως ἔσται, σχῆμα μόνον ἔχων καί φαινόμενος, ἀλλ᾿ οὐκ ὤν. Καί ἡ διαλεκτική σοι τοίνυν, ὡς χνοώδης διεκπεφύσηται, καί οἱ σοί ἅπαντες συλλογισμοί, εἰ ἄρα καί μή ἀφίενται τοῦ τῶν συλλογισμῶν (σελ. 474) ὀνόματος, σοφιστικοί εἰσιν, οὐκ ὄντες, ἀλλά φαινόμενοι, μᾶλλον δέ οὐδέ τοῦτο, δεδόσθω δ᾿ ὅμως˙ αἱ δ᾿ ἐκ τῶν ἡμῖν ἐνυπαρχόντων λόγων προστιθέμεναι προτάσεις, μή οὖσαι αἴτιοι τοῦ συμπεράσματος, πῶς ἄν εἶεν αἴτιοι τῆς πίστεως αὐτοῦ; Εἰ δέ συγχωρεῖ, τίς ὁ λόγος καθ᾿ ὅν διαλεκτικόν μέν θέλων ὀνομάζειν τόν αὐτοῦ συλλογισμόν, τά τε μή καθόλου λαμβάνει ὡς καθόλου καί τάς ἐν ἡμῖν ἐννοίας πίστιν παρέχειν τοῖς λογίοις τίθεται καί τόν συλλογισμόν πίστεως, ἀλλ᾿ οὐχί γνώσεως, αἴτιον ἡγεῖται καί ἁπλῶς πάντα συγχωρεῖ τά καί τῷ λόγῳ τῆς τέχνης μή συμβαίνοντα, τοῖς δέ ἀποδεικτικόν καλοῦσιν, οὐδέν οἴεται συγχωρητέον;

Ἔτι, ἐπείπερ ἐν οἷς δοκεῖς ἡμᾶς ἐλέγχειν, τό μοναδικόν φῄς διττόν καί ὁμώνυμον παρ᾿ οὐδέν ἄλλο ἤ ὅτι ἄλλως ἐφ᾿ ἑκάστου τῶν παρ᾿ ἡμῖν αἰσθητῶν ἔχει καί ἄλλως ἐπί τοῦ Θεοῦ, μάθε ὡς πάντα τά ἐπί Θεοῦ λεγόμενα τοῦτον τόν τρόπον διττά καί ὁμώνυμα˙ οὐδέν γάρ τῶν ἐπ᾿ αὐτοῦ λεγομένων οὕτως ἔχει ὥσπερ ἐφ᾿ ἑκάστου τῶν παρ᾿ ἡμῖν, οὐχ ὅπως τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀλλ᾿ οὐδέ τῶν νοητῶν, ὥστ᾿ ἐν ἅπασί σου τοῖς συλλογισμοῖς παρά τό διττόν τοῦτο τούς ἀκροωμένους ἐπιχειρεῖς παρακρούεσθαι˙ σοφιστικοί σοι ἄρ᾿ εἰσίν ἅπαντες, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ διαλεκτικοί. Ἔτι, εἰ μοναδικόν ἐστιν ὁ Θεός, καί τοιοῦτο μοναδικόν ὡς μή ἐκ πολλῶν ἕν, ἐπί δέ τούτου τοῦ ἑνός οὐκ ἔστι τόδε τι εἶναι καί ὑποκείμενον, τούτων δ᾿ ἄνευ πρότασις οὐκ ἔστι˙ προτάσεως μή οὔσης, οὐδέ συλλογισμός ἔσται, μή ὅτι διαλεκτικός, ἀλλ᾿ οὐδέ σοφιστικός. Τούς σούς τοίνυν διαλεκτικούς, οὕς αὐτός φῄς, συλλογισμούς, μήτε διαλεκτικούς, μήτε σοφιστικούς ἀναφανέντας, τί γε ὀνομάσωμεν; Ἀρρήτους, ἤ καί ἀδιανοήτους.

Αὐτίκα ὅν φῄς ἀκριβῆ σοι ἐς τά μάλιστα συλλογισμόν, «Πατρός καί Υἱοῦ μία ἐνέργεια, ὧν μία ἐνέργεια, μία δύναμις, ὧν μία δύναμις, οὐσία καί φύσης ἡ αὐτή, (σελ. 476) Πατρός ἄρα καί Υἱοῦ, οὐσία καί φύσις ἡ αὐτή»˙ τοῦτον δή προβαλλομένοις ἀπόκρισις πυνθανομένοις˙ ἄλλος μέν γάρ τις τοῦτον οὕτως ἐκτιθέμενος, οὐκ ἄν εὐθύνοιτο παρ᾿ ἡμῶν˙ ὡς δέ σόν, ἀπό τῶν σῶν ἐτάσομεν. Ὧν γάρ, τίνων λέγεις; Εἰ μέν γάρ ἁπάντων, μή καί λίαν πλημμελές; Τά γάρ ὑπεξῃρημένα πάσης πληθύος ταύτῃ δι᾿ αὐτοῦ συντάττεις καί ἀπό τῶν κτιστῶν περί τῆς ἀκτίστου φύσεως διδάσκειν ἀξιοῖς. Ἔτι δέ καί διά τοῦ διττοῦ τῆς ἐνεργείας τρόπου σοφιστικῶς ἡμᾶς ἐπιχειρεῖς παρακρούεσθαι˙ καί γάρ οὐδ᾿ αὐτός ἄν φαίης οὕτως εἶναι μίαν δύναμίν τε καί ἐνέργειαν Υἱοῦ τε καί Πατρός, ὡς ἐμοῦ τε καί σοῦ μία ἐστίν ἐνέργειά τε καί δύναμις. Εἰ δ᾿ οὐ πάντων, πῶς οὐκ ἀσυλλόγστος ὁ ἀκριβέστατος αὐτός σου συλλογισμός, ἐστερημένος τοῦ καθόλου; Πρός