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He came in order not to work, and so it turned out; for being occupied with the reception of his friend, he does not work. These things are called consequential, because this is how things turn out. But God does not wish to be righteous alone, but for all to be made like Him according to their ability.

93 That there are not two principles. That there are not two principles, one good and one evil, we shall know from this: for the good and the evil are contrary to one another and destructive of one another and do not subsist in one another or with one another. Therefore, each of these will exist in a part of the universe. And first, each of them will be circumscribed not only by the universe, but also by a part of the universe. Then who is it that has allotted the region to each? For they will not say that they agreed and came to terms with each other, since evil is not evil if it makes peace and comes to terms with the good, nor is good good if it is amicably disposed towards evil. But if another has defined for each of these its own domain, he will rather be God. And of necessity one of two things must happen: either they touch and destroy each other, or there is something in between, in which neither the good nor the evil will be, like some diaphragm separating both from each other. And there will no longer be two, but three principles. And of necessity one of these must either be at peace, which evil cannot be (for that which is at peace is not evil), or be in conflict, which the good cannot be (for that which is in conflict is not perfectly good), or the evil must fight, and the good not fight back, but be destroyed by the evil, or be grieved and afflicted, which is not a characteristic of the good. Therefore, there is one good principle, free from all evil. But if this is so, they say, whence comes evil? For it is impossible for evil to have its origin from the good. We say, then, that evil is nothing other than the privation of the good and a turning away from what is according to nature to what is contrary to nature; for nothing is evil by nature. For all things that God has made are very good, insofar as they have come into being. Thus, therefore, remaining as they were created, they are very good; but voluntarily departing from what is according to nature and coming to what is contrary to nature, they are in evil. By nature, then, all things are servants and subjects of the Creator. When, therefore, any of the creatures voluntarily rebels and becomes disobedient to its Maker, it has constituted evil in itself; for evil is not some substance nor a property of a substance, but an accident, that is, a voluntary turning away from what is according to nature to what is contrary to nature, which is sin. Whence then is sin? —The invention of the free will of the devil. —Is the devil then evil? —Insofar as he was created, he is not evil, but good; for he was created by the Creator as a brilliant and luminous angel, having free will as a rational being, and he voluntarily departed from virtue according to nature and came to be in the darkness of evil, being distanced from God, the only good and giver of light; for from Him every good thing is made good, and insofar as he is distanced from Him by will (for not by place), he has come to be in evil.

94 For what reason did God, foreknowing those who were going to sin and not repent

create them. God through goodness brings into being from non-being the things that are created and is the foreknower of things that will be. If, then, they were not going to be, neither would they be going to be evil, nor would they be foreknown. For knowledge is of things that are, and foreknowledge is of things that will certainly be; for first is to be, and then to be good or evil. But if, because they were going to be evil from their own choice, the goodness of God had prevented them from coming into being, evil would have conquered the goodness of God. Therefore God makes all things that He makes good; but each one becomes good or evil from his own choice. Therefore, even if the Lord said, 'It would have been better for that man if he had not been born,' He was not speaking against His own creation, but against the evil that came upon His creation from its own choice and indolence. For the indolence of his own will rendered useless to him the of the

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ἵνα μὴ ἐργάσηται, παρεγένετο, οὕτω δὲ ἀπέβη· ἀσχολούμενος γὰρ περὶ τὴν τοῦ φίλου ὑποδοχὴν οὐκ ἐργάζεται. Λέγεται δὲ ταῦτα ἐκβατικά, ὅτι οὕτως ἀποβαίνουσι τὰ πράγματα. Οὐ θέλει δὲ ὁ θεὸς μόνος εἶναι δίκαιος, ἀλλὰ πάντας ὁμοιοῦσθαι αὐτῷ κατὰ δύναμιν. 93 Ὅτι οὐ δύο ἀρχαί Ὅτι οὐ δύο ἀρχαί, μία ἀγαθὴ καὶ μία πονηρά, ἐντεῦθεν εἰσόμεθα· ἐναντία γὰρ ἀλλήλοις τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ πονηρὸν καὶ ἀλλήλων φθαρτικὰ καὶ ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἢ σὺν ἀλλήλοις οὐχ ὑφιστάμενα. Ἐν μέρει τοίνυν τούτων ἕκαστον ἔσται τοῦ παντός. Καὶ πρῶτον μὲν περιγραφήσονται οὐχ ὑπὸ τοῦ παντὸς μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὸ μέρους τοῦ παντὸς τούτων ἕκαστον. Ἔπειτα τίς ὁ τὴν χώραν ἑκάστῳ ἀποτεμόμενος; Οὐ γὰρ ἀλλήλοις συνενεχθῆναι καὶ συμβιβασθῆναι φήσουσιν, ἐπεὶ οὐ κακὸν τὸ κακὸν εἰρήνην ἄγον πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθόν τε συμβιβαζόμενον, οὐδ' ἀγαθὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν πρὸς τὸ κακὸν φιλικῶς διακείμενον. Εἰ δὲ ἕτερος τούτων ἑκάστῳ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀφώρισε διατριβήν, ἐκεῖνος μᾶλλον ἔσται θεός. Ἀνάγκη δὲ καὶ δυοῖν θάτερον ἢ ἅπτεσθαι καὶ φθείρειν ἀλλήλους ἢ εἶναί τι μέσον, ἐν ᾧ οὐδὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν οὐδὲ τὸ κακὸν ἔσται, ὥσπερ τι διάφραγμα διεῖργον ἐξ ἀλλήλων ἀμφότερα. Καὶ οὐκέτι δύο, ἀλλὰ τρεῖς ἀρχαὶ ἔσονται. Ἀνάγκη δὲ καὶ τούτων τὸ ἕτερον ἢ εἰρηνεύειν, ὅπερ τὸ κακὸν οὐ δύναται (τὸ γὰρ εἰρηνεῦον οὐ κακόν), ἢ μάχεσθαι, ὅπερ τὸ ἀγαθὸν οὐ δύναται (τὸ γὰρ μαχόμενον οὐ τελέως ἀγαθόν), ἢ τὸ μὲν κακὸν μάχεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν μὴ ἀντιμάχεσθαι, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τοῦ κακοῦ φθείρεσθαι, ἢ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ κακοῦσθαι, ὅπερ οὐ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ γνώρισμα. Μία τοίνυν ἀρχὴ ἀγαθὴ πάσης κακίας ἀπηλλαγμένη. Ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο, φασί, πόθεν τὸ κακόν; Ἀμήχανον γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ κακὸν ἔχειν τὴν γένεσιν. Φαμὲν οὖν, ὅτι τὸ κακὸν οὐδὲν ἕτερόν ἐστιν εἰ μὴ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ στέρησις καὶ ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν εἰς τὸ παρὰ φύσιν πα ρατροπή· οὐδὲν γὰρ κακὸν κατὰ φύσιν. Πάντα γάρ, ὅσα ἐποίησεν ὁ θεός, καλὰ λίαν, καθὸ γέγονεν. Οὕτω τοίνυν μένοντα, καθὼς ἔκτισται, καλὰ λίαν εἰσίν, ἑκουσίως δὲ ἀποφοιτῶντα ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ εἰς τὸ παρὰ φύσιν ἐρχόμενα, ἐν τῷ κακῷ γίνονται. Κατὰ φύσιν μὲν οὖν πάντα δοῦλα καὶ ὑπήκοα τοῦ δημιουργοῦ. Ὅταν οὖν ἑκουσίως τι τῶν κτισμάτων ἀφηνιάσῃ καὶ παρήκοον τοῦ ποιήσαντος αὐτὸ γένηται, ἐν ἑαυτῷ συνεστήσατο τὴν κακίαν· κακία γὰρ οὐκ οὐσία τίς ἐστιν οὐδὲ οὐσίας ἰδίωμα, ἀλλὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἤτοι ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν εἰς τὸ παρὰ φύσιν ἑκούσιος παρατροπή, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ἁμαρτία. Πόθεν οὖν ἡ ἁμαρτία; -Τῆς αὐτεξουσίου γνώμης τοῦ διαβόλου εὕρημα. -Κακὸς οὖν ὁ διάβολος; -Καθὸ μὲν γέγονεν, οὐ κακός, ἀλλ' ἀγαθός· ἄγγελος γὰρ λαμπρὸς καὶ φωτεινὸς ὑπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ ἔκτισται, αὐτεξούσιος ὡς λογικός, ἑκουσίως τε τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἀρετῆς ἀπεφοίτησε καὶ ἐν τῷ ζόφῳ τῆς κακίας γέγονε, θεοῦ μακρυνθεὶς τοῦ μόνου ἀγαθοῦ καὶ φωτοποιοῦ· ἐξ αὐτοῦ γὰρ πᾶν ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθύνεται, καὶ καθόσον ἐξ αὐτοῦ μακρύνεται γνώμῃ (οὐ γὰρ τόπῳ), ἐν τῷ κακῷ γέγονεν.

94 Τίνος ἕνεκεν προγινώσκων ὁ θεὸς τοὺς ἁμαρτάνειν καὶ μὴ μετανοεῖν

μέλλοντας ἔκτισεν Ὁ θεὸς δι' ἀγαθότητα ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι παράγει τὰ γινόμενα καὶ τῶν ἐσομένων προγνώστης ἐστίν. Εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ ἔμελλον ἔσεσθαι, οὐδ' ἂν κακοὶ ἔμελλον ἔσεσθαι οὐδ' ἂν προεγινώσκοντο. Τῶν γὰρ ὄντων αἱ γνώσεις, καὶ τῶν πάντως ἐσομένων αἱ προγνώσεις· πρῶτον γὰρ τὸ εἶναι, καὶ τότε τὸ καλὸν ἢ κακὸν εἶναι. Εἰ δὲ μέλλοντας ἔσεσθαι διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ ἀγαθότητα τὸ κακοὺς ἐξ οἰκείας προαιρέσεως μέλλειν ἔσεσθαι ἐκώλυσεν αὐτοὺς γενέσθαι, τὸ κακὸν ἐνίκα ἂν τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ ἀγαθότητα. Ποιεῖ τοιγαροῦν ὁ θεὸς ἀγαθὰ ἅπαντα, ἃ ποιεῖ· ἕκαστος δὲ ἐξ οἰκείας προαιρέσεως καλός τε καὶ κακὸς γίνεται. Εἰ καὶ τοίνυν ἔφη ὁ κύριος· «Συνέφερε τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐκείνῳ, εἰ οὐκ ἐγεννήθη», οὐ τὴν οἰκείαν κτίσιν κακίζων ἔλεγεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐξ οἰκείας προαιρέσεως καὶ ῥαθυμίας ἐπιγενομένην τῷ κτίσματι αὐτοῦ κακίαν. Ἡ γὰρ τῆς οἰκείας γνώμης ῥαθυμία ἄχρηστον αὐτῷ τὴν τοῦ