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93

17. So, the Emperor Michael had not, in truth, been occupied with wars and battles until then, but nevertheless he had both a weighty mind and a noble spirit and not the least zeal for the suffering Romans, and in his eagerness, as those who know say, he was bursting. And when the occasion then presented itself, calling him to campaign in the east, he was ready at once. And at the same time his father and emperor commanded it, and he himself showed no ignoble eagerness. Therefore, at the beginning of spring, around the time of the Paschal days, he set out, leading a large barbarian force of Alans, and expecting to meet up with a not inconsiderable Roman force as well, partly already gathered from here, and partly wintering on campaign 311 there. So he set out with greater hopes, as it was possible for many to perceive, and quickly arrived at the eastern regions, and having encamped at Magnesia on the Hermus, from there he drew up his forces against the enemy, as if to fight at once should they appear anywhere. For the time being, however, he also sent out detachments, and attacking in companies they took captives, and our men were revelling in the spoils of the enemy. But to invade openly was not safe for them, as the enemy were using their fortifications, nor did the enemy provide the opportunity, having been checked once and for all by the emperor's reputation and having taken refuge in the most rugged of the mountains. But the emperor was seeking an opportunity that would lead them to daring, so that they would both emerge from their recesses and be willing to attack. And scarcely had it arrived, (18) when indeed the enemy at the same time gathered against him, and having been marshalled into an infinite multitude, they took courage and advanced against the emperor’s own retinue with great and weighty spirit. And when it was announced to the emperor that the enemy had gathered in a multitude and that, not yet daring to attack, they were remaining, hesitating to fight, he formed a plan not to await their advance, but to advance on them himself and fall upon them while they were not yet daring to engage, so that by at once striking them with terror and at the same time giving themselves the 312 reputation of being confident, they might achieve something noble. These things he said, and with difficulty he persuaded the commanders under him. For the Alanic force was still at its peak, and they were hopeful of success, and they were more eager than they were able. On the other hand, the Roman force was also large, and this too, no less, was spurred on to action, being commanded by a young emperor. And there was hope for the onlookers of great successes and of being beyond all failure. Since, therefore, the emperor was thus eager and the army was eager with him, and now setting out they advanced, employing a greater and ever fresh spirit once and for all, and were already not near but among the enemy themselves and were about to attack, at once, as the saying goes, "the potsherd having turned," the commanders hesitated from fear and became suspicious, not fearing the enemy, as they said, but supposedly being concerned for the emperor. For to be left alone in battle was not so terrible for them, but for the state of affairs to be risked with the emperor was exceedingly difficult. For the hopes of success were neither firmly fixed nor secure, but they might even now be defeated. For there was a multitude also among the 313 enemy, experienced in battle, and they would not have dared to advance openly otherwise, if they did not hope for great things. And the emperor's reputation had also become well known to them, on account of which it was more likely that one of two things would happen: either that they would retreat out of fear from weakness, or that they would appear confident from the greatest hope. Which should be feared more when advancing with the emperor and not alone by themselves. Saying these things, they themselves completely abandoned their impulse, and they also bent the emperor's impulses, and at the same time a second after the first and a third after him and so on, speaking of fears and conjuring up terrible suspicions, they persuaded him to turn back, since it seemed safe neither to attack with the emperor, nor to brave the war alone by themselves; for they considered everything secondary to keeping both the emperor and so great an army in safety. Therefore, even though he did not wish it, the emperor became of their counsel, and an army so provided with multitude and equipment turned back, having accomplished nothing. Not

93

17. Ὁ μὲν οὖν βασιλεὺς Μιχαὴλ ταῖς ἀληθείαις μὲν πο λέμοις οὐκ ἐσχολάκει καὶ μάχαις ἐς τότε, ὅμως δ' εἶχε καὶ φρό νημα ἐμβριθὲς καὶ λῆμα γενναῖον καὶ ζῆλον ὑπὲρ τῶν κακουμέ νων Ῥωμαίων οὐχ ἥκιστα, καὶ ταῖς προθυμίαις, ὡς τοὺς εἰδό τας λέγειν, ἐσφάδαζεν. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ καιρὸς ἐφειστήκει ὁ τότε κα λῶν αὐτὸν στρατεύειν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνατολῆς, ἕτοιμος ἦν αὐτίκα. καὶ ἅμ' ὁ πατὴρ καὶ βασιλεὺς προσέταττε, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐδίδου τὰς προθυμίας οὐκ ἀγεννεῖς. ἅμα γοῦν ἦρι περί που τὰς Πασχα λίους ἡμέρας ἐξώρμα, πολὺ μὲν βαρβαρικὸν ἐκ τῶν Ἀλανῶν ἐπαγόμενος, οὐκ ὀλίγῳ δὲ καὶ Ῥωμαϊκῷ ἐντυχεῖν ἐλπίζων, τῷ μὲν καὶ συνειλεγμένῳ ἐντεῦθεν ἤδη, τῷ δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκεῖ στρα 311 τείαν διάγοντι. ἐξῄει μὲν οὖν ἐν ἐλπίσι μείζοσιν, ὡς ἐννοεῖν πολ λοὺς ἦν, καὶ διὰ ταχέων τοῖς τῆς ἀνατολῆς ἐφίστατο μέρεσι, Μαγνησίᾳ δὲ τῇ κατὰ τὸν Ἕρμον προσοικήσας ἐκεῖθεν κατὰ τῶν ἐχθρῶν συνέταττε τὰς δυνάμεις ὡς πολεμησειούσας αὐτίκα ἤν που φανεῖεν. τέως δέ γε καὶ ἀποστολὰς ἐποιεῖτο, καὶ προσβάλ λοντες κατὰ λόχους ᾐχμαλώτιζον, καὶ σκύλοις τῶν πολεμίων οἱ ἡμέτεροι ἐνετρύφων. τὸ δὲ προφανῶς εἰσβαλεῖν οὔτ' αὐτοῖς ἦν ἀσφαλές, χρωμένων τοῖς ὀχυρώμασι τῶν ἐχθρῶν, οὔτ' ἐκεῖνοι παρεῖχον, ἅπαξ κατὰ φήμην τὴν βασιλέως ἀνασταλέντες καί γε τοῖς ἐρυμνοτάτοις τῶν ὀρέων ἐνδύντες. βασιλεὺς δὲ καιρὸν ἐζή τει τὸν εἰς τόλμην σφᾶς ἐπάξοντα, ὥστε καὶ τῶν μυχῶν ἀνακύ ψαι καὶ προσβαλεῖν ἐθέλειν. καὶ μόλις ἐφειστήκει, (18) ὅτε δὴ καὶ ἅμα κατ' αὐτὸν οἱ πολέμιοι γεγονότες, καὶ συνταχθέντες εἰς πλῆθος ἄπειρον, ἐθάρρουν καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς περὶ τὸν βασιλέα σὺν μεγάλῳ καὶ ἐμβριθεῖ ἐπιέναι φρονήματι. ἀγγελθὲν δὲ βασιλεῖ ὅτι τε κατὰ πλῆθος συνέστησαν οἱ πολέμιοι καὶ ὅτι μήπω θαρροῦντες προσβάλλειν γνωσιμαχοῦντες μένουσι, βουλὴν βου λεύεται ἐφ' ᾧ μὴ ἀναμένειν τοὺς ἐπιόντας, ἀλλ' αὐτοὺς ἐπιέναι σφίσι καὶ ἐμπεσεῖν μή πω θαρροῦσι τὴν συμπλοκήν, ὡς ἂν ἅμα μὲν καταπλήξαντες ἅμα δὲ καὶ τὴν τῶν θαρρούντων ἑαυτοῖς 312 ὑπόνοιαν θέμενοι πράξωσί τι γενναῖον. ταῦτ' ἔλεγε, καὶ μόλις τοὺς ὑφ' ἑαυτῷ ἡγεμόνας ἔπειθε. καὶ γὰρ ἔτι ἦν καὶ τὸ Ἀλανι κὸν ἀκμάζον, καὶ ἐν ἐλπίσι τοῦ εὖ σχήσειν ἦσαν, καὶ προεθυ μοῦντο μεῖζον ἢ ὥστε δύνασθαι. ἑτέρωθεν δὲ καὶ τὸ Ῥωμαϊκὸν πολὺ ἦν, καὶ οὐχ ἧττον καὶ τοῦτο τὰς ὁρμὰς παρεθήγετο ὑπὸ νέῳ βασιλεῖ στρατηγούμενον. καὶ ἦν ἐλπὶς τοῖς ὁρῶσι μεγάλων κατορθωμάτων καὶ παντὸς ἐπέκεινα σφάλματος. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν οὕτω βασιλεὺς μὲν ὥρμα στρατὸς δὲ ξυνώρμα, καὶ ἤδη ἐξιόντες προσέβαλλον μείζονι καὶ αἰεὶ νέῳ καθάπαξ τῷ λήματι χρώμενοι, καὶ ἤδη οὐ παρ' αὐτοῖς ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτοῖς ἦσαν τοῖς πολεμίοις καὶ προσβαλεῖν ἔμελλον, αὐτίκα, ὀστράκου φασὶ μεταπεσόντος, γνω σιμαχοῦσιν ἐκ δέους οἱ ἡγεμόνες καὶ ἐν ὑπονοίαις ἐγένοντο, οὐ δεδιότες ἐχθρούς, ὡς ἔφασκον, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ βασιλέως φροντίζον τες δῆθεν. αὐτοὺς μὲν γὰρ καὶ μόνους λειφθῆναι μάχης οὐ τόσον δεινόν, βασιλεῖ δὲ συγκινδυνεύειν τὰ πράγματα καὶ λίαν παγχά λεπον εἶναι. μηδὲ γὰρ ἀραρότως καὶ ἀσφαλῶς τῶν ἐλπίδων πε ριγενέσθαι, ἀλλ' ἤδη καὶ ἡττηθῆναι. πλῆθος γὰρ κἀν τοῖς 313 ἐναντίοις εἶναι καὶ μάχης ἔμπειρον, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως θαρρῆσαν φανεροὺς ἐπιέναι, εἴπερ οὐκ ἤλπιζον τὰ μεγάλα. ἀνάπυστον δὲ καὶ τὴν βασιλέως φήμην σφίσι γεγενῆσθαι, δι' ἣν καὶ μᾶλλον ἓν δυοῖν εἰκὸς εἶναι ξυμβῆναι, ἢ φοβηθέντας ἐξ ἀσθενείας ἀναχω ρεῖν ἢ θαρροῦντας ἐξ ἐλπίδος μεγίστης φαίνεσθαι. ὃ καὶ φοβη τέον ἂν μᾶλλον εἶναι σὺν βασιλεῖ καὶ μὴ μόνοις καθ' αὑτοὺς ἐπιοῦσι. ταῦτα λέγοντες αὐτοὶ μὲν τῆς ὁρμῆς καθυφίεσαν πάντῃ, ὑπέκλων δὲ καὶ τὰς τοῦ βασιλέως ὁρμάς, καὶ ἅμα δεύτερος ἐπὶ πρώτῳ καὶ τρίτος ἐπὶ τούτῳ καὶ ἐφεξῆς, φόβους λέγοντες καὶ ὑπονοίας εἰδωλοποιούμενοι φοβεράς, ὑποστρέφειν ἔπειθον, ὡς μήτε σὺν βασιλεῖ προσβάλλειν φαινόμενον ἀσφαλές, μήτ' αὐ τούς γε μόνους καταθαρρεῖν τὸν πόλεμον· πάντα γὰρ δεύτερα ἐλογίζοντο τοῦ βασιλέα τε καὶ στρατὸν τόσον ἐν ἀσφαλεῖ γε περι ποιήσασθαι. γίνεται τοιγαροῦν καὶ μὴ θέλων ὁ βασιλεὺς τῆς ἐκείνων βουλῆς, καὶ στρατὸς οὕτως ἔχων πλήθους τε καὶ παρα σκευῆς μηδέν τι πράξας ὑπέστρεφεν. οὐ