there is no demonstration concerning any of the divine things, and his entire struggle tends toward no end at all. For if this becomes perfectly clear, if nothing else, at least because of not wanting to speak idly he will refrain from the objection; and it will be perfectly clear as soon as we learn from him for what reason he stripped for this contest, and this should appear to be useless.

He himself says, therefore, in his preface and in his arguments against us that, "it is necessary now to say to what my arguments concerning these things tend; I considered how it would be possible in a single argument to refute all and to show to be sophisms the syllogisms made by the Latins. I saw, therefore, that it was possible to achieve this if one were able to show these to be neither dialectical nor demonstrative; but to show them not to be dialectical was very easy for me, by merely pointing out that the premises they take are disputed by us equally with the conclusion; but to show them not to be demonstrative was completely impossible (p. 518) if one conceded it is possible to reason demonstratively concerning divine things." Consider what you are saying, O philosopher: it was very easy for you to show all the arguments proposed syllogistically by the Latins on behalf of their own dogma have premises that are disputed equally with the conclusion, and you are anxious lest they, ceasing to call these syllogisms dialectical, should call them demonstrative and reduce you to the utmost perplexity? And is it demonstrative, or does it seem to be, a syllogism that has disputed premises, and these equally so with the conclusion?

Who of those brought up with literary education, or even of those moderately attached to it, would ever say this? For you showed, as you yourself say there, that all their syllogisms were sophisms; then you are afraid lest they should say that the ones proven to be sophistic are demonstrative? And is it possible for the sophistic to be demonstrative at all? You have suffered something of the same sort, my good man, as if someone, with the sun and moon being under the earth, were to say that those above the earth pass this part of time in deep darkness, as being deprived also of the light of the moon, and then were afraid lest they should say that this is the steady light of day and thus prove him to be lying; for a syllogism shown not to be dialectical, it is possible to suppose it is demonstrative, as being better than this, but as being worse than the dialectical, it is among the impossibilities for anyone ever to think this to be demonstrative, just as it is possible to suppose air brighter than a full-moon night is day, but not air that is darker.

You ought, therefore, to have said this to them and been rid of the business; but you, having refuted them for deducing falsehoods from things no less obscure, or rather clearly false, then, having feared lest they might seem to have deduced demonstratively from falsehoods, (p. 518) you came to the necessity of saying that there is no demonstration at all concerning divine things, and of vehemently contradicting us when we say that some divine things are so manifest according to the traditions of the fathers, that there is of them both contact and demonstration and knowledge, but also beyond the intellect that sees intellectually and beyond the one who has transcended even the intellectual activities themselves and who, by a cessation of every perceptive power, is super-united by ineffable grace to the incomprehensible things.

It follows, therefore, from what the philosopher by force, as he himself says, but nevertheless submitted to, that all the syllogisms spoken against him by the Latins are irreproachable; for, according to him, the patristic traditions agree with these. It seems, therefore, that he condemns himself as not having been able to refute these. For if, being able, he knew this, how would he have feared lest they should call the sophistic ones demonstrative, one of the outsiders would say; but I would not say this; rather, indeed, I am also annoyed that the beauty

οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις ἐπ᾿ οὐδενός τῶν θείων, καί ὁ πᾶς ἀγών αὐτῷ πρός οὐδέν ὅλως τείνει τέλος. Ἄν γάρ τοῦτο γένηται κατάδηλον, εἰ μηδέν ἄλλο, διά γοῦν τό μή θέλειν ματαιολογεῖν ἀφέξεται τῆς ἐνστάσεως˙ ἔσται δέ κατάδηλον εὐθύς ἄν παρ᾿ ἐκείνου μάθωμεν οὗπερ ἕνεκα πρός τήν ἀγωνίαν ἀπεδύσατο ταύτην, καί τοῦτ᾿ ἀχρεῖον ὄν φανῇ.

Φησί τοίνυν αὐτός ἐν τῇ προθεωρίᾳ κἀν τοῖς πρός ἡμᾶς λόγοις ὡς, «δεῖ νῦν εἰπεῖν πρός τί μοι τείνουσιν οἱ περί τούτων λόγοι˙ ἐσκεψάμην πῶς ἄν εἴη ἑνί λόγῳ ἅπαντας ἀνασκευάσαι καί δεῖξαι σοφίσματα τούς ὑπό Λατίνων γινομένους συλλογισμούς. Ἑώρων οὖν δυνατόν ὄν τούτου τυχεῖν εἴ τις οἷος τ᾿ εἴη δεῖξαι τούτους μήτε διαλεκτικούς ὄντας μήτε ἀποδεικτικούς˙ ἀλλά τό μέν μή εἶναι αὐτούς διαλεκτικούς προχειρότατον ἦν μοι δεῖξαι, δηλώσαντι μόνον ὡς ἅ λαμβάνουσιν ἐπίσης ἡμῖν ἀμφισβητεῖται τῷ συμπεράσματι˙ τό δέ μή εἶναι ἀποδεικτικούς ἀδύνατον ὅλως ἦν δεῖξαι (σελ. 518) συγχωρήσαντι δυνατόν εἶναι ἀποδεικτικῶς ἐπί τῶν θείων συλλογίσασθαι». Σκέψαι τί λέγεις, ᾦ φιλόσοφε˙ προχειρότατον ἦν σοι δεῖξαι πάντας τούς ὑπό Λατίνων ὑπέρ τοῦ οἰκείου δόγματος συλλογιστικῶς προτεινομένους λόγουσ τάς προτάσεις ἔχοντας ἐπίσης ἀμφισβητουμένας τῷ συμπεράσματι καί ἀγωνιᾷς μή τούς συλλογισμούς τούτους ἀφέμενοι τοῦ διαλεκτικούς καλεῖν ἀποδεικτικούς προσαγορεύσωσι καί εἰς ἀπορίαν τήν ἐσχάτην περιστήσωσί σε; Καί ἔστι ἀποδεικτικόν ἤ εἶναι ἤ δοκεῖν συλλογισμόν τόν τάς προτάσεις ἀμφισβητουμένας ἔχοντα, καί ταῦτα ἐπίσης τῷ συμπεράσματι;

Τί ποτε τῶν παιδείᾳ λόγων συντεθραμμένων ἤ καί τῶν μετρίως ἡμμένων ταύτης τοῦτ᾿ εἴποι; Σοφίσματα γάρ ἔδειξας, ὡς αὐτός ἐκεῖ λέγεις, τούς συλλογισμούς αὐτῶν ὄντας ἅπαντας˙ εἶτα δέδοικας μή τούς σοφιστικούς ὄντας ἐξεληλεγμένους ἀποδεικτικούς εἶναι φῶσι; Καί ἔστι τόν σοφιστικόν ἀποδεικτικόν ὅλως εἶναι; Ταὐτόν τι πέπονθας, ὦγαθέ, ὥσπερ ἄν τις, ὑπό γῆν ἡλίου καί σελήνης ὄντων, τό τοῦ χρόνου τοῦτο μέρος ἐν βαθεῖ σκότει διανύειν ἔλεγε τούς ὑπέρ γῆν, ὡς καί τοῦ τῆς σελήνης φωτός ἐστερημένους, εἶτ᾿ ἐδεδίει μή τό σταθερόν εἶναι τοῦτο τῆς ἡμέρας φῶσι καί οὕτω ψευδόμενον ἀπελέγξωσιν αὐτόν˙ συλλογισμόν γάρ μή διαλεκτικόν μέν δεικνύμενον, ὡς τούτου κρείττονα ἔστιν ἀποδεικτικόν ὑπολαβεῖν, ὡς δέ χείρω τοῦ διαλεκτικοῦ, τῶν ἀδυνάτων οἰηθῆναί ποτέ τινα τοῦτον ἀποδεικτικόν, ὥσπερ καί ἀέρα πανσελήνου μέν νυκτός φανότερον ἔστιν ὑπολαβεῖν ἡμέραν, σκοτεινότερον δ᾿ οὐκ ἔστι.

Τοῦτο τοίνυν πρός αὐτούς εἰπόντα σε χρῆν ἀπηλλάχθαι πραγμάτων˙ σύ δ᾿ ἐκ τῶν οὐχ ἧττον ἀσαφῶν, μᾶλλον δέ σαφῶς ψευδῶν, τά ψευδῆ συναγαγόντας ἀπελέγξας, εἶτα φοβηθείς μή ἐκ ψευδῶν ἀποδεικτικῶς δόξωσι συναγαγεῖν, (σελ. 518) εἰς τό μηδεμίαν ἀπόδειξιν ἐπί τῶν θείων εἶναι λέγειν εἰς ἀνάγκην ἦλθες καί ἡμῖν ἀντιλέγειν ἀκρατῶς λέγουσιν ὡς τά μέν τῶν θείων οὕτως ἐστίν ἐμφανῆ κατά τάς τῶν πατέρων παραδόσεις, ὡς καί ἐπαφήν εἶναι τούτων καί ἀπόδειξιν καί ἐπιστήμην, ἀλλά καί ὑπέρ τόν νοερῶς ὁρῶντα νοῦν καί ὑπέρ τόν καί αὐτάς τάς νοεράς ἐνεργείας ὑπεραναβάντα καί κατά ἀπόπαυσιν πάσης ἀντιληπτικῆς δυνάμεως χάριτι ἀρρήτῳ ὑπερηνωμένον τοῖς ἀπερινοήτοις.

Συμβαίνει τοίνυν ἐξ ὧν ὁ φιλόσοφος βίᾳ μέν, ὡς αὐτός φησιν, ὑπέστη δ᾿ ὅμως ἀνεπιλήπτους εἶναι τούς πρός αὐτόν παρά Λατίνων εἰρημένους ἅπαντας συλλογισμούς˙ συναιροῦνται γάρ τούτοις κατ᾿ αὐτόν αἱ πατερικαί παραδόσεις. Ἔοικε τοιγαροῦν ἑαυτοῦ καταγινώσκειν ὡς μή δυνηθέντος ἀπελέγξαι τούτους. Εἰ γάρ τοῦτο δυνηθείς ἠπίστατο, πῶς ἄν ἐφοβήθη μή ἀποδεικτικούς τούς σοφιστικούς καλέσωσιν, εἶπεν ἄν τις τῶν ἀλλοτρίων˙ ἐγώ δ᾿ οὐ τοῦτο φαίην ἄν˙ μᾶλλον μέν οὖν καί ἀνιώμενος ὅτι τό κάλλος