of a discourse that has been refuted and unwillingly supports our own arguments. But if the example has been found from that very source, one ought to marvel at the manifestation of the truth and the power of the supporting argument.

But he, having nothing to charge, driven by an untimely ambition to seem to be the only one, uses the teachings from the school of vanity against us just as against the heterodox; (for envy is not accustomed to distinguish the pious from the impious), wherefore he also attempts to obscure the manifestation of the truth and thinks to escape notice, having poured around himself the blackness of his art, or rather, of his evil art. Hence, he has just now, as the first of all theologians from all time, both discovered and declared that there is no demonstration concerning any of the divine things. Why, O philosopher? But he would have said, if he were present, first mocking us for our ignorance, as he is accustomed, or rather for our slowness in learning, that "since the divine is beyond knowledge and mind and opinion, and all sensation and thought and contact and cognition, and showing this just now, flowing with my discourse like rivers, I have overwhelmed those who do not think so."

Well done; but bear with being further questioned by us slow learners, for this too is not from philosophy: "Of that, then, of which there is knowledge and intellection and opinion, imagination and sensation, is it possible for there to be a demonstration?" He would certainly have said so, since this is also present in his own discourses. Since these things have been thus previously agreed upon, listen, O philosopher, to the one who dwells far above your deluges, I mean Dionysius the Great, the hymnodist of the divine names, who says, praising wisdom itself, that "God is known both through knowledge (p. 526) and through unknowing, and of Him there is intellection and reason and knowledge and contact and sensation and opinion and imagination and name and all other things." Therefore there is also a demonstration of Him, on the one hand, according to what was previously agreed by you, for He also has all the properties of things demonstrable, and on the other hand, because of the most comprehensive statement later adduced by the saint: for he says, "of God there are also all other things," and one of all things is demonstration, so that there is also a demonstration of Him.

In addition to these, the contrary affirmations of beings, when spoken of God, are not contrary to each other, and the negations do not subvert the affirmations; for opposites, according to a single and unitive cause of identity, He at once holds beforehand and contains, and therefore, according to this argument, if concerning divine things there is not demonstration and there is, then to say that there is a demonstration of none of the divine things or of all is not true, but rather that there is of some, and there is not of others. For what does this divinely-inspired speaker say next, as he proceeds? "The divine is neither conceived, nor spoken, nor named, and is not any of the beings, nor is it known in any of the beings?" What then? In the same way there is both intellection of Him and "other things," and "He is neither conceived, nor does he come to be in any of the beings." Certainly in a different respect; this, then, is what we say, that some of the divine things are knowable and demonstrable, but others are unknowable and indemonstrable.

But you, least of all initiated into these things, as it seems, say that there is no knowledge or demonstration of any of the divine things, but only faith, and you do not even listen to the great Paul, who says to the unbelieving Greeks "that which is known of God is manifest" and that "having known God, they did not glorify or worship Him as God," nor have you experienced or believed in the true contemplation of God, which arises in the faithful who demonstrate their faith by works, which (p. 528) the Lord blesses in the gospels, you who boast greatly in faith, although it is the end of faith, or its prize, or the earnest of its prize, energized through love: for if there is only faith concerning divine things, not even this contemplation is true. But if it is true, as indeed it is

ἐξεληλεγμένον λόγων καί τοῖς ἡμετέροις ἄκοντα συνηγοροῦντα λόγοις. Εἰ δέ καί αὐτόθεν εὕρηται τό δεῖγμα, θαυμάσαι ἔδει τῆς ἀληθείας τό ἐμφανές καί τοῦ συνηγόρου λόγου τήν δύναμιν.

Ὁ δέ μηδέν ἔχων ἐγκαλεῖν ὑπό τῆς ἐπί τῷ μόνος εἶναί τει δοκεῖν ἀκαίρου φιλοτιμίας τοῖς ἐκ τοῦ διδασκαλείου τῆς ματαιότητος καί καθ᾿ ἡμῶν ὥσπερ κατά τῶν ἑτεροδόξων χρῆται˙ (διαστέλλειν γάρ τῶν δυσσεβῶν τούς εὐσεβεῖς ὁ φθόνος οὐκ εἴωθε), διό καί τό φανερόν τἀληθοῦς συσκιάζειν πειρᾶται καί λαθεῖν οἴεται, τῆς τέχνης, μᾶλλον δέ τῆς κακοτεχνίας, τό μέλαν περιχεάμενος. Ἐντεῦθεν μηδ᾿ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν ἐπ᾿ οὐδενός τῶν θείων ἄρτι πρῶτος τῶν ἐκ τοῦ παντός αἰῶνος θεολόγων καί ἐξεῦρε καί ἀπεφήνατο. ∆ιατί, ὦ φιλόσοφε; Ἀλλ᾿ εἶπεν ἄν, εἰ παρῆν, ἐπισκώψας ἡμᾶς πρότερον τῆς ἀμαθίας ἕνεκεν, ὥσπερ εἴωθε, μᾶλλον δέ τῆς δυσμαθείας, ὡς «ἐπεί τό θεῖον ὑπέρ ἐπιστήμην τέ ἐστι καί νοῦν καί δόξαν, αἴσθησίν τε πᾶσαν καί διάνοιαν καί ἐπαφήν καί γνῶσιν, καί τοῦτο δεικνύς ἔναγχος, κατά ποταμούς τῷ λόγῳ ρέων τούς μή οὕτω κατέκλυσα φρονοῦντας».

Εὖγε˙ ἀλλ᾿ ἀνάσχου προσερωτώμενος ὑπό τῶν δυσμαθῶν ἡμῶν, καί τοῦτο γάρ οὐκ ἀπό φιλοσοφίας˙ «οὗ τοίνυν ἐπιστήμη τέ ἐστι καί νόησις καί δόξα, φαντασία τε καί αἴσθησις, τούτου ἔστιν εἶναι ἀπόδειξις»; Πάνυ γε ἄν εἶπεν, ἐπεί καί τοῦτ᾿ ἔνεστι κἀν τοῖς ἐκείνου λόγοις. Ἐπειδή ταῦθ᾿ οὕτω προδιωμολόγηται, ἄκουσον, ὦ φιλόσοφε, τοῦ ὑπερανῳκισμένου τῶν σῶν κατακλυσμῶν, ∆ιονυσίου τοῦ μεγάλου λέγω, τοῦ τῶν θείων ὀνομάτων ὑμνῳδοῦ, ὅς φησι τήν αὐτοσοφίαν ἐξυμνῶν ὡς «ὁ Θεός καί διά γνώσεως (σελ. 526) γινώσκεται καί δι᾿ ἀγνωσίας, καί ἔστιν αὐτοῦ καί νόησις καί λόγος καί ἐπιστήμη καί ἐπαφή καί αἴσθησις καί δόξα καί φαντασία καί ὄνομα καί τἄλλα πάντα». Οὐκοῦν καί ἀπόδειξίς ἐστιν αὐτοῦ, τοῦτο μέν καί κατά τά σοί προδιωμολογημένα, ἔχει γάρ καί τά τῶν ἀποδεικτῶν ἅπαντα, τοῦτο δέ καί διά τόν ὕστερον ἐπενηνεγμένον τῷ ἁγίῳ συμπεριληπτικώτατον λόγον˙ «ἔστι γάρ φησι «τοῦ Θεοῦ καί τἄλλα πάντα», ἕν δέ τῶν πάντων καί ἡ ἀπόδειξις, ὥστε καί ἀπόδειξίς ἐστιν αὐτοῦ.

Πρός δέ τούτοις καί αἱ ἐναντίαι θέσεις τῶν ὄντων ἐπί Θεοῦ λεγόμεναι ἀλλήλαις οὐκ ἐναντιοῦνται καί αἱ ἀφαιρέσεις οὐκ ἀνατρέπουσι τάς θέσεις˙ τά γάρ ἀντικείμενα κατά μίαν καί ἑνικήν ταὐτότητος αἰτίαν ἅμα προέχει καί περιέχει, καί κατά τουτονί τοιγαροῦν τόν λόγον, εἰ μή ἔστιν ἐπί τῶν θείων ἀπόδειξις καί ἔστιν, ἐπ᾿ οὐδενός ἄρ᾿ εἶναι φάναι τῶν θείων ἀπόδειξιν ἤ παντός οὐκ ἀληθές, ἀλλ᾿ εἶναι μέν ἐπί τινων, οὐκ εἶναι δ᾿ ἐφ᾿ ἑτέρων. Τί γάρ ἐφεξῆς καί ὁ θεορρήμων οὗτος λέγει προϊών; «Οὔτε νοεῖται τό θεῖον, οὔτε λέγεται, οὔτε ὀνομάζεται, καί οὐκ ἔστι τι τῶν ὄντων, οὐδέ ἔν τινι τῶν ὄντων γινώσκεται; Τί οὖν; Κατά τόν αὐτόν τρόπον ἔστι τε νόησις αὐτοῦ καί «ἄλλα, καί οὔτε νοεῖται, οὔτε ἔν τινι τῶν ὄντων γινέσκεται». Πάντως καθ᾿ ἕτερον˙ τοῦτο οὖν ἐστιν, ὅ ἡμεῖς φαμεν, ὅτι τά μέν τῶν θείων γνωστά ἐστι καί ἀποδεικτά, τά δ᾿ ἄγνωστά τε καί ἀναπόδεικτα.

Σύ δ᾿ ἥκιστα μεμυημένος ταῦθ᾿ ὡς ἔοικεν οὐδενός φῄς εἶναι τῶν θείων γνῶσιν οὐδέ ἀπόδειξιν, ἀλλά πίστιν μόνην, καί οὐδέ τοῦ μεγάλου Παύλου ἀκούεις, ὅς τοῖς ἀπίστοις Ἕλλησι λέγει «φανερόν εἶναι τό γνωστόν τοῦ Θεοῦ» καί ὅτι «γνόντες τόν Θεόν, οὐχ ὡς Θεόν ἐδόξασαν ἤ ἐσεβάσθησαν», οὐδέ τήν τοῖς πιστοῖς καί ἔργῳ τήν πίστιν ἐπιδεικνυομένοις ἐγγινομένην ἀληθῆ Θεοῦ θεωρίαν, ἥν ἐν (σελ. 528) εὐαγγελίοις μακαρίζει ὁ Κύριος, ἤ πέπονθας ἤ πεπίστευκας, ὅς τῇ πίστει μεγαλαυχῶν, καίτοι τῆς πίστεως οὖσαν τέλος ἤ βραβεῖον ἤ βραβείου ἀρραβῶνα διά τῆς ἀγάπης ἐνεργούμενον˙ εἰ γάρ πίστις ἐπί τῶν θείων μόνη, οὐδ᾿ ἡ θεωρία αὕτη ἀληθής. Εἰ δ᾿ ἀληθής, ὥσπερ οὖν